






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N^o



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BOURRIENNE'S MEMOIRS OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE


EDITED BY EDGAR SANDERSON, M.A.

NAPOLÉON.—‘Well, Bourrienne, you too will be immortal

BOURRIENNE.—‘Why, General?’

NAPOLÉON.—‘Are you not my secretary?’

BOURRIENNE.—‘Tell me the name of Alexander’s.



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After the picture by Paul Delaroche.

Napoleon

MEMOIRS OF

Napoleon Bonaparte

FROM THE FRENCH OF
F. DE BOURRIENNE

*Private Secretary to Napoleon, and Minister of State under the Directory,
the Consulate, the Empire and the Restoration*

NEWLY EDITED, WITH NOTES
AND A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

London : **HUTCHINSON & CO.**
Paternoster Row   1904

PREFACE

THE present translation of the *Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte*, by M. de Bourrienne, originally published in 1836, was undertaken for the purpose of compressing into one volume the life of perhaps the most extraordinary man the world has ever produced. Bourrienne was eminently qualified to be the biographer of Napoleon; he had lived on terms of the closest intimacy with him from his boyhood, and from the official situation as private secretary which he afterwards held under him when general, consul, and emperor, he was present both at the planning and execution of many of the extraordinary deeds which so rapidly succeeded each other during that eventful period. He was able to observe the gradual development and working out of those striking and brilliant ideas which were communicated to him, in the frankness of confidential intimacy, at the moment of their birth, but which were not always matured and acted upon until a subsequent period.

He has stated that he always had in view the publication of his *Memoirs of Napoleon*, and that, from an early period, he commenced making notes and collecting documents, so as to preserve a perfect recollection of facts and impressions, 'until the time should arrive at which he might tell the truth, and the whole truth.'

No one can read his Memoirs without being convinced of the truth of the narrative, or fail afterwards in forming a perfect

estimate of the personal character of Napoleon. The only work in our own language which bears any comparison with the present in its graphic delineation of character is Boswell's *Life of Johnson*.

The original work extends to ten volumes, in which the author has confined himself, almost entirely, to the *personal* life and character of Napoleon, and has seldom given any military detail. The translator has attempted to supply this deficiency, and to connect the history by adding short abstracts, taken from various authors, of the principal military operations in which Napoleon was himself engaged ; he has also appended a concise account of his second abdication, residence at St. Helena, and death, and trusts that he has succeeded in condensing the voluminous materials which were presented to him into one connected narrative of great interest

MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

CHAPTER I

THE desire of speculating upon an illustrious name could alone have given birth to the numerous publications under the title of memoirs, of secret histories, and of rhapsodies, which have appeared about Napoleon. On reading them, we are at a loss to determine whether we ought to be most surprised at the audacity of the writers, or the good-nature of their readers. But, in fact, contemporary biography is for the most part an imposture, and the history of a great man written during his life is either a panegyric or a satire.

Posterity will not be divided in their judgment of Napoleon as his contemporaries have been. In a future age, the recollections of his splendid triumphs will have been very much weakened; but, at the same time, the evils which his sixty victories have brought upon the great European family will have been forgotten. His wars and his conquests will be estimated solely by their results; his policy, by the utility and permanency of the institutions which he created, and their harmony with the age in which he lived.

It will be asked, whether he might not have chosen a career less painfully splendid, but more marked by wisdom, than that of war; and whether he was right in preferring the renown which always accompanies great military glory, to the reputation, less brilliant but more desirable, of having powerfully contributed to the happiness of mankind.

An historian will one day arise, who will do justice to his merit : as for myself, I do not even pretend to aspire to the honour of being his biographer ; I am only about to relate all that I know of this extraordinary man, and which I believe I know well—that which I have seen and heard, and of which I have preserved numerous notes. With confidence I call him an extraordinary man—who, owing everything to himself, acquired the most absolute sway over a great and enlightened nation, obtained so many victories, subdued so many states, distributed crowns to his family, made and unmade kings, and who became nearly the most ancient sovereign in Europe, and who was, without doubt, the most distinguished of his age ; such an individual cannot be called an ordinary man.

The reader must not expect to find in these Memoirs an uninterrupted series of all the events which marked the great career of Napoleon ; nor details of all the battles, with the recital of which so many eminent men have usefully and ably occupied themselves. I shall say little about whatever I did not see or hear myself, and which is not supported by official documents.

Napoleon Bonaparte was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th of August, 1769. The name was originally written Buonaparte ; but during the first campaign in Italy he dropped the *u*, merely to render the spelling conformable with the pronunciation, and to abridge his signature. It has been said, that he suppressed a year in his age, and that he was born in 1768 ; but this is untrue. He always told me that the 15th of August, 1769, was his birth-day ; and as I was born on the 9th of July in that year, our proximity of age seemed to strengthen our union and friendship when at the military school of Brienne.

Napoleon was the second son of Charles Marie de Buonaparte, a noble, deputy of the noblesse of Corsica, and Lætitia Ramolino, his wife ; there were five brothers, Joseph, Napoleon, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome ; and three sisters, Eliza, Caroline, and Pauline. Five others must have died in infancy, for we are informed that his mother had thirteen children, and became a widow at the age of thirty.*

Bonaparte was undoubtedly a man of good family. I have

* Bonaparte ever, in after life, acknowledged, with gratitude, the obligations he was under to his mother, and expressed his belief that he owed his subsequent elevation principally to her early lessons ; and, indeed, laid it down as a maxim, that the future ' good or bad conduct of a child depends entirely on the mother.'

seen an authentic account of his genealogy, which he obtained from Tuscany. A great deal has been written about the civil dissensions which forced his family to leave Italy and take refuge in Corsica. On this subject I have nothing to state. His father was poor, and he himself received his education at the public expense, an advantage of which many honourable families availed themselves. A memorial, addressed by his father, Charles Buonaparte, to M. de Segur, then Minister of War, states, that his fortune had been reduced by an attempt to drain the salt marshes, and by the injustice of the Jesuits, by whom he had been deprived of his inheritance. The object of this memorial was, to solicit a sub-lieutenant's commission for Napoleon, who was then fourteen years of age ; and to get Lucien, his third son, admitted a king's scholar at the military college of Brienne. The answer returned by the minister to this memorial was 'That his request was inadmissible so long as his second son remained at the military school in Brienne. Two brothers cannot be placed at the same time in the military schools.' When Napoleon had completed his fifteenth year, he was sent to Paris, until he should attain the requisite age for entering the army.

Much has been said, and in an opposite spirit, of Bonaparte's boyhood ; he has been described in terms of enthusiastic praise and the most ridiculous condemnation. This will always be the case with those individuals, whom genius or other favourable circumstances have elevated above their fellow-men. It is absurd to endeavour to find in an infant the germ of great crimes, or of eminent virtues. He used to laugh heartily at those tales which bedecked him with virtues or loaded him with crimes, just as their authors were actuated by admiration or hatred. I recollect, however, an anecdote which has been given to the public with various modifications, and which has become familiar to most readers.

During the winter of 1783-4, so memorable for the heavy falls of snow, which blocked up the roads and covered the country to a depth of six or eight feet, Napoleon was greatly at a loss for those out-door amusements and retired walks in which he used to take so much delight. During play-hours he had no alternative but to mix with the crowd of his school-fellows, and to walk with them up and down the area of an immense hall. To relieve himself from this monotonous parade he contrived to stir up the whole school to amuse themselves in a different manner, by forming passages through the snow

in the great court-yard, and erecting horn-works, sinking trenches, raising parapets, etc. 'Our works being completed,' said he, 'we can divide ourselves into parties, enact a species of siege, and I, as the inventor of this new amusement, undertake to direct the attack.' The proposal was joyfully acceded to by his school-fellows, and immediately put into execution. This mimic combat was carried on during a period of fifteen days, and did not cease until, by gravel and small stones having got mixed with the snow which formed our bullets, many of the students, besiegers as well as besieged, were severely wounded. I recollect that I myself was a considerable sufferer from this kind of shot.

Bonaparte and I were nine years old when our friendship commenced. We soon became very intimate, for there was a certain sympathy of heart between us. I enjoyed this intimacy and friendship without interruption until 1784, when he was transferred from the military school at Brienne to that of Paris. I was one of those youthful companions who could best accommodate themselves to his stern and severe character. His natural reserve, his disposition to meditate on the subjugation of Corsica, and the impressions which he had received in his youth respecting the misfortunes of his country, and of his family, led him to seek solitude, and rendered his general demeanour somewhat disagreeable; but this was more in appearance than in reality. Our equality of age placed us together in the classes of languages and mathematics. His ardent desire to acquire knowledge was remarkable from the very commencement of his studies. When he first came to the college he only spoke the Corsican dialect, from which circumstance he already excited a lively interest. The *Sieur Dupuis*, then vice-principal, a gentleman of polished manners and an excellent grammarian, undertook to give him lessons in the French language. His pupil repaid his care so well, that in a very short time he had also learned the first rudiments of Latin. But to this language he had such an aversion, that in his fifteenth year he was still in the fourth class. In the Latin I left him very speedily; but I could never get before him in the mathematical class, in which, in my opinion, he was, beyond dispute, the ablest in the whole school. I used sometimes to help him with his Latin themes and versions; and in return he assisted me in the solution of problems, which he demonstrated with a readiness and facility that perfectly astonished me—but to themes and translations he had a great aversion.

At Brienne, Bonaparte was remarkable for the dark colour of his complexion, which the climate of France afterwards very much changed, as well as for his piercing and scrutinizing glance, and for the style of his conversation both with his masters and companions. His conversation almost always bore the appearance of ill-humour, and he was certainly not very sociable. This I think may be attributed to the misfortunes of his family during his childhood, and the impressions made on his mind by the subjugation of his country.

The students were invited by turns to dine with Father Berton, the principal of the school. One day, it being Bonaparte's turn to enjoy this indulgence, some of the professors who were at table, knowing his admiration for Paoli, purposely spoke disrespectfully of him. 'Paoli,' Bonaparte replied, 'was a great man ; he loved his country ; and I never shall forgive my father, who was his adjutant, for consenting to the union of Corsica with France. He ought to have followed Paoli's fortunes, and to have fallen with him.'

Generally speaking, Bonaparte was not liked by his companions, and they certainly did not flatter him. He associated but little with them, and rarely took part in their amusements. The submission of his country to France seemed to disturb his mind, and led him to keep away from the boisterous exercises of his school-fellows. I, however, was almost always with him. During play-hours he withdrew to the library, where he read with great eagerness books of history, particularly Polybius and Plutarch. He ran over Arrian with great delight, but had little taste for Quintus Curtius. I have often left him in the library to join the sports of my companions.

The temper of the young Corsican was not improved by the railleries of the students, who were fond of ridiculing his name, Napoleon, and his country. He has often said to me, 'I will do these French all the mischief in my power : ' and when I have endeavoured to pacify him, he would say—' But you never insult me ; you love me.'

Father Patrauld, our mathematical professor, was much attached to Bonaparte, and he had great reason to be proud of him as a pupil. The other professors, in whose classes he was not distinguished, took little notice of him. He had no taste for the study of languages, polite literature, or the fine arts ; and as there were no indications of his ever becoming a scholar, the pedants of the establishment were inclined to consider him stupid. It has often been reported that he received a careful education

at Brienne ; but this is untrue, for at that time the monks were incapable of giving it. I must confess, that the extended information of the present day is, to me, a painful contrast with the limited education I received at the military college. I am only surprised that the establishment should have produced a single able man.

Though Bonaparte had seldom reason to speak well of his fellow-students, yet he was above complaining against them ; and when in his turn he had to see to the performance of any duty which they neglected, he preferred to go into confinement himself than to denounce the culprits.

Bonaparte, during his life, has performed a sufficiency of great actions to render it unnecessary to dilate upon the pretended wonders of his boyhood. I should be unjust were I to say that he was an ordinary boy ; I have never considered him as such. I am bound to declare, on the contrary, that amidst a crowd of competitors he was a very distinguished scholar.

I have read in some biographical account of him, that when about fourteen years of age he happened to be at a party where some one eulogized Turenne, and a lady observed that he certainly was a great man, but that she would have liked him better had he not burned the Palatinate. 'What signifies that,' said he, 'if the burning was necessary to the object he had in view ?' This may be very pretty, but it is a mere fiction. Bonaparte was fourteen in 1783 ; he was then at Brienne, where we saw no company, and least of all the company of ladies.

Bonaparte was fifteen years and two months old when he went to the military college of Paris. I accompanied him in a chaise to Nogent-sur-Seine ; and we parted with mutual regret. We did not again meet until 1792. We continued our correspondence during these eight years, but so little did I anticipate the high destinies, which, after his elevation, it has been said his youth indicated, that I have not kept one of the letters which he wrote me during this period. I destroyed the whole so soon as they were answered. I only recollect that, in a letter which he wrote to me about a year after his arrival in Paris, he called upon me to fulfil a promise which I had made at Brienne to enter the army with him. Like him and with him I had passed through a course of study necessary for the service of the artillery : and I had even gone, in 1787, for three months to Metz, in order to join practice to theory. But a strange ordinance, issued in 1778, by M. de Segur, required, as a proof of the necessary talent, that aspirants for the honour of serving their

king and country should have at least four quarters of nobility on their escutcheons. My mother, who had been told that we had at least a dozen, immediately set off for Paris to find a M. d'Ogny, of the Heralds' office, to whom she presented the letters patent of her husband, who had died six weeks before I was born. She shewed that Louis XIII. had, in 1640, granted a patent of nobility to Fauvelet de Villemont, who, in 1586, had kept several districts in Burgundy in obedience to the king, at the peril of his life and to the ruin of his fortune; and that his family had filled the first places in the magistracy, downwards from the fourteenth century. All was correct; but it was observed that the patent of nobility had not been duly registered by the parliament; and to remedy this omission, they demanded a fee of twelve thousand francs. This my mother refused to pay, and there the matter rested.

On his arrival at the military school of Paris, he found the whole establishment on so brilliant and expensive a footing, that he immediately addressed a memorial on the subject to the Vice-principal Berton. He shewed that the system of education was pernicious, and far from being calculated to fulfil the object which every wise government must have in view. He complained that the mode of life was too expensive and delicate for 'poor gentlemen,' and could not prepare them for returning to their modest homes, or for the hardships of the camp. Instead of the numerous attendants by whom they were surrounded, their dinners of two courses, and their horses and grooms, he suggested that they should be obliged to perform the little necessary services for themselves, such as brushing their clothes, etc., and that they should eat the coarse bread made for soldiers. Temperance and sobriety, he added, would render them robust, and enable them to bear the severity of the seasons, to brave the fatigues of war, and to inspire the respect and obedience of the soldiers under their command. Thus reasoned Napoleon at the age of sixteen, and time shewed that he never departed from these principles. The establishment of the military school at Fontainebleau is a positive proof of this.

Napoleon, being of a restless and observing disposition, speaking his opinion openly and with energy, did not remain long at the military school of Paris. His superiors, annoyed by the decision of his character, hastened the period of his examination, and he obtained the first vacant sub-lieutenancy in a regiment of artillery. As for myself, I left Brienne in 1787, and as I could not enter the artillery, from the circumstance above stated, I proceeded in

the following year to Vienna, with a letter of recommendation to M. de Montmorin, soliciting employment in the French embassy, then at the Court of Austria. After having been initiated in the first steps of diplomacy, I was advised by M. de Noailles to go to one of the German universities, to study the law of nations and foreign languages. I accordingly repaired to Leipsic.

I had scarcely got there when the French revolution broke out. Alas ! the reasonable reforms which the age demanded, and which liberal and right-thinking men desired, were very different from that total overthrow and destruction of the state which followed, and the long series of crimes which darken the pages of French history.

In the month of April, 1792, I returned to Paris, where I again met Bonaparte, and renewed the friendship of our youthful days. I had not been fortunate, and adversity pressed heavily upon him ; his resources frequently failed him. We passed our time as two young men of three-and-twenty may be supposed to have done, who had little money, and less occupation. He was worse off in this respect than myself ; we started some new project every day, and were on the lookout for some profitable speculation, but everything failed us. At this time he was soliciting employment from the minister of war, and I at the office for foreign affairs. I was, for the moment, the most fortunate of the two.

While we were thus spending our time in an unprofitable manner, the 20th of June arrived—a sad prelude to the 10th of August. We met, by appointment, at a restaurateur's, in the Rue St. Honoré, near the Palais-Royal. On going out we saw a mob approaching, in the direction of the market-place, which Bonaparte estimated at from five to six thousand men. They were a parcel of blackguards, armed with weapons of every description, and shouting the grossest abuse, whilst they proceeded at a rapid rate towards the Tuileries. This mob appeared to consist of the vilest and most profligate of the population of the suburbs. 'Let us follow the rabble,' said Bonaparte. We got the start of them, and took up our station on the terrace, bordering the river. It was there that he was an eye-witness of the scandalous scenes that ensued ; and it would be difficult to describe the surprise and indignation which they excited in him. Such weakness and forbearance, he said, could not be excused ; but when the king shewed himself at a window which looked out upon the garden, with the red cap, which one of the mob had just placed upon his

head, he could no longer repress his indignation ; ‘What madness !’ he loudly exclaimed ; ‘how could they allow that rabble to enter ? why do they not sweep away four or five hundred of them with the cannon ? and then the rest would take themselves off very quickly.’

When we sat down to dinner, he discussed with great good sense the causes and consequences of this unrepressed insurrection. He foresaw, and developed with sagacity, all that would follow ; and in this he was not mistaken. The 10th of August soon arrived ; as for myself, I received an appointment a few days after the 20th of June, as Secretary of Legation at Stuttgart, to which city I set out on the 2nd of August, and did not again see my young and ardent friend until 1795. He told me that my departure would hasten his own for Corsica ; we separated, with feeble hopes, as it appeared at the time, of ever meeting again. It was after the fatal 10th of August, that Bonaparte visited Corsica ; he did not return until 1793.

It was during my absence from France, that Bonaparte, in the rank of *chief of battalion*, performed his first campaign, and contributed so powerfully to the taking of Toulon. Of this period of his life I have no personal knowledge, and, therefore, I shall not speak of it as an eye-witness.

To connect the narrative of Bourrienne, and to complete this interesting part of Bonaparte’s history, we give the accompanying extract from another account of his life :—

General Paoli, who had lived in England ever since the termination of that civil war in which Charles Buonaparte, the father of Napoleon, had served under his banner, was cheered, when the French revolution first broke out, with the hope that liberty was about to be restored to Corsica. He came to Paris, was received with applause as a tried friend of freedom, and appointed governor of his native island, which, for some time, he ruled wisely and happily. But as the revolution advanced, Paoli, like most other wise men, became satisfied that license was more likely to be established by its leaders, than law and rational liberty ; and avowing his aversion to the growing principles of Jacobinism, and the scenes of tumult and bloodshed to which they gave rise, he was denounced in the National Assembly as the enemy of France. An expedition was sent to deprive him of his government, under the command of La Combe, Michel, and Salicetti, one of the Corsican deputies to the Convention ; and Paoli called on his countrymen to take arms in his and their own defence.

It was at this time (1793) that Bonaparte had leave of absence from his regiment, and was in Corsica, on a visit to his mother. Paoli, who knew him well, did all he could to enlist him in his cause ; but Napoleon had satisfied himself that Corsica was too small a country to maintain independence ; and that she must fall under the rule either of France or England ; and that her interests would be best served by adhering to the former. He therefore resisted all Paoli's offers, and tendered his sword to the service of Salicetti. He was appointed provisionally to the command of a battalion of national guards ; and the first military service on which he was employed was the reduction of a small fortress, called the Torre di Capitulo, near the Ajaccio. He took it ; but was soon besieged in it, and he and his garrison, after a gallant defence, and living for some time on horse-flesh, were glad to evacuate the tower, and escape to the sea. The English government now began to reinforce Paoli, and the cause of the French party seemed to be, for the moment, desperate. The Bonapartes were banished from Corsica ; and their mother and sisters took refuge first at Nice, and afterwards at Marseilles, where for some time they suffered all the inconveniences of exile and poverty. Napoleon rejoined his regiment. He had chosen France for his country ; and seems, in truth, to have preserved little or no affection for his native soil.

Bonaparte's first military service occurred, as we have seen, in the summer of 1793. The king of France had been put to death on the 21st of January, in that year ; and in less than a month afterwards the Convention had declared war against England. The murder of the king, alike cruel and atrocious, had in fact united the princes of Europe against the revolutionary cause, and within France itself a strong reaction took place. The people of Toulon, the great port and arsenal of France on the Mediterranean, partook of the sentiments, and invited the English and Spanish fleets off their coast to come to their assistance, and garrison their city. The allied admirals took possession accordingly of Toulon, and a motley force of English, Spanish, and Neapolitans, prepared to defend the place. In the harbour and roads there were found about twenty-five ships of the line, and the city contained immense naval and military stores of every description, so that the defection of Toulon was regarded as a calamity of the first order by the revolutionary government.

This event occurred in the midst of that period which has

received the name of the *reign of terror*. Whatever else the government wanted, vigour to repel aggressions from without was displayed in abundance. Two armies immediately marched upon Toulon; and after a series of actions, in which the passes in the hills behind the town were forced, the place was at last invested, and a memorable siege commenced.

It was conducted with little skill, first by Cartaux, a vain coxcomb, who had been a painter, and then by Doppet, an ex-physician and a coward. Cartaux had not yet been superseded when Bonaparte made his appearance at head-quarters, with a commission to assume the command of the artillery. It has been said, that he owed his appointment to the private regard of Salicetti; but the high testimonials he had received from the military academy were more likely to have served him; nor is it possible to suppose that he had been so long in the regiment of La Fere, without being appreciated by some of his superiors. However this may have been, he was received almost with insolence by Cartaux, who, strutting about in a uniform covered with gold lace, told him his assistance was not wanted; but he was welcome to partake in his glory.

It was during the siege of Toulon, that Napoleon, while constructing a battery under the enemy's fire, had occasion to prepare a despatch, and called out for someone who could use a pen. A young sergeant, named Junot, leaped out, and leaning on the breastwork, wrote as he dictated. As he finished, a shot struck the ground by his side, scattering dust in abundance over him and everything near him. 'Good,' said the soldier, laughing, 'this time we shall spare our sand.' The cool gaiety of this pleased Bonaparte; he kept his eye on the man; and Junot became afterwards marshal of France, and Duke of Abrantes.

SIEGE OF TOULON

EXTRACTED FROM THE MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON, DICTATED AT
ST. HELENA.

NAPOLEON, on his arrival, found the head-quarters at Beausset. They were busy making preparations to burn the allied squadrons in the road of Toulon; and the next day the Commandant of artillery went with the General-in-chief to visit the batteries.

What was his surprise to find a battery of six twenty-four pounders planted a quarter of a league from the passes of Ollioules, at three gun-shots from the English vessels, and two from the shore ; and all the volunteers of the Côte d'Or and the soldiers of the regiment of Burgundy occupied with heating the balls at all the *bastides* ! (country-houses). He did not conceal his astonishment.

The first care of the Commandant of the artillery was to get together a great number of officers in that department, whom the circumstances of the revolution had removed. At the end of six weeks, he was enabled to assemble, organize, and supply a park of two hundred pieces of artillery. Colonel Gassendi was placed at the head of the arsenal of constructions at Marseilles. The batteries were advanced, and placed on the most advantageous points of the shore ; and their effect was such, that some large vessels were dismasted, several smaller ones sunk, and the enemy were forced to abandon that part of the road.

The Commandant of the artillery, who for the space of a month had been carefully reconnoitring the ground, and had made himself perfectly acquainted with all its localities, proposed the plan of attack which occasioned the reduction of Toulon. He regarded all the propositions of the Committee of Fortifications as totally useless, under the circumstances of the case ; and it was his opinion, that a regular siege was not at all necessary.

In a word, he declared that it was not necessary to march against the place at all, but only to occupy the position which he had proposed ; and which was to be found at the extreme point of the promontory of Balagnier and l'Eguillette ; that he had discovered this position a month before, and had pointed it out to the General-in-chief, assuring him that if he would occupy it with three battalions, he would take Toulon in four days ; that the English had become, since he first observed it, so sensible of its importance, that they had disembarked 4000 men there, had cut down all the wood that covered the promontory of Cair, which commanded the whole position, and had employed all the resources of Toulon, even the galley-slaves, in order to intrench themselves there ; making it, as they expressed themselves, 'a little Gibraltar.' But that the point, which a month ago might have been seized and occupied without opposition, now required a serious attack ; that it would not be advisable to risk an assault, but to form batteries,

mounted with twenty-four pounders and mortars, in order to destroy the epaulements, which were constructed of wood, to break down the palisades, and throw a shower of shells into the interior of the fort ; and that then, after a vigorous fire for eight-and-forty hours, the work should be stormed by picked troops.

In conformity to the plan proposed, the French raised five or six batteries against Little Gibraltar, and constructed platforms for fifteen mortars. A battery had also been raised of eight twenty-four pounders and four mortars against Fort Malbosquet, the construction of which was a profound secret to the enemy, as the men who were employed on the work were entirely concealed from observation by a plantation of olives.

General O'Hara, who commanded the allied army at Toulon, was greatly surprised at the erection of so considerable a battery close to a fort of such importance as Malbosquet, and gave orders that a sortie should be made at break of day. The battery was situated in the centre of the left of the army ; the troops in that part consisted of about 6000 men ; occupying the line from Fort Rouge to Malbosquet, and so disposed as to prevent all individual communication, though too much scattered to make an effectual resistance in any given point.

An hour before day, General O'Hara sallied out of the garrison with 6000 men ; and, meeting with no obstacle, his skirmishers only being engaged, spiked the guns of the battery.

In the meanwhile the drums beat the *générale* at headquarters, and Dugommier with all haste rallied his troops : the Commandant of artillery posted himself on a little headland behind the battery, on which he had previously established a dépôt of arms. A communication from this point to the battery had been effected by means of a boyau which was substituted for the trench. Perceiving from this point that the enemy had formed to the right and left of the battery, he conceived the idea of leading a battalion which was stationed near him through the boyau. By this plan he succeeded in coming out unperceived among the brambles close to the battery, and immediately commenced a brisk fire upon the English, whose surprise was such, that they imagined it was their own troops on the right, who through some mistake were firing on those on the left. General O'Hara hastened towards the French to rectify the supposed mistake, when he was wounded in the hand by a musket-ball, and a sergeant seized and dragged him prisoner into the boyau ; the disappearance of the English general was

so sudden, that his own troops did not know what had become of him.

In the meantime, Dugommier, with the troops he had rallied, placed himself between the town and the battery : this movement disconcerted the enemy, who forthwith commenced their retreat. They were hotly pursued as far as the gates of the fortress, which they entered in the greatest disorder and without being able to ascertain the fate of their general. Dugommier was slightly wounded in this affair. A battalion of volunteers from the Isere distinguished itself during the day.

Dugommier determined that a decisive attack should be made upon Little Gibraltar : the Commandant of the artillery accordingly threw 7 or 8,000 shells into the fort, while thirty twenty-four pounders battered the works.

On the 18th of December, at four in the afternoon, the troops left their camps, and marched towards the village of Seine : the plan was to attack at midnight, in order to avoid the fire of the fort and the intermediate redoubts. At length, after a most furious attack, Dugommier, who according to his usual custom headed the leading column, was obliged to give way ; and in the utmost despair he cried out, 'I am a lost man.' Success was indeed every way important in those days, for the want of it usually conducted the unfortunate general to the scaffold.

The fire of the cannonading and musquetry continued. Captain Muiron of the artillery, a young man full of bravery and resources, and who was perfectly acquainted with the position, availed himself so well of the windings of the ascent, that he conducted his troops up the mountain without sustaining any loss. He debouched at the foot of the fort : he rushed through an embrasure : his soldiers followed him—and the fort was taken. The English and Spanish cannoneers were all killed at their guns, and Muiron himself was dangerously wounded by a thrust from the pike of an English soldier.

As soon as they were masters of the fort, the French immediately turned the cannon against the enemy.

At break of day the French marched on Balagnier and l'Eguillette : the enemy had already evacuated those positions. The twenty-four pounders and the mortars were brought to mount these batteries, whence they hoped to cannonade the combined fleets before noon ; but the Commandant of the artillery deemed it impossible to fix them there. They were of stone, and the engineers who had constructed them had committed an error, in placing a large tower of masonry just at their

entrance, so near the platforms that whatever balls might have struck them would have rebounded on the gunners, besides the splinters and rubbish. They therefore planted pieces of cannon on the heights behind the batteries. They could not open their fire until the next day; but no sooner did Lord Hood, the English admiral, see that the French had possessed themselves of these positions, than he made signal to weigh anchor and get out of the road.

He then went to Toulon to make it known that there was not a moment to be lost in getting out to sea directly. The weather was dark and cloudy, and everything announced the approach of the Libeccio (or south-west) wind, so terrible at this season. The council of the combined forces immediately met; and, after mature deliberation, they unanimously agreed that Toulon was no longer tenable. They accordingly proceeded to take measures as well for the embarkation of the troops, as for burning and sinking such French vessels as they could not carry away with them, and setting fire to the marine establishments; they likewise gave notice to all the inhabitants, that those who wished to leave the place might embark on board the English and Spanish fleets.

In the night, Fort Ponté was blown up by the English, and an hour afterwards a part of the French squadron was set on fire. Nine seventy-four gun ships and four frigates or corvettes became a prey to the flames.

The fire and smoke from the arsenal resembled the eruption of a volcano, and the thirteen vessels which were burning in the road were like so many magnificent displays of fireworks. The masts and forms of the vessels were distinctly marked by the blaze, which lasted many hours, and formed an unparalleled spectacle. It was a heart-rending sight to the French to see such grand resources and so much wealth consumed within so short a period. They feared, at first, that the English would blow up Fort La Malgue, but it appeared that they had not time to do so.

The Commandant of artillery then went to Malbosquet. The fort was already evacuated. He ordered the field-pieces to sweep the ramparts of the town, and heighten the confusion by throwing shells from the howitzers into the port, until the mortars, which were placed upon the road with their carriages, could be planted in the batteries, and shells thrown from them in the same direction.

During all this time the batteries of l'Eguillette and Balagnier

kept up an incessant fire on the vessels in the road. Many of the English ships were much damaged, and a great number of transports with troops on board were sunk. The batteries continued their fire all the night, and at break of day the English fleet was seen out at sea. By nine o'clock in the morning a high Libeccio wind got up, and the English ships were forced to put into the Hyères.

The news of the taking of Toulon caused a sensation in Provence and throughout France, the more lively as such success was unexpected and almost un hoped-for. From this event Napoleon's reputation commenced ; he was made Brigadier-general of artillery in consequence, and appointed to the command of that department in the Army of Italy. General Dugommier was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees.

CHAPTER II

AFTER the taking of Toulon, Bonaparte rapidly advanced in his profession. On the 13th of July, 1794, the Representatives of the People, with the Army of Italy, passed the following resolution :—‘ That General Bonaparte should proceed to Genoa, to confer, in conjunction with the Chargé d’Affaires of the French Republic, with the Genoese government, on the matters comprised in his instructions.’ To the above were added private instructions to inform himself of the state of the fortresses of Genoa and Savona, and of the neighbouring country, and to become acquainted, as far as possible, with the conduct, civil and political, of the French ambassador, Tilly ; and to collect all facts which might develop the intentions of the Genoese government relative to the coalition.

This mission and the secret instructions evince the confidence with which Bonaparte, who had not completed his twenty-fifth year, had inspired men who were deeply interested in making a prudent choice of their agents.

He proceeded to Genoa, and there fulfilled the purposes of his mission. The 9th of Thermidor arrived, and the deputies called Terrorists were superseded by Albitte and Salicetti. In the disorder which then existed, they were either ignorant of the orders given to General Bonaparte, or they were inspired by envy at the rising glory of the young general of artillery. Be this as it may, these Representatives of the People issued

an order that General Bonaparte should be arrested, suspended from his rank, and arraigned before the Committee of Public Safety ; and, extraordinary as it may appear, this resolution was founded on that very journey which Bonaparte executed by order of the Representatives of the People.

Had this decree been published three weeks sooner, and had Bonaparte been given up previously to the 9th Thermidor to the Committee of Public Safety, it is very probable that his career would have been at an end, and we should have seen perish on a scaffold, at the age of twenty-five, the man who was destined in the five-and-twenty years following to astonish the world by the vastness of his conceptions—his gigantic projects—the greatness of his military glory—his extraordinary good fortune ;—his errors—his reverses—and his final overthrow.

On being arrested he addressed a very energetic note to Albitte and Salicetti, which had the effect of causing more particular inquiry to be made ; and on the 20th of August, 1794, they issued a decree, declaring that they saw nothing to justify any suspicion of his conduct, and ordering that he should be provisionally set at liberty. He remained under arrest fifteen days.

General Bonaparte returned to Paris, where I also shortly afterwards arrived from Germany. Our intimacy was resumed, and he gave me an account of all the principal events which had passed in the campaign of the South. He loved to talk over his military achievements at Toulon. He spoke of his first successes with that feeling of pleasure and satisfaction which they naturally inspired.

The government of the day wished to send him to La Vendée, as Brigadier-general of infantry. Two reasons determined the youthful general to refuse this appointment. He considered the scene of action as unworthy of his talents, and he considered his projected removal from the artillery to the infantry as an insult. The last was that which he officially assigned for his refusal. In consequence of his refusal to accept the appointment offered him, the Committee of Public Safety decreed that he should be struck off the list of general officers in active employment.

Deeply mortified at this unexpected blow, Bonaparte returned into private life, and found himself doomed to an inactivity intolerable to his ardent temperament and youthful energy. He lodged in the Rue de Mail, in a house near the Place de

Victoires. We recommenced the life which we had led previous to his departure for Corsica, in 1792. It was with pain that he resolved to wait patiently the removal of the prejudices which men in power had entertained against him; and he hoped that, in the perpetual changes which were taking place power would at length pass into the hands of those who would be disposed to consider him with favour. At this time he frequently dined and spent the evening with me and my elder brother; and on these occasions he rendered himself very agreeable by his amiable manners and the charms of his conversation. I called on him almost every morning, and I met at his lodgings several persons who were distinguished at the time; and among others with Salicetti, with whom he used to maintain very animated conversations, and showed a wish to be left alone with him. Salicetti at one time sent him 3000 francs (£125), as the price of his carriage, which his poverty had laid him under the necessity of selling. I imagined that our young friend either was, or wished to become, a party in some political intrigue. He now became thoughtful, frequently melancholy and disturbed, and he waited daily with marked impatience the arrival of Salicetti, who having become implicated in the insurrectionary movement of the 20th of May, 1795, was obliged to withdraw himself to Venice. Sometimes returning to more homely ideas, he envied the good fortune of his brother Joseph, who had just married Mademoiselle Clery, the daughter of a rich and respectable merchant at Marseilles. He would often say, 'That Joseph is a lucky fellow!'

Meanwhile time passed away, but nothing was done; his projects were unsuccessful, and his applications unattended to. This injustice embittered his spirit, and he was tormented with the desire to do something. To remain in the crowd was intolerable. He resolved to leave France; and the favourite idea, which he never afterwards abandoned, that the East was the most certain path to glory, inspired him with the determination to proceed to Constantinople, and to make a tender of his services to the Grand Seignior. What dreams, what gigantic projects, did he not entertain, during this excitement of his imagination! He asked me to go with him, which I declined. I looked upon him as a young enthusiast, driven on to extravagant enterprises and desperate resolutions by his restless activity of mind, and by the irritating treatment which he had experienced, and, it may be added, his want of money.

He did not blame me for refusing to accompany him, but said that he would be accompanied by Junot, Marmont, and some other officers with whom he had become acquainted at Toulon, and who would be willing to attach themselves to his fortunes.

In accordance with this feeling he drew up a note, which he addressed to Aubert and Coni, in which he requested to be sent, with a few officers of different services, but possessing collectively a perfect knowledge of the military art, under the patronage of the French government, for the purpose of placing the army of the Grand Seignior in a condition more suitable to the circumstances of the times, as it seemed highly probable that the Porte might find itself in alliance with France, and assaulted by the continental armies of Austria and Russia.

No answer was returned to this application. Turkey remained unaided, and Bonaparte unoccupied. If, however, it had been endorsed, '*granted*,' that word would probably have changed the fate of Europe.

At length Bonaparte was nominated to the command of a brigade of artillery in Holland ; but as there were indications of an approaching crisis, his services were called for on a nearer and more important field.

The agitation continued till the 13th of Vendemiaire (Oct. 5, 1795), when the storm burst. This day, when the Sections of Paris attacked the Convention, must be considered as influencing, in a remarkable degree, the astonishing destiny of Bonaparte. This, although at the time not well understood, was the cause of those enormous disorders which afterwards convulsed Europe. The blood then shed fed the germs of his young ambition ; and it must be admitted that the history of past ages presents few periods filled with events so extraordinary as those which occurred between the years 1795 and 1815. The man whose name serves in some measure as a remembrance of all these wonderful events might well count upon immortality.

Living retired at Sens since the month of July, I only learned from the journals and public report the cause of the insurrection of the Sections. I cannot therefore positively say what part Bonaparte may have taken in the plots which preceded the explosion. He appeared only a secondary actor in that bloody drama, to which he had been called by Barras, as second in command. The account of the events of that day, which I have given, was furnished to me by himself, in a letter in

his own hand-writing, and which bears all his peculiarities of style.

AUTOGRAPH LETTER OF BONAPARTE TO M. BOURRIENNE.

On the 13th, at five in the morning, the Representative of the people, Barras, was nominated Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior, and General Bonaparte second in command.

The field artillery was still in the camp at Sablons, guarded only by 150 men ; the rest was at Marly, with 200 men. The dépôt at Meudon was without any guard. At Feuillans were only some four pounders, without gunners, and but twenty-four thousand cartridges. The magazines of provisions were in different parts of Paris ; the drums were beating the *générale* in many sections ; that of the Theatre Français had advanced posts to the Pont-Neuf, which was barricadoed.

General Barras ordered the artillery to be brought from the camp at Sablons to the Tuileries, and caused gunners to be sought out from the battalions of 89, and in the gendarmerie, and placed them at the palace. He sent to Meudon 200 men of the legion of police, which he brought from Versailles, 50 horsemen, and two companies of veterans. He ordered the removal of the stores at Marly to Meudon, and sent for cartridges, and established a manufactory for them at Meudon. He provided for the subsistence of the army and the Convention for several days, independent of the magazines in the Sections. General Verdier, who commanded at the Palais-National, manœuvred with great coolness, and was ordered not to fire until the last extremity.

In the meantime, reports arrived from all sides that the Sections were assembling in arms, and forming their columns : he disposed the troops to defend the Convention, and prepared his artillery to repulse the rebels. He placed cannon at Feuillans to batter the street St. Honoré ; two eight pounders were placed at each opening, and, in case of mischance, pieces were placed in reserve to take in flank any column which might have forced a passage. He left in the Carrousel three eight-pound howitzers, to play upon the houses from which they might fire upon the Convention. At four o'clock the rebel columns issued from all the streets, in order to form : the most inexperienced troops would have seized this critical moment to fall upon them ; but the blood about to flow was that of French-

men ; it was necessary to allow these misguided men, already stained with the crime of rebellion, to sully themselves still more by shedding the first blood of their countrymen.

At a quarter to five, the rebels were formed ; they began the attack on all points ; they were everywhere repulsed. French blood flowed, the crime as well as the disgrace of that day fell upon the Sections.

Among the dead there were everywhere recognized emigrants, the old proprietaires, and nobles. Of the prisoners, the greatest part were Chouans of Charette. The Sections however did not consider themselves beaten : they fell back on the Church of St. Roche, the Theatre of the Republic, and the Palace Egalité, and everywhere excited the inhabitants to arms. To spare the effusion of blood, it was necessary to prevent them from rallying, and to pursue them briskly ; but without engaging in difficult passes.

The general ordered General Montchoisy, who was at the Place Revolution with the reserve, to form a column, and, with two twelve pounders, to march by the Boulevard, turn the Place Vendome, and to form a junction with the piquet at head-quarters, and then to return in column. General Brune, with two howitzers, debouched by the Streets of St. Nicaise and St. Honoré. General Cartaux brought 200 men of his division, with a four pounder, to the Place of the Palace Egalité. General Bonaparte, who had two horses killed under him, hastened to Feuillans. The columns put themselves in motion ; St. Roche and the Theatre of the Republic were forced ; the rebels abandoned them. The rebels retired to the upper part of the street La Loi, where they barricadoed themselves ; patrols were sent out, and cannon fired upon them occasionally during the night, which kept them in check.

At daybreak, the general being informed that certain students of St. Genevieve were on their march, with two pieces of cannon, to join the rebels, he sent a detachment of dragoons, who took the cannon and brought them to the Tuileries.

The Sections, though beaten, still showed a firm determination to resist ; they had barricadoed the streets of the Section Grenelle, and placed their cannon in the principal avenues. At nine o'clock, General Berruyer took a position in the Place Vendome, and with two eight pounders bore upon the principal station of the Section le Pelletier. The generals Vachet, Brune, and Duvigier, prepared their divisions for the attack ; but the courage of the Sectionaries began to fail when they saw their

retreat likely to be cut off; they evacuated their position, and forgot, on the appearance of our soldiers, the honour of French cavaliers, which they had affected to maintain.

The Section of Brutus continued to occasion uneasiness, and it was blockaded. Everywhere the patriots resumed courage, everywhere the poniards of the emigrants armed against their country disappeared, everywhere the people were convinced of their delusion and folly.

The following day the Sections of le Pelletier, and the Theatre Français, were disarmed.

In this bulletin of the 13th Vendemiaire, it will be observed with what anxiety Bonaparte throws upon those whom he calls rebels, the reproach of shedding the first blood. He labours to prove that his adversaries were the aggressors; but it is certain, that he always regretted that day. He has often told me, that he would give years of his life to have this page torn from his history. He had no doubt that the Parisians were much exasperated against him, and he could have wished that those words of Barras, which, at the time, gave him so much pleasure, had never been spoken;—‘It is to the able and prompt disposition of General Bonaparte, and to the ability with which he distributed the troops, that we owe the security of this palace (the Tuileries).’ This is very true; but it is not always agreeable that the truth should be told.

The result of this civil contest brought Bonaparte forward and elevated him above the crowd, and shortly after raised him to the command of that army which he ever afterwards led on to victory.

Whilst Commandant of Paris, it is stated that Eugene Beauharnois, a boy of ten or twelve years of age, son of Viscount Beauharnois, who had been a general officer in the Republican armies, but put to death by Robespierre, presented himself to the general, and requested to have his father’s sword restored to him. Bonaparte caused the request to be complied with; and the tears of the boy, as he received and kissed the relic, excited his attention. He treated the boy so kindly, that next day his mother, Josephine de Beauharnois, came to thank him; and her beauty and singular gracefulness of address made a strong impression upon him. The acquaintance thus commenced speedily led to their marriage.

I returned from Sens to Paris after the 13th Vendemiaire. and during the short time I was there, I saw Bonaparte less frequently than formerly. This I can only attribute to the

multifarious duties of his new appointment. When I did meet him, it was either at breakfast or dinner. He one day desired me to observe a lady, who sat nearly opposite to him, and asked my opinion of her. The way in which I answered his question appeared to give him satisfaction. He spoke a good deal about her, her family, and her amiable qualities. He told me that he would probably marry her, believing that a union with the young widow would contribute essentially to his happiness; and I easily gathered from his conversation, that this marriage would powerfully second his ambition. His increasing intimacy with her whom he loved brought him in contact with the most influential persons of his time, and afforded him the means of realizing his pretensions.

The marriage took place on the 9th of March, 1796, and he only remained in Paris twelve days after the ceremony. It was a union in which, with the exception of a few light clouds, there was much affection. Bonaparte never, to my knowledge, gave cause of real sorrow to his wife. In addition to her beauty, Madame Bonaparte possessed many excellent qualities, and I am convinced that most of those who were intimate with her, had reason to speak in her favour; to few indeed did she ever give cause of complaint. Benevolence was in her a natural impulse, and she was kind and attractive to those with whom she was acquainted; but she was not sufficiently careful in the selection of those whom she confided in. It sometimes happened that her bounty and protection were bestowed on persons who did not deserve it. She nourished to excess a taste for splendour and expense; and this seemed to become so much a habit, that she indulged in it without any motive. This often led to unpleasant differences between her and her husband; when the day of payment arrived, she never reported more than half the amount of the bills, and when the truth came out she was exposed to just remonstrances. How many tears did she shed which might have been easily spared!

Tranquillity was now restored in Paris; and the Directory had leisure to turn their attention to the affairs of the Army of Italy, which was in a most confused and unsatisfactory condition. They determined to give it a new general, and Bonaparte was appointed to the splendid command.

Bonaparte left Paris on the 21st of March, 1796, and, after paying a short visit to his mother at Marseilles, arrived, after a rapid journey, at the head-quarters at Nice. At the age

of twenty-six, he assumed the command of the Army of Italy; exulting in the knowledge that, if he should conquer, the honour would be all his own. He had worked for others at Toulon, at the Col di Tende, and even in the affair of the Sections, as the first command had been nominally in the hands of Barras. Now he was burning with enthusiasm, and resolved to distinguish himself. 'You are too young,' said one of the Directors, hesitating about his appointment as general. 'In a year,' answered Napoleon, 'I shall be either old or dead.' The Directory, who had still some fears as to the youth of Napoleon, proposed, early in May, to appoint General Kellerman, who commanded the Army of the Alps, second in command of the Army of Italy. This was far from being agreeable to Bonaparte; he wrote to Carnot, on the 24th of May—'Whether I shall be employed here or anywhere else is indifferent to me: to serve my country, and to merit from posterity a page in our history, is all my ambition. If you join Kellerman and me in the command in Italy, you will undo everything. He has more experience than I, and knows how to make war better than I do, but both together we shall make it badly. I will not willingly serve with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe.'

'He found the army in numbers about 50,000; but wretchedly deficient in cavalry, in stores of every kind, in clothing, and even in food: and watched by an enemy greatly more numerous. It was under such circumstances that he at once avowed the daring scheme of forcing a passage to Italy, and converting the richest territory of the enemy himself into the theatre of war. "Soldiers," said he, "you are hungry and naked: the Republic owes you much, but she has not the means to pay her debts. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains that the sun beholds. Rich provinces, opulent towns, all shall be at your disposal. Soldiers! with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and constancy?" This was his first address to his army. The sinking hearts of the men beat high with hope and confidence when they heard the voice of the young and fearless leader; and Augereau, Massena, Serrurier, Joubert, Lannes—distinguished officers, who might themselves have aspired to the chief command—felt, from the moment they began to understand his character and system, that the true road to glory would be to follow the star of Napoleon.

'The objects of the approaching expedition were three: first,

to compel the King of Sardinia, who had already lost Savoy and Nice, but still maintained a powerful army on the frontiers of Piedmont, to abandon the alliance of Austria : secondly, to compel the Emperor, by a bold invasion of Lombardy, to make such exertions in that quarter as might weaken those armies which had so long hovered on the Rhine ; and, if possible, to stir up the Italian subjects of that crown to adopt the revolutionary system, and emancipate themselves for ever from its yoke. The third object, though more distant, was not less important. The influence of the Romish Church was considered by the Directory as the chief, though secret, support of the cause of royalism within their own territory ; and to reduce the Vatican into insignificance, or at least force it to submission and quiescence, appeared indispensable to the internal tranquillity of France. The Revolutionary Government, besides this general cause of hatred and suspicion, had a distinct injury to avenge. Their agent, Basseville, had three years before been assassinated in a popular tumult at Rome : the Papal troops had not interfered to protect him, nor the Pope to punish his murderers.

‘Napoleon’s plan for gaining access to the fair regions of Italy differed from that of all former conquerors : they had uniformly penetrated the Alps at some point or other of that mighty range of mountains : he judged that the same end might be accomplished more easily by advancing along the narrow strip of comparatively level country which intervenes between those enormous barriers and the Mediterranean sea, and forcing a passage at the point where the last of the Alps melt, as it were, into the first and lowest of the Apennine range. No sooner did he begin to concentrate his troops towards this region, than the Austrian general, Beaulieu, took measures for protecting Genoa, and the entrance of Italy. He himself took post with one column of his army at Voltri, a town within ten miles of Genoa : he placed D’Argenteau with another Austrian column at Monte Notte, a strong height farther to the westward ; and the Sardinians, under Colli, occupying Ceva—which thus formed the extreme right of the whole line of the allied army. The French could not advance towards Genoa but by confronting some one of the three armies thus strongly posted, and sufficiently, as Beaulieu supposed, in communication with each other.

‘It was now that Bonaparte made his first effort to baffle the science of those who fancied there was nothing new to be done

in warfare. On the 10th of April, D'Argenteau came down upon Monte Notte, and attacked some French redoubts, in front of that mountain and the villages which bear its name, at Montelegino. At the same time General Cevoni and the French van were attacked by Beaulieu near Voltri, and compelled to retreat. The determined valour of Colonel Rampon, who commanded at Montelegino, held D'Argenteau at bay during the 10th and 11th : and Bonaparte, contenting himself with watching Beaulieu, determined to strike his effectual blow at the centre of the enemy's line. During the night of the 11th various columns were marched upon Montelegino, that of Cervoni and that of Laharpe from the van of the French line, those of Augereau and Massena from its rear. On the morning of the 12th, D'Argenteau, preparing to renew his attack on the redoubts of Montelegino, found he had no longer Rampon only and his brave band to deal with ; that French columns were in his rear, on his flank, and drawn up also behind the works at Montelegino ; in a word, that he was surrounded. He was compelled to retreat among the mountains : he left his colours and cannon behind him, 1000 killed, and 2000 prisoners. The centre of the allied army had been utterly routed, before either the Commander-in-chief at the left, or General Colli at the right of the line, had any notion that a battle was going on.—Such was the battle of Monte Notte, the first of Napoleon's fields.

'The very next day after this victory he commanded a general assault on the Austrian line. Augereau, with a fresh division, marched at the left upon Millesimo ; Massena led the centre towards Dego ; and Laharpe, with the French right wing, manœuvred to turn the left flank of Beaulieu.

'Augereau rushed upon the outposts of Millesimo, seized and retained the gorge which defends that place, and cut off Provera with 2000 Austrians, who occupied an eminence called Cossaria, from the main body of Colli's army. Next morning Bonaparte himself arrived at that scene of the operations. He forced Colli to accept battle, utterly broke and scattered him, and Provera, thus abandoned, was obliged to yield at discretion.

'Bonaparte rapidly followed up the advantages which he had gained, and succeeded in separating the Austrian and Sardinian armies. Both were again defeated, and the Sardinian army may be said to have been annihilated in their disastrous retreat ; they lost the whole of their cannon, their baggage, and the best part of their troops.

‘The conqueror took possession of Cherasco, within ten miles of Turin, and their dictated the terms on which the King of Sardinia was to be permitted to retain any shadow of sovereign power.

‘Thus, in less than a month, did Napoleon lay the gates of Italy open before him. He had defeated in three battles forces much superior to his own ; inflicted on them, in killed, wounded and prisoners, a loss of 25,000 men ; taken eighty guns and twenty-one standards ; reduced the Austrians to inaction ; utterly destroyed the Sardinian king’s army ; and lastly, wrested from his hands Coni and Tortona, the two great fortresses called “the keys of the Alps,”—and indeed, except Turin itself, every place of any consequence in his dominions. This unfortunate prince did not long survive such humiliation. He was father-in-law to both of the brothers of Louis XVI., and, considering their cause and his own dignity as equally at an end, died of a broken heart, within a few days after he had signed the treaty of Cherasco.

‘The consummate genius of this brief campaign could not be disputed ; and the modest language of the young General’s despatches to the Directory, lent additional grace to his fame. At this time the name of Bonaparte was spotless ; and the eyes of all Europe were fixed in admiration on his career.’

CHAPTER III.

BONAPARTE, having become master of Piedmont, stopped for a short time to reorganize his army, previous to his descent into Lombardy. He pointed out to his victorious soldiers the rich and extensive plains which spread out before them ; and, in an address which he circulated, he reminded them, that ‘Hannibal had forced the Alps, and that we have turned them. You were utterly destitute, and you have supplied all your wants. You have gained battles without cannon, passed rivers without bridges, performed forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without strong liquors, and often without bread. None but Republican phalanxes, soldiers of liberty, could have endured such things. Thanks for your perseverance ! But, soldiers, you have done nothing—for there remains much to do : Milan is not yet ours. The ashes of the conquerors of Tarquin are still trampled by the assassins of Basseville.’

The Austrian general had concentrated his army behind

the Po, with the intention of preventing the enemy from passing that great river, and making his way to the capital of Lombardy.

‘Napoleon employed every device to make Beaulieu believe that he designed to attempt the passage of the Po at Valenza; and the Austrian, a man of routine, who had himself crossed the river at that point, was easily persuaded that these demonstrations were sincere. Meanwhile his crafty antagonist executed a march of incredible celerity upon Placenza, fifty miles lower down the river; and appeared there on the 7th of May, to the utter consternation of a couple of Austrian squadrons, who happened to be reconnoitring in that quarter. He had to convey his men across that great stream in common ferry boats, and could never have succeeded had there been anything like an army to oppose him. Andreossi (afterwards so celebrated) was commander of the advance guard: Lannes (who became afterwards the Marshal Duke of Montebello) was the first to throw himself ashore at the head of some grenadiers. The German hussars were driven rapidly from their position, and the passage of this great river was effected without the loss of a single man.

‘Beaulieu, as soon as he ascertained how he had been outwitted, advanced upon Placenza, in the hope of making the invader accept battle with the Po in his rear; but Bonaparte had no intention to await the Austrian on ground so dangerous, and was marching rapidly towards Fombio, where he knew he should have room to manœuvre. The advance divisions of the hostile armies met at that village on the 8th of May. The Imperialists occupied the steeples and houses, and hoped to hold out until Beaulieu could bring up his main body. But the French charged so impetuously with the bayonet, that the Austrian, after seeing one-third of his men fall, was obliged to retreat, in great confusion, leaving all his cannon behind him, across the Adda. Behind this river Beaulieu now concentrated his army, establishing strong guards at every ford and bridge, and especially at Lodi, where as he guessed (for once rightly) the French general designed to force his passage.

‘The wooden bridge of Lodi formed the scene of one of the most celebrated actions of the war; and will ever be peculiarly mixed up with the name of Bonaparte himself. It was a great neglect in Beaulieu to leave it standing when he removed his head-quarters to the east bank of the Adda; his outposts were driven rapidly through the old straggling town of Lodi on the

10th; and the French, sheltering themselves behind the walls and houses, lay ready to attempt the passage of the bridge. Beaulieu had placed a battery of thirty cannon so as to sweep it completely; and the enterprise of storming it in the face of this artillery, and the whole army drawn up behind, is one of the most daring on record.

‘Bonaparte’s first care was to place as many guns as he could get in order in direct opposition to this Austrian battery. A furious cannonade on his side of the river also now commenced. The General himself appeared in the midst of the fire, pointing with his own hand two guns in such a manner as to cut off the Austrians from the only path by which they could have advanced to undermine the bridge; and it was on this occasion that the soldiery, delighted with his dauntless exposure of his person, conferred on him his honorary nickname of *The Little Corporal*. In the meantime he had sent General Beaumont and the cavalry to attempt the passage of the river by a distant ford (which they had much difficulty in effecting), and awaited with anxiety the moment when they should appear on the enemy’s flank. When that took place, Beaulieu’s line, of course, shewed some confusion, and Napoleon instantly gave the word. A column of grenadiers, whom he had kept ready drawn up close to the bridge, but under shelter of the houses, were in a moment wheeled to the left, and their leading files placed upon the bridge. They rushed on, shouting *Vive la Republique!* but the storm of grape-shot for a moment checked them. Bonaparte, Lannes, Berthier, and Lallemand hurried to the front, and rallied and cheered the men. The column dashed across the bridge in despite of the tempest of fire that thinned them. The brave Lannes was the first who reached the other side, Napoleon himself the second. The Austrian artillerymen were bayoneted at their guns, before the other troops, whom Beaulieu had removed too far back, in his anxiety to avoid the French battery, could come to their assistance. Beaumont pressing gallantly with his horse upon the flank, and Napoleon’s infantry forming rapidly as they passed the bridge, and charging on the instant, the Austrian line became involved in inextricable confusion, broke up and fled. The slaughter on their side was great, on the French there fell only 200 men. With such rapidity, and consequently with so little loss, did Bonaparte execute this dazzling adventure—“the terrible passage,” as he himself called it, “of the bridge of Lodi.”

‘It was, indeed, terrible to the enemy. It deprived them

of another excellent line of defence, and blew up the enthusiasm of the French soldiery to a pitch of irresistible daring. Beaulieu, nevertheless, contrived to withdraw his troops in much better style than Bonaparte had anticipated. He gathered the scattered fragments of his force together, and soon threw the line of the Mincio, another tributary of the Po, between himself and his enemy. The great object, however, had been attained : the Austrian general escaped, and might yet defend Mantua, but no obstacle remained between the victorious invader and the rich and noble capital of Lombardy. The garrison of Pizzighitone, seeing themselves effectually cut off from the Austrian army, capitulated. The French cavalry pursued Beaulieu as far as Cremona, which town they seized ; and Napoleon himself prepared to march at once upon Milan.

‘A revolutionary party had always existed there, as indeed in every part of the Austrian dominions beyond the Alps ; and the tricolour cockade, the emblem of France, was now mounted by multitudes of the inhabitants. The municipality hastened to invite the conqueror to appear among them as their friend and protector, and on the 14th of May, four days after Lodi, Napoleon accordingly entered, in all the splendour of a military triumph, the venerable and opulent city of the old Lombard kings.

‘He was not, however, to be flattered into the conduct, as to serious matters, of a friendly general. He levied immediately a heavy contribution (eight hundred thousand pounds sterling) at Milan—taking possession, besides, of twenty of the finest pictures in the Ambrosian gallery.

‘In modern warfare the works of art had hitherto been considered as a species of property entitled in all cases to be held sacred ; and Bonaparte’s violent and rapacious infraction of the rule now excited a mighty clamour throughout Europe.

‘Bonaparte remained but five days in Milan ; the citadel of that place still held out against him ; but he left a detachment to blockade it, and proceeded himself in pursuit of Beaulieu. The Austrian had now planted the remains of his army behind the Mincio, having his left on the great and strong city of Mantua, which has been termed “the citadel of Italy,” and his right at Peschiera, a Venetian fortress, of which he took possession in spite of the remonstrances of the Doge. This position was the strongest that it is possible to imagine. The invader hastened once more to dislodge him.

‘The French Directory, meanwhile, had begun to entertain suspicions as to the ultimate designs of their young general, whose success and fame had already reached so astonishing a height. They determined to check, if they could, the career of an ambition which they apprehended might outgrow their control. Bonaparte was ordered to take half his army, and lead it against the Pope and the King of Naples, and leave the other half to terminate the contest with Beaulieu, under the orders of Kellerman. But he acted on this occasion with the decision which these Directors in vain desired to emulate. He answered by resigning his command. “One half of the army of Italy,” said he, “cannot suffice to finish the matter with the Austrian. It is only by keeping my force entire that I have been able to gain so many battles and to be now in Milan. You had better have one bad general than two good ones.” The Directory durst not persist in displacing the chief whose name was considered as the pledge of victory. Napoleon resumed the undivided command, to which now, for the last time, his right had been questioned.

‘The French advanced on the Mincio; and the General made such disposition of his troops, that Beaulieu doubted not he meant to pass that river, if he could, at Peschiera. Meantime, he had been preparing to repeat the scene of Placenza;—and actually, on the 30th of May, forced the passage of the Mincio, not at Peschiera, but farther down at Borghetto. The Austrian garrison at Borghetto in vain destroyed one arch of the bridge. Bonaparte supplied the breach with planks, and his men, flushed with so many victories, charged with a fury not to be resisted. Beaulieu was obliged to abandon the Mincio, as he had before the Adda and the Po, and to take up the new line of the Adige.

‘The Austrian had, in effect, abandoned for the time the open country of Italy. He now lay on the frontier, between the vast tract of rich provinces which Napoleon had conquered, and the Tyrol. The citadel of Milan, indeed, still held out; but the force there was not great, and, cooped up on every side, could not be expected to resist much longer. Mantua, which possessed prodigious natural advantages, and into which the retreating general had flung a garrison of full 15,000 men, was, in truth, the last and only Italian possession of the imperial crown, which, as it seemed, there might still be a possibility of saving. Beaulieu anxiously waited the approach of new troops from Germany to attempt the relief of this great city;

and his antagonist, eager to anticipate the efforts of the imperial government, sat down immediately before it.

‘Mantua lies on an island, being cut off on all sides from the main land by the branches of the Mincio, and approachable only by five narrow causeways, of which three were defended by strong and regular fortresses or intrenched camps, the other two by gates, drawbridges, and batteries. Situated amidst stagnant waters and morasses, its air is pestilential, especially to strangers. The garrison were prepared to maintain the position with their usual bravery ; and it remained to be seen whether the French general possessed any new system of attack, capable of abridging the usual operations of the siege, as effectually as he had already done by those of the march and the battle. His commencement was alarming ; of the five causeways, by sudden and overwhelming assaults, he obtained four ; and the garrison were cut off from the main land, except only at the fifth causeway, the strongest of them all, named, from a palace near it, *La Favorita*. It seemed necessary, however, in order that this blockade might be complete, that the Venetian territory, lying immediately beyond Mantua, should be occupied by the French.—The imperial general had, as we have seen, neglected the reclamations of the Doge, when it suited his purpose to occupy Peschiera. “You are too weak,” said Bonaparte, when the Venetian envoy reached his head-quarters, “to enforce neutrality on hostile nations such as France and Austria. Beaulieu did not respect your territory when his interest bade him violate it ; nor shall I hesitate to occupy whatever falls within the line of the Adige.” In effect, garrisons were placed forthwith in Verona, and all the strong places of that domain. The tricolour flag now waved at the mouth of the Tyrolese passes ; and Napoleon, leaving Serrurier to blockade Mantua, returned to Milan, where he had important business to arrange.

‘The King of Naples, utterly confounded by the successes of the French, was now anxious to procure peace, almost on whatever terms, with the apparently irresistible Republic. Nor did it, for the moment, suit Bonaparte’s view to condemn his advances. He concluded an armistice accordingly, which was soon followed by a formal peace, with the King of the Two Sicilies ; and the Neapolitan troops, who had recently behaved with eminent gallantry, abandoning the Austrian general, began their march to the South of Italy.

‘This transaction placed another of Napoleon’s destined

victims entirely within his grasp. With no friend behind him, the Pope saw himself at the mercy of the invader ; and in terror prepared to submit. Bonaparte demanded, as the price of peace, and obtained, a million sterling, a hundred of the finest pictures and statues in the papal gallery, a large supply of military stores, and the cession of Ancona, Ferrara, and Bologna, with their respective domains.

‘He next turned his attention to the Grand Duke of Tuscany : for the present, the Florentine museum and the Grand Duke’s treasury were spared ; but Leghorn, the seaport of Tuscany and great feeder of its wealth, was seized without ceremony ; the English goods in that town were confiscated to the ruin of the merchants ; and a great number of English vessels in the harbour made a narrow escape. The Grand Duke, in place of resenting these injuries, was obliged to receive Bonaparte with all the appearances of cordiality at Florence, and the spoiler repaid his courtesy by telling him, rubbing his hands with glee, during the princely entertainment provided for him, “I have just received letters from Milan ; the citadel has fallen ;—your brother has no longer a foot of land in Lombardy.”

‘In the meantime the General did not neglect the great and darling plan of the French government, of thoroughly revolutionizing the North of Italy, and establishing there a group of Republics. The peculiar circumstances of Northern Italy, as a land of ancient fame and high spirit, long split into fragments, and ruled, for the most part, by governors of German origin, presented many facilities for the realization of this design ; and Bonaparte was urged constantly by his government at Paris, and by a powerful party in Lombardy, to hasten its execution. He, however, thought that more was to be gained by temporizing with both the governments and the people of Italy, than by any hasty measures of the kind recommended. He, therefore, temporized : content, in the meantime, with draining the exchequers of the governments, and cajoling from day to day the population. The Directory were with difficulty persuaded to let him follow his own course ; but he now despised their remonstrances, and they had been taught effectually to dread his strength.

‘The Austrian government having, in some measure, recovered from the consternation produced by the rapid destruction of their army under Beaulieu, resolved to make a great effort to recover Lombardy.

‘Beaulieu had been too often unfortunate to be trusted longer

Wurmser, who enjoyed a reputation of the highest class, was sent to replace him : 30,000 men were drafted from the armies on the Rhine to accompany the new general ; and he carried orders to strengthen himself farther, on his march, by whatever recruits he could raise among the warlike and loyal population of the Tyrol.

‘The consequences of thus weakening the Austrian force on the Rhine were, for the moment, on that scene of the contest, inauspicious. The French, in two separate bodies, forced the passage of the Rhine—under Jourdan and Moreau ; before whom the imperial generals, Wartensleben and the Archduke Charles, were compelled to retire. But the skill of the Archduke ere long enabled him to effect a junction with the columns of Wartensleben ; and thus to fall upon Jourdan with a great superiority of numbers, and give him a signal defeat. Moreau, learning how Jourdan was discomfited, found himself compelled to give up the plan of pursuing his march farther into Germany, and executed that famous retreat through the Black Forest which has made his name as splendid as any victory in the field could have done.

‘Wurmser, when he fixed his head-quarters at Trent, mustered in all 80,000 ; while Bonaparte had but 30,000 to hold a wide country, in which abhorrence of the French cause was now prevalent, to keep up the blockade of Mantua, and to oppose this fearful odds of numbers in the field.

‘Wurmser might have learned from the successes of Bonaparte the advantages of compact movement ; yet he was unwise enough to divide his great force into three separate columns, and to place one of these upon a line of march which entirely separated it from the support of the others—in other words, to interpose the waters of the Lago di Guarda between themselves and the march of their friends—a blunder not likely to escape the eagle eye of Napoleon.

‘He immediately determined to march against the division of Quasdonowich, and fight him where he could not be supported by the other two columns. This could not be done without abandoning for the time the blockade of Mantua. The guns were buried in the trenches during the night of the 31st July, and the French quitted the place with a precipitation which the advancing Austrians considered as the result of terror.

‘Napoleon meanwhile rushed against Quasdonowich, who had already come near the bottom of the Lake of Guarda. At Salo, close by the lake, and, farther from it, at Lonato, two

divisions of the Austrian column were attacked and overwhelmed. Augereau and Massena, leaving merely rear-guards at Borghetto and Peschiera, now marched also upon Brescia. The whole force of Quasdonowich must inevitably have been ruined by these combinations, had he stood his ground ; but by this time the celerity of Napoleon had overawed him, and he was already in full retreat upon his old quarters in the Tyrol. Augereau and Massena, therefore, counter-marched their columns, and returned towards the Mincio. They found that Wurmser had forced their rear-guards from their posts : that of Massena, under Pigeon, had retired in good order to Lonato ; that of Augereau, under Vallette, had retreated in confusion, abandoning Castiglione to the Austrians.

‘Flushed with these successes, old Wurmser now resolved to throw his whole force upon the French, and resume at the point of the bayonet his communication with the scattered column of Quasdonowich. He was so fortunate as to defeat the gallant Pigeon at Lonato, and to occupy that town. But this new success was fatal to him. In the exultation of victory he extended his line too much towards the right ; and this over-anxiety to open the communication with Quasdonowich had the effect of so weakening his centre, that Massena, boldly and skilfully seizing the opportunity, poured two strong columns on Lonato, and regained the position ; whereon the Austrian, perceiving that his army was cut in two, was thrown into utter confusion. At Castiglione alone a brave stand was made. But Augereau, burning to wipe out the disgrace of Vallette, forced the position, though at a severe loss. Such was the battle of Lonato. Thenceforth nothing could surpass the discomfiture and disarray of the Austrians. They fled in all directions upon the Mincio, where Wurmser himself, meanwhile, had been employed in revictualling Mantua.

‘Wurmser collected together the whole of his remaining force, and advanced to meet the conqueror. They met between Lonato and Castiglione. Wurmser was totally defeated, and narrowly escaped being a prisoner : nor did he without great difficulty regain Trent and Roveredo, those frontier positions from which his noble army had so recently descended with all the confidence of conquerors. In this disastrous campaign the Austrians lost 40,000 : Bonaparte probably understated his own loss at 7000. During the seven days which the campaign occupied he never took off his boots, nor slept except by starts. The exertions which so rapidly achieved

this signal triumph were such as to demand some repose ; yet Napoleon did not pause until he saw Mantua once more completely invested. The reinforcement and revictualling of that garrison were all that Wurmser could shew, in requital of his lost artillery, stores, and 40,000 men.

‘During this brief campaign the aversion with which the ecclesiastics of Italy regarded the French manifested itself in various quarters. At Pavia, Ferrara, and elsewhere, insurrections had broken out, and the spirit was spreading rapidly at the moment when the report of Napoleon’s new victory came to re-awaken terror and paralyse revolt.

‘While he was occupied with restoring quiet in the country, Austria, ever constant in adversity, hastened to place 20,000 fresh troops under the orders of Wurmser ; and the brave veteran, whose heart nothing could chill, prepared himself to make one effort more to relieve Mantua, and drive the French out of Lombardy. His army was now, as before, greatly the superior in numbers ; and though the bearing of his troops was more modest, their gallantry remained unimpaired. Once more the old general divided his army ; and once more he was destined to see it shattered in detail.

‘He marched from Trent towards Mantua, through the defiles of the Brenta, at the head of 30,000 ; leaving 20,000 under Davidowich at Roveredo, to cover the Tyrol. Bonaparte instantly detected the error of his opponent. He suffered him to advance unmolested as far as Bassano, and the moment he was there, and consequently completely separated from Davidowich and his rear, drew together a strong force, and darted on Roveredo, by marches such as seemed credible only after they had been accomplished.

‘The battle of Roveredo (Sept. 4) is one of Napoleon’s most illustrious days. The enemy had a strongly entrenched camp in front of the town ; and behind it, in case of misfortune, Calliano, with its castle seated on a precipice over the Adige, where that river flows between enormous rocks and mountains, appeared to offer an impregnable retreat. Nothing could withstand the ardour of the French. The Austrians, though they defended the entrenched camp with their usual obstinacy, were forced to give way by the impetuosity of Dubois and his hussars. Dubois fell, mortally wounded, in the moment of his glory : he waved his sabre, cheering his men onwards with his last breath. “I die,” said he, “for the Republic : only let me hear, ere life leaves me, that the victory is ours.”

The French horse, thus animated, pursued the Germans, who were driven, unable to rally, through and beyond the town. Even the gigantic defences of Calliano proved of no avail. Height after height was carried at the point of the bayonet; 7000 prisoners and fifteen cannon remained with the conquerors.

‘Wurmser heard with dismay of the utter ruin of Davidowich; and doubted not that Napoleon would now march onwards into Germany, and joining Jourdan and Moreau, whose advance he had heard of, and misguessed to have been successful, endeavour to realize the great scheme of Carnot—that of attacking Vienna itself. The old general saw no chance of converting what remained to him of his army to good purpose, but by abiding in Lombardy, where he thought he might easily excite the people in his emperor’s favour, overwhelm the slender garrisons left by Bonaparte, and so cut off, at all events, the French retreat through Italy, in case they should meet with any disaster in the Tyrol or in Germany. Napoleon had intelligence which Wurmser wanted. Wurmser himself was his mark; and he returned from Trent to Primolano, where the Imperialist’s vanguard lay, by a forced march of not less than sixty miles performed in two days. The surprise with which this descent was received may be imagined. The Austrian van was destroyed in a twinkling. The French, pushing everything before them, halted that night at Cismone—where Napoleon was glad to have half a private soldier’s ration of bread for his supper. Next day he reached Bassano, where the aged marshal once more expected the fatal rencounter. The battle of Bassano (Sept. 8) was a fatal repetition of those that had gone before it. Six thousand men laid down their arms. Quasdonowich, with one division of 4000, escaped to Friuli; while Wurmser himself, retreating to Vicenza, there collected with difficulty a remnant of 16,000 beaten and discomfited soldiers. His situation was most unhappy; his communication with Austria wholly cut off—his artillery and baggage all lost—the flower of his army no more. Nothing seemed to remain but to throw himself into Mantua, and there hold out to the last extremity, in the hope, however remote, of some succours from Vienna; and such was the resolution of this often outwitted but never dispirited veteran.

‘Bonaparte, after making himself master of some scattered corps which had not been successful in keeping up with Wurmser, reappeared once more before Mantua. The battle of St. George (so called from one of the suburbs of the city) was fought on the 13th of September, and after prodigious slaughter, the French

remained in possession of all the causeways ; so that the blockade of the city and fortress was thenceforth complete. The garrison, when Wurmser shut himself up, amounted to 26,000. Before October was far advanced the pestilential air of the place, and the scarcity and badness of provisions, had filled his hospitals, and left him hardly half the number in fighting condition. The misery of the besieged town was extreme ; and if Austria meant to rescue Wurmser, there was no time to be lost.

‘The French party in Corsica had not contemplated without pride and exultation the triumphs of their countryman. His seizure of Leghorn, by cutting off the supplies from England, greatly distressed the opposite party in the island, and an expedition of Corsican exiles, which he now despatched from Tuscany, was successful in finally reconquering the country. To Napoleon this acquisition was due ; nor were the Directory insensible to its value. He, meanwhile, had heavier business on his hands.

‘The Austrian council well knew that Mantua was in excellent keeping ; and being now relieved on the Rhenish frontier, by the failure of Jourdan and Moreau’s attempts, were able to form once more a powerful armament on that of Italy. The supreme command was given to Marshal Alvinzi, a veteran of high reputation. He, having made extensive levies in Illyria, appeared at Friuli ; while Davidowich, with the remnant of Quasdonowich’s army, amply recruited among the bold peasantry of the Tyrol, and with fresh drafts from the Rhine, took ground above Trent. The marshal had in all 60,000 men under his orders. Bonaparte had received only twelve new battalions, to replace all the losses of those terrible campaigns, in which three imperial armies had already been annihilated.* The enemy’s superiority of numbers was once more such, that nothing, but the most masterly combinations on the part of the French general could have prevented them from sweeping everything before them in the plains of Lombardy.

‘Bonaparte heard in the beginning of October that Alvinzi’s columns were in motion : he had placed Vaubois to guard Trent, and Massena at Bassano to check the march of the field-marshal : but neither of these generals was able to hold his ground. The troops of Vaubois were driven from that position of Calliano, the strength of which has been already mentioned, under circumstances which Napoleon considered disgraceful to the character

* To replace all his losses in the two last campaigns, he had received only 7000 recruits.

of the French soldiery. Massena avoided battle ; but such was the overwhelming superiority of Alvinzi, that he was forced to abandon the position of Bassano. Napoleon himself hurried forward to sustain Massena : and a severe rencontre, in which either side claimed the victory, took place at Vicenza. The French, however, retreated, and Bonaparte fixed his head-quarters at Verona. The whole country between the Brenta and the Adige was in the enemy's hands ; while the still strong and determined garrison of Mantua in Napoleon's rear, rendering it indispensable for him to divide his forces, made his position eminently critical.

‘His first care was to visit the discomfited troops of Vaubois. “You have displeased me,” said he, “you have suffered yourselves to be driven from positions where a handful of determined men might have bid an army defiance. You are no longer French soldiers ! You belong not to the army of Italy.” At these words tears streamed down the rugged cheeks of the grenadiers. “Place us but once more in the van,” cried they, “and you shall judge whether we do not belong to the army of Italy.” The General dropped his angry tone ; and in the rest of the campaign no troops more distinguished themselves than these.

‘Having thus revived the ardour of his soldiery, Bonaparte concentrated his columns on the right of the Adige, while Alvinzi took up a very strong position on the heights of Caldiero, on the left bank, nearly opposite to Verona. In pursuance of the same system which had already so often proved fatal to his opponents, it was the object of Bonaparte to assault Alvinzi, and scatter his forces, ere they could be joined by Davidowich. He lost no time, therefore, in attacking the heights of Caldiero ; but in spite of all that Massena, who headed the charge, could do, the Austrians, strong in numbers and in position, repelled the assailants with great carnage. A terrible tempest prevailed during the action, and Napoleon, in his despatches, endeavoured to shift the blame to the elements.

‘The country behind Caldiero lying open to Davidowich, it became necessary to resort to other means of assault, or permit the dreaded junction to occur. The genius of Bonaparte suggested to him on this occasion a movement altogether unexpected. During the night, leaving 1,500 men under Kilmaine to guard Verona, he marched for some space rearwards, as if he had meant to retreat on Mantua, which the failure of his recent assault rendered not unlikely. But his columns were

ere long wheeled again towards the Adige ; and finding a bridge ready prepared, were at once placed on the same side of the river with the enemy,—but in the rear altogether of his position, amidst those wide-spreading morasses which cover the country about Arcola. This daring movement was devised to place Napoleon between Alvinzi and Davidowich ; but the unsafe nature of the ground, and the narrowness of the dykes, by which alone he could advance on Arcola, rendered victory difficult, and reverse most hazardous. He divided his men into three columns, and charged at daybreak (Nov. 15) by the three dykes which conduct to Arcola. The Austrian, not suspecting that the main body of the French had evacuated Verona, treated this at first as an affair of light troops ; but as day advanced the truth became apparent, and these narrow passages were defended with the most determined gallantry. Augereau headed the first column that reached the bridge of Arcola, and was there, after a desperate effort, driven back with great loss. Bonaparte, perceiving the necessity of carrying the point ere Alvinzi could arrive, now threw himself on the bridge, and seizing a standard, urged his grenadiers once more to the charge.

‘The fire was tremendous : once more the French gave way, Napoleon himself, lost in the tumult, was borne backwards, forced over the dyke, and had nearly been smothered in the morass, while some of the advancing Austrians were already between him and his baffled column. His imminent danger was observed : the soldiers caught the alarm, and rushing forwards, with the cry, “Save the General,” overthrew the Germans with irresistible violence, plucked Napoleon from the bog, and carried the bridge. This was the first battle of Arcola.

‘This movement revived in the Austrian lines their terror for the name of Bonaparte ; and Alvinzi saw that no time was to be lost if he meant to preserve his communication with Davidowich. He abandoned Caldiero, and gaining the open country behind Arcola, robbed his enemy for the moment of the advantage which his skill had gained. Napoleon, perceiving that Arcola was no longer in the rear of his enemy but in his front, and fearful lest Vaubois might be overwhelmed by Davidowich, while Alvinzi remained thus between him and the Brenta, evacuated Arcola, and retreated to Ronco.

‘Next morning, having ascertained that Davidowich had not been engaged with Vaubois, Napoleon once more advanced upon Arcola. The place was once more defended bravely, and once

more it was carried. But this second battle of Arcola proved no more decisive than the first ; for Alvinzi still contrived to maintain his main force unbroken in the difficult country behind ; and Bonaparte again retreated to Ronco.

‘The third day was decisive. On this occasion also he carried Arcola ; and, by two stratagems, was enabled to make his victory effectual. An ambuscade, planted among some willows, suddenly opened fire on a column of Croats, threw them into confusion, and, rushing from the concealment, crushed them down into the opposite bog, where most of them died. In one of his conversations at St. Helena, he thus told the sequel : “At Arcola I gained the battle with twenty-five horsemen. I perceived the critical moment of lassitude in either army—when the oldest and bravest would have been glad to be in their tents. All my men had been engaged. Three times I had been obliged to re-establish the battle. There remained to me but some twenty-five *guides*. I sent them round on the flank of the enemy with three trumpets, bidding them blow loud and charge furiously. *Here is the French cavalry*, was the cry ; and they took to flight.” . . . The Austrians doubted not that Murat and all the horse had forced a way through the bogs ; and at that moment Bonaparte, commanding a general assault in front, the confusion became hopeless. Alvinzi retreated finally, though in decent order, upon Montebello.

‘It was at Arcola that Muiron, who ever since the storming of Little Gibraltar had lived on terms of brotherlike intimacy with Napoleon, seeing a bomb about to explode, threw himself between it and his General, and thus saved his life at the cost of his own. Napoleon, to the end of his life, remembered and regretted this heroic friend.

‘In these three days Bonaparte lost 8000 men ; the slaughter among his opponents must have been terrible. Once more the rapid combinations of Napoleon had rendered all the efforts of the Austrian cabinet abortive. For two months after the last day of Arcola, he remained the undisturbed master of Lombardy. All that his enemy could shew, in set-off for the slaughter and discomfiture of Alvinzi’s campaign, was that they retained possession of Bassano and Trent, thus interrupting Bonaparte’s access to the Tyrol and Germany. This advantage was not trivial ; but it had been dearly bought.

‘A fourth army had been baffled ; but the resolution of the Imperial Court was indomitable, and new levies were diligently forwarded to reinforce Alvinzi. Once more (January 7, 1797)

the marshal found himself at the head of 60,000; once more his superiority over Napoleon's muster-roll was enormous; and once more he descended from the mountains with the hope of relieving Wurmser and conquering Lombardy. The fifth act of the tragedy was yet to be performed.

'We may here pause to notice some civil events of importance which occurred ere Alvinzi made his final descent. The success of the French naturally gave new vigour to the Italian party, who, chiefly in the large towns, were hostile to Austria, and desirous to settle their own government on the republican model. Two republics accordingly were organized; the Cispadane and the Transpadane—handmaids rather than sisters of the great French democracy. These events took place during the period of military inaction which followed the victories of Arcola. The new Republic hastened to repay Napoleon's favour by raising troops, and placed at his disposal a force which he considered as sufficient to keep the Papal army in check during the expected renewal of Alvinzi's efforts.

'Bonaparte at this period practised every art to make himself popular with the Italians; nor was it of little moment that they in fact regarded him more as their own countryman than a Frenchman; that their beautiful language was his mother tongue; that he knew their manners and their literature, and even in his conquering rapacity displayed his esteem for their arts.

'Alvinzi's preparations were in the meantime rapidly advancing. The enthusiasm of the Austrian gentry was effectually stirred by the apprehension of seeing the conqueror of Italy under the walls of Vienna, and volunteer corps were formed everywhere and marched upon the frontier. The gallant peasantry of the Tyrol had already displayed their zeal; nor did the previous reverses of Alvinzi prevent them from once more crowding to his standard. Napoleon proclaimed that every Tyrolese caught in arms should be shot as a brigand. Alvinzi replied, that for every murdered peasant he would hang a French prisoner of war: Bonaparte rejoined, that the first execution of this threat would be instantly followed by the gibbeting of Alvinzi's own nephew, who was in his hands. These ferocious threats were laid aside, when time had been given for reflection; and either general prepared to carry on the war according to the old rules, which are at least sufficiently severe.

'Alvinzi sent a peasant across the country to find his way

if possible into the beleaguered city of Mantua, and give Wurmser notice that he was once more ready to attempt his relief. The veteran was commanded to make what diversion he could in favour of the approaching army; and if things came to the worst to fight his way out of Mantua, retire on Romagna, and put himself at the head of the Papal forces. The spy who carried these tidings was intercepted, and dragged into the presence of Napoleon. The terrified man confessed that he had swallowed the ball of wax in which the despatch was wrapped. His stomach was compelled to surrender its contents; and Bonaparte prepared to meet his enemy. Leaving Serrurier to keep up the blockade of Mantua, he hastened to resume his central position at Verona, from which he could, according to circumstances, march with convenience on whatever line the Austrian main body might choose for their advance.

‘The Imperialists, as if determined to profit by no lesson, once more descended from the Tyrol upon two different lines of march; Alvinzi himself choosing that of the Upper Adige; while Provera headed a second army, with orders to follow the Brenta, and then, striking across to the Lower Adige, join the marshal before the walls of Mantua. Could they have combined their forces there, and delivered Wurmser, there was hardly a doubt that the French must retreat before so vast an army as would then have faced them. But Napoleon was destined once more to dissipate all these victorious dreams. He had posted Joubert at Rivoli, to dispute that important position, should the campaign open with an attempt to force it by Alvinzi, while Augereau’s division was to watch the march of Provera. He remained himself at Verona until he could learn with certainty by which of these generals the first grand assault was to be made. On the evening of the 13th of January, tidings were brought him that Joubert had all that day been maintaining his ground with difficulty; and he instantly hastened to what now appeared to be the proper scene of action for himself.

‘Arriving about two in the morning (by another of his almost incredible forced marches) on the heights of Rivoli, he, the moonlight being clear, could distinguish five separate encampments, with innumerable watch-fires, in the valley below. His lieutenant, confounded by the display of this gigantic force, was in the very act of abandoning the position. Napoleon instantly checked this movement; and bringing up more

battalions, orced the Croats from an eminence which they had already seized on the first symptoms of the French retreat. Napoleon's keen eye, surveying the position of the five encampments below, penetrated the secret of Alvinzi; namely, that his artillery had not yet arrived, otherwise he would not have occupied ground so distant from the object of attack. He concluded that the Austrian did not mean to make his grand assault very early in the morning, and resolved to force him to anticipate that movement. For this purpose, he took all possible pains to conceal his own arrival; and prolonged, by a series of petty manœuvres, the enemy's belief that he had to do with a mere outpost of the French. Alvinzi swallowed the deceit; and, instead of advancing on some great and well-arranged system, suffered his several columns to endeavour to force the heights by insulated movements, which the real strength of Napoleon easily enabled him to baffle. It is true that at one moment the bravery of the Germans had nearly overthrown the French on a point of pre-eminent importance; but Napoleon himself galloping to the spot, roused by his voice and action the division of Massena, who, having marched all night, had lain down to rest in the extreme of weariness, and seconded by them and their gallant general,* swept everything before him. The French artillery was in position: the Austrian's (according to Napoleon's shrewd guess) had not yet come up, and this circumstance decided the fortune of the day. The cannonade from the heights, backed by successive charges of horse and foot, rendered every attempt to storm the summit abortive; and the main body of the Imperialists was already in confusion, and, indeed, in flight, before one of their divisions, which had been sent round to outflank Bonaparte, and take higher ground in his rear, was able to execute its errand. When, accordingly, this division (that of Lusignan) at length achieved its destined object—it did so, not to complete the misery of a routed, but to swell the prey of a victorious enemy. Instead of cutting off the retreat of Joubert, Lusignan found himself insulated from Alvinzi, and forced to lay down his arms to Bonaparte. "Here was a good plan," said Napoleon, "but these Austrians are not apt to calculate the value of minutes." Had Lusignan gained the rear of the French an hour earlier, while the contest was still hot in front of the heights of Rivoli, he might have made the 14th of January one of the darkest,

* Hence, in the sequel, Massena's title, 'Duke of Rivoli.'

instead of one the brightest days, in the military chronicles of Napoleon.

‘He, who in the course of this trying day had had three horses shot under him, hardly waited to see Lusignan surrender, but entrusted his friends, Massena, Murat, and Joubert, with the task of pursuing the flying columns of Alvinzi. He had heard during the battle, that Provera had forced his way to the Lago di Guarda, and was already, by means of boats, in communication with Mantua. The force of Augereau having proved insufficient to oppose the march of the Imperialists’ second column, it was high time that Napoleon himself should hurry with reinforcements to the Lower Adige, and prevent Wurmser from either housing Provera, or joining him in the open field, and so effecting the escape of his own still formidable garrison, whether to the Tyrol or the Romagna.

‘Having marched all night and all next day, Napoleon reached the vicinity of Mantua late on the 15th. He found the enemy strongly posted, and Serrurier’s situation highly critical. A regiment of Provera’s hussars had but a few hours before nearly established themselves in the suburb of St. George. This Austrian corps had been clothed in white cloaks, resembling those of a well-known French regiment ; and advancing towards the gate, would certainly have been admitted as friends, but for the sagacity of one sergeant, who could not help fancying that the white cloaks had too much of the gloss of novelty about them, to have stood the tear and wear of three Bonapartean campaigns. This danger had been avoided, but the utmost vigilance was necessary. The French general himself passed the night in walking about the outposts, so great was his anxiety.

‘At one of these he found a grenadier asleep by the root of a tree ; and taking his gun, without wakening him, performed a sentinel’s duty in his place, for about half an hour ; when the man, starting from his slumbers, perceived with terror and despair the countenance and occupation of his general. He fell on his knees before him. “My friend,” said Napoleon, “here is your musket. You had fought hard, and marched long, and your sleep is excusable : but a moment’s inattention might at present ruin the army. I happened to be awake, and have held your post for you. You will be more careful another time.”

‘It is needless to say how the devotion of his men was nourished by such anecdotes as these flying ever and anon from column to column. Next morning there ensued a hot skirmish, recorded as the battle of St. George. Provera was compelled to

retreat, and Wurmser, who had sallied out and seized the causeway and citadel of La Favorita, was fain to retreat within its old walls, in consequence of a desperate assault headed by Napoleon in person.

Provera now found himself entirely cut off from Alvinzi, and surrounded with the French. He and 5000 men laid down their arms on the 16th of January. Various bodies of the Austrian force, scattered over the countries between the Adige and the Brenta, followed the example; * and the brave Wurmser, whose provisions were by this time exhausted, found himself at length under the necessity of sending an offer of capitulation.

General Serrurier, as commander of the blockade, received Klenau, the bearer of Wurmser's message, and heard him state, with the pardonable artifice usual on such occasions, that his master was still in a condition to hold out considerably longer, unless honourable terms were granted. Napoleon had hitherto been seated in a corner of the tent wrapped in his cloak; he now advanced to the Austrian, who had no suspicion in whose presence he had been speaking, and taking his pen, wrote down the conditions which he was willing to grant. "These," said he, "are the terms to which your general's bravery entitles him. He may have them to-day; a week, a month hence, he shall have no worse. Meantime, tell him that General Bonaparte is about to set out for Rome." The envoy now recognized Napoleon; and on reading the paper perceived that the proposed terms were more liberal than he had dared to hope for. The capitulation was forthwith signed.

On the 2nd of February, Wurmser and his garrison marched out of Mantua; but when the aged chief was to surrender his sword, he found only Serrurier ready to receive it. Napoleon's generosity, in avoiding being present personally to witness the humiliation of this distinguished veteran, forms one of the most pleasing traits in his story. The Directory had urged him to far different conduct. He treated their suggestions with scorn: "I have granted the Austrian," he wrote to them, "such terms as were, in my judgment, due to a brave and honourable enemy, and to the dignity of the French Republic."

The loss of the Austrians at Mantua amounted, first and last, to not less than 27,000 men. Besides innumerable military stores, upwards of 500 brass cannon fell into the hands of the

* Such was the prevailing terror, that one body of 6000 under Rene surrendered to a French officer who had hardly 500 men with him.

conqueror; and Augereau was sent to Paris to present the Directory with *sixty* stand of colours. He was received with tumults of exultation, such as might have been expected, on an occasion so glorious, from a people less vivacious than the French.

‘The surrender of Provera and Wurmser, following the total rout of Alvinzi, placed Lombardy wholly in the hands of Napoleon; and he now found leisure to avenge himself on the Pope for those hostile demonstrations which, as yet, he had been contented to hold in check. The terror with which the priestly court of the Vatican received the tidings of the utter destruction of the Austrian army, and of the irresistible conqueror’s march southwards, did not prevent the Papal troops from making some efforts to defend the territories of the Holy See. General Victor, with 4000 French and as many Lombards, advanced upon the route of Imola. A Papal force, in numbers about equal, lay encamped on the river Senio in front of that town. Monks with crucifixes in their hands ran through the lines, exciting them to fight bravely for their country and their faith. The French general, by a rapid movement, threw his horse across the stream a league or two higher up, and then charged with his infantry through the Senio in their front. The resistance was brief. The Pope’s army, composed mostly of new recruits, retreated in confusion. Faenza was carried by the bayonet. Colli and 3000 more laid down their arms: and the strong town of Ancona was occupied. On the 10th of February the French entered Loretto, and rifled that celebrated seat of superstition of whatever treasures it still retained; the most valuable articles had already been packed up and sent to Rome for safety. Victor then turned westwards from Ancona, with the design to unite with another French column which had advanced into the Papal dominion by Perugia.

‘The panic which the French advance had by this time spread was such that the Pope had no hope but in submission. The peasants lately transformed into soldiers abandoned everywhere their arms, and fled in straggling groups to their native villages. The alarm in Rome itself recalled the days of Alaric.

‘The conduct of Bonaparte at this critical moment was worthy of that good sense which formed the original foundation of his successes, and of which the madness of pampered ambition could alone deprive him afterwards. He well knew that, of all the inhabitants of the Roman territories, the class who

contemplated his approach with the deepest terror were the unfortunate French priests, whom the revolution had made exiles from their native soil. One of these unhappy gentlemen came forth in his despair, and surrendering himself at the French head-quarters, said he knew his fate was sealed, and that they might as well lead him at once to the gallows. Bonaparte dismissed this person with courtesy, and issued a proclamation that none of the class should be molested ; on the contrary, allotting to each of them the means of existence in monasteries, wherever his arms were or should be predominant.

‘This conduct, taken together with other circumstances of recent occurrence, was well calculated to nourish in the breast of the Pope, the hope that the victorious General of France had, by this time, discarded the ferocious hostility of the revolutionary government against the Church of which he was head. He hastened, however, to open a negotiation, and Napoleon received his envoy not merely with civility, but with professions of the profoundest personal reverence for the holy father. The Treaty of Tolentino (12th Feb., 1797) followed. By this the Pope conceded formally (for the first time) his ancient territory of Avignon ; he resigned the legations of Ferrara, Bologna, and Romagna, and the port of Ancona ; agreed to pay about a million and a half sterling, and to execute to the utmost the provisions of Bologna with respect to works of art. On these terms Pius was to remain nominal master of some shreds of the patrimony of St. Peter.’

CHAPTER IV.

IN the preceding chapter we have given a rapid account of the extraordinary campaign of the Army of Italy, to the Treaty of Tolentino. It is the most splendid and celebrated of which we have any account, and the more remarkable, in having been directed by the surpassing genius of a young hero of six-and-twenty, who, with a very inferior force, beat successively the well-appointed armies of the King of Sardinia and the Emperor of Austria. These armies were commanded by their bravest and most experienced generals ;—but no experience was equal to the genius, the vigilance, and activity of Bonaparte. The oldest and most experienced commanders of the Emperor of Austria complained that he set aside all the ordinary rules of war, and would not fight according to system. Bonaparte was

an inventor, and disregarded system ; his object was to destroy his enemy, and in this he succeeded in a remarkable manner.

‘He was now master of all Northern Italy, with the exception of the territories of Venice. He heard without surprise that the Doge had been raising new levies, and that the senate could command an army of 50,000, composed chiefly of fierce and semi-barbarous Slavonian mercenaries. He demanded what these demonstrations meant, and was answered that Venice had no desire but to maintain a perfect neutrality. After some negotiation, he told the Venetian envoy, that he granted the prayer of his masters. “Be neuter,” said he, “but see that your neutrality be indeed sincere and perfect. If any insurrection occur in my rear, to cut off my communications in the event of my marching on Germany—if any movement whatever betray the disposition of your senate to aid the enemies of France, be sure that vengeance will follow—from that hour the independence of Venice has ceased to be.”

‘More than a month had now elapsed since Alvinzi’s defeat at Rivoli ; in nine days the war with the Pope had reached its close ; and, having left some garrisons in the towns on the Adige, to watch the neutrality of Venice, Napoleon hastened to carry the war into the hereditary dominions of the Emperor. Twenty thousand fresh troops had recently joined his victorious standard from France ; and at the head of perhaps a larger force than he had ever before mustered, he proceeded to the frontier of the Frioul, where, according to his information, the main army of Austria, recruited once more to its original strength, was preparing to open a sixth campaign—under the orders, not of Alvinzi, but of a general young like himself, and hitherto eminently successful—the same who had already by his combinations baffled two such masters in the art of war as Jourdan and Moreau—the Archduke Charles ; a prince on whose high talents the last hopes of the empire seemed to repose.

‘To give the details of the sixth campaign, which now commenced, would be to repeat the story which has been already five times told.

‘Bonaparte found the Archduke posted behind the river Tagliamento, in front of the rugged Carinthian mountains which guard the passage in that quarter from Italy to Germany. Detaching Massena to the Piave, where the Austrian division of Lusignan were in observation, he himself determined to charge the Archduke in front. Massena was successful in driving Lusignan before him, as far as Belluno (where a rear-

guard of 500 surrendered), and thus turned the Austrian flank. Bonaparte then attempted and effected the passage of the Tagliamento. After a great and formal display of his forces, which was met by similar demonstrations on the Austrian side of the river, he suddenly broke up his line and retreated. The Archduke, knowing that the French had been marching all the night before, concluded that the General wished to defer the battle till another day ; and in like manner withdrew to his camp. About two hours after Napoleon rushed with his whole army, who had merely lain down in ranks, upon the margin of the Tagliamento, no longer adequately guarded—and had forded the stream ere the Austrian line of battle could be formed. In the action which followed (March 12) the troops of the Archduke displayed much gallantry, but every effort to dislodge Napoleon failed ; at length retreat was judged necessary. The French followed hard behind. They stormed Gradisca, where they made 5000 prisoners ; and—the Archduke pursuing his retreat—occupied in the course of a few days Trieste, Fiume, and every stronghold in Carinthia. In the course of a campaign of twenty days, the Austrians fought Bonaparte ten times, but the overthrow on the Tagliamento was never recovered ; and the Archduke, after defending Styria inch by inch as he had Carinthia, at length adopted the resolution of reaching Vienna by forced marches, there to gather round him whatever force the loyalty of his nation could muster, and make a last stand beneath the walls of the capital.

‘This plan, at first sight the mere dictate of despair, was in truth that of a wise and prudent general. The Archduke had received intelligence from two quarters of events highly unfavourable to the French. General Laudon, the Austrian commander on the Tyrol frontier, had descended thence with forces sufficient to overwhelm Bonaparte’s lieutenants on the Upper Adige, and was already in possession of the whole Tyrol, and of several of the Lombard towns. Meanwhile the Venetian Senate, on hearing of these Austrian successes, had plucked up courage to throw aside their flimsy neutrality, and not only declared war against France, but encouraged their partisans in Verona to open the contest with an inhuman massacre of the French wounded in the hospitals of that city. The vindictive Italians, wherever the French party was inferior in numbers, resorted to similar atrocities. The Venetian army passed the frontier : and, in effect, Bonaparte’s means of deriving supplies of any kind from his rear were for the time wholly cut off.

‘Vienna was panic-struck on hearing that Bonaparte had stormed the passes of the Julian Alps ; the imperial family sent their treasure into Hungary ; and the Archduke was ordered to avail himself of the first pretence which circumstances might afford for the opening of a negotiation.

‘That prince had already, acting on his own judgment and feelings, dismissed such an occasion with civility and with coldness. Napoleon had addressed a letter to his Imperial Highness from Clagenfurt, in which he called on him, as a brother-soldier, to consider the certain miseries and the doubtful successes of war, and put an end to the campaign by a fair and equitable treaty. The Archduke replied, that he regarded with the highest esteem the personal character of his correspondent, but that the Austrian government had committed to his trust the guidance of a particular army, not the diplomatic business of the empire. The prince, on receiving these new instructions from Vienna perceived, however reluctantly, that the line of his duty was altered ; and the result was a series of negotiations—which ended in the provisional treaty of Leoben, signed April 18, 1797.’

The preceding account of the Italian campaign has been supplied to connect the narrative of Bourrienne ; he was now about to join the General-in-chief at the head-quarters of the Army of Italy, and he did not leave him for a moment until the end of 1802.

It is impossible for me to avoid occasionally intruding myself in the course of these memoirs ; but I owe it to myself to shew that I was no intruder, nor pursued, as an obscure intriguer, the path of fortune. I was influenced more by friendship than by ambition when I took a part on the theatre where the rising glory of the future Emperor already shed a lustre on all who were attached to his destiny. It will be seen from the following letters with what confidence I was then honoured :—

‘HEAD-QUARTERS, AT MILAN,

‘20 Prairial, year IV.

‘June 8, 1796.

‘The General-in-chief has charged me, my dear Bourrienne, to make known to you the pleasure he received on hearing of you, and his desire that you should join us. Take your departure, then, my dear Bourrienne, and arrive quickly. You will be sure of obtaining the testimonies of affection which

you inspire from all who know you ; and we much regret that you have not been here to have a share in our success. The campaign which we have just concluded will be celebrated in the records of history. It is surprising that with less than 30,000 men, in a state of almost complete destitution, we have, in less than two months, beaten, eight different times, an army of from 65 to 70,000 men, obliged the King of Sardinia to make a humiliating peace, and driven the Austrians from Italy. The last victory, of which you have doubtless had an account, the passage of the Mincio, has closed our labours. There now remain for us the siege of Mantua and the castle of Milan ; but these obstacles will not detain us long. Adieu, my dear Bourrienne ; I repeat General Bonaparte's request that you should repair hither, and the testimony of his desire to see you. Receive, &c.

‘ MARMONT,

‘ Chief of Brigade, and Aide-de-camp to the General-in-chief.’

Eleven months after the receipt of the above letter I received other letters from Marmont, as well as from the General-in-chief, urging me to hasten my journey to join them at headquarters ; and at the moment I was about to depart I received the following letter :—

HEAD-QUARTERS, JUDENBURGH,

‘ 10 Germinal, year V.

‘ April 8, 1797.

‘ The General-in-chief again orders me, my dear Bourrienne, to urge you to come to him quickly. We are in the midst of success and triumphs. The German campaign commenced in a manner more brilliant than that of Italy. You may judge what a promise it holds out to us. Come, my dear Bourrienne, immediately—yield to our solicitations—share our pains and pleasures, and you will add to our enjoyments.

‘ I have directed the courier to pass through Sens, that he may deliver this letter to you, and bring me back your answer.

‘ MARMONT.’

To the above letter this order was subjoined—

‘ The citizen Fauvelet de Bourrienne is ordered to leave Sens, and repair immediately by post to the head-quarters of the Army of Italy.

‘ BONAPARTE.’

My reason for not accepting these friendly invitations before arose from my not having been able to obtain the erasure of my name from the emigrant list, and which I did not obtain until a later period, through the influence of the General-in-chief. But now I determined without hesitation to set out for the army. General Bonaparte's order, which I registered at the municipality of Sens, served for a passport, which might otherwise have been refused me.

I did not leave Sens until the 11th of April, and arrived in the Venetian States at the moment when the insurrection against the French broke out. I had passed through Verona on the 16th, where I remained two hours, little expecting the massacre which afterwards took place. When about a league from the town, I was stopped by a band of insurgents, who obliged me to call out, 'Long live St. Mark !' an order with which I speedily complied, and passed on. On the following day all the French who were confined in the hospitals were butchered, amidst the ringing of the church bells, and by the encouragement of the priests. Upwards of four hundred of the French were killed.

The last days of Venice were now approaching. Two causes powerfully contributed to hasten her downfall, after an existence of twelve hundred years : the successes of the French had propagated the principles of the revolution in Italy ; the Archduke of Milan had been deposed ; and why should not the Doge of Venice cease to rule ? The spirit of the revolution was gradually diffused, and discontent rapidly spread along with it. The difference between the new doctrines and the gloomy institutions of Venice was too marked not to occasion a desire of change. This was followed by a desire on the part of the patriotic party to revolutionize the Venetian States on the main land, to unite them with Lombardy, and to form of the whole one republic. In fact, the force of circumstances alone brought on the insurrection of those territories. The pursuit of the Archduke Charles into the heart of Austria encouraged the Venetian Senate to hope that it would be easy to annihilate the feeble remnant of the French army, which was scattered throughout their territory : but in this they were disappointed. Bonaparte skilfully took advantage of the disturbances, and the massacres consequent on them, to adopt towards the Senate the tone of an offended conqueror. He wrote to the Directory that the only part they could take was to destroy this sanguinary and ferocious government, and to erase the Venetian name from the face of the earth.

On returning from Leoben,* he, without ceremony, seized Venice, changed the established government, and took possession of her territories ; and, at the negotiations of Campo-Formio, he found himself able to dispose of them as he pleased, in compensation for the concessions which had been exacted from Austria. The fate of this republic was now sealed—it disappeared from the list of states without a struggle and without noise. He executed severe revenge. Venice was called upon to pay 3,000,000 francs in gold, and as many more in naval stores ; and to deliver up five ships of war, twenty of the best pictures, and 500 manuscripts.

In their last agony the Venetian Senate made a vain effort to secure the personal protection of the General, by offering him a purse of seven millions of francs. He rejected this with scorn. He had already treated in the same style a bribe of four millions, tendered on the part of the Duke of Modena. Austria herself, it is said, did not hesitate to tamper in the same manner, though far more magnificently, as became her resources, with his Republican virtue. He was offered, if the story be true, an independent German principality for himself and his heirs. ‘I thank the Emperor,’ he answered, ‘but if greatness is to be mine, it shall come from France.’

The Venetian Senate were guilty of another and a more inexcusable piece of meanness. They seized the person of Count D’Entraigues, a French emigrant, who had been living in their city as agent for the exiled house of Bourbon ; and surrendered him and all his papers to the victorious General. Bonaparte discovered among these documents ample evidence that Pichegru, the French general on the Rhine, and universally honoured as the conqueror of Holland, had some time before this hearkened to the proposals of the Bourbon princes ; and had, among other efforts to favour the royal cause, not hesitated even to misconduct his military movements with a view to the downfall of the government which had entrusted him with his command.

This was a secret, the importance of which Napoleon could well appreciate ; and he forthwith communicated it to the Directory at Paris.

* The Doge and Senate hastened to send offers of submission, but their messengers were treated with anger and contempt.

‘French blood has been treacherously shed,’ said Napoleon ; ‘if you could offer me the treasures of Peru—if you could cover your whole dominion with gold—the atonement would be insufficient: the lion of St. Mark must lick the dust.’

CHAPTER V

I JOINED Bonaparte at Leoben, on the 19th of April, the day after the signature of the preliminaries of peace. Here ceased my intercourse with him as equal with equal, companion with companion ; and those relations commenced in which I saw him great, powerful, and surrounded with homage and glory. I no longer addressed him as formerly ; I was too well aware of his personal importance. His position had placed too great a distance in the social scale between us for me not to perceive the necessity of conforming myself accordingly. I made with pleasure, and without regret, the easy sacrifice of familiarity of *thee* and *thouing*, and other trifles. He said, in a loud voice, when I entered the apartment in which he stood surrounded by a brilliant staff, 'I am glad to see you, at last.' As soon as we were alone, he gave me to understand that he was pleased with my reserve. I was immediately placed at the head of his cabinet ; I spoke to him the same evening respecting the insurrection in the Venetian States ; of the dangers which threatened the French, and of those which I had myself escaped. 'Be tranquil,' said he, 'these rascals shall pay for it ; their republic has had its day.'

In the first conversation which Bonaparte had with me I thought I could perceive that he was dissatisfied with the preliminaries of peace. He had wished to advance with his army upon Vienna, and, before offering peace to the Archduke Charles, he wrote to the Directory that he wished to follow up his successes ; but to be enabled to do so, he wished to be sustained by the co-operation of the armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and that of the Rhine. The Directory replied that he must not reckon on a diversion in Germany, and that the armies alluded to were not to pass the Rhine. This resolution, so unexpected, obliged him to terminate his triumphs, and renounce, for the present, his favourite project of planting the standards of the Republic upon the walls of Vienna.

In traversing the Venetian States to return to Milan, he frequently spoke of the affairs of that republic ; and constantly stated that he was originally entirely unconnected with the insurrections which had taken place ; but as they had occurred he was not sorry for it, for that he certainly would

take advantage of them in the settlement of the definitive treaty.

We arrived at Milan on the 5th of May. Bonaparte took up his residence at Montebello, a beautiful seat about three leagues from that city. Here commenced the negotiations for the peace, which was terminated at Passeriano. During the course of these negotiations, the Directory ordered the General-in-chief to demand the liberation of La Fayette, Latour-Maubourg, and Bureau de Puzy, who had been detained at Olmutz, since 1792, as prisoners of state. He executed this commission with as much pleasure as zeal; but he met with many difficulties, and it required all his vigour of character to enable him to succeed at the end of three months. They obtained their freedom in August 1797, and received it with that feeling of independence and dignity which a long and rigid captivity had not been able to destroy.

It was now the month of July, and the negotiations were still protracted, and the obstacles which were continually recurring could only be attributed to the artful policy of Austria, who seemed anxious to gain time. The news which he received at this time from Paris occupied his whole attention. He beheld with extreme displeasure, and even with violent anger, the manner in which the leading orators in the councils, and pamphlets written in a similar spirit, spoke of him, his army, his victories, the affairs of Venice, and the national glory. He regarded with indignation the suspicions which they endeavoured to throw upon his conduct and his ulterior views; and was furious at seeing his services depreciated, his glory and that of his companions in arms disparaged. On this occasion he wrote to the Directory a very spirited letter, and demanded his dismissal.

At this time it was generally reported that Carnot, from his office in the Luxembourg, had traced out the plan of those operations by which Bonaparte had acquired so much glory; and that to Berthier he was indebted for their successful execution: and many persons are still of this opinion; but there is no foundation for the belief.—Bonaparte was an inventor, and not an imitator. It is true that, at the commencement of these brilliant campaigns, the Directory had transmitted to him certain instructions; but he always followed his own plans, and wrote that all would be lost if he were blindly to put in practice movements conceived at a distance from the scene of action. He also offered his resignation. The Directory, at length, ad-

mitted the difficulty of dictating military operations at Paris, and left everything to him—and certainly, there was not a movement or operation which did not originate with himself. Bonaparte was exceedingly sensitive on this subject ; and one day he said to me, ‘As for Berthier, since you have been with me, you see what he is—he is a blockhead : yet it is he who has done all.’ Berthier, however, was a man of honour, courage, and probity, and exceedingly regular in the performance of his duties, and very efficient as the head of the staff of the army. This is all the praise that can be given him, and, indeed, all that he desired. Bonaparte had a great regard for Berthier, and he in return looked up to him with so much admiration, that he never could have presumed to oppose his plans, or give any advice. Bonaparte was a man of habit, and was much attached to all the people about him, and did not like new faces.

At this time young Beauharnois came to Milan ; he was then in his seventeenth year, and had lived in Paris with his mother since the departure of Bonaparte. On his arrival he immediately entered the service, as aide-de-camp to the General-in-chief, who felt for him an affection which was justified by his many good qualities. Eugene had an excellent heart, a manly courage, a prepossessing exterior, with an obliging and amiable temper. His life is matter of history ; and those who knew him will agree that his maturer years did not disappoint the promise of his youth. Already he displayed the courage of a soldier, and at a later period he evinced the talent of a statesman. From the time of his arrival in Milan till the end of the year 1802, I never lost sight of him for a moment ; and during an intimacy of several years, nothing has occurred that would induce me to recall a single word of this praise.

Bonaparte was justly of opinion that the tardiness of the negotiations, and the difficulties which incessantly arose, were founded on the expectation of an event which would change the government of France, and render the chances of peace more favourable to Austria. He urged the Directory to put an end to this state of things—to arrest the emigrants, to destroy the influence of foreigners, to recall the armies, and to suppress the journals, which he said were sold to England, and were more sanguinary than Marat ever was. He despised the Directory, which he accused of weakness, indecision, extravagance, and a perseverance in a system degrading to the national glory.

He had long foreseen the struggle about to take place between the partisans of Royalty and the Republic, and had been urged by his friends to choose his party, or to act for himself; but before deciding, he first thought of his own interest. He did not consider that he had yet done enough to bear him out in seizing the supreme power, which, under existing circumstances, he might easily have done. He was satisfied, for the present, with joining that party which appeared to have the support of public opinion. I know he was determined upon marching to Paris with 25,000 men, if affairs appeared to take a turn unfavourable to the Republic, which he preferred to Royalty, because he expected to derive greater advantages from it. He carefully arranged his plan of the campaign. He considered that in defending this so-much-despised Directory, he was only protecting a power which appeared to have no other object than to occupy a situation until he was prepared to fill it. His resolution of passing the Alps with 25,000 men, and marching by Lyons upon Paris, was well known in the capital, and everyone was occupied in discussing the consequences of this passage of another Rubicon. Determined on supporting the majority of the Directory, and of combating the Royalist faction, he sent his aide-de-camp, La Valette, to Paris, towards the end of July, and Augereau followed him very shortly after. Bonaparte wrote to the Directory, that Augereau had solicited permission to go to Paris on his own private affairs; but the truth is, that he was sent expressly to urge on the revolution which was preparing against the Royalist party, and the minority of the Directory. Bernadotte was subsequently despatched on the same errand; but he did not take any great part in the affair—he was always prudent.

The Republican members of the Directory were Barras, Rewbell, and La Reveillière. Carnot, and Barthelemy were the other two, who were considered favourable to the emigrants, and to the re-establishment of monarchy.

The crisis of the 18th Fructidor (Sept. 5, 1797), which brought a triumph to the Republican party, and retarded for three years the extinction of the pentarchy, presents one of the most remarkable events in its short and feeble existence. The Republican Directors had determined upon arresting those members of the Council of Five Hundred, and of the Ancients, who were obnoxious to them; and to secure their success, they appointed Augereau military commandant, which was the object of Bonaparte's wishes.

Various plans were proposed and abandoned, and La Valette writes to Bonaparte on the 7th that the obstacles which occasioned it were—First, Disagreement respecting the means of execution. Second, The fear of engaging in a contest of which the success is not doubtful, but of which the consequences are uncertain. Third, the embarrassment which would be caused by the Council of Ancients, who are determined to oppose no resistance, and by the Council of Five Hundred, who must be driven away, because they will not go quietly. And Fourth, The fear of the Babœuf reaction.

However, these fears were got over, and they determined upon a vigorous stroke. The fear of being anticipated, at length caused measures to be hurried forward.

At midnight, on the 17th, Augereau despatched orders to all the troops to march upon the points specified. Before day-break the bridges and principal squares were planted with cannon. At daybreak the halls of the Council were surrounded, the guards of the Council fraternized with the troops, and forty of the most distinguished members of the Council of Five Hundred, and thirty-four of that of the Ancients, supposed most devoted to royalty, were arrested, and conducted to the Temple. Among the intended victims were Carnot and Barthelemy, both members of the Directory. Barthelemy fell into the hands of his pursuers; but Carnot effected his escape. These Directors were replaced by Merlin and François de Neufchateau, both zealous Republicans. The arrested deputies were afterwards banished to French Cayenne, where the greater part of them perished through the pestilential influence of the climate.—It was by this means that the new revolution, as it was called, of the 18th Fructidor (Sept. 5, 1797) was effected.

Bonaparte was intoxicated with joy when he heard of the happy issue of the 18th Fructidor. Its results produced the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, and the fall of the Royalist party, which for some months had disturbed his tranquillity. The *Clichians* had objected to receive Joseph Bonaparte as the deputy for Liamone, into the Council of Five Hundred. His brother's victory removed the difficulty; but the General soon perceived that the victors abused their power, and were again compromising the safety of the Republic, by reviving the principles of revolutionary government.

The Directory were alarmed at his discontent, and offended by his censure. They conceived the singular idea of opposing to him Augereau, of whose blind devotion they had received

many proofs ; and this general they appointed commander of the Army of Germany. Augereau, whose extreme vanity was notorious, believed himself in a situation to compete with Bonaparte. His arrogance was founded on the circumstance that, with a numerous body of troops, he had arrested some unarmed representatives, and torn the epaulets from the shoulders of the commandant of the guard of the Councils. The Directory and he filled the head-quarters at Passeriano with spies and intriguers.

Bonaparte, who was informed of everything, laughed at the Directory, and tendered his resignation, in order that he might be requested to continue in command. He felt very indignant at this conduct on the part of the Directory, and complained to them with great spirit of the ingratitude which the government had shown to him, and insisted that another should be appointed to succeed him in the command. To these remonstrances the Directory replied without delay, and endeavoured to repel the reproaches of mistrust and ingratitude, of which he had accused them, and to assure him of the entire confidence of the government.

After this event Bonaparte became more powerful, and Austria less haughty and confident. The Directory had before that period been desirous of peace, and Austria, hoping that the events which were expected at Paris would be favourable to her interest, had created obstacles for the purpose of delay. But now she was again anxious for peace ; and Bonaparte, still distrusting the Directory, was fearful lest they had penetrated his secret, and attributed his powerful concurrence on the 18th Fructidor to the true cause—his personal views of ambition. Some of the General's friends also wrote to him from Paris, and, for my part, I never ceased repeating to him, that the peace, the power of making which he held in his own hands, would render him far more popular than the renewal of hostilities, undertaken with all the chances of success and reverse.

These feelings, together with the early appearance of bad weather, precipitated his determination. On being informed on the 13th of October, at daybreak, that the mountains were covered with snow, he feigned at first to disbelieve it, and leaping from his bed, he ran to the window, and convinced of the sudden change, he calmly said, 'What ! before the middle of October ! what a country is this ! well, we must make peace.' After having hastily put on his clothes, he shut himself up with me in his closet, and carefully reviewed the returns from the

different corps of the army. 'Here are,' said he, 'nearly 80,000 effective men ; I feed, I pay them : but I can bring but 60,000 into the field on the day of battle. I shall gain it ; but afterwards my force will be reduced 20,000 men, by killed, wounded, and prisoners. Then how can I oppose all the Austrian forces that will march to the protection of Venice ? It would be a month before the armies of the Rhine could support me, if they were able to do so ; and in fifteen days all the roads will be deeply covered with snow. It is settled—I will make peace. Venice shall pay for the expense of the war, and our boundary shall be the Rhine. The Directory and the lawyers may say what they please.'

It is well known that, by the treaty of Campo-Formio, the belligerent powers made peace at the expense of the Republic of Venice, which at first had nothing to do in the quarrel, and which only interfered at a late period, probably against her inclination, and impelled by the force of circumstances. But what has been the result of this great political spoliation ? A part of the Venetian territory was adjudged to the Cisalpine Republic : it is now in the possession of Austria. Another considerable portion, and the capital itself, fell to the lot of Austria in compensation for the Belgic provinces and Lombardy. Austria now occupies Lombardy, and the additions then made to it. Belgium came into the possession of the house of Orange, but is now become an independent kingdom. France obtained Corfu and some of the Ionian Islands ; these now belong to England.

Thus have we been gloriously conquering for Austria and England. An ancient state is overturned without noise, and its provinces, after being divided among the neighbouring states, are now all under the dominion of Austria. We do not possess a foot of ground in all the fine countries we conquered, and which served as compensation for the immense acquisitions of the house of Hapsburgh in Italy. This time she was aggrandised by a war which was to herself most disastrous.

The Directory was far from being satisfied with the treaty of Campo-Formio, and with difficulty resisted the temptation of not ratifying it. But all their objections were made in vain. Bonaparte made no scruple of disregarding his instructions.

CHAPTER VI

THE 18th Fructidor, without doubt, powerfully contributed to the conclusion of peace at Campo-Formio. The Directory, hitherto, had not been very pacifically inclined, but having struck what is called a *coup d'état*, they at length saw the necessity of obtaining absolution from the discontented by giving peace to France. And Austria, at the same time, observing the complete failure of the royalist plots in the interior of France, thought it high time to conclude a treaty with the Republic, which, notwithstanding all the defeats she had sustained, would still leave her a preponderating influence in Italy.

The campaign of Italy, so fertile in the glorious achievements of arms, had also the effect of tempering the fierceness of the republican spirit which had spread over France. Bonaparte, negotiating with princes and their ministers on a footing of equality, but still with all that superiority to which victory and his genius entitled him, gradually taught foreign courts to be familiar with republican France, and the Republic to cease considering all states governed by kings as of necessity enemies.

Under these circumstances the departure of the General-in-chief, and his expected visit to Paris, excited general attention. The feeble Directory was prepared to submit to the presence of the conqueror of Italy in the capital.

On the 17th November he quitted Milan for the congress at Rastadt, there to preside in the French legation. But before his departure he sent to the Directory one of those trophies, the inscription on which might easily be considered as fabulous, but which in this case was nothing but the truth. This trophy was the flag of the Army of Italy, and General Joubert was appointed to the honourable mission of presenting it to the government. On one side of the flag were the words, 'To the Army of Italy, the grateful country.' The other contained an enumeration of the battles fought, the places taken, and a striking and simple abridgement of the history of the Italian campaign :—

'150,000 prisoners; 170 standards; 550 pieces of battering cannon; 600 pieces of field artillery; five bridge equipages;

nine 64-gun ships; twelve 32-gun frigates; 12 corvettes; 18 galleys; armistice with the King of Sardinia; convention with Genoa; armistice with the Duke of Parma; armistice with the King of Naples; armistice with the Pope; preliminaries of Leoben; convention of Montebello with the republic of Genoa; treaty of peace with the Emperor at Campo-Formio.

‘Liberty given to the people of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Massa-Carrara, La Romagna, Lombardy, Brescia, Bergami, Mantua, Crema, part of the Veronese, Chiavenna, Bormio, the Valtelina, the Genoese, the Imperial Fiefs, the people of the departments of Corcyro, of the *Ægean* Sea, and of Ithaca.

‘Sent to Paris all the master-pieces of Michael Angelo, of Guercino, of Titian, of Paul Veronese, of Correggio, of Albano, of Carracci, of Raphael, and of Leonardo da Vinci.’

Thus were enumerated on a flag destined to decorate the hall of the public sittings of the Directory, the military deeds of the campaign of Italy, its political results, and the conquest of the monuments of art.

The greater part of the Italian cities had been accustomed to consider their conqueror as a liberator—such was the magic of the word *liberty*, which resounded from the Alps to the Apennines. In his way to Mantua the General took up his residence in the palace of the ancient dukes, where he stopped two days. The morrow of his arrival was devoted to the celebration of a military funeral, in honour of General Hoche, who had just died. His next object was to hasten the execution of a monument which he was erecting to the memory of Virgil. Thus in one day he paid honour to France and Italy—to modern glory and to ancient fame—to the laurels of war and the laurels of poetry.

A person who saw Bonaparte on this occasion for the first time, describes him thus, in a letter to Paris: ‘I beheld with deep interest and extreme attention that extraordinary man who has performed such great deeds, and about whom there is something which seems to indicate that his career is not yet terminated. I found him very like his portraits, small in stature, thin, pale, with an air of fatigue, but not in ill health, as has been reported. He appeared to me to listen with more abstraction than interest, as if occupied rather with what he was thinking of, than with what was said to him. There is great intelligence in his countenance, along with an expression of habitual meditation, which reveals nothing of what is passing within. In that thinking head, in that daring

mind, it is impossible not to suppose that some designs are engendering *which will have their influence on the destinies of Europe.*

If the above letter had not been published in the journals for 1797, it might have been presumed to have been written after subsequent events had verified the conjecture.

The journey of Bonaparte through Switzerland was to him a real triumph, and it was not without its utility; his presence seemed to calm many inquietudes. From the many changes which had occurred on the other side of the Alps, the Swiss apprehended some dismemberment, or at least some encroachment on their territory, which the chances of war might have rendered possible. Everywhere he applied himself to restore confidence, and everywhere he was received with enthusiasm. He proceeded on his journey to Rastadt, by Aix in Savoy, Berne, and Basle. On arriving at Berne, during the night, we passed through a double line of carriages, well lighted up, and filled with beautiful women, all of whom raised the cry, 'Long live Bonaparte! long live the Pacificator!

On arriving at Rastadt Bonaparte found a letter from the Directory, calling him to Paris. He eagerly obeyed this invitation to withdraw from a place where he knew he could act only an insignificant part, and which he had fully determined on leaving, never to return. Such tedious employment did not suit his character, and he had been sufficiently dissatisfied with the similar proceedings at Campo-Formio.

Bonaparte has said at St. Helena that he did not return from Italy with more than 300,000 francs; but I know that at that time he had more than 3,000,000 in his possession. With the 300,000 francs he could not have lived in the style in which he afterwards did in Paris, nor have expended such large sums of money in his excursion along the coast, and for other purposes.

Bonaparte's brothers, desirous of obtaining the complete ascendancy over his mind, endeavoured to lessen the influence which Josephine possessed from the love of her husband. They tried to excite his jealousy, and took advantage of her stay at Milan after our departure, which had been authorised by Bonaparte himself. But his confidence in his wife, his journey to the coast, his incessant labour to hurry forward the Egyptian expedition, and his short stay at Paris, prevented such feelings from taking possession of his mind. I shall afterwards have

occasion to return to these intrigues. Admitted to the confidence of both, I had an opportunity of averting or lessening a great deal of mischief. If Josephine still lived, she would allow me this merit. I never took part against her but once, and that unwittingly, in regard to the marriage of her daughter Hortense. Josephine had never as yet spoken to me on the subject. Bonaparte wished to give his daughter-in-law to Duroc,* and his brothers were anxious to promote it, in order to separate Josephine from Hortense, for whom Bonaparte felt the tenderest affection. Josephine, on the other hand, wished Hortense to marry Louis Bonaparte. Her motive for doing so may be easily supposed to have been to gain support in a family where she seemed to have none but enemies; and she carried her point.

The most magnificent preparations had been made at the Luxembourg for the reception of Bonaparte on his return from Rastadt. The great court of the palace was elegantly ornamented; and they had constructed at the lower end, close to the palace, a large amphitheatre for the accommodation of official persons. Opposite to the principal entrance stood the altar of the country, surrounded by the statues of Liberty, Equality, and Peace. When Bonaparte entered, everyone stood up uncovered; the windows were full of young and beautiful females. But, notwithstanding this splendour, an icy coldness characterised the ceremony. Everyone seemed to be present only for the purpose of beholding a sight, and curiosity rather than joy seemed to influence the assembly. This, however, was partly occasioned by one of the clerks of the Directory, who had forced his way upon a part of the scaffolding not intended to be used, and who no sooner placed his foot upon the plank than it tilted up, and the imprudent man fell the whole height into the court. The accident created a general stupor—ladies fainted, and the windows were nearly deserted.

On this occasion the Directory displayed great splendour; and Talleyrand, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

* It was not at Toulon, as has been stated, that Bonaparte took Duroc into the artillery, and made him his aide-de-camp. The acquaintance was formed at a subsequent period, in Italy. Duroc's cold character and unexcursive mind suited Napoleon, whose confidence he enjoyed until his death, and who entrusted him with missions perhaps above his abilities. At St. Helena, Bonaparte often declared that he was much attached to Duroc. I believe this to be true; but I know that the attachment was not returned.

introduced Bonaparte to the Directory in a very flattering speech. But so great was the impatience of the assembly that his speech was little attended to—so anxious was everyone to hear Bonaparte. The conqueror of Italy then rose, and pronounced with a modest air, but in a firm voice, the following brief address:—

‘Citizen Directors—The French people, to become free, had to contend with kings. To obtain a constitution founded on reason the prejudices of eighteen centuries had to be overcome. The constitution of the year III. and you have triumphed over all those obstacles. Religion, feudalism, and royalty, have successively, during twenty ages, governed Europe; but from the peace which you have just concluded dates the era of representative governments. You have effected the organization of the Great Nation, the territory of which is only circumscribed because Nature herself has fixed its limits. You have done more. The two most beautiful portions of Europe, formerly so celebrated for the sciences, the arts, and the great men whose birth-place they were, beheld with glad expectation the genius of freedom arise from the tombs of their ancestors. Such are the pedestals on which destiny is about to place two powerful nations.

‘I have the honour to lay before you the treaty signed at Campo-Formio, and ratified by his majesty the Emperor. When the happiness of the French shall be secured on the best practical laws then Europe will become free.’

Barras, then president of the Directory, made a speech in reply, and then embraced the General, which was followed by the other Directors. Each acted to the best of his ability his part in this sentimental comedy.

The two Councils were not disposed to be behind the Directory in the manifestation of joy. A few days after they gave a splendid banquet to the General in the gallery of the Louvre, which had recently been enriched by the masterpieces of painting brought from Italy.

At Paris he took up his residence in the same small modest house that he had occupied before he set out for Italy, in the *Rue Chantereine*, which, about this time, in compliment to its illustrious inhabitant, received from the municipality the new name of *Rue de la Victoire*. Here he resumed his favourite studies and pursuits, and, apparently contented with the society of his private friends, seemed to avoid, as carefully as others in his situation might have courted, the honours of popular distinction

and applause. It was not immediately known that he was in Paris, and when he walked the streets his person was rarely recognized by the multitude. His mode of life was somewhat necessarily different from what it had been when he was both poor and obscure ; his society was courted in the highest circles, and he from time to time appeared in them, and received company at home with the elegance of hospitality over which Josephine was so well qualified to preside. But policy as well as pride moved him to shun notoriety. Before he could act again, he had much to observe ; and he knew himself too well to be flattered either by the stare of mobs or of saloons.

In his intercourse with society at this period, he was, for the most part, remarkable for the cold reserve of his manners. He had the appearance of one too much occupied with serious designs, to be able to relax at will into the easy play of ordinary conversation. He did not suffer his person to be familiarized out of reverence. When he did appear he was still, wherever he went, the Bonaparte of Lodi, and Arcola, and Rivoli.

In January, 1798, he again renewed, without success, his former attempt to obtain a dispensation of age, and a seat in the Directory ; but perceiving that the time was not favourable, he laid it aside. The Directory were popular with no party ; but there were many parties ; and, numerically, probably the Royalists were the strongest. The pure Republicans were still powerful ; the army of Italy was distant and scattered ; that of the Rhine, far more numerous, and equally well disciplined, had its own generals—men not yet in reputation much inferior to himself ; but having been less fortunate than their brethren in Italy, had consequently acquired less wealth. It was no wonder that the soldiery of the Rhine regarded the others, if not their leader, with some little jealousy. In Napoleon's own language, 'the pear was not yet ripe.'

He proceeded, therefore, to make a regular survey of the French coast opposite to England, with the view of improving its fortifications, and (ostensibly at least) of selecting the best points for embarking an invading force. For this service he was eminently qualified ; and many local improvements of great importance, long afterwards effected, were first suggested by him at this period. In this rapid excursion of eight days he wished to ascertain the practicability of a descent upon England. He was accompanied by Lannes, Sulkowsky, and myself. He made his observations with that patience, knowledge, and tact, which he possessed in so high a degree ; he examined until

midnight sailors, pilots, smugglers and fishermen ; he made objections, and listened attentively to their answers. We returned to Paris by Antwerp, Brussels, Lisle, and Saint Quentin. 'Well, General,' said I, 'what do you think of your journey ; are you satisfied ?' He replied quickly, with a negative shake of the head, 'It is too hazardous ; I will not attempt it. I will not risk upon such a stake the fate of our beautiful France.'

He had himself, in the course of the preceding autumn, suggested to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the celebrated Talleyrand, the propriety of making an effort against England in another quarter of the world—of seizing Malta, proceeding to occupy Egypt, and therein gaining at once a territory capable of supplying to France the loss of her West Indian colonies, and the means of annoying Great Britain in her Indian trade and empire. To this scheme he now recurred : the East presented a field of conquest and glory on which his imagination delighted to brood : 'Europe,' said he, 'is but a molehill—all the great reputations have come from Asia.' The injustice of attacking the dominions of the Grand Seignior, an old ally of France, formed but a trivial obstacle in the eyes of the Directory : the professional opinion of Bonaparte that the invasion of England, if attempted then, must fail, could not but carry its due weight. The Egyptian expedition was determined on—but kept strictly secret. The attention of England was still riveted on the coasts of Normandy and Picardy, between which and Paris Bonaparte studiously divided his presence—whilst it was on the borders of the Mediterranean that the ships and the troops really destined for action were assembling.

From all I saw I am of opinion that the wish to get rid of an ambitious young man, whose popularity excited envy, triumphed over the evident danger of removing, for an indefinite period, an excellent army, and the more probable loss of the French fleet. As to Bonaparte, he was well assured that nothing remained for him but to choose between that hazardous enterprise and his certain ruin. Egypt was, he thought, the right place to maintain his reputation, and to add fresh glory to his name. On the 12th of April, 1798, he was appointed General-in-chief of the army of the East.

Having rifled to such purpose the cabinets and galleries of the Italian princes, he was resolved not to lose the opportunity of appropriating some of the rich antiquarian treasures of Egypt ; nor was it likely that he should undervalue the opportunities which his expedition might afford of extending the

boundaries of science, by a careful observation of natural phenomena. He drew together, therefore, a body of eminent artists and connoisseurs, under the direction of Monge, who had managed his Italian collections: it was perhaps the first time that a troop of *Savans* (there were 100 of them) formed part of the staff of an invading army.

The English government, meanwhile, although they had no suspicion of the real destination of the armament, had not failed to observe what was passing in Toulon. They probably believed that the ships there assembled were meant to take part in the great scheme of the invasion of England. However this might have been, they had sent a considerable reinforcement to Nelson, who then commanded on the Mediterranean station; and he, at the moment when Bonaparte reached Toulon, was cruising within sight of the port. Napoleon well knew that to embark in the presence of Nelson would be to rush into the jaws of ruin; and waited until some accident should relieve him from this terrible watcher. On the evening of the 19th of May fortune favoured him. A violent gale drove the English off the coast, and disabled some ships so much that Nelson was obliged to go into the harbours of Sardinia, to have them repaired. The French general instantly commanded the embarkation of all his troops; and as the last of them got on board, the sun rose on the mighty armament; it was one of those dazzling suns which the soldiery delighted afterwards to call 'the suns of Napoleon.'

CHAPTER VII.

WE left Paris on the 3rd of May, 1798. Ten days before the departure of General Bonaparte for the conquest of Egypt and Syria, a prisoner, Sir Sidney Smith, escaped from the Temple, who was destined to contribute most materially to the failure of an expedition which had been conceived with the greatest boldness. This escape was pregnant with future events; a forged order of the Minister of Police prevented the revolution of the East. We arrived at Toulon on the 8th. Bonaparte knew by the movements of the English that not a moment was to be lost; contrary winds delayed us ten days, which he employed in the examination of the most minute details of the expedition.

The squadron sailed on the 19th of May. Seldom have the shores of the Mediterranean witnessed a nobler spectacle. The unclouded sun rose on a semicircle of vessels, extending in all to not less than six leagues : consisting of thirteen ships of the line, fourteen frigates, and 400 transports, under the command of Admiral Brueys. They carried 40,000 picked soldiers, and these were commanded by officers, whose names were only inferior to that of the General-in-chief : of the men as well as of their leaders the far greater part were already accustomed to follow Napoleon, and to consider his presence as the pledge of victory.

We arrived off Malta on the 10th of June. It was not taken by force of arms, but by a previous arrangement with the imbecile knights. Bonaparte has stated himself, that he took Malta when he was at Mantua. No one acquainted with Malta could imagine that an island surrounded with such formidable and perfect fortifications, would have surrendered in two days to a fleet which was pursued by an enemy. General Caffarelli observed to the General-in-chief, that 'it is lucky there is someone in the town to open the gates for us.'

After having provided for the government and defence of the island, with his usual activity and foresight, we left it on the 19th of June. Many of the knights followed us, and took military and civil appointments.

During the night of the 22nd of June, the English squadron was almost close upon us. It passed within six leagues of the French fleet. Nelson, who learned at Messina of the capture of Malta, on the day we left the island, sailed direct for Alexandria, which he rightly considered as the point of our destination. By making all sail, and taking the shortest course, he arrived before Alexandria on the 28th ; but on not meeting with the French fleet he immediately put to sea.

On the morning of the 1st of July, the expedition arrived off the coast of Africa, and the column of Severus pointed out to us the city of Alexandria. Bonaparte determined on an immediate landing. This the admiral opposed on account of the state of the weather, and recommended a delay of a few hours ; he observed, that Nelson could not return for several days ; but the General-in-chief sternly refused, and said, 'There is no time to be lost ; fortune gives me three days ; if I do not make the most of them, we are lost.' The admiral then gave the signal for a general landing, which, on account of the surge, was not effected without much difficulty and danger, and the loss of many by drowning.

It was on the 2nd of July, at one o'clock in the morning, that we landed on the soil of Egypt, at Marabou, about three leagues from Alexandria. At three o'clock the same morning, the General-in-chief marched on Alexandria, with the divisions of Kleber, Bon, and Morand. The Bedouin Arabs, who hovered about our right flank and rear, carried off the stragglers. Having arrived within gun-shot of the city, the walls were scaled, and French valour soon triumphed over all obstacles.

The first blood I had seen shed in this war was that of General Kleber ; he was struck on the head by a ball, not in scaling the wall, but in directing the attack. He came to Pompey's pillar, where the General-in-chief and many members of the staff were assembled. It was on this occasion that I first spoke to him, and from that day our friendship commenced.

The capture of Alexandria was only the work of a few hours. It was not given up to pillage, as has been asserted, and often repeated.

Bonaparte employed the six days he remained in Alexandria in establishing order in the city and the province, with that activity and talent which I could never sufficiently admire ; and in preparing for the march of the army across the province of Bohahireh. During his stay he issued a proclamation, which contained this passage :—

‘People of Egypt ! You will be told that I am come to destroy your religion—do not believe it. Be assured that I come to restore your rights, to punish the usurpers, and that I respect, more than the Mamelukes, God, his Prophet, and the Alcoran. Tell them that all men are equal in the eye of God : wisdom, talents, and virtue make the only difference.’

He sent Desaix, with 4500 infantry and sixty cavalry, to Beda, on the road to Damanhour. This general was the first to experience the privations and sufferings of the campaign, which the whole army had soon to endure. His noble character, and his attachment to Bonaparte seemed about to give way to the obstacles which surrounded him. On the 15th of July he wrote from Bohahireh, ‘I beseech you, do not allow us to remain in this position ; the soldiers are discouraged and murmur. Order us to advance or fall back ; the villages are mere huts, and absolutely without resources.’

In these immense plains, burned up by a vertical sun, water, everywhere so common, becomes an object of contest. The wells and springs, those secret treasures of the desert, are carefully

concealed from the traveller ; and frequently, after our most oppressive marches, nothing was found to allay the thirst but disgusting pools of brackish water.

On the 7th of July, Bonaparte left Alexandria for Damanhour, and during the march was incessantly harassed by the Arabs : they had filled up or poisoned the cisterns and springs, which already were so rare in the desert. The soldiers, who on this first march began to suffer from an intolerable thirst, felt but little relief from the brackish and unwholesome water which they met with. The miseries of this progress were extreme. The air is crowded with pestiferous insects ; the glare of the sand weakens most men's eyes, and blinds many ; water is scarce and bad : and the country had been swept clear of man, beast, and vegetable. Under this torture even the gallant spirits of such men as Murat and Lannes could not sustain themselves : —they trod their cockades in the sand. The common soldiers asked, with angry murmurs, if it was here the General designed to give them their seven acres which he had promised them ? He alone was superior to all these evils. Such was the happy temperament of his frame.

On reaching Damanhour, our head-quarters were established at the residence of the Sheik. The house had been recently white-washed, and looked very well outside ; but the interior was in a state of ruin not to be described. Bonaparte knew the owner to be rich, and, having inspired him with confidence, he inquired, through the medium of an interpreter, how, having the means, he deprived himself of every comfort, assuring him, at the same time, that any avowals he might make should not be wrested to his prejudice. 'Look at my feet,' said he ; 'it is now some years since I repaired my house, and purchased a little furniture. It became known at Cairo ; a demand for money followed, because my expenses proved that I was rich. I refused ; they then punished me, and obliged me to pay. Since that time I have allowed myself only the necessaries of life, and I repair nothing.' The old man was lame in consequence of the infliction he had suffered. Woe to him who in this country is supposed to be rich ; the outward appearance of poverty is the only security against the rapacity of power, and the cupidity of barbarism.

One day a small troop of mounted Arabs assailed our head-quarters ; Bonaparte, who was at the window, indignant at this audacity, said to young Croisier, an aide-de-camp in attendance, 'Croisier, take some guides, and drive these fellows away.'

In an instant Croisier appeared upon the plain, with fifteen guides. The parties skirmished; we saw the combat from the window; there was an appearance of hesitation in the attack, which surprised the General. He called from the window, as if they could have heard him. 'Forward! I say—why don't you charge?' Our horsemen seemed to fall back as the Arabs advanced; after a short but pretty obstinate combat, the Arabs retired unmolested, and without loss. The anger of the General could not be restrained, it burst upon Croisier when he returned, and so harshly, that he retired shedding tears. Bonaparte desired me to follow, and to endeavour to calm him; but it was in vain—'I will not survive it,' said he, 'I will seek death the first occasion that offers. I will not live dishonoured.' Croisier found the death he sought at Acre.

On the 10th of July, our head-quarters were established at Rahmahanieh, where they remained during the 11th and 12th. At this place commences the canal which was cut by Alexander, to convey water to his new city, and to facilitate commercial intercourse between Europe and the East.

The flotilla, commanded by the brave chief of division, Perrée, had just arrived from Rosetta. Perrée was on board the shebeck called the *Cerf*.

Bonaparte placed on board the *Cerf* and the other vessels of the flotilla, those individuals who, not being military, could not be serviceable in engagements, and whose horses served to mount a few of the troops. I was one of these individuals.

On the night of the 13th of July, the General-in-chief directed his march towards the south, along the left bank of the Nile. The flotilla sailed up the river, parallel with the left wing of the army. It fell in with seven Turkish gun-boats coming from Cairo, and was exposed simultaneously to their fire, and that of the Mamelukes, Fellahs, and Arabs, who lined both banks of the river. They had small guns mounted on camels.

Perrée cast anchor, and an engagement commenced at nine o'clock on the 14th of July, and continued till half-past twelve.

At the same time, the General-in-chief met and attacked a corps of about 4000 Mamelukes.* His object, as he afterwards

* At this period, Egypt, though nominally governed by a pacha appointed by the Grand Seignior, was in reality in the hands of the Mamelukes; a singular body of men, who paid but little respect to any authority but that of their own chiefs. Of these chiefs or beys

said, was to turn the corps by the left of the village of Chebreisse, and to drive it upon the Nile.

Several vessels had already been boarded and taken by the Turks, who massacred the crews before our eyes, and with barbarous ferocity shewed us the heads of the slaughtered men. Perrée, at considerable risk, despatched several persons to inform the General-in-chief of the desperate situation of the flotilla. The cannonade which Bonaparte had heard since the morning, and the explosion of a Turkish gun-boat, which was blown up by the artillery of the shebeck, led him to fear that our situation was really perilous. He, therefore, made a movement to the left, in the direction of the Nile and Chebreisse, beat the Mamelukes, and forced them to retire on Cairo. At sight of the French troops, the commander of the Turkish flotilla weighed anchor, and sailed up the Nile. The two banks of the river were evacuated, and the flotilla escaped the destruction which a short time before had appeared inevitable.

After this we had no communication with the army until the 23rd of July. On the 22nd we came in sight of the Pyramids, and were informed that we were only about ten leagues from Gizeh, where they are situated. The cannonade which we heard, and which augmented in proportion as the north wind diminished, announced a serious engagement; and that same day we saw the banks of the Nile strewed with heaps of dead bodies, which the waves were every moment washing into the sea. This horrible spectacle, the silence of the surrounding villages, which had hitherto been armed against us, and the cessation of the firing from the banks of the river, led us to infer, with tolerable certainty, that a battle fatal to the Mamelukes had taken place.

We shortly after learned that, on the 21st of July, the army came within sight of the Pyramids, which, but for the regularity of the outline, might have been taken for a distant ridge of rocky mountains. While every eye was fixed on these hoary

there were twenty-four; each one of whom ruled over a separate district: who often warred with each other, and were as often in rebellion against their nominal sovereign.

The Mamelukes were considered by Napoleon to be, individually, the finest cavalry in the world. They rode the noblest horses of Arabia, and were armed with the best weapons which the world could produce; carbines, pistols, &c., from England, and sabres of the steel of Damascus. Their skill in horsemanship was equal to their fiery valour. With that cavalry and the French infantry, Bonaparte said, it would be easy to conquer the world.

monuments of the past, they gained the brow of a gentle eminence, and saw at length spread out before them the vast army of the beys, its right posted on an intrenched camp by the Nile, its centre and left composed of that brilliant cavalry with which they were by this time acquainted. Napoleon, riding forwards to reconnoitre, perceived (what escaped the observation of all his staff) that the guns on the intrenched camp were not provided with carriages—he instantly decided on his plan of attack, and prepared to throw his force on the left, where the guns could not be available. Mourad Bey, who commanded in chief, speedily penetrated his design; and the Mamelukes advanced gallantly to the encounter. ‘Soldiers,’ said Napoleon, ‘from the summit of yonder Pryamids forty ages behold you’; and the battle began.

The French formed into separate squares, and awaited the assault of the Mamelukes. These came on with impetuous speed and wild cries, and practised every means to force their passage into the serried ranks of their new opponents. They rushed on the line of bayonets, backed their horses upon them, and at last, maddened by the firmness which they could not shake, dashed their pistols and carbines into the faces of the men. They who had fallen wounded from their seats, would crawl along the sand, and hew at the legs of their enemies with their scimitars. Nothing could move the French: the bayonet and the continued roll of musketry by degrees thinned the host around them; and Bonaparte at last advanced. Such were the confusion and terror of the enemy when he came near the camp, that they abandoned their works, and flung themselves by hundreds into the Nile. The carnage was prodigious, and great multitudes were drowned. The name of Bonaparte now spread panic through the East; and the ‘Sultan Kebir’ (or King of Fire—as he was called from the deadly effects of the musketry in this engagement) was considered as the destined scourge of God, whom it was hopeless to resist.

The French now had recompense for the toils they had undergone. The bodies of the slain and drowned Mamelukes were rifled, and, it being the custom for these warriors to carry their wealth about them, a single corpse often made a soldier’s fortune.

The occupation of Cairo was the immediate consequence of the victory of Embabeh, or the Pyramids. Bonaparte established his head-quarters in the house of Elfey Bey, in the great square of Ezbekyeh.

The march of the French army to Cairo was attended by an uninterrupted succession of combats and victories. We had won the battles of Rahmahanieh, Chebreisse, and the Pyramids. The Mamelukes were defeated, and their chief, Mourad Bey, was obliged to fly into Upper Egypt ; and Bonaparte now found no obstacle to oppose his entrance into the capital after a campaign of only twenty days.

No conqueror, perhaps, ever enjoyed a victory so much as Bonaparte, and yet no one was ever less inclined to abuse his triumphs.

After the battle of the Pyramids, he despatched the following letter and proclamation from his head-quarters at Gizeh :—

THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, BONAPARTE, TO THE SHEIKS AND
NOTABLES OF CAIRO.

‘You will see by the annexed proclamation, the sentiments which animate me.

‘Yesterday the Mamelukes were for the most part killed or wounded, and I am in pursuit of the few who escaped.

‘Send here the boats which are on your bank of the river, and send also a deputation to acquaint me with your submission. Provide bread, meat, straw, and barley for my troops. Be under no alarm, and rest assured that no one is more anxious to contribute to your happiness than I.

(Signed) ‘BONAPARTE.’

Immediately on his arrival at Cairo, the Commander-in-chief occupied himself in the civil and military organization of the country. Only those who have seen him at this time, when in the full vigour of youth, can estimate his extraordinary activity. Egypt, so long the object of his study, was as well known to him in a few days as if he had lived in it for ten years. He issued orders to observe the most strict discipline, and these orders were rigidly enforced. The mosques, civil and religious institutions, harems, women, the customs of the country, were scrupulously respected. A few days had scarcely elapsed when the French soldiers were admitted into the houses, and might be seen peaceably smoking their pipes with the inhabitants, assisting them in their labours, and playing with their children.

After he had been four days at Cairo, during which time he employed himself in examining everything, and consulting everyone from whom he could obtain any information, he issued the following order :—

‘Art. 1.—There shall be in each province of Egypt a divan, composed of seven individuals, whose duty will be to superintend the interests of the province; to communicate to me any complaints that may be made; to prevent warfare among the different villages; to apprehend and punish criminals (for which purpose they may demand assistance from the French commandant); and take every opportunity of enlightening the people.

‘Art. 2.—There shall be in each province an aga of the Janisaries, maintaining constant communication with the French commandant. He shall have with him a company of sixty armed natives, whom he may take wherever he pleases, for the maintenance of good order, subordination, and tranquillity.

‘Art. 3.—There shall be in each province an intendant, whose business will be to levy the miri, the feddam, and the other contributions which formerly belonged to the Mamelukes, but which now belong to the French Republic. The intendant shall have as many agents as may be necessary.

‘Art. 4.—The said intendant shall have a French agent to correspond with the Finance Department, and to execute all the orders he may receive.

(Signed)

‘BONAPARTE.’

While Bonaparte was thus actively taking measures for the organization of the country, General Desaix had marched into Upper Egypt in pursuit of Mourad Bey. We learned that Ibrahim, who, next to Mourad, was the most influential of the beys, had proceeded towards Syria, by the way of Balbeys and Saheleyeh. The General-in-chief immediately determined to march, in person, against that formidable enemy, and he left Cairo about fifteen days after he had entered it. It is unnecessary to describe the well-known engagement in which Bonaparte drove Ibrahim back upon El Arish; besides, I do not enter minutely into the details of battles, my chief object being to record events which I personally witnessed.

During this absence of the Commander-in-chief, the intelligence arrived at Cairo of the overwhelming disaster of the French squadron, at Aboukir, on the 1st of August. The aide-de-camp despatched by General Kleber with this intelligence, went, at my request, instantly to Saheleyeh, where Bonaparte then was, who returned immediately to Cairo, a distance of thirty-three leagues.

On learning the terrible catastrophe at Aboukir, the Com-

mander-in-chief was overwhelmed with anguish. In spite of all his energy and fortitude, he was deeply distressed by the disasters which now assailed him. To the painful feelings excited by the complaints and dejection of his companions in arms, was now added the irreparable misfortune of the burning of our fleet. He measured the fatal consequences of this event at a single glance. We were now cut off from all communication with France, and all hope of returning thither, except by a degrading capitulation with an implacable and hated enemy. He had lost all chance of preserving his conquest, and to him this was indeed a bitter reflection.

When alone with me he gave free vent to his emotion. I observed to him that the disaster was doubtless great ; but that it would have been infinitely more irreparable had Nelson fallen in with us at Malta, or had waited for us four-and-twenty hours before Alexandria, or in the open sea. 'Any one of these events,' said I, 'which were not only possible, but probable, would have deprived us of every resource. We are blockaded here ; but we have provisions and money. Let us then wait patiently to see what the Directory will do for us.' 'The Directory !' exclaimed he, angrily ; 'the Directory is composed of a set of scoundrels ! they envy and hate me, and would gladly let me perish here. Besides, you see how dissatisfied the whole army is : not a man is willing to stay.'

The gloomy reflections which at first assailed Bonaparte were speedily banished, and he soon recovered the fortitude and presence of mind which had been for a moment shaken by the overwhelming news from Aboukir. He, however, sometimes repeated, in a tone which it would be difficult to describe, 'Unfortunate Brueys, what have you done !'

I have remarked that, in some chance observations which escaped Napoleon at St. Helena, he endeavoured to throw all the blame of the affair on Admiral Brueys. Persons who are determined to make Bonaparte an exception to human nature, have unjustly reproached the admiral for the loss of the fleet. I went iller a few details relative to the affair of Aboukir, for it is gratifying to render justice to the memory of a man like Admiral Brueys.

Brueys, it is said, would not go to Corfu, in spite of the positive and reiterated orders he received. Bonaparte's letter to the Directory, and his words at St. Helena, have been tortured to show that Brueys expiated by his death the great fault of which he had been guilty. Much has been said about the report of

Captain Barré ; but the reply of the admiral ought also to be taken into account. Brueys, for good reasons, did not think that vessels of the size of those of the squadron could enter the ports of Alexandria. But it is said the orders to repair to Corfu were reiterated ; though when, and by whom, is not mentioned. From the order of the 3rd of July, to the time of his unfortunate death, Brueys did not receive a line from Bonaparte, who, on his part, did not receive all the admiral's despatches until the 26th of July, when he was at Cairo, and consequently too late to enable his answer to come to hand before the 1st of August. Brueys is also reproached with having persisted in awaiting the course of events at Aboukir. Can it be supposed that the admiral would have remained on the coast of Egypt against the express orders of the General-in-chief, who was his superior in command ?

The friendship and confidence with which Admiral Brueys honoured me, his glorious death, and the fury with which he has been accused, impose upon me the obligation of defending him.

The loss of the fleet convinced General Bonaparte of the necessity of speedily and effectively organizing Egypt, where everything denoted that we should stay for a considerable time, except in the event of a forced evacuation, which the General was far from foreseeing or fearing. The distance of Ibrahim Bey and Mourad Bey now left him a little at rest. War, fortifications, taxation, government, the organisation of the divans, trade, art, and science, all occupied his attention. Orders and instructions were immediately despatched, if not to repair the defeat, at least to avert the first danger that might ensue from it. On the 21st of August, Bonaparte established at Cairo an institute of the arts and sciences, of which he subsequently appointed me a member in the room of M. de Sucey, who was obliged to return to France, in consequence of the wound he had received on board the flotilla in the Nile.

About the end of August, Bonaparte wished to open negotiations with the Pasha of Acre, surnamed *the Butcher*. He offered Djezzar his friendship, sought his in return, and gave him the most consolatory assurances of the safety of his dominions. But Djezzar, confiding in his own strength, and in the protection of the English, who had anticipated Bonaparte, was deaf to every overture, and would not even receive Beauvoisin, who was sent to him on the 22nd of August. A second envoy was beheaded at Acre.

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM the time Bonaparte received intelligence of the disaster at Aboukir, until the revolt of Cairo, on the 22nd of October, he often found the time to hang heavily on his hands. Though employed in so many ways, yet there was not enough to occupy his singularly active mind. When the heat was not too great, he rode out on horseback, and on his return, if there were no despatches to read, no letters to answer, or orders to be issued, he was immediately absorbed in thought, and would sometimes converse very strangely.

The signal for the execution of this revolt was given from the minarets on the night of the 20th of October, and on the morning of the 21st it was announced at head-quarters that the city of Cairo was in open insurrection. The General-in-chief was not, as has been stated, in the isle of Raouddah ; he did not hear the firing of the alarm-guns. He rose when the news arrived ; it was then five o'clock. He was informed that all the shops were closed, and that the French were attacked. A moment after, he learned the death of General Dupuy, commandant of the garrison, who was killed by a lance in the street. Bonaparte immediately mounted his horse and, accompanied by only thirty guides, advanced on all the threatened points, restored confidence, and, with great presence of mind, adopted measures of defence.

An order which had been issued on our arrival in Cairo for watching the criers of the mosques, had for some weeks been neglected. At certain hours of the night these criers address prayers to the Prophet. As it was merely a repetition of the same ceremony over and over again, in a short time no notice was taken of it. The Turks, perceiving this negligence, substituted for their prayers and hymns cries of revolt, and by this sort of verbal telegraph insurrectionary excitement was transmitted to the northern and southern extremities of Egypt. The insurrection was general from Syene to Lake Marœotis.

It was about half-past eight in the morning, when Bonaparte returned to head-quarters, and while at breakfast he was informed that some Bedouin Arabs, on horseback, were trying to force their entrance into Cairo. He ordered his aide-de-camp, Sulkowsky, to mount his horse, to take with him fifteen guides,

and proceed to the point where the assailants were most numerous. This was the Bab-en-Nassr, or the gate of victory. Croisier observed to the General-in-chief, that Sulkowsky had scarcely recovered from the wounds at Saheleyeh, and he offered to take his place. He had his motives for this. Bonaparte consented ; but Sulkowsky had already set out. Within an hour after, one of the fifteen guides returned, covered with blood, to announce that Sulkowsky and the remainder of his party had been cut to pieces. This was speedy work, for we were still at table when the sad news arrived.

Some time after this revolt, the necessity of securing our own safety occasioned the commission of a terrible act of cruelty. A tribe of Arabs had surprised and massacred a party of the French. The General-in-chief ordered his aide-de-camp, Croisier, to proceed to the spot, surround the tribe, destroy their huts, kill all their men, and conduct the rest of the population to Cairo. The order was to decapitate the victims, and to bring their heads in sacks to Cairo, to be exhibited to the people.

Beauharnois accompanied Croisier in this cruel expedition : they returned next day, accompanied by several asses laden with sacks. The sacks were opened in the principal square, and the heads rolled out before the assembled populace. I cannot describe the horror I experienced : but, at the same time, I must confess that it had the effect for a considerable time of securing tranquillity, and even the existence of the small parties which were required to be sent out in all directions.

Since the month of August, Bonaparte had had his eyes fixed upon Syria, and expected the landing of the Turkish army, which took place shortly after. He comprehended, with his usual ability, the dangers which menaced him from the side of the isthmus of Suez, and he resolved in his mind the means of averting them.

On the 11th of February, 1799, we commenced our march for Syria with about 12,000 men : it has been stated that we numbered only 6,000, but the fact is we lost nearly that number during the campaign. Our little army advanced upon El-Arish, where we arrived on the 17th. The fatigues of the desert and the want of water excited violent murmurs amongst the soldiers, and they insulted those whom they saw on horseback—they indulged in the most violent abuse of the Republic, the *savans*, and those whom they regarded as the authors of the expedition. At times soldiers worn down by thirst, and unable

to wait for the distribution of the water, pierced the skins with their bayonets, and by this violence rendered the scarcity still greater. In a few days El-Arish surrendered. On the 28th we had the first prospect of the verdant and fertile fields of Syria, which recalled to our recollection those of our own country; and the prospect of mountains and green fields occasioned us to forget for a while the sufferings of an expedition of which few could form a judgment, either of the design or the end.

On the 4th of March we laid siege to Jaffa, the ancient Joppa, a pretty town, which held out until the 6th, when it was taken by assault. The massacre was horrible. Bonaparte sent his aides-de-camp, Beauharnois and Croisier, to appease the fury of the soldiers, and to report what was passing. They learned that a considerable part of the garrison had retired into a large building, a sort of enclosed court. They proceeded to the place displaying their scarfs, which denoted their rank. The Arnauts and Albanians, of whom these refugees were composed, cried from the windows that they would surrender if their lives were spared—if not, they threatened to fire upon the aides-de-camp, and to defend themselves to the last extremity. The officers granted their request, and they were marched into the camp in two divisions, to the amount of 4,000.

I was walking with General Bonaparte, in front of his tent, when he saw this multitude of men approaching, and before he even saw his aides-de-camp, he turned to me with an expression of grief, 'What do they wish me to do with these men? Have I food for them—ships to convey them to Egypt or France? Why have they served me thus?' After the General-in-chief had listened with anger to the explanation of Eugene and Croisier, they received a severe reprimand for their conduct. But the deed was done. Four thousand men were there. It was necessary to decide upon their fate. The two aides-de-camp observed, that they had found themselves alone in the midst of numerous enemies, and that he had directed them to restrain the carnage. 'Yes,' replied the General-in-chief, with great warmth, 'as to women, children, and old men—all the peaceable inhabitants; but not with respect to armed soldiers. It was your duty to die, rather than bring these unfortunate creatures to me. What do you want me to do with them?'

On the first day of their arrival, a council of war was held in the tent of the General-in-chief to determine what should be

done with them. The council deliberated a long time without coming to any decision.

On the evening of the following day, the daily reports of the generals of division came in. They spoke of nothing but the insufficiency of the rations, the complaints of the soldiers—of their murmurs and discontent at seeing their bread given to enemies, who had been withdrawn from their vengeance, inasmuch as a decree of death, in conformity with the laws of war, had been passed on Jaffa. All these reports were alarming, and especially that of General Bon, in which no reserve was made. He spoke of nothing less than the fear of a revolt, which would be justified by the serious nature of the case.

The council assembled again. All the generals of division were summoned to attend, and for several hours they discussed what measures might be adopted, with the most sincere desire to discover and execute any which would save the lives of these unfortunate prisoners.

The third day arrived without its being possible to come to any conclusion favourable to the preservation of these unfortunate men. The murmurs in the camp grew louder—the evil went on increasing—remedy appeared impossible—danger was real and imminent.

The order for shooting the prisoners was given and executed on the 10th of March.

This atrocious scene, when I think of it, still makes me shudder, as it did on the day I beheld it ; and I would wish it were possible for me to forget it, rather than be compelled to describe it. All the horrors imagination can conceive, relative to that day of blood, would fall short of the reality.

I have related the truth, the whole truth. I was present at all the discussions, all the conferences, all the deliberations. I had not, as may be supposed, a deliberative voice ; but I am bound to declare that the situation of the army, the scarcity of food, our small numerical strength, in the midst of a country where every individual was an enemy, would have induced me to vote in the affirmative of the proposition which was carried into effect, if I had had a vote to give. It was necessary to be on the spot in order to understand the horrible necessity which existed.

After the siege of Jaffa, the plague began to exhibit itself with more severity. It was brought from Damietta, by the division of Kleber. We lost between 7 and 8000 men by the contagion, during the Syriac expedition.

On the 18th of March we arrived before Acre, and learned

that Djezzar had cut off the head of our envoy, Mailly-de-Chateau-Renaud, and had thrown his body into the sea in a sack. This cruel pacha was guilty of a great many similar executions ; and when bathing in the sea we frequently met with bodies in this state, which the waves had washed ashore.

The details of the siege of Acre are well known. Although surrounded by a wall, flanked with strong towers, and having, besides, a broad and deep ditch defended by works, this little fortress did not appear likely to hold out against French valour and the skill of our engineers and artillery : but the ease and rapidity with which Jaffa had been taken deceived us in some degree as to the comparative strength of the two places, and the difference of their respective situations. At Jaffa we had a sufficient artillery : at St. Jean d'Acre we had not. At Jaffa we had to deal only with a native garrison : at St. Jean d'Acre we were opposed by a garrison strengthened by reinforcements of men and supplies of provisions, supported by the English fleet, and assisted by European science.

It was undoubtedly Sir Sidney Smith who did us the greatest injury. Much has been said respecting his communications with the General-in-chief. The reproaches which the latter cast upon him for endeavouring to seduce the soldiers and officers of the army were the more singular, even if they were well-founded, inasmuch as these means are frequently employed by leaders in war.

The enemy had within the town some excellent riflemen, chiefly Albanians. They placed stones, one over the other, on the walls, put their fire-arms through the interstices, and thus, completely sheltered, fired with destructive precision.

The siege of St. Jean d'Acre lasted sixty days. During that time, eight assaults and twelve sorties took place. In the assault of the 8th of May, more than 200 men penetrated into the town. Already they shouted victory ; but the breach having been taken in reverse by the Turks, it was not approached without some degree of hesitation, and the 200 men who had entered were not supported. The streets were barricadoed. The cries and the howlings of the women, who ran through the streets, throwing, according to the custom of the country, dust in the air, excited the male inhabitants to a desperate resistance, which rendered unavailing this short occupation of the town, by a handful of men, who, finding themselves left without assistance, retreated towards the breach. Many who could not reach it, perished in the town.

The siege was raised on the 20th of May. It cost us a loss of nearly 3000 men in killed, death by the plague, and in wounded. Had there been less precipitation in the attack, and had the siege been undertaken according to the rules of war, it could not have held out three days: one assault like that of the 8th of May would have been sufficient. If, on the day when we first came in sight of the ramparts of Acre, we had made a less inconsiderate estimate of the strength of the place, and taken into consideration our absolute want of artillery of a sufficient calibre, our scarcity of gunpowder, and the difficulty of procuring food, we certainly never should have undertaken the siege.

Bonaparte until this time had never experienced any reverses, but had continually proceeded from triumph to triumph, and therefore confidently anticipated the taking of St. Jean d'Acre. In his letters to the generals in Egypt, he fixed the 25th of April for the accomplishment of that event. He reckoned that the grand assault against the tower could not be made before that day; it took place, however, twenty-four hours sooner. 'The slightest circumstances produce the greatest events,' said Napoleon, according to the memorial of St. Helena; 'had St. Jean d'Acre fallen, I should have changed the face of the world.' And again, 'the fate of the East lay in that small town.'

Almost every evening during the siege Bonaparte and myself used to walk together, at a little distance from the sea-shore; and when employed in this manner on the day after the unfortunate assault of the 8th of May, he felt distressed at seeing the blood of so many brave men which had been uselessly shed. He said to me, 'Bourrienne, I see that this wretched place has cost me a number of men, and wasted much time. But things are too far advanced not to attempt a last effort. If I succeed, as I expect, I shall find in the town the pacha's treasures, and arms for 300,000 men. I will stir up and arm the people of Syria, who are disgusted at the ferocity of Djezzar, and who, as you know, pray for his destruction at every assault. I shall then march upon Damascus and Aleppo. On advancing into the country, the discontented will flock round my standard, and swell my army. I will announce to the people the abolition of servitude, and of the tyrannical governments of the pachas. I shall arrive at Constantinople with large masses of soldiery. I shall overturn the Turkish empire, and found, in the East, a new and grand empire,

which will fix my name in the records of posterity. Perhaps I shall return to Paris by Adrianople, or by Vienna, after having annihilated the house of Austria.' As soon as I returned to my tent, I committed to paper this conversation, when it was fresh in my recollection ; and I can, therefore, venture to say it is correct.

We left St. Jean d'Acre on the 20th of May, during the night, to avoid a sortie from the besieged, and to conceal the retreat of the army, which had to traverse three leagues along the shore exposed to the fire of the English vessels, lying in the roads of Mount Carmel. The sick and wounded had been sent off two days before. Thus terminated this disastrous expedition. We proceeded along the shores of the Mediterranean, and passed Mount Carmel. Some of the wounded were carried on litters, and others on horses, mules, and camels. Near Mount Carmel we learned that three of our sick, who had been left in the hospital, had been cruelly put to death by the Turks.

During this fatiguing march the soldiers were oppressed by the most intolerable thirst, and exposed to an excessive heat, which disheartened the men, and encouraged a cruel selfishness, or the most shocking indifference. I saw officers, with their limbs amputated, thrown from the litters, although their conveyance in that manner had been ordered, and who had themselves given money to recompense the bearers : wounded soldiers were abandoned in the corn fields. Our march was illumined by torches, lighted for the purpose of setting fire to the towns, the villages, the hamlets, and the rich crops of corn which everywhere covered the earth. The whole country was in a blaze. The sun, which shone in an unclouded sky, was often obscured by the smoke of our continued conflagrations. Such was our march, and such are the horrors of war.

We reached Tentoura on the 20th of May, when a most oppressive heat prevailed, which produced general dejection. We had nothing to sleep on but the parched and burning sand ; on our left lay a hostile sea ; our losses in wounded and sick were already considerable, since leaving Acre ; and there was nothing consolatory in the future. The truly afflicting condition, in which the remains of an army called *triumphant*, were plunged, produced, as might well be expected, a corresponding impression on the mind of the General-in-chief. Scarcely had he arrived at Tentoura, when he ordered his tent to be pitched. He then called me, and with a mind occupied by the calamities of our

situation, dictated an order that everyone should march on foot, and that all the horses, mules, and camels, should be given up to the wounded, the sick, and infected, who had been removed, and who still shewed signs of life. 'Carry that to Berthier,' said he; and the order was instantly despatched. Scarcely had I returned to the tent, when Vigogne, the General-in-chief's equerry, entered, and, raising his hand to his cap, said, 'General, what horse do you reserve for yourself?' In the state of excitation in which Bonaparte was, this question irritated him so violently, that, raising his whip, he gave the equerry a severe blow on the head, saying, in a terrible voice, 'Everyone must go on foot, you rascal—I the first. Do you not know the order? Be off.'

The remains of our heavy artillery were lost in the moving sands of Tentoura, from the want of horses, the small number that remained being now employed in more indispensable services. The soldiers seemed to forget their own sufferings, at the loss of those bronze guns, which had enabled them so often to triumph, and which had made Europe tremble.

We halted at Cæsarea on the 22nd of May, and we marched all the following night. Towards daybreak, a man, concealed in a bush, upon the left of the road, fired a musket almost close to the head of the General-in-chief, who was sleeping on his horse. I was beside him. The wood being searched, the Naplousian was taken without difficulty, and ordered to be shot on the spot. Four guides pushed him towards the sea, by thrusting their carbines against his back; when close to the water's edge they drew the triggers, but all the four muskets hung fire: a circumstance which was accounted for by the great humidity of the night. The Syrian threw himself into the water, and swimming with great agility and rapidity, gained a ridge of rocks so far off, that not a shot from the whole troop, which fired as it passed, reached him. Bonaparte, who continued his march, desired me to wait for Kleber, whose division formed the rear-guard, and to tell him not to forget the Naplousian. The poor fellow was, I believe, shot at last.

We returned to Jaffa on the 24th of May, and stopped there during the 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th. This town had lately been the scene of a horrible transaction, dictated by necessity, and it was again destined to witness the exercise of the same dire law. Here I have a severe duty to perform. I will state what I know, and what I saw.

Some tents were erected on a small eminence, near the gardens

which encircle Jaffa to the east. Orders were immediately given to undermine and blow up the fortifications, and, on the 27th, at a given signal, we saw all at once the town uncovered. An hour afterwards, the General, attended by Berthier and several physicians and surgeons, entered his tent. A long and melancholy deliberation ensued, as to the fate of those who were incurably sick of the plague, and who were on the point of death. After a discussion of the most serious and conscientious character, it was determined to anticipate by means of medicine, an inevitable death which must take place a few hours later, but under circumstances more painful and cruel.

Our little army arrived at Cairo on the 14th of June, after a most harassing march of twenty-five days. The heat, during the passage of the desert, ranged from 100 to 110 degrees of Fahrenheit. The fallacious *mirage* was here even more vexatious than in the plains of Bohahireh. The excessive thirst, together with the most complete illusion, induced us, in spite of our experience, to urge on our wearied horses towards those imaginary lakes, which some moments after appeared but salt and arid sands.

The brackish waters of these deserts, which our horses drank with avidity, occasioned the loss of great numbers, who dropped down before they had got a mile from the watering-place.

Bonaparte announced his entry into the capital of Egypt by one of those lying bulletins, which deceived only fools. 'I bring with me,' said he, 'many prisoners and colours—I have rased the palace of Djezzar, the ramparts of Acre—there no longer remains one stone upon another, all the inhabitants have left the town by sea—Djezzar is dangerously wounded.' Our return to Cairo has been attributed to the insurrections which broke out during the unfortunate expedition into Syria ; but nothing is more incorrect. The reverses which we experienced before St. Jean d'Acre, and the fear of a hostile landing, were the motives which induced our return to Egypt. What more could we do in Syria, but lose men and time, neither of which we had to spare ?

Bonaparte had scarcely arrived at Cairo, when he was informed that the brave and indefatigable Mourad Bey was descending by the route of Fayoum, to form a junction with reinforcements collecting in Bohahireh. In all probability this movement had some connection with the expected landing of the Turkish army, of which he had been apprised. Mourad had selected the Natron Lakes for his place of rendezvous. To

this point Murat was despatched ; but on hearing of his approach, the Bey retreated by the Desert of Gizeh and the great Pyramids.

Bonaparte attached great importance to the destruction of this active chief, whom he looked upon as the bravest and most dangerous of his enemies in Egypt, and who was constantly hovering about the skirts of the desert.

On the 14th of July, Bonaparte left Cairo for the Pyramids. He remained three or four days among the ruins of this ancient city of the dead. This journey to the Pyramids, in which he had solely in view the destroying of Mourad Bey, has given occasion to a little romance, pretty enough. It is stated that he had appointed an audience with the mufti and the ulemas, and that, on entering into the great Pyramid, he exclaimed, 'Glory to Allah ! God only is God, and Mahomet is his prophet !' Now the fact is, Bonaparte never entered into the great Pyramid ; he never had any intention of the kind. I certainly should have accompanied him, as I never for one moment quitted him while in the desert. He sent some persons into one of the great Pyramids ; but he remained without. They gave him an account of what they had seen in the interior ; that is to say, they informed him there was nothing to be seen.

On the evening of the 15th of July, while we were walking in the direction of Alexandria, we perceived an Arab messenger riding towards us at full speed. He brought to the General a despatch from Marmont, who commanded there at the time, greatly to Bonaparte's satisfaction. The Turks had landed at Aboukir, under the escort and protection of an English squadron. This news of the disembarkation of 15,000 or 16,000 enemies did not surprise Bonaparte, who had expected it for some time. As soon as he had read the despatch, he retired to his tent, and dictated to me his orders for the march of the troops. At this moment, I saw in him the development of that ardent character which rose superior to difficulties, and that celerity which anticipated events. He was all action, and never hesitated for a moment. On the 16th of July, at four in the morning, he was on horseback, and the army in full march. I must do justice to that presence of mind, to that promptitude of decision, to that rapidity of execution, which, at this period of his life, never for a moment forsook him on great occasions. On the 23rd, we arrived at Alexandria, where all was prepared for that memorable conflict, which, although it did not counterbalance the immense losses and melancholy results of the naval battle of

the same name, will always recall to the memory of Frenchmen one of their most brilliant achievements in arms.*

After the battle which was fought on the 25th, Bonaparte sent a flag of truce on board the English admiral's ship. Our intercourse was marked by that politeness which ought to mark the intercourse of civilized nations. The admiral made our envoy some little presents, in return for those we had sent, and likewise a copy of the French Gazette of Frankfort, dated 10th of June, 1799. For ten months we had been without news from France. Bonaparte glanced over this journal with an eagerness easily to be imagined.† 'Ah !' said he, 'my expectations have not deceived me ; the fools have lost Italy. All the fruit of our victories has disappeared : I must leave Egypt.'

* As M. de Bourrienne gives no details of this memorable battle, the following extract from Rovigo's Memoirs will supply the deficiency :—

'Whilst General Bonaparte was coming in person from Cairo, the troops on board the Turkish fleet had effected a landing, and taken possession of the fort of Aboukir, and of a redoubt placed behind the village of that name.

'The Turks had nearly destroyed the weak garrisons, that occupied those two military points, when General Marmont, who commanded at Alexandria, came to their relief. This general, seeing the two posts in the power of the Turks, returned to shut himself up in Alexandria, where he would probably have been blockaded by the Turkish army, had it not been for the arrival of the General-in-chief.

'Bonaparte arrived at midnight, with his guides and the remaining part of his army, and ordered the Turks to be attacked the next morning. In this battle, as in the preceding ones, the attack, the encounter, and the rout, were occurrences of a moment, and the result of a single movement on the part of our troops. The whole Turkish army plunged into the sea, to regain their ships, leaving behind them everything they had brought on shore.

'Whilst this event was occurring on the sea-shore, a pacha had left the field of battle, with a corps of about 3000 men, in order to throw himself into the fort of Aboukir. They soon felt the extremities of thirst, which compelled them, after the elapse of a few days, to surrender unconditionally to General Menou, who was left on the ground, to close the operations connected with the Turkish army recently defeated.'

† 'The French, on their return from St. Jean d'Acre, were totally ignorant of all that had taken place in Europe for several months. Napoleon, eager to obtain intelligence, sent a flag of truce on board the Turkish admiral's ship, under the pretence of treating for the ransom of the prisoners taken at Aboukir ; not doubting but the envoy would be stopped by Sir Sidney Smith, who carefully prevented all direct communication between the French and the Turks. Accordingly, the French flag of truce received directions from Sir Sidney to go on

He desired Berthier to be called ; he told him to read the news. 'Things,' said he, 'go ill in France ; I must see what is passing there ; you must come with me.' Myself, Berthier and Gantheaume, whom he had sent for, were the only parties to be intrusted with the secret. He recommended Berthier to be prudent, to testify no symptoms of joy, to change nothing of his usual habits, nor to purchase anything. He finished by saying, that he depended upon him. 'I am sure of myself,' said he ; 'I am sure of Bourrienne.' Berthier promised to be silent, and he kept his word. He had had enough of Egypt ; he burned with the desire of returning to France, and feared lest his own indiscretion might ruin all. Gantheaume arrived, and Bonaparte gave him orders to prepare two frigates, *La Muiron* and *La Carrière*, and two small vessels, *La Revanche* and *La Fortune*, with provisions for 400 or 500 men, and for two months. He communicated to him his secret intentions, and recommended the strictest secrecy, lest intelligence of his preparations should reach any of the English cruisers. He afterwards arranged with Gantheaume the course he intended to steer ; he provided for everything.

Bonaparte left Alexandria on the 5th of August, and arrived at Cairo on the 10th, for the purpose of making some parting arrangements. There he caused to be renewed the report of his proceeding to Upper Egypt, which appeared the more feasible, as such had been, in fact, his determination previous to our excursion to the Pyramids, as was well known to the army and to the inhabitants of Cairo. All at once, he announced an intention of examining the Delta ; and to encourage that belief, he wrote on the 18th to the Divan, desiring them to keep him regularly informed of the state of affairs at Cairo during his absence. By this means he succeeded in preventing any suspicion of his projected departure from arising among the soldiery ; and we had no sooner left Cairo than we returned to Alexandria.

Hitherto our secret had been well kept. General Lanusse,

board his ship. He experienced the handsomest treatment ; and the English commander having, among other things, ascertained that the disasters of Italy were quite unknown to Napoleon, indulged in the malicious pleasure of sending him a file of newspapers. Napoleon spent the whole night in his tent, perusing the papers ; and he came to the determination of immediately proceeding to Europe, to repair the disasters of France, and, if possible, to save her from destruction.'—*Memorial de Sainte Helene.*

however, who commanded at Menouf, where we arrived on the 20th, had divined our intentions. 'You are going to France,' said he. My reply in the negative confirmed his suspicions.

On the 22nd of August, we returned to Alexandria, and the General informed all those who had accompanied him from Cairo, that France was their destination. At this intelligence, joy appeared in every countenance.

General Kleber, who was instructed by Bonaparte to succeed him in the command of the army, was invited to come from Damietta to Rosetta, to confer with him on affairs of extreme importance. Bonaparte, in making an appointment which he knew he could not keep, wished to avoid the reproaches and sturdy frankness of Kleber. He wrote to him all that he had got to say, and assigned as his reason for not keeping his appointment, that his fear of being observed by the English cruisers had induced him to depart three days earlier than he intended. But Bonaparte knew well, when he wrote this letter, that he should be at sea when it was received. Kleber complained bitterly of this deception to the Directory. The singular fate which befell his despatches will be seen hereafter.

CHAPTER IX.

ON the 23rd of August, we embarked in the two frigates *La Muiron* and *La Carrière*. Our number was between 400 and 500. The night was dark when we got on board; but, by the feeble light of the stars, we were enabled to perceive a corvette, which approached to observe, and, as it were, to be a party in our silent and nocturnal embarkment.*

It has been falsely stated, that Admiral Gantheaume was absolute master of his movements, as if anyone could command when Bonaparte was present. So far from that, he told the admiral, in my presence, that he would not follow the usual

* 'The horses of the escort had been left to run loose on the beach, and all was perfect stillness in Alexandria, when the advanced posts of the town were alarmed by the wild galloping of horses, which, from a natural instinct, were returning to Alexandria through the desert. The picket ran to arms on seeing horses, ready saddled and bridled, which were soon discovered to belong to the regiment of guides. They at first thought that a misfortune had happened to some detachment in its pursuit of the Arabs. With these horses came also

course, and run out into the open sea. 'It is my wish,' said he, 'that you keep on the African side till you get to the southward of Sardinia. I have here a handful of brave fellows with some artillery. If the English should fall in with us, I will immediately run on shore, and, with my party, make my way by land to Oran, Tunis, or some other port, from whence we may obtain the means of getting home.' Such was his resolution, and it was irrevocably fixed.

During one-and-twenty days of impatience and disappointment, we were tossed about by contrary winds. At length, however, a favourable breeze sprang up, which, in a short time, carried us past that point on the African coast near which Carthage formerly stood; and we soon afterwards made Sardinia, and ran along its western coast, keeping well in with the land. Bonaparte intended to have run ashore, in case of falling in with an English squadron; then to have gained Corsica, and to have awaited a favourable opportunity of reaching France.

Everything had contributed to render our voyage dull and monotonous. The General had lost four aides-de-camp, Croisier, Sulkowsky, Julien, and Guibert; Caffarelli, Brueys, Casabianca, were no more. Our misfortunes; the uncertainty of our favourable reception at home; the situation of affairs in France, of whose reverses we had acquired an imperfect knowledge; the danger of being made prisoners in a sea swarming with the ships of the enemy;—all these threw a gloom over our spirits, and checked every disposition to amusement. Bonaparte incessantly paced the deck, occupied in superintending the execution of his orders. The appearance of the smallest sail renewed his inquietudes. The fear of being a prisoner to the English haunted him continually; he dreaded, as the worst of evils, the falling into their hands; and, at last, he trusted to their generosity!

At length, on the 8th of October, after having been chased by, and escaped from, an English squadron, we entered, at eight in the morning, the bay of Frejus. None of the sailors

those of the generals who had embarked with General Bonaparte; so that Alexandria was, for a time, in considerable alarm. The cavalry was ordered to proceed, in all haste, in the direction whence the horses came; and everyone was giving himself up to the most gloomy conjectures, when the cavalry returned to the city with the Turkish groom, who was bringing back General Bonaparte's horse to Alexandria.'—*Memoirs of the Duke de Rovigo.*

being acquainted with that part of the coast, we knew not exactly where we were ; for a moment we were in doubt as to whether we should run in. We were not expected, and we could not answer the signals, which had been changed during our absence. Some shots were fired at us from the batteries ; but our confident entrance into the harbour, the numbers which crowded the decks of both frigates, and our demonstrations of joy, did not allow them long to remain in suspense. Scarcely had we come to an anchor, when it was rumoured about that one of the ships carried General Bonaparte. In an instant the sea was covered with boats. In vain we endeavoured to keep the people off ; we were fairly lifted up, and carried on shore. When we represented to the crowd of men and women, who pressed about us, the danger they ran, they all cried out, ‘ We’d rather have the plague than the Austrians.’

It will be remembered what effects the simple announcement of the return of Bonaparte produced in France and throughout Europe. He has been accused, among other things, of breaking the sanitary laws. It was his intention to have submitted implicitly to the usual quarantine ; but the inhabitants of Frejus would not permit it : we were, as I have already stated, absolutely carried on shore. Still, when we consider the landing of 500 persons and a quantity of goods from Alexandria, where the plague had been raging during the summer, we must regard it as a singular happiness that France and Europe had been preserved from such a scourge.

People frequently speak of the good fortune which attaches to an individual, and even accompanies him through life. Without professing to believe in this sort of predestination, yet, when I call to mind the numerous dangers which Bonaparte escaped in so many enterprises, the hazards he encountered, the chances he ran, I can conceive that others may have this faith ; but, having for a length of time studied ‘ the man of destiny,’ I have remarked, that what was called his fortune, was, in reality, his genius ; that his success was the consequence of his admirable foresight—of his calculations, rapid as lightning—and of the conviction that boldness is often the truest wisdom. If, for example, during our voyage from Alexandria to Frejus, he had not imperiously insisted on pursuing a course different from that usually taken, and which usual course was recommended by the admiral, would he have escaped the perils which beset his path ? Probably not. And was all this the effect of chance ? Certainly not.

Scarcely had he arrived at Frejus, than, in his anxiety for news, he questioned every one he met. There he first learned the extent of our reverses in Italy. 'The evil is too great,' said he; 'there is nothing to be done.' He decided on returning to Paris the very evening of the day on which we landed. Everywhere on his journey, in the towns, in the villages, he was received, as at Frejus, with enthusiasm which it is impossible to describe: those only who witnessed his triumphal journey could form even a faint idea of it; and it required no great spirit of observation to foresee something similar to what afterwards happened.

The provinces, a prey to anarchy and civil war, were threatened with foreign invasion. Nearly the whole of the south presented the afflicting spectacle of one vast arena of contending factions. The nation groaned under the weight of tyrannical laws, and was universally opposed to a pentarchy, without moral force, without justice, and which had become the sport of faction and intrigue. The highways were infested by robbers; the agents of the Directory practised the most scandalous extortions—disorder reigned throughout—everything wore the aspect of dissolution. Any change was felt to be preferable to the continuance of such a state of things; and the majority of Frenchmen wished to escape from such an intolerable position. Two dangers threatened at the same time; anarchy, and the Bourbons. Everyone felt the pressing necessity of concentrating the powers of the state in a single hand; and at the same time, maintaining those institutions, which were suited to the spirit and intelligence of the age; and which France, after having so dearly purchased, was now upon the point of losing for ever. The country looked for a man who was capable of restoring her to tranquillity; but as yet, no such man had appeared. A soldier of fortune presented himself, covered with glory; he had planted the standard of France on the Capitol, and on the Pyramids. His great actions, his brilliant enterprises, always crowned with success, his devotion to France, the justness of his conceptions, all concurred to point him out as the man most capable of making the country of his adoption great and happy, and of establishing public liberty. Bonaparte was deficient neither in elevated views, in knowledge, nor in the necessary acquirements; but the will alone was wanting. For who, in fact, could have supposed that, having obtained the supreme power, he would have availed himself of it to trample under foot all the principles he had so long

professed, and to which he owed his elevation? Who could have believed, that he would have superseded, by the most absolute despotism, that constitutional liberty, for which France had so long sighed, and for the peaceable enjoyment of which she had made so many sacrifices? But so it is: when his ambition had been gratified, when he had sacrificed everything to gain his point, we see him re-establishing the principles which he had combated, and defending them with equal energy. Could he venture to hope, that in the course of those immense enterprises which formed the business of his life, not one would have proved unfortunate? Did he not consider, that when a man is in himself *all*, *all* must fall with him; and that the destiny of a nation which depends upon the gain or loss of a battle, is based upon nothing?

Among the projects which Bonaparte was incessantly revolving in his mind, must undoubtedly be ranked the project of attaining the head of the French government; but it is a mistake to suppose, that, on his return from Egypt, he had formed any fixed plan. There was something vague in his ambitious aspirations; and he was fond of building those imaginary edifices, called castles in the air. The current of events was in accordance with his wishes; and it may truly be said, that the whole French nation smoothed, for Bonaparte, the road which led to power. It is certain, that the unanimous plaudits and universal joy which accompanied him along a journey of more than 200 leagues, induced him to regard as a national mission that step, which was at first prompted merely by his wish of meddling with the affairs of the Republic.

This spontaneous burst of popular feeling, unordered and unpaid for, loudly proclaimed the grievances of the people, and their hope that the man of victory would become their deliverer. The general enthusiasm excited by the return of the conqueror of Egypt, delighted him to a degree which I cannot express; and was, he as often assured me, a powerful stimulus in urging him to the object to which the wishes of France seemed to direct him.

In times of disorder, when all powers are confounded, and nothing can establish a counterpoise, the cleverest, the strongest, and the boldest, may easily oppress the rest. Bonaparte's military superiority over his contemporaries, the ascendancy of his good fortune and glory, and the influence of his name, assisted him at this time, as throughout two-thirds of his career.

If, when master of the power which was offered to him, he

had followed the principles he previously professed, and for which he had heretofore fought and conquered ;—if he had defended, with all the influence of his glory, that liberty, which the nation claimed, and which the age demanded ;—if he had rendered France as happy and as free, as he rendered her glorious—posterity could not have refused him the very first place among those great men, at whose side he will be ranged. But not having done for the welfare of mankind what he undertook for his own glory, posterity will judge of him by what he has achieved. He will have full credit for his victories, but not for his conquests, which produced no result, and not one of which he preserved. His claim to the title of one of the greatest captains that ever lived, will be undisputed ; but he left France less than when she was intrusted to him, and less than she had been left by Louis XIV. His brilliant campaigns in Italy gave Venice to Austria, and the Ionian Isles to England. His Egyptian expedition gave Malta to the English, destroyed our navy, and cost us 22,000 men. The civil code is the only one of Bonaparte's legislative acts which can be sanctioned by philosophy and reason. All his other laws were null, and rested only on his existence. Did he, either in his character of Consul or Emperor, contribute to the happiness of France ? Posterity will answer in the negative. Indeed, if we weigh, in one scale, all our victories and all our glory, and in the other, Europe in Paris, and the disgraceful treaty of 1815, with its accessories and consequences, it will be seen on what side the balance will turn.

On the 16th of October, we arrived at Paris, whither the news of his landing at Frejus had been transmitted by telegraph. The day after his arrival, he paid a visit to the Directory. The interview was cold. On the 24th he said to me, 'I dined yesterday, at Gohier's ; Sieyes was present, but I affected not to see him ; and I could perceive the rage with which this neglect inflamed him.' 'But are you sure,' said I, 'that he is against you ?' 'I know not that yet,' he replied ; 'but he belongs to a system that I do not like :' he was, at this time, considering how he might turn Sieyes out, and become a Director in his place.

To throw a clear light on the course of the great events which are about to be opened to our view, it is necessary here to take a rapid glance at the state of parties in Paris on our return. Moreau enjoyed a high military reputation ; the army of the Rhine had reared in its ranks men of great valour ; and

without withholding their meed of approbation from the conqueror of Italy, there was something which more personally concerned themselves in their admiration of the general who had repaired the disasters of Scherer in Germany. Nothing, in fact, is more natural, than to exalt those particular triumphs in which we ourselves have had a share. Bernadotte, who was a zealous republican, had been Minister of War during our campaign in Egypt; but had resigned three weeks before the return of Bonaparte to France. Both these generals enjoyed the confidence of the armies which they had commanded, and might be considered their representatives. Bonaparte had for devoted adherents the companions of his glory in Italy, and those whom he afterward called 'his Egyptians.' The army was absolutely republican; whilst the miserable Directory appeared, as it were, an institution invented for the express purpose of being the instrument of intriguers. Our road was beset with difficulties, which it was necessary to appreciate—an incredible enthusiasm, it is true, had accompanied us on our route to Paris; but something more was wanting to the obtaining of suffrages than the shouts of the multitude.

At this time, the partizans of Bernadotte wished him to re-assume his post of Minister of War; and it became of importance to Bonaparte to prevent this project from succeeding. Two days after our arrival he said to me, 'I believe that I shall have Bernadotte and Moreau against me; but I do not fear Moreau—he is devoid of energy; he prefers military to political power; we shall gain him, by the promise of a command. But Bernadotte has Moorish blood in his veins. He is bold and enterprising; he does not like me, and I am certain he will oppose me. If he should become ambitious, he will venture anything: besides, the fellow is not to be seduced; he is disinterested and clever. But, after all, we have just arrived; we shall see.'

The first views of General Bonaparte had for object the obtaining a seat in the Directory, but to this his age presented an insurmountable obstacle; whatever efforts he might make to get over this he found would be in vain. As soon as his intentions became known, he found himself surrounded by all those who recognised in him the man they had long looked for. These men, who were able and influential in their own sphere, laboured to effect a reconciliation between Bonaparte and Sieyes, and to convert into friendship the dislike which existed between them. It was reported to Bonaparte that Sieyes had said, after the dinner at which he had been treated with so much disrespect,

‘Do you see how that little insolent fellow treats a member of that government which ought to have ordered him to be shot?’

But all was changed through the mediation of able friends, who impressed upon Bonaparte the hopelessness of supplanting Sieyes, and that it was better to join with him in overthrowing that constitution which neither of them loved. One said to Bonaparte, in my hearing, ‘Seek a support among those who treat as Jacobins the friends of the Republic, and, believe me, Sieyes is at the head of that party.’ Scarcely had Sieyes come to an understanding with Bonaparte, when he let out that Barras had said, ‘The little Corporal has made his fortune in Italy; he has no occasion to go back.’ Bonaparte went to the Directory expressly to refute this assertion: he complained bitterly before the Directors; affirmed boldly that his supposed wealth was a fable, and, if he had made his fortune, it had not been at the expense of the Republic.

During this brief political crisis, nothing passed more elevated, more noble, or less contemptible, than what we have seen in former revolutionary movements. Everything, in these political plots, is accompanied with so much trickery, falsehood, and treachery, that for the honour of humanity a veil should be drawn over their detail. All is brought about by the point of the sword.

Bonaparte admitted few persons into his confidence; he communicated his plans to those only who were necessary to their success. The rest mechanically followed their leaders, and the impulse which was given to them: they passively waited the fulfilment of the promises they had received, and by which their services had been purchased.

The parts in the great drama which was shortly to be enacted were well cast. During the three days preceding the 9th of November, everyone was at his post. Lucien pushed on with activity and intelligence the conspiracy in the two Councils; Sieyes took charge of the Directory; Real, under the influence of Fouché, negotiated with the departments, and, by the directions of his chief, dexterously managed, without compromising Fouché, to ruin those from whom that minister had derived his power: so early as the 5th Fouché had said to me, ‘Tell your general to be speedy; if he delays, he is lost.’

On the morning of the 9th of November (18th Brumaire) all the generals devoted to Bonaparte were assembled at his house. I had never before seen such a number together. All were in full uniform except Bernadotte. I was surprised to see him in plain clothes, and I stepped up and said, in a low voice, ‘General,

everyone here, except you and I, are in uniform.' 'Why should I be in uniform?' said he. As he uttered these words, Bonaparte, struck with the same surprise as myself, stopped short while speaking to several persons around him, and turning quickly towards Bernadotte, said—'How is this? you are not in uniform?' 'I never am on a morning when I am not on duty,' replied Bernadotte. 'You will be on duty presently.' 'I have not heard a word of it: I should have received my orders sooner.'

Bonaparte then led Bernadotte into an adjoining room. Their conversation was not long, for there was not time to spare.

The modest abode of the conqueror of Italy was too small for such a multitude, they filled the court and the passages.

The Council of Ancients assembled the same morning, in the Tuileries, at the early hour of seven; one of the conspirators forthwith declared that the salvation of the state demanded vigorous measures, and proposed two decrees for their acceptance; one, by which the meetings of the legislative bodies should be instantly transferred to the Chateau of St. Cloud, some miles from Paris: and another investing Napoleon with the supreme command of all the troops in and about the capital, including the National Guard. These motions were instantly carried; and, in the course of a few minutes, Bonaparte received, in the midst of his martial company, the announcement of his new authority. He only waited for this being brought to him, before he should mount his horse. That decree was adopted in the Council of Ancients, by what may be called a false majority, for the members of the Council were summoned at different hours, and it was so contrived, that sixty or eighty of them, whom Lucien and his friends had not been able to gain over, should not receive their notices in time.

As soon as the message from the Council of Ancients arrived, Bonaparte requested all the officers to follow him. A few hesitated, and did not: among others, Bernadotte. Bonaparte returned quickly to request him to do so, but he declined.

A large body of troops, amounting to about 10,000 men, had been assembled from an early hour in the gardens of the Tuileries, accompanied by the generals Bournonville, Moreau, and Macdonald. Bonaparte reviewed these troops, and read to them the decree of the Council of Ancients, appointing him to the command of all the military force, and charging him with the maintenance of the public tranquillity.

At ten o'clock on the same morning, the adverse Council of Five Hundred assembled also, and heard, with astonishment and

indignation, of the decree by which their sittings were transferred from Paris (the scene of their popular influence) to St. Cloud. They had, however, no means of disputing that point: they parted with cries of '*Vive la Republique! Vive la Constitution!*' and incited the mob, their allies, to muster next morning on the new scene of action—where, it was evident, this military revolution must either be turned back, or pushed to consummation. During the rest of the day Napoleon remained at the Tuileries; the troops were in arms; the population expected with breathless anxiety the coming of the decisive day. A strong body of soldiery marched to St. Cloud under the orders of Murat.

On the 19th I went to St. Cloud, with my friend, La Valette. As we passed the Place Louis XV., now Louis XVI., he asked me what was doing, and what my opinion was as to the coming events. Without entering into any detail, I replied, 'My friend, either we shall sleep to-morrow at the Luxembourg, or there will be an end of us.' Who could tell which of the two things would happen? Success legalized a bold enterprise, which the slightest accident might have changed into a crime.

The sittings of the Ancients under the presidency of Lemer cier, commenced at one o'clock. A warm discussion took place upon the state of affairs, and confusion reigned in the Councils:—in that of the Five Hundred disorder was at its height. Already the Directory had ceased to exist. Sieyes and Ducos had joined the party of Bonaparte; and Gohier and Moulins were prisoners in the Luxembourg, and in the custody of General Moreau; Barras, after declaring that his sole object in aspiring to the office of a Director had been his love of liberty, had sent in his resignation. At this moment Bonaparte entered, attended by a body of grenadiers, who remained outside the entrance of the hall. He attempted to address this assembly, but his voice was drowned in cries of, '*Live the Republic! Live the Constitution! Down with the Dictator!*' Bonaparte fell back upon the grenadiers—he was joined by his brother Lucien, who had been president of the assembly; still the soldiers hesitated to act, when Lucien, drawing his sword, cried, 'I swear to plunge this in the bosom of my brother, if ever he makes an attempt against the liberties of Frenchmen.' This dramatic stroke was perfectly successful; hesitation vanished at the words, and, at a sign from Bonaparte, Murat, at the head of the grenadiers, rushed into the hall, and drove out the Representatives. All were obliged to yield to the logic of the bayonet, and here ceased the employment of a military force on this famous day.

At ten o'clock at night the most profound calm reigned in the palace of St. Cloud, where lately such tumultuous scenes had taken place. All the Deputies were still there, and might be seen wandering about in the saloon, the galleries, and the courts. The greatest number appeared much frightened ; some affected to be satisfied ; but all were extremely anxious to get back to Paris—but this they could not do till an order was issued for the purpose.

The day had been passed in destroying one government—it became necessary to devote the night to the formation of a new one. The Council of Ancients assembled, and Lucien set about finding out such members of the Council of Five Hundred as he thought he could rely upon. He succeeded in getting together only about thirty, and these, with their president, were supposed to represent that numerous assembly of which they formed so small a part. This phantom of a representative body was essential, because Bonaparte, in spite of the illegalities of the preceding day, wished it should appear that he had acted according to law. They finished by decreeing, that there was no longer a Directory ; and that sixty-one individuals, who were named, had ceased to be members of the national representation, in consequence of the excesses to which they were continually proceeding, and for having taken an active part in the late disturbances. They decreed, that the powers of government should be administered by three Consuls ; and they nominated to these offices, Sieyes, Roger Ducos, and Bonaparte. Everything was concluded by three o'clock in the morning, and the palace of St. Cloud assumed its accustomed calm, and presented the appearance of a vast solitude.

At three o'clock in the morning I accompanied Bonaparte, in his carriage, to Paris. He was extremely fatigued, after so many trials and tribulations. A new feature was opened before him. He was completely absorbed in thought, and did not utter a single word during the journey. When he arrived at his own house he said, 'Bourrienne, I said many ridiculous things. I like better to speak to soldiers than to lawyers. These fellows intimidated me. I have not been used to public assemblies ; but that will come in time.'

On the morning of the 20th of Brumaire (11th of November) the first consul sent his brother Louis to inform the ex-Director, Gohier, that he was at liberty. This haste was not without a motive, for Bonaparte was anxious to install himself in the Luxembourg ; and we removed there the same evening.

Everything was to be created—Bonaparte had almost the whole of the army with him, and on it he could depend ; but military force was not alone sufficient, and he wished a great civil power legally established. He immediately set about the composition of a Senate, a Tribunate, a Council of State, and a new legislative body—in fact, a new constitution.* A consular government was formed, at the head of which was Bonaparte, named consul for ten years ; Cambaceres, second consul, also for ten years, and Lebrun, third consul, named for five years. To these were added a conservative Senate, a legislative body of 300 members, and a tribunate of 100 members. This latter was suppressed in 1807.

The consuls, on the 17th of November, gave directions for the arrest and detention of sixty-one deputies, thirty-eight of whom were ordered for transportation to the pestilential shores of French Guienne. The remainder were permitted to remain in France, under the inspection of the police. This proscription, from which I had the good fortune to extricate M. Moreau de Worms, produced a bad effect ; it evinced an ill-timed severity, contrary to the assurances of moderation made at St. Cloud on the 9th. Cambaceres drew up a report, in which he pointed out the inutility of such measures as to the maintenance of tranquillity, in consequence of which the orders for deportation were withdrawn, and the parties placed under the surveillance of the police. Some days after Sieyes entered the cabinet of Bonaparte. ‘Here,’ said he, ‘this M. Moreau de Worms, whom M. Bourrienne prevailed upon you to save from transportation, has been getting on at a fine rate. I told you what he was—I have received from Sens a letter which tells me that he is there, and that he has been denouncing the late changes in the most violent manner to the people assembled in the market-place.’ ‘Are you quite sure of your agents ?’ ‘Entirely so ; I will answer for the truth of what they have written.’ Bonaparte shewed me the letter, at the same time reproaching me severely. ‘What will you say, General,’ said I, ‘if, in the course of an hour, I produce to you this same Moreau, who has been declaiming against you at Sens ?’ ‘I defy you,’ said he. ‘I have pledged myself

* The constitution of the year VIII. was presented on the 13th of December, 1799, and accepted by the people on the 7th of February, 1800. The establishment of the Council of State took place on the 24th of December, 1799. The installation of the new legislative body and the Tribunate, was fixed for the 1st of January, 1800.

for him,' returned I, 'and I knew what I was doing ; he is an enthusiast, but a man of honour, and incapable of breaking his word.' 'Well, we shall see—Go, bring him.' I was pretty sure of what I said ; for about an hour before I had seen M. Moreau, who had remained concealed in Paris since the 9th of November. Nothing was more easy than for me to find him ; and in threequarters of an hour after he was at the Luxembourg. I presented him to Bonaparte, who conversed with him a long time. After he was gone, 'Well,' said Bonaparte to me, 'you were right ; that fool, Sieyes, is as credulous as Cassandra—this shews us that we must not give implicit credit to the reports of those fellows whom we are obliged to employ in the police—but in fact, Bourrienne, this M. Moreau of yours is not so bad, and I like him much—I must do something for him.' M. Moreau did not long wait for a proof of the consul's favourable dispositions towards him ;—a few days after, on my simple recommendation, he was appointed to a situation with an annual salary of ten thousand francs (£416 13s. 4d.).

At the Luxembourg the principal employment of Bonaparte was in planning ways and means for raising money ; for although Machiavel has written a chapter to prove that money is of very little use in the affairs of this world, Bonaparte was of a different opinion. He occupied here a suite of rooms on the ground floor, to the right, entering from the street Vaugirard. His cabinet was near a private stair, leading to Josephine's apartments on the first floor—I occupied apartments on the second floor, immediately above. After breakfast, which was served at ten, Bonaparte would converse a while with his ordinary guests, that is to say, with his aides-de-camp, the persons he had invited, and myself, who never quitted him. He received also several private friends,—among others his brothers, Joseph and Lucien, whom he always saw with pleasure, and conversed familiarly with them. Cambaceres came about noon and remained with him generally about an hour. Lebrun visited but seldom. Notwithstanding his elevation, his virtue remained unaltered. He appeared to Bonaparte too moderate, because he always opposed himself to his ambitious views, and to his plans for seizing on the supreme power. When he rose from breakfast, after having bid good morning to Josephine and her daughter Hortense, he generally said, 'Come, Bourrienne : let us go to work.'

During the day I remained with Bonaparte, sometimes reading

to him, sometimes writing to his dictation. Three or four times in the week he went to the council. We dined at five. After dinner the first consul ascended to the apartments of Josephine, where he commonly received the visits of the ministers, and always with pleasure those of the Minister for Foreign Affairs; especially after the portfolio of that department had been placed in the hands of Talleyrand. At midnight, and often sooner, he gave the signal for retiring, by saying in a hasty manner, 'Come, let's go to bed.'

It was at the Luxembourg, in the apartments of which the adorable Josephine presided with so much grace, that the word *Madame* came again into use. This first return to the ancient French politeness was startling to some zealous republicans; but things were soon carried further at the Tuileries by the introduction of *Votre Altesse*, on occasions of state ceremony, and *Monseigneur*, in the family circle.

At the commencement of the first consul's administration, though he always consulted the notes he had collected, he yet received with attention the recommendations of persons with whom he was well acquainted; but it was not safe for them to recommend a rogue or a fool. The men whom he most disliked were those whom he called *babblers*, who are continually prating of everything and on everything. He often said, 'I want more head and less tongue.'

On taking the government into his own hands, Bonaparte knew so little of the revolution and of the men engaged in civil employments, that it was indispensably necessary for him to collect information from every quarter respecting men and things. But when the conflicting passions of the moment became more calm, and the spirit of party more prudent, and when order had been, by his severe investigations, introduced where hitherto unbridled confusion had reigned, he became gradually more scrupulous in granting places, whether arising from newly-created offices, or from those changes which the different departments often experienced. He then said to me, 'Bourrienne, I give up your department to you. Name whom you please for the appointments; but remember, you must be responsible to me.'

What a list would that be which should contain the names of all the prefects, sub-prefects, receivers-general, and other civil officers, to whom I gave places! I have kept no memoranda of their names: and, indeed, what advantage would there have been in doing so? It was impossible for me to have a personal

knowledge of all the fortunate candidates ; but I relied on recommendations in which I had confidence.

I have had little to complain of in those I obliged ; though it is true that, since my separation from Bonaparte, I have seen many of them generously take the opposite side of the street in which I was walking, and, by that delicate attention, save me the trouble of raising my hat.

When a new government rises upon the ruins of one which has been overturned, the best chance it has of rendering itself a favourite with the nation, if that nation be at war, is to hold out the prospect of peace ; because peace is always an object which is desired by the people. This Bonaparte knew very well ; and if in his heart he wished for war, he was aware of what vast importance it was to him to appear to be desirous of peace. Thus, immediately after his installation at the Luxembourg, he hastened to notify to all the foreign powers his accession to the consulate, and likewise caused letters to be addressed to all the diplomatic agents of the French government abroad. He also hastened to open negotiations with the court of London. At this time we were at war with nearly the whole of Europe. We had lost Italy. The Emperor of Germany was governed by his ministers, who in their turn were governed by England, and France had no army in the interior. It was of great importance to the first consul, that foreign powers should understand that it was impossible to expect the restoration of the Bourbons ; that it was the object of the existing government to adopt a system of order and regeneration ; and that it was capable of maintaining friendly relations with them all. To attain this end Bonaparte gave orders to Talleyrand to make the first overtures of peace to the English cabinet. A correspondence took place, which shewed the condescending policy of Bonaparte and the arrogant policy of England.

The exchange of notes which took place was attended by no immediate result. However, the first consul had partly attained his object : if the British government would not enter into negotiations for peace, there was, at least, reason to presume that subsequent overtures of the consular government might be listened to. The correspondence had, at all events, afforded Bonaparte the opportunity of declaring his principles ; and, above all, it had enabled him to ascertain that the return of the Bourbons to France would not be a *sine qua non* condition for the restoration of peace between the two powers.

Since M. de Talleyrand had been Minister for Foreign Affairs,

the business of that department had proceeded with great activity. It was an important advantage to Bonaparte to find a nobleman of the old regime among the republicans. The choice of M. de Talleyrand was, in some sort, an act of courtesy to the foreign courts. It was a delicate attention to the diplomacy of Europe to introduce to its members, for the purpose of treating with them, a man whose rank was at least equal to their own, and who was universally distinguished for a polished elegance of manner combined with solid good qualities and real talents.

It was not with England alone that he sought to establish friendly relations ; the consular government also offered peace to the house of Austria ; but separately. The object of this offer was to awaken a jealousy between the two powers. Speaking to me one day of his extreme desire for peace, he said, ' You see, Bourrienne, I have two great enemies upon my hands. I will not conceal from you that I prefer peace with England. Nothing would be more easy than to destroy Austria. She has no money except what she receives through England.'

These negotiations, however, were attended with no success. None of the European powers would recognize the new government of which Bonaparte was the chief ; the victory of Marengo was necessary to produce the peace of Amiens.

CHAPTER X.

IN reading the history of the great men of antiquity, we often regret that their historians have so occupied themselves with the hero, that they have forgotten to speak of the man. Though no two beings can more closely resemble each other than an illustrious man and an individual in humble life, yet when we follow them into the details of their private life, it is not the less true that we are desirous of becoming acquainted with the most trifling habits of those whom great talents have elevated above their fellows. Is this merely an effect of curiosity, or is it not rather a movement of self-love ? and do we not unconsciously seek to console ourselves for their superiority, by reflecting on their weaknesses, their faults, their absurdities,—in short, all the points of resemblance which they have with other men. In order, therefore, that persons who are anxious for such details may have an opportunity to gratify their curiosity in respect to

Bonaparte, I will here endeavour to describe him as I saw him from my own observation, in his physical and moral character, his tastes, his habits, his passions, and his caprices. I ought to add, that I do not guarantee the resemblance of the portrait which I am about to trace, but from 1792 to 1804, a period during which I scarcely ever lost sight of him.

The person of Bonaparte has served as a subject for the most skilful painters and sculptors ; many able artists, whose talent does honour to France, have successfully delineated his features ; and yet it may be said that there exists no perfectly faithful resemblance. It is not always granted to genius to triumph over impossibilities. His finely shaped head, his superb forehead, his pale and elongated visage, and his meditative look, have been transferred to the canvas ; but the quickness of his glance and the rapidity of his expression were beyond imitation. All the various workings of his mind were instantaneously depicted in his countenance, and his glance changed from mild to severe, and from angry to good-humoured, almost with the rapidity of lightning. It may be truly said, that he had a particular look for every thought that arose in his mind, an appropriate physiognomy for every impulse that agitated his soul.

He had finely-formed hands, and he was very proud of them, and took particular care of them ; and sometimes, while conversing, he would look at them with an air of satisfaction. He also fancied that he had fine teeth, but his pretensions to that advantage did not appear to me to be so well founded.

When he walked, either alone or in company with anyone in his apartments or in the gardens, he stooped a little, and crossed his hands behind his back. He frequently gave an involuntary shrug of his right shoulder, which he elevated a little, at the same time moving his mouth from the left towards the right. If an observer had not known that these movements were merely the effect of an ill habit, he might have supposed that they were convulsive motions. They were in reality the indices of profound meditation, and of intensity of thought. Frequently, after these walks, he drew up, or dictated to me, the most important notes. He could endure great fatigue, not only on horseback and on foot when with the army, but at all times ; frequently walking five or six hours at a time, without being aware of it. He had a habit, when he walked with anyone with whom he was familiar to link his arm into that of his companion, and lean on it.

Bonaparte has frequently said to me, 'Bourrienne, you see how temperate and thin I am ; but nothing can prevent me from thinking that, by the time I am forty, I shall become a great eater, and get very fat. I foresee that my constitution will undergo a change. I take a deal of exercise ; but what of that—it is a presentiment, and will certainly be realized.' This idea annoyed him very much, and, as I was of a different opinion, I never failed to represent those fears as groundless ; but he could not be convinced, and, during the whole time that I was with him, this apprehension never quitted him for a moment, and it was but too well founded.

For the bath he had an absolute passion, and considered it a necessary of life : I have known him to remain there for two hours. During this time, I read to him the daily papers, or any new pamphlets ; for he would hear all, know all, and see all, for himself. While he remained in the bath, he used to be continually turning on the warm water, and, at times, would raise the temperature, so that I have found myself enveloped in such a dense vapour that I could not see to read, and was obliged to open the door.

I have always found Bonaparte extremely temperate, and an enemy to all excess. He was aware of the absurd stories which were circulated about him, and he was often vexed at them. It has been everywhere said, that he was subject to fits of epilepsy ; but, during more than eleven years that I was constantly with him, I have never seen in him any symptom in the least degree indicative of that malady. He was of sound health and a good constitution. If his enemies have endeavoured to degrade him by describing him as subject to a grievous periodical infirmity, his flatterers considered, as it would appear, that sleep was incompatible with greatness, and have been as far from the truth in speaking of his imaginary watchings. Bonaparte made others watch ; but he slept himself, and he slept well. He wished that I should call him every morning at seven o'clock : I was, therefore, always the first to enter his bedroom ; but frequently, when I have attempted to rouse him, he has said to me, still half asleep, 'Ah, Bourrienne, do, I entreat you, allow me to sleep a little longer.' When nothing pressed, I did not disturb him again till eight o'clock. He in general slept seven hours out of the twenty-four, besides dozing a little in the afternoon.

Among the private instructions given to me by Bonaparte, there was a very singular one. 'During the night,' said he,

'enter my chamber as seldom as possible. Never awake me when you have good news to announce ; because, with good news, nothing presses : but, when you have bad news, rouse me immediately ; for then there is not an instant to be lost.' This calculation was good, and he found his advantage in it.

As soon as he rose, his valet de chambre shaved him, and dressed his hair. During these operations I read the newspapers to him, beginning with the *Moniteur*. He paid little attention to any but the German and English journals. 'Get on, get on,' he would say as I read the French papers ; 'I know all about it : they only say what they think will please me.' I have often been surprised that his valet did not cut him during these readings ; for, when anything remarkable occurred, he would turn abruptly to my side.

When Bonaparte had finished his toilet, which he did with great care, for he was particularly neat in his dress, we descended together to his cabinet. There he signed the answers to important petitions, the analysis of which had been made by me on the evening before. It was on levee days particularly, and days of parade, that he was most exact in these matters, because I used to remind him that the greater part of the petitioners would present themselves in the apartments, and that they would ask him for answers. To avoid this annoyance, I informed them beforehand the decision of the first consul. He then read the letters which I had opened and placed upon his table, arranged according to their importance. He directed me to answer them in his name. Sometimes, however, though rarely, he answered them himself.

At ten, the maître d'hôtel announced breakfast : we sat down to a repast of extreme frugality. Almost every morning he ate some chicken, dressed with oil and onions. He drank very little wine ; it was always either claret or burgundy, but he preferred the latter. After breakfast, as after dinner, he took a cup of strong coffee. I have never seen him take coffee between meals, and I do not know what gave rise to the general belief that Bonaparte was particularly fond of coffee. This notion must have originated with those persons who pretended that he could not sleep at night. The one story is necessary to the support of the other. When he did sit up later than usual, it was not coffee he drank, but chocolate, of which he made me take a cup along with him ; but this never happened but when our sittings were prolonged to two or three in the morning.

All that has been said about his immoderate use of snuff, has no more foundation in truth than his pretended partiality for coffee. It is true, he had early learned this habit; but he took it very sparingly, and always from a box, of which he had a great many; because this was one of his hobbies. If he had any resemblance to the great Frederick, it was not in making the pocket of his waistcoat a depôt for snuff, for, as I have already said, he carried his notions of personal neatness even to an extreme.*

Bonaparte had two ruling passions—the love of glory, and the love of war. He was never more gay than in the camp, and never more morose than when unemployed. Building, too, was gratifying to his imagination, whilst projects of gigantic edifices filled the void caused by the want of active employment. He knew that monuments form a part of the history of nations, and that their duration bears witness to the civilization of their founders long after they have disappeared from the earth, and that they likewise often bear false witness to remote generations of the reality of merely fabulous conquests. He knew that the fine arts impart to great actions a lasting renown, and consecrate the memory of those princes who have protected and encouraged them. And yet he has often said to me, ‘A great reputation is but a great noise; the more there is of it, the farther off it is heard. Laws, institutions, monuments, nations—all perish; but the noise continues, and resounds in after generations.’ This was one of his favourite ideas. ‘My

* ‘It has been alleged that his majesty took an inordinate deal of snuff, and that, in order to take it with the greater facility, he carried it in his waistcoat pockets, which, for that purpose, were lined with leather. This is altogether untrue. The fact is, the emperor never took snuff except from a snuff-box, and, though he used a great deal, he actually took but very little. He would frequently hold the snuff-box to his nose, merely to smell the snuff; at other times, he would take a pinch, and, after smelling it for a moment, he would throw it away. Thus it frequently happened that the spot where he was sitting or standing was strewed with snuff; but his handkerchiefs, which were of the finest cambric, were scarcely ever soiled. He had a great collection of snuff-boxes; but those which he preferred were of dark tortoise-shell, lined with gold, and ornamented with cameos or antique medals in gold or silver. Their form was a narrow oval, with hinged lids. He did not like round boxes, because it was necessary to employ both hands to open them, and in this operation he not unfrequently let the box or the lid fall. His snuff was generally very coarse rappee: but he sometimes liked to have several kinds of snuff mixed together.’ —*Memoires de Constant*.

power,' he would say, 'depends on my glory, and my glory on the victories I have gained. My power will fall if I do not base it on fresh glories and new victories. Conquest has made me what I am, and conquest alone can enable me to maintain my position.' It was this sentiment which was always uppermost in his mind, and which became his ruling principle of action—that occasioned his incessant dreaming of new wars, and scattering their seeds throughout Europe. He believed that if he remained stationary, he would fall, and he was tormented with the desire to be always advancing. 'A newly-born government,' said he, 'must dazzle and astonish; when it ceases to do that, it must fall.' It was impossible to expect repose on the part of a man who was restlessness itself.

His sentiments towards France differed much from those he had entertained in his youth. For a length of time he bore with impatience the recollection of the conquest of Corsica, which he then considered his country. But this feeling was effaced, and I can affirm that he passionately loved France. His imagination kindled at the very idea of seeing her great, happy, powerful, and dictating her laws to other nations. He fancied his name inseparably connected with France, and resounding in the ears of posterity. In all his actions, the present moment vanished before the ages yet to come; so in every country in which he made war, the opinion of France was present to his mind. As Alexander, at Arbela, thought less of having vanquished Darius than in having gained the suffrages of the Athenians, so Bonaparte, at Marengo, was haunted by the idea of 'What will they say of this in France?'

Before fighting a battle, Bonaparte thought little about what he should do in case of success; but a good deal about what he should do in case of a reverse. I state this as a fact of which I have often been a witness, and I leave to his brethren in arms the task of deciding whether his calculations were always correct. He accomplished much, because he risked everything; his excessive ambition urged him on to power, and power obtained only furnished food for his ambition. He was thoroughly convinced of the truth, that a mere trifle frequently decides the greatest events. This was the reason that he was always more anxious to watch events than to tempt them; and when the right moment approached, he then suddenly took advantage of it. It is curious that, in the midst of all the cares occasioned by his warlike projects, and the labours of government, the fear of the Bourbons pursued

him incessantly ; and his mighty mind beheld, in the Faubourg Saint Germain, a phantom which never ceased to menace him.

Bonaparte was not naturally disposed to form a high estimate of human nature, and he despised men the more as he became better acquainted with them. In him, this unfavourable opinion of human nature was justified by many glaring examples of baseness, and his severity was the result of a maxim he frequently repeated, 'There are two levers by which men may be moved—fear and interest.' What esteem, for instance, could Bonaparte have for the pensioners on the treasury of the Opera ? This fund received a considerable sum from the gambling houses, a part of which served to cover the expenses of that magnificent theatre. The remainder was distributed in gratuities, and for other secret purposes, which were paid on orders signed by Duroc. There might often be seen entering, by the little door in the Rue Rameau, personages of very different characters. The lady who was the favourite of the commander-in-chief in Egypt, whose captive husband was so maliciously released by the English, was a frequent visitor at the treasury. There might be found together a philosopher and an actor, a celebrated orator and a broken-down musician, a priest, a courtesan, and even a cardinal.

One of Bonaparte's greatest misfortunes was, that he did not believe in friendship, nor did he feel the necessity of loving, the most gratifying sentiment given to man. How often has he said to me, 'Friendship is but a name ; I love no one, no, not even my brothers ; Joseph, perhaps, a little ; and if I do love him, it is from habit, and because he is my elder. Duroc ! ah, yes ! I love him too ; but why ? his character pleases me ; he is cold, reserved, and resolute ; and I really believe he never shed a tear ! As to myself, it is all one to me ; I know well that I have not one true friend. As long as I continue what I am, I may have as many pretended friends as I please. Believe me, Bourrienne, we must leave sensibility to the women, it is their business ; but men should be firm in heart and in purpose, or they should have nothing to do with war or government.'

In his social relations Bonaparte's temper was bad ; but his fits of ill-humour passed away like a cloud, and spent themselves in words. His violent language, and his bursts of indignation, were all calculated and prepared beforehand : when he wished to express his dissatisfaction to anyone, he liked to have a witness present ; then his remarks were always harsh

severe, and humiliating. But he was sparing of these violent attacks ; and they never took place but upon sufficient proof of the misconduct of those against whom they were directed.

When it was his intention to give anyone a lecture, he always desired to have a third party as witness ; I have often thought that this gave him a greater degree of confidence ; in fact, when alone with him, and when one had become acquainted with his character, you were certain of getting the better, by mustering a sufficiency of coolness, moderation, and good temper. We are told that he has declared at St. Helena, that he has admitted a third person on such occasions, only that the blow might resound to a greater distance. That, however, was not his real motive ; because, in that case, it would have been more simple to have made the affair public at once ; but he had other reasons. During the whole time I remained in his service, I have remarked, that he disliked private interviews ; when he expected anyone, he has said to me beforehand, 'Bourrienne, you are to remain' ; and when anyone was announced whom he did not expect, as a minister or a general, on my rising to go out, he would say in an undertone, 'Stay where you are.' Certainly it was not with the design of getting what he said reported abroad that he detained me, for it was as foreign to my character, as to my duty, to gossip what I had heard—I should not have had time to do so ; besides, it may be presumed that the small number of persons admitted as witnesses to those conferences, were aware of the consequences attending indiscreet disclosures under a government that was made acquainted with all that was said and done.

Bonaparte entertained the most profound aversion to the sanguinary men of the revolution, and particularly for the regicides. It was a painful burden to him, to be under the necessity of dissembling his sentiments towards them ; and when he spoke to me of these men of blood, of those whom he called the assassins of Louis XVI., it was with horror ; and he deplored the necessity that he was under of employing them. How often has he said to Cambaceres at the same time gently pinching his ear, to soften by this familiarity the bitterness of the remark—'My dear Cambaceres, I had nothing to do with it ; but your case is clear ; if ever the Bourbons return, you will be hanged !' A forced laugh would then contract the leaden countenance of Cambaceres, in a manner which it would be as difficult as disagreeable to describe—this smile was uniformly the sole reply of the second consul, who, only once, in my hearing, made

answer, 'Come now, let us have no more of these ill-timed jokes.' If to anyone the description of laughing like a spectre could be applied, it was to Cambaceres.

Bonaparte had many singular habits and tastes. When affairs did not go as he wished, or anything disagreeable occupied his mind, he used to hum something, which most certainly could not be called a tune, for his voice was very unmusical. He would at the same time seat himself at the writing-table, and swing back in his chair in such a manner, that I have often been obliged to caution him, lest he should tumble over. In this position he would then vent his humour upon the right arm of his elbow-chair, cutting it with his penknife, which indeed he seemed to keep for no other use. I took care to keep him at all times supplied with good pens, because, having to decipher his scrawls, it was my interest that he should write, not legibly, for that was out of the question, but as little illegibly as possible.

The sound of bells pronounced on Bonaparte a singular effect, which I could never account for ; he listened to them with delight. When we were at Malmaison, and walking in the avenue leading to the plain of Ruel, how often has the tolling of the village bells interrupted our most serious conversations ! He stopped short, lest the moving of our feet should cause the loss of any of those sounds which charmed him. He used even to be vexed, because my feelings on these occasions did not accord with his own. So powerful was the effect produced upon him by the sounds of these bells, that his voice would falter as he said, 'Ah ! this recalls to my mind the first years I passed at Brienne ; I was then happy.' When the bells ceased, he would resume his gigantic speculations and launch into futurity, place a crown upon his head, and hurl kings from their thrones.

Nowhere except on the field of battle did I ever see Bonaparte more happy than in the gardens of Malmaison. During the first days of the consulate, we used to go there every Saturday evening, and stay the whole of Sunday, and sometimes Monday. There he neglected business *a little*, for the pleasure of walking, and to observe with his own eyes the improvements he had ordered to be made. At first, he sometimes visited the neighbourhood ; but the reports of the police destroyed this feeling of security, by raising apprehensions of royalist partizans in ambush to carry him off. During the first four or five days that we stayed there, he amused himself in calculating the annual worth of this property. He forgot neither the park nor the kitchen-garden ; he estimated the total at 8,000 francs (£333

6*s.* 8*d.*) ; 'That is not so bad,' said he ; 'but to live here would require an income of 30,000 francs' (£1,250). I laughed heartily on seeing him apply seriously to this inquiry ; these modest aspirations were not of long duration.

When in the country, he had much pleasure in seeing tall and elegant females, clothed in white, walking in the shady avenues ; he could not endure coloured garments, especially those of a dark colour. He also had a dislike to ladies who were inclined to be corpulent, and to those in the family way ; his repugnance to them was extreme, and they were seldom invited to his parties. He had all the qualifications requisite for being what the world calls an agreeable man, except the wish to be so. His manner was imposing rather than pleasing, and those who did not know him well felt, when in his presence, an involuntary feeling of awe. In the drawing-room, where the excellent Josephine did the honours with so much grace and affability, all was gaiety and ease, and no one felt a superior during the absence of her lord. On his arrival, all was changed, and every eye was fixed upon his countenance, to read there the disposition of his mind, whether disposed to be talkative, dull, or cheerful.

He frequently talked a great deal, sometimes even too much, but he conversed in the most agreeable manner, and was truly entertaining. His conversation seldom turned upon gay or humorous subjects, and never upon frivolous matters. He loved discussion so much, that in the heat of argument it was possible to draw from him secrets the most important. Sometimes he amused himself in a small circle, by telling stories of presentiments and apparitions : for this he always chose the dusk of the evening, and he would prepare his hearers for what was coming by some solemn remark.

All the narratives of Bonaparte were full of entertainment and originality. On a journey, he was particularly conversant : in the heat of conversation he was always fascinating, always abounding with new views and sublime ideas ; and at times there escaped some indiscreet disclosures of his future intentions, or at least of matters which might give a clue to what he wished to conceal. I ventured to remark on this imprudence ; he took my observations in good part, and acknowledged his failing, saying, however, that he did not think he had gone so far. At St. Helena he has since frankly acknowledged this want of caution.

When in a good humour, his ordinary caresses consisted in slight fillips with the first and second fingers, or gently pinching the tip of the ear. In his most friendly conversations with those whom

he admitted on a footing of unreserved intimacy, he was in the habit of saying, 'You are a simpleton, a ninny, a booby, a fool, an imbecile.' These words served to vary his cabinet of compliments ; but they were never employed seriously, and the tone with which they were pronounced rendered their application one of kindness.

Bonaparte had no faith either in medicine or the prescriptions of physicians. He spoke of it as an art altogether conjectural, and his opinion on this subject was not to be shaken. His powerful mind rejected all but demonstrated truths. He had but an indifferent memory for names and dates ; but for facts and localities his memory was prodigious. I recollect on a journey from Paris to Toulon he pointed out to me six places well adapted for great battles, and he never forgot them. They were recollections of the earliest journeys of his youth, and he described to me the nature of the ground, and pointed out the positions he would have occupied, even before we had reached the places themselves.

Bonaparte was insensible to the charms of poetic harmony. He had not even sufficient ear to feel the rhythm of poetry, nor could he recite a stanza without violating the metre : but the sublime ideas of poetry charmed him. He idolized Corneille, and that to such a degree, that one day after the representation of *Cinna* he said to me, 'If such a man as Corneille lived in my time, I would make him my prime minister. It is not his poetry that I admire so much, but his good sense, his knowledge of the human heart, and, in a word, his profound policy.' He has said at Saint Helena that he would have made Corneille a prince ; but at the time he spoke to me about him he had not thought of making either kings or princes.

Politeness to the fair sex was no part of the character of Bonaparte. He rarely had anything agreeable to say to them, and he often, indeed, addressed to them the rudest and most extraordinary remarks. Sometimes he would say, 'Heavens ! how red your arms are !' to another, 'What an ugly head-dress you have got !' or, 'Who has bundled up your hair that way ?' Again, 'What a dirty dress you have got ! do you never change your gown ?—I have seen you in that one at least twenty times.' To the beautiful Duchess of Chevreuse, remarkable for her fine flaxen hair, he said, 'Why, bless me ! your hair is red !' (*vous avez les cheveux roux*) ; but as this was evidently a play upon her name (*Chevreuse*), it may pass. He often spent an hour at the toilet of his wife, who had a most correct taste, and that, probably,

rendered him more fastidious as to the costume of other ladies. At first, elegance was what he chiefly required ; at a later period, splendour and magnificence ; but he always required modesty. He frequently expressed his dislike to those dresses which left the neck exposed which were in fashion at the beginning of the consulate.

Bonaparte did not love play, which was fortunate for those he invited to his parties ; for when he sat down to a card-table, which he sometimes considered himself obliged to do, nothing could exceed the dullness of the drawing-room, whether at the Luxembourg or at the Tuileries. When, on the contrary, he walked about among the company, everyone was pleased, because he addressed his discourse to a variety of persons, but it was principally with learned men that he wished to converse, and especially with those who had accompanied him on the Egyptian expedition. But, after all, it was not so much in the drawing-room as at the head of his troops that one must have seen him to form a just idea of the man. Uniform became him much better than the handsomest dress of any other kind. His first trials of dress coats were not very happy. I have been told that the first time he put on his official robes he wore a black stock ; this singular contrast was remarked to him, and he replied, ‘ So much the better ; it leaves me something at least of the soldier, and there is no harm in that.’ For my own part, I neither saw the black stock, nor heard this reply.*

* On the subject of Bonaparte's dress, Constant, his valet, gives the following details :—

‘ His majesty's waistcoats and smallclothes were always of white cassimir. He changed them every morning, and never wore them after they had been washed three or four times. He never wore any but white silk stockings. His shoes, which were very light and lined with silk, were ornamented with gold buckles of an oval form, either plain or wrought. He also occasionally wore gold knee-buckles. During the empire, I never saw him wear pantaloons. The emperor never wore jewels. In his pocket he carried neither purse nor money ; but merely his handkerchief, snuff-box, and *bonbonnière* (or sweetmeat-box). He usually wore only two decorations, viz., the cross of the Legion of Honour, and that of the Iron Crown. Across his waistcoat and under his uniform coat, he wore a *cordou rouge*, the two ends of which were scarcely perceptible. When he received company at the Tuileries, or attended a review, he wore the grand *cordou* on the outside of his coat. His hat, which it is almost superfluous to describe as long as portraits of his majesty are extant, was of an extremely fine and light kind of beaver, the inside was wadded and lined with silk. It was unadorned with either cord, tassel, or feather, its only ornament being a silk loop, fastening a small tri-coloured cockade.’

The first consul paid his private debts very punctually ; but he disliked settling the accounts of the contractors who bargained with the ministers for supplies for the public service. Of this description of debts he put off the payment by every sort of excuse and difficulty, and frequently assigned the very worst reasons. Hence arose immense arrears in the expenditure, and the necessity of a committee of liquidation. It was with him a principle, a fixed idea, that all contractors were rogues. All that he did not pay them he considered as a just deduction, and the sums subtracted from their accounts as in part restitution of a robbery. The less a minister paid upon his budget, the more he became a favourite with Bonaparte, and this ruinous economy can alone explain the credit which Decres so long enjoyed at the expense of the French navy.

Bonaparte's religious opinions were not fixed. 'My reason,' said he to me one day, 'keeps me in disbelief of many things, but the impressions of my childhood, and the feelings of my early youth, throw me back into uncertainty.' I have already said how he was affected by the tolling of bells, and it is a fact which I have at least twenty times witnessed. He was fond of conversing about religion. I have frequently, in Egypt, on board *L'Orient* and *Le Muiron*, heard him take an animated part in conversations of this nature. He readily conceded everything that was proved, and everything that appeared to him to come of men and of time ; but he would not hear of materialism. I remember that, being upon deck one beautiful night, surrounded by several persons who were arguing in favour of this afflicting dogma, Bonaparte, raising his hand towards the heavens, and pointing to the stars—'Tell me, gentlemen,' said he, 'who has made all these ?' The perpetuity of a name in the memory of man was to him the immortality of the soul. He was perfectly tolerant towards every religion, and could not conceive why men should be persecuted for their religious belief.*

Bonaparte disliked much to reverse a decision, even when aware that it had been unjust. In small things, as well as in great, nothing could induce him to retrace his steps ; with him to fall back was to be lost. I have seen an example of this

* Policy induced Bonaparte to re-establish religious worship in France, which he thought would be a powerful aid to the consolidation of his power ; but he would never consent to the persecution of other religions. He wished to influence mankind in positive and temporal things, but not in points of belief.

tenacity of purpose in the case of the general Latour-Foissac ; he appeared affected by the injustice done him ; but he wished some time to elapse before he repaired it. His heart and his conduct were at variance ; but his good dispositions gave way before what he considered his public duty. In spite of this sort of feeling, however, Bonaparte was neither rancorous nor vindictive. His character was not a cruel one. I certainly cannot justify the acts forced upon him by cruel necessity and the imperious law of war. But this I can say, that he has frequently been unjustly accused. None but those who are blinded by fury could have given him the name of Nero or Caligula. No part of his conduct justified such abuse. I think that I have stated his real faults with sufficient sincerity to be believed upon my word ; and I can assert that Bonaparte, apart from politics, was feeling, kind, and accessible to pity ; he was very fond of children, and a bad man has seldom such a disposition. In the habit of private life he had (and the expression is not too strong) much benevolence and great indulgence for human weakness. A contrary opinion is too firmly fixed in some minds for me to hope to remove it. I shall, I fear, have opposers, but I address myself to those who are in search of truth. I lived in the most unreserved confidence with Bonaparte until the age of thirty-four years, and I advance nothing lightly. To judge impartially we must take into consideration the influence which time and circumstances exercise on men ; and distinguish between the different characters of the youth at school, the general, the consul, and the emperor.

I have hitherto spoken but little of Murat, but being now arrived at the period of his marriage with one of the sisters of the first consul, I take the opportunity of returning to some interesting occurrences which preceded this alliance, more especially as this will give me an opportunity of entering into some family details, which I shall do with becoming caution, but without concealing the truth, which I take for my guide.

Murat possessed an uncommonly fine and well-proportioned form ; his muscular strength, the elegance of his manners, his lofty bearing, and his dauntless courage in battle, resembled less a republican soldier than one of those accomplished cavaliers of whom we read in Ariosto and Tasso. The nobleness of his manner soon made the lowness of his birth to be forgotten. He was affable, polite, gallant ; and in the field of battle twenty men, commanded by Murat, were worth a whole regiment.

Once only he shewed himself under the influence of fear ; * and we shall see in what circumstance it was that he ceased to be himself.

When Bonaparte, in his first Italian campaign, had forced Wurmser to take refuge in Mantua, with 28,000 men, he ordered Miollis, with only 4000 men, to oppose any sorties which the Austrian general might make. In one of these sorties, Murat, at the head of a feeble detachment, was ordered to charge Wurmser. He was afraid, neglected to execute the order, and in the first moment of confusion, said that he was wounded. Murat immediately fell into disgrace with the Commander-in-chief, whose aide-de-camp he was

Murat had been previously sent to Paris to present to the Directory the first colours taken by the Army of Italy in the battles of Dego and Mondovi. It was on this occasion that he became acquainted with Madame Tallien, and the wife of the General-in-chief. But he had already been introduced to the beautiful Caroline Bonaparte, in Rome, at the house of her brother Joseph, who there exercised the functions of ambassador of the Republic. It even appeared that Caroline had not been then indifferent to him, and that he was the successful rival of the son of the Princess of Santa Croce, who eagerly sought the honour of her hand. Madame Tallien and Madame Bonaparte gave a distinguished reception to the aide-de-camp, and as they possessed considerable influence with the Directory, they solicited and obtained for him the rank of general of brigade. It was a remarkable thing at the time to see Murat, notwithstanding his rank, remain the aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, the military code not permitting him to have an aide-de-camp of a rank superior to that of chief of brigade, which was equivalent to that of colonel. This was an anticipation of the prerogatives usually reserved for princes and kings.

It was after this mission that Murat, on his return to Italy, fell into disgrace with the Commander-in-chief, who placed him in the division of Reillé, and afterwards in that of Baraguay d'Hilliers. So that when we went to Paris, after the treaty of Campo-Formio, Murat was not of the party. But as the *ladies*, with whom he was a great favourite, interested themselves

* Marshal Lannes, so brave and brilliant in war, and so well able to appreciate courage, one day sharply rebuked a colonel, for having punished a young officer just arrived from Fontainebleau, because he gave evidence of fear in his first engagement. ' Know, colonel,' said he, ' none but a coward will boast that he never was afraid.'

much for him, and were not without interest with the Minister of War, they succeeded in having Murat joined to the army of Egypt, when he was attached to the division of Genes. On board *L'Orient* he remained constantly in the most complete disgrace. During the passage Bonaparte never once spoke to him; and even in Egypt he treated him with the greatest coolness, and frequently sent him from the head-quarters on difficult missions. But the General-in-chief having at length opposed him to Mourad Bey, Murat performed such prodigies of valour, in so many perilous encounters, that he effaced the transient stain which a moment of hesitation had attached to him under the walls of Mantua. And, finally, he contributed so powerfully to the success of the day at Aboukir, that Bonaparte, pleased to be able to bring to France the last laurel which he had gathered in Egypt, forgot the fault of a moment, and wished also to forget what had doubtlessly been told him of Murat; for, although Bonaparte never said so to me, I had sufficient reasons for thinking that the name of Murat had been coupled with that of Charles, by Junot, in the course of his indiscreet disclosures at the wells of Messoudiah. The charge of grenadiers, commanded by Murat on the 19th Brumaire, in the hall of the Five Hundred, removed all the remaining traces of dislike; and during those moments when the aspirations of ambition reigned paramount in the mind of Bonaparte, the rival of the Prince of Santa Croce was appointed to the command of the consular guard.

It is reasonable to suppose that Madame Bonaparte, in seeking to conciliate the esteem of Murat, by aiding his advancement, had principally in view to obtain an additional partisan to oppose to the brothers and the family of Bonaparte; and for this she had sufficient reason. They allowed no occasion to pass of manifesting their jealousy and hatred; and the good Josephine, who could be reproached with nothing but the being, perhaps, too much of the woman, was tormented by dismal presentiments. Carried away by the easiness of her disposition, she did not see that the coquetry which procured her defenders placed arms at the same time in the hands of her most implacable enemies.

In this state of things Josephine, who was well convinced that she had attached Murat to herself by the bonds of friendship and gratitude, and ardently wishing to see him united to Bonaparte by a family alliance, favoured with all her influence his marriage with Caroline. She was not ignorant that already,

at Milan, an intimacy had commenced between Caroline and Murat, which rendered their marriage extremely desirable ; and it was she who first proposed it to Murat. Murat hesitated, and proceeded to consult M. Collot, a good counsellor in all things ; and whose intimate relations with Bonaparte had made him acquainted with all the secrets of the family. M. Collot advised Murat to go without loss of time, and make a formal demand to the first consul of his sister's hand. Murat went immediately to the Luxembourg for the purpose, and made his proposals to Bonaparte. Did he do right ? But for this he had not mounted the throne of Naples—but for this he had not been shot at Pizzo.

Be it as it may, the first consul received the proposal of Murat more as a sovereign than as a fellow-soldier. He heard him with unmoved gravity, and said that he would take time to consider it, but gave no positive answer.

Murat's proposal was, as may be supposed, the subject of the evening's conversation at the Luxembourg ; Madame Bonaparte exerted all her powers of persuasion to obtain the consent of the first consul. Hortense, Eugene, and myself, joined our entreaties. 'Murat,' said he, 'Murat is the son of an innkeeper. In the elevated rank to which fortune and my glory have raised me, I cannot mix my blood with his. Besides, there is no hurry—I shall see by-and-by.' We dwelt on the mutual affection of the young people, and we did not forget to mention Murat's devotion to his person, and to recall to his recollection his brilliant courage, and his gallant conduct in Egypt, 'Yes,' said he, with animation, 'Murat was superb at Aboukir.' We did not allow the favourable moment to escape, we redoubled our persuasions, and at length he consented. When, in the evening, he and I were alone in his cabinet—'Well, Bourrienne,' said he, 'you ought to be satisfied—for my part I am ; all things considered Murat suits my sister, and then they cannot say that I am proud, that I seek grand alliances. Had I given my sister to a noble, all you Jacobins would have cried out for a counter-revolution. Besides, I am pleased that my wife takes an interest in the marriage ; you are aware of the reasons. Since it is settled, I must hasten the business, we have no time to lose. If I go to Italy, I wish to take Murat with us—I must strike a decisive blow there—come to-morrow.'

On the following morning, at seven o'clock, when I entered the chamber of the first consul, he appeared still better pleased than on the preceding evening with the resolution he had come

to. I could easily perceive that, with all his finesse, he was not aware of the real motive which had induced Josephine so to interest herself about the marriage of Murat and Caroline. From the satisfaction of Bonaparte, it appeared to me that in the earnestness of his wife he had found a proof that the reports of her intimacy with Murat were calumnies.

The marriage of Murat and Caroline was privately celebrated at the Luxembourg. The first consul had not yet learned to consider his family affairs as affairs of state. But previous to the celebration, we had to play a little comedy, in which I could not but accept a part, and which I may as well relate here.

At the time of the marriage of Murat, Bonaparte had but little money, and therefore he gave his sister but thirty thousand francs as a portion. Still feeling the necessity of making her a marriage present, and not having money to purchase a suitable one, he took a diamond necklace which belonged to his wife, and gave it to the future bride. Josephine was by no means satisfied with this subtraction, and set her wits to work to find the means of replacing her necklace. She knew the jeweller Foucier possessed a magnificent collection of fine pearls, which, it was said, had belonged to the unfortunate Marie Antoinette. Josephine caused them to be brought to her, and judged there was sufficient to make a very fine necklace. But to purchase them required two hundred and fifty thousand francs, and how was the money to be raised? Madame Bonaparte had recourse to Berthier, at that time Minister of War. Berthier, after biting his nails as usual, set about liquidating certain demands against the hospital service of Italy; and as the contractors in those days took care to be grateful to their patrons, the pearls passed from the strong chest of M. Foucier to the jewel-case of Madame Bonaparte.

The pearls were thus secured; but there arose another trifling difficulty, of which Madame Bonaparte had never dreamed. How was she to wear a necklace purchased without the knowledge of her husband? What rendered this more difficult was, that the first consul knew that his wife had no money; and being, besides, something of a *busybody*, he knew, or thought he knew, of all the jewellery of Josephine. The pearls remained, therefore, upwards of a fortnight in the jewel-case of Madame Bonaparte, without her venturing to wear them. What a punishment for a woman! At length her vanity overcame her prudence, and being unable to conceal them any longer, Josephine said to me, 'Bourrienne, to-morrow there will be a great drawing room, and I must absolutely wear my pearls. But, you know, he will

grumble if he notices them. I beg, Bourrienne, that you will keep near me. If he asks me how I got my pearls, I will answer, without hesitation, that I have had them for a length of time.'

Everything happened as Josephine had feared; Bonaparte, noticing the pearls, did not fail to say to her, 'Ah, what have we got here? How very fine you are to-day! Where did you get these pearls? I don't think I have ever seen them.' 'To be sure you have—you have seen them a dozen times. It is the necklace which the Cisalpine Republic gave me, and which I wore in my hair.' 'But I think——.' 'Well, ask Bourrienne—he will tell you.' 'Well, Bourrienne, what do you say to it? Do you recollect them?' 'Yes, General, I recollect very well having seen them before.' This was not untrue, for Madame Bonaparte had previously shewn them to me; and besides, she had in fact received a pearl necklace from the Cisalpine Republic, but it was by no means to be compared to that of Foucier.—Madame Bonaparte acted her part admirably, and I did not act amiss the character of accomplice, which was assigned to me in this little comedy. Bonaparte had no suspicions. When I beheld the easy confidence of Madame Bonaparte, I could not help recollecting Suzanne's reflection on the facility with which well-bred ladies can tell falsehoods without appearing to do so.

CHAPTER XI.

It is not my intention to say much about the laws, acts, and decrees, which the first consul passed or authorized. What, indeed, were they all, with the exception of the civil code? I cannot, however, omit to state, that many of the first decisions of the consuls had very beneficial effects in the restoration of order throughout France. Perhaps none but those who recollect the previous state of society, can fully appreciate them. The Directory, more base and equally perverse as the Convention, had retained the horrible 21st of January* as one of the festivals of the Republic. The first consul, immediately on attaining to power, had determined to abolish it; but so great was the influence of the abettors of this event, that he had to proceed with caution. He and his colleagues, Sieyes and Roger Ducos, signed, on the 5th Nivose, a decree abolishing all festivals, excepting

* The beheading of Louis XVI.

those of the 22nd of September and the 14th of July ; intending by this means to commemorate only the recollection of the foundation of the Republic and of liberty.

All was calculation with Bonaparte. To produce effect was his highest gratification, and he let slip no opportunity of saying or doing things which were calculated to please the multitude.

On the 24th Brumaire, he visited the prisons. He always preferred to make such visits unexpectedly, that the governors of the different public establishments might be taken by surprise. In this way he generally saw things as they really were. I was in his closet when he returned, and, as he entered, he exclaimed, 'What fools these Directors were ! To what a state have they brought our public establishments. But stay a little. I will put all in order. The prisoners are in a shocking state, and miserably fed. I questioned them as well as the jailors, for nothing is to be learned from the superiors. When I was in the Temple, I could not help thinking of the unfortunate Louis XVI. He was an excellent man, but too amiable to deal with mankind. And Sir Sidney Smith, I made them shew me his apartments. If they had not allowed him to escape, I should have taken St. Jean d'Acre. There are too many painful recollections connected with that prison ; I shall have it pulled down, some day or other. I ordered the jailors' books to be brought, and, finding some hostages were in confinement, I liberated them. I told them an unjust law had placed them under restraint, and that it was my first duty to restore them to liberty. Did I not do right, Bourrienne ?' I congratulated him sincerely on this act of justice, and he was very sensible to my approbation, for I was not accustomed to greet him 'well' on all occasions.

Another circumstance which happened at the commencement of the consulate, affords an example of Bonaparte's inflexibility, when he had once formed a determination. In the spring of 1799, when we were in Egypt, the Directory gave to General Latour-Foissac, a highly distinguished officer, the command of Mantua, the taking of which had so powerfully contributed to the glory of the conqueror of Italy. Shortly after Latour's appointment to this important post, the Austrians besieged Mantua. It was well known that the garrison was supplied with provisions and ammunition for a long resistance ; yet, in the month of July, it surrendered to the Austrians. The act of capitulation contained a curious article, viz., 'General Latour-Foissac and his staff shall be conducted, as prisoners, to Austria ; the garrison shall be allowed to return to France.' This dis-

inction between the general and the troops intrusted to his command, and, at the same time, the prompt surrender of Mantua, were circumstances which, it must be confessed, were calculated to excite suspicions of Latour-Foissac. The consequence was, when Bernadotte was made war minister, he ordered an inquiry into the general's conduct by a court-martial. Latour-Foissac had no sooner returned to France, than he published a justificatory memorial, in which he showed the impossibility of his having made a longer defence, when he was in want of many objects of the first necessity.

Such was the state of the affair on Bonaparte's elevation to the consular power. The loss of Mantua, the possession of which had cost him so many sacrifices, roused his indignation to so high a pitch, that, whenever the subject was mentioned, he could find no words to express his rage. He stopped the investigation of the court-martial, and issued a violent decree against Latour-Foissac, even before his culpability had been proved. This proceeding occasioned much discussion, and was very dissatisfactory to many general officers, who, by this arbitrary decision, found themselves in danger of forfeiting the privilege of being tried by their natural judges, whenever they happened to displease the first consul. For my own part, I must say, that this decree against Latour-Foissac was one which I saw issued with considerable regret. I was alarmed for the consequences. After the lapse of a few days, I ventured to point out to him the undue severity of the step he had taken ; I reminded him of all that had been said in Latour-Foissac's favour, and tried to convince him how much more just it would be to allow the trial to come to a conclusion. 'In a country,' said I, 'like France, where the point of honour stands above everything, it is impossible Foissac can escape condemnation if he be culpable.' 'Perhaps you are right, Bourrienne,' rejoined he ; 'but the blow is struck ; the decree is issued. I have given the same explanation to everyone ; but I cannot so suddenly retrace my steps. To retrograde is to be lost. I cannot acknowledge myself in the wrong. By-and-by we shall see what can be done.'

Bonaparte always spoke with great disrespect of the Directory, which he had turned out, and accused them of peculation and of every abuse in the administration, and frequently threatened to make them refund.

In the first moments of poverty, the consular government had recourse to a loan of 12,000,000 francs ; and, in affixing salaries

to the principal officers of state, the greatest moderation was exercised.

The following table shews the modest budget of the consular government for the year VIII :—

	Francs.
Legislative body	2,400,000
Tribunate	1,312,000
Archives	75,000
The three consuls, including 750,000 francs of secret service money	1,800,000
Council of state	675,000
Secretaries to the Councils and to the Councillors of state	112,500
The six ministers	360,000
The Minister of Foreign Affairs	90,000
Total	<u>6,854,500</u>

Bonaparte's salary was fixed at 500,000 francs.

That interval of the consular government during which Bonaparte remained at the Luxembourg, may be called the preparatory consulate. Then were sown the seeds of the great events which he meditated, and of those institutions with which he wished to mark his possession of power. He was then, if I may use the expression, two individuals in one—the republican general, who was obliged to appear the advocate of liberty and the principles of the revolution ; and the votary of ambition, secretly plotting the downfall of that liberty and those principles.

I often wondered at the consummate address with which he contrived to deceive those who were likely to see through his designs. This hypocrisy, which some, perhaps, may call profound policy, was indispensable to the accomplishment of his projects ; and sometimes, as if to keep himself in practice, he would do it in matters of secondary importance. For example, his opinion of the insatiable avarice of Sieyes is well known ; yet, when he proposed, in his message to the Council of Ancients, to give his colleague, under the title of national recompense, the price of his obedient secession, it was, in the words of the message, a recompense worthily bestowed on his *disinterested virtues*.

The presentation of sabres and muskets of honour dates also from the Luxembourg ; for who does not see that this was but preparatory to the foundation of the Legion of Honour ? A sergeant of grenadiers, named Leon Aune, having been included

in the first distribution, easily obtained permission to write to the first consul to thank him. Bonaparte wished to make a parade of answering him, and dictated to me the following letter for Aune :—

‘I have received your letter, my brave comrade ; you had no occasion to remind me of your gallant behaviour ; you are the bravest grenadier in the army, since the death of the brave Benezete. You have received one of the hundred sabres which I have distributed, and all agree that none deserve it better.

‘I wish much to see you again. The Minister of War sends you an order to come to Paris.’

This cajolery to a soldier answered well the purpose which Bonaparte proposed. The letter to Aune could not fail of circulating through the whole army. Only think of the first consul, the greatest general of France, calling a sergeant his brave comrade ; who could have written so but a stanch republican, a true friend to equality ? No more was wanting to raise the enthusiasm of the army. At the same time Bonaparte began to find that he had too little room at the Luxembourg ; and preparations were set on foot for a removal to the Tuileries.

Nevertheless, this great step towards the re-establishment of monarchy required to be taken with prudence. It was of importance to do away with the idea that none but a king could inhabit the palace of our ancient kings : what then was to be done ? They had brought from Italy a fine bust of Brutus, and Brutus had sacrificed tyrants. This was the very thing wanted ; and David received instructions to place Junius Brutus in the gallery of the Tuileries. What more convincing proof of a horror of tyranny ? and as at the same time a bust could do no harm, all was in place ; all perfectly reasonable.

To sleep at the Tuileries in the bed-chamber of the kings of France was all that Bonaparte wished ; the rest would follow of course. He wished to establish a principle, the consequences of which would be afterwards deduced. Hence the affectation of never inserting in public documents the name of the Tuileries ; but designating that place solely as the palace of the government. The first preparations were sufficiently modest, for it was unbecoming in a good republican to affect pomp.

Nothing was a matter of indifference to Bonaparte. It was not merely at hazard that he selected the statues that were to decorate the grand gallery of the Tuileries. He chose among the

Greeks, Demosthenes and Alexander, to render homage at the same time to the genius of eloquence and the genius of conquest. Among the great men of modern times he gave the preference to Gustavus Adolphus, then to Turenne and the great Condé ; to Turenne, whose military talents he so much admired ; to Condé that it might be seen that there was nothing fearful in the recollection of a Bourbon ; and to shew, at the same time, that he knew how to render homage to all who deserved it. The recollection of the most glorious days of the French navy was recalled by the statue of Duguay Trouin ; Marlborough and Prince Eugene had also their places in the gallery, as if witnesses of the disasters which closed the great reign ; and Marshal Saxe, as it were to shew that the reign of Louis XV. had not been altogether without glory. Finally, the names of Dugommier, Dampierre, and Joubert, proclaimed to all the world the esteem which Bonaparte cherished for his former brothers in arms, who had become the victims of a cause which was no longer his.

About the same time Bonaparte completed the formation of his council of state : he divided it into five sections ; 1. The Interior ; 2. The Finances ; 3. The Marine ; 4. That of War ; 5. Legislation. He fixed the salaries of the councillors of state at 25,000 francs, and that of the presidents of sections at 30,000. He settled the costume of the consuls, the ministers, and the different bodies of the state. This led to the re-introduction of velvet, which had been proscribed with the ancient regime, and the reason assigned for the employment of this unrepublican article in the dresses of the consuls and ministers was, that it would give encouragement to the manufactures of Lyons. Thus, in the most trifling details, it was the constant aim of Bonaparte to efface the idea of the republic, and to prepare matters so well, that the habits of the monarchy being restored, all that would at length be required would be the change of a name. I must at the same time say that the first consul despised the frivolities of dress ; I do not even recollect having seen him in the consular costume, which he only consented to wear when he was obliged to do so at a public ceremony. The only dress he was fond of, and the only one in which he felt himself at ease, was the modest costume of the camp ; that in which he subdued the ancient Eridanus and the Nile : this was the uniform of the guides, a corps to which Bonaparte was sincerely attached, and which it must be avowed they well deserved ; for, where else could be found such devotion, such firmness, such courage ?

A consular decision of another and more important nature

had some time before, namely, about the beginning of winter, brought happiness to a great number of families. Bonaparte, as is known, had prepared the events of the 18th Fructidor, to give him plausible reasons for overthrowing the Directory. The Directory being overthrown, he wished, in part at least, to undo what had been done on the 18th Fructidor ; he, therefore, caused the Minister of Police to present a report on the exiled persons. In consequence of this report, the first consul authorized forty of them to return to France, placing them, however, under the observation of the police, and assigning them their place of residence. The greatest part of these distinguished men, whom Bonaparte thus restored to their country, did not long remain under the surveillance of the police. A number of them were even shortly called to fill in the government those high functions to which their talents appeared to call them. It was, in fact, natural that Bonaparte, who wished, in appearance at least, to base his government on those principles of moderate republicanism which had caused their exile, should recall them to second his views. Barrere wrote a justificatory letter to the first consul ; but he took no notice of it, for he could not go so far as to esteem Barrere. And thus he proceeded in calling to the councils of the consulate the men proscribed by the Directory, precisely as he afterwards called the emigrants, proscribed by the Republic, to the highest functions of the empire. The time and the men were different ; but the intention was the same.

CHAPTER XII.

BEFORE removing to the Tuileries, the first consul organized his secret police, which he intended to serve as a sort of counter police to that under the direction of Fouché. Duroc and De Moncey were the first Directors ; afterwards, Davoust and Junot. Madame Bonaparte called this a vile system of espionage ; and my remarks upon the inutility of the measure were in vain. Bonaparte had the weakness to fear Fouché ; and, at the same time, to consider him necessary. Fouché, whose talents in this way are too well known to require any approbation, soon discovered this institution as well as its principal agents, and led them into many absurd reports ; and in this way increased his own credit with Bonaparte.

Of the three consuls to whom the 18th Brumaire gave birth,

Bonaparte lost no time in declaring himself the eldest ; and it was easy to see, from the expressions that escaped him from time to time, that his ambition was by no means satisfied ; and that the consulate was but a step towards arriving at the complete establishment of monarchical unity. The Luxembourg became too small to contain the chief of the government, and it was resolved that Bonaparte should inhabit the Tuileries. The 30th Pluviose, the day for quitting it, having arrived, at seven o'clock in the morning I entered as usual the chamber of the first consul : he was in a profound sleep, and this was one of the days on which he desired me to let him sleep a little longer. I have already remarked that General Bonaparte was less moved at the moment of executing designs that he had projected than at the moment of their conception. Such facility had he in considering that which he had determined upon as already executed. On my return, he said to me with an air of marked satisfaction, 'Well, Bourrienne, we shall at length sleep at the Tuileries ; you are very fortunate, you are not obliged to make a show of yourself ; you may go in your own way : but as for myself, I must go in a procession ; this is what I dislike ; but we must have a display ; this is what people like. The Directory was too simple, it therefore enjoyed no consideration. With the army, simplicity is in its place ; but, in a great city, in a palace, it is necessary that the chief of the state should draw attention on himself by all possible means ; but we must move with caution. My wife will see the review from the apartments of Lebrun : go, if you will, with her ; but meet me in the cabinet as soon as you see me dismount.'

At one o'clock precisely, Bonaparte left the Luxembourg. The procession, doubtless, was far from exhibiting that magnificence which characterized those under the empire ; but it had all the pomp which the existing state of affairs in France authorized. The only real splendour of that period was the magnificent appearance of the troops ; and 3000 picked men, among whom was the superb regiment of the guides, were assembled for the occasion. All marched in the finest order, with their bands playing. The generals and their staff were on horseback ; the ministers in their carriages. The consular carriage alone was drawn by six white horses, which recalled the memory of glory and of peace. These beautiful horses had been presented to the first consul by the Emperor of Germany, after the treaty of Campo-Formio. Bonaparte also wore the magnificent sabre which had been given to him by the Emperor

Francis. In the same carriage with the first consul were his colleagues Cambaceres and Lebrun. Everywhere upon his route through a considerable part of Paris he was received with shouts of joy, which, on this occasion at least, had no necessity to be ordered by the police. The approaches to the Tuileries were lined by the guards, a royal usage, which contrasted singularly with an inscription over the entrance through which Bonaparte passed : 'THE 10th OF AUGUST, 1792. ROYALTY IS ABOLISHED IN FRANCE, AND SHALL NEVER BE RE-ESTABLISHED !' It was already re-established.

The troops being drawn up in the square, the first consul, alighting from his carriage, mounted, or to speak more correctly leaped on his horse, and reviewed the troops, whilst the other two consuls ascended to the apartments where the Council of State and the ministers attended them. A number of elegant females, dressed in the Grecian costume, which was then the fashion, filled the windows ; from every quarter there was an influx of spectators impossible to describe, and from every quarter as if from a single voice were heard acclamations of '*Long live the First Consul !*' Who would not have been intoxicated by such enthusiasm ?

The first consul prolonged the review for some time, passed between the lines, addressing flattering expressions to the commanders of corps. He then placed himself near the entrance to the Tuileries, having Murat on his right, Lannes on his left, and behind him a numerous staff of young warriors, whose faces were browned by the suns of Egypt and of Italy, and who had each been engaged in more combats than he numbered years. When he saw pass before him the colours of the 96th, the 43rd, and the 30th demi-brigade, as these standards presented only a bare pole, surmounted by some tatters, perforated by balls, and blackened with gunpowder, he took off his hat, and bent to them in token of respect. This homage of a great captain to standards mutilated on the field of battle, was hailed by a thousand acclamations, and the troops having defiled, the first consul, with a bold step, ascended the staircase of the Tuileries.

The part of the General was finished for the day, and now began that of the chief of the state, for even at this time the first consul was himself the consulate. I will here relate a fact which contributed not a little in determining Bonaparte to become in reality the chief over his colleagues. It will not be forgotten, that when Roger Ducos and Sieyes bore the title of consuls, the three members of the consulate were equal, if not in fact,

at least in right. Cambaceres and Lebrun having replaced them, Talleyrand was called to succeed M. Rhünhart, as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was admitted to a private audience in the cabinet of the first consul, where I also was. Talleyrand addressed Bonaparte in the following words, which I have never forgotten : ‘ Citizen Consul,’ said he, ‘ you have confided to me the ministry of foreign affairs, and I will justify your confidence ; but I think it right to declare that I will transact business with you alone. There is in this no vain pride upon my side, I speak to you solely for the interests of France, in order to her being well-governed ; that there may be unity of action, it is indispensable that you should be first consul, and that the first consul should have the management of all that relates directly to politics ; that is to say, the home and police departments, the department of foreign relations, and those of the war and admiralty. It will therefore be altogether proper, that the ministers of the five departments transact business with you alone : and, if you will permit me to say it, General, the direction of legal affairs, the administration of justice, should be given to the second consul, who is a very able lawyer ; and to the third consul, who is an excellent financier, the management of the public revenue. This will occupy and amuse them, and you, General, having at your disposal the vital powers of government, will be enabled to attain the noble object which you have proposed to yourself, the regeneration of France.’

These remarkable words were not such as Bonaparte could hear with indifference, they were too much in accord with his secret wishes not to be listened to with pleasure. As soon as Talleyrand had gone ; ‘ Do you know, Bourrienne,’ said he, ‘ that Talleyrand gives good counsel ; he is a man of excellent sense.’—‘ General, such is the opinion of all who know him.’—‘ Talleyrand,’ added he, with a smile, ‘ is no fool, he has penetrated my designs. What he has advised, you know well I wish to do. He is right ; but one stroke more :—they walk quick who walk alone. Lebrun is an honest man, but he has no head for politics ; he makes books. Cambaceres has too many traditions of the revolution. My government must be entirely new.’

Before taking possession of the Tuileries, we had frequently visited the place, to see how the repairs, or, to speak more correctly, the white washings, ordered by Bonaparte, advanced. At the beginning, seeing the number of *caps of liberty* which they had painted upon the walls, he said to M. Lecomte,

then the architect employed at the Tuileries, 'Wash out all these things, I won't have any such fooleries.'

The first consul himself pointed out the slight changes which he wished to be made in the apartment destined for himself. A bed of ceremony was placed in an apartment joining his cabinet. But he slept there but rarely, for Bonaparte had the simplest tastes, and loved external splendour only as a means of imposing upon men. To speak in the language of common life, at the Luxembourg, at Malmaison, and during the first period of his residence at the Tuileries, Bonaparte always slept with his wife. Every night he descended to Josephine's apartment, by a small staircase opening into a wardrobe, adjoining his cabinet, and which had formerly been the oratory of Mary de Medicis. I never entered Bonaparte's bedroom but by this little staircase, and by which he also came to our cabinet.

As to our cabinet, or office, where I have seen so many events prepared, so many great, and so many little affairs transacted, and where I have passed so many hours of my life, I can at this day give the most minute description of it for the amusement of those who take an interest in such details. There were two tables placed in it, one, extremely beautiful, for the first consul, stood nearly in the centre of the apartment, and his arm-chair was turned with its back to the fireplace, having the window to the right. To the right again was a small apartment for Duroc, by which also was a communication with the attendant in waiting, and with the state apartments. My table, which was very plain, stood near the window, whence in summer I enjoyed the prospect of the tufted foliage of the chestnut trees; but in order to see the promenaders in the gardens, I was obliged to rise up: a little to the right, was a door which led to the bed chamber of ceremony, already spoken of, and farther on the hall of audience, on the ceiling of which Lebrun had painted the effigy of Louis XIV. A tri-coloured cockade pasted upon the forehead of the great king, bore witness to the turpitude and imbecility of the Convention. The consular, afterwards the imperial cabinet, has bequeathed me many recollections, and in reading these pages I trust the reader will be of opinion that I have not forgotten them all.

We were now at last in the Tuileries! On the morning after the day so long wished for, after sleeping in the palace of kings, I addressed Bonaparte on entering his chamber: 'Well, General, here you are at last, without difficulty, and amid the acclamations of the people. Do you recollect what you said to

me two years since in the Rue St. Anne ?—I might make myself king now, but it is not time yet !’ ‘Yes, very true, I recollect it. See what it is to have the mind set upon a thing : it is not yet two years. Do you think we have managed affairs badly during that time ? In fact, I am very well satisfied ; yesterday’s affair went off well. Do you think that all those people who came to pay their court to me were sincere ? Certainly not, but the joy of the people was real ; the people know what is right ! Besides, consult the great thermometer of public opinion, the public funds ; the 17th Brumaire, at eleven—the 20th, sixteen—to-day, twenty-one. In this state of things I can allow the Jacobins to chatter, but they must not speak too loud.’

As soon as he was dressed we went to walk in the gallery of Diana ; he examined the statues which had been placed there by his orders, and appeared to be quite at home in his new residence. Among other things he said, ‘Bourrienne, to be at the Tuileries is not all ; we must remain here. Who are they who have inhabited this palace ? Ruffians—the conventionalists ! Stop a moment—there is your brother’s house. Was it not from thence that we beheld the Tuileries besieged, and the good Louis XVI. carried off ? But be tranquil ; let them try it again.’

The ancient usages of royalty made their way, by little and little, into the former abodes of royalty. Among the rights attached to the crown, and which the constitution did not give to the first consul, was one which he greatly desired, the right of pardoning ; and which, by the most happy of all usurpations, he arrogated to himself. When the imperious necessities of his political situation, to which in fact he sacrificed everything, did not interpose, the saving of life afforded him the highest satisfaction—he would even have thanked those to whom he rendered such a service, for the opportunity they had afforded him of doing so. Such was the consul—I do not speak of the emperor. Bonaparte, first consul, was accessible to the solicitations of friendship in favour of the proscribed. Of this the following fact, which touched me so nearly, offers an incontestable proof.

When we were still at the Luxembourg M. Defeu, a French emigrant, had been taken in the Tyrol, with arms in his hands, by the republican troops. He was brought to Grenoble, and confined in the military prison of that town. The laws against emigrants taken in arms were terrible, and the judges dared not be indulgent. Tried in the morning—condemned during the course of the day, and shot in the evening—such was the usual course. A relation of mine, daughter of M. de Poitrincourt,

came from Sens to Paris to inform me of the frightful situation of M. Defeu, who was allied to some of the most honourable families in Sens, where everyone felt for him the most lively interest.

I had stepped out for a few moments, to speak to Mademoiselle de Poitrincourt. On my return I found the first consul surprised at my absence, as I was not in the habit of quitting the cabinet without his knowledge. 'Where have you been?' said he. 'To see a relation who has a favour to entreat of you.' 'What is it?' I then related to him the melancholy situation of M. Defeu. His first answer was terrible. 'No mercy!' said he, 'no mercy for emigrants! The man who fights against his country, is a child who would kill his mother.' This first burst of anger being over, I pressed him again; I represented the youth of M. Defeu—the good effect which clemency would produce. 'Well then,' said he, 'write, The first consul orders the judgment on M. Defeu to be suspended.' He signed this laconic order—I forwarded it to General Ferino, informed my cousin, and awaited in tranquillity the termination of the affair.

Scarcely had I entered the apartment of the first consul the next morning, when he said to me, 'Well, Bourrienne, you do not speak to me about M. Defeu; are you satisfied?' 'General, I cannot find words to express my gratitude.' 'Very well, but I do not like to do things by halves. Write to Ferino, that I desire M. Defeu may be immediately liberated. I make perhaps one who will prove ungrateful. But we can't help that—so much the worse for him. In such cases, Bourrienne, never be afraid to speak to me—when I refuse it is because I cannot do otherwise.'

I sent off, at my own expense, an extraordinary courier, who arrived in time to save the life of M. Defeu. His mother, whose only son he was, and his uncle, came from Sens to Paris to express to me their gratitude. I saw tears of joy fall from the eyes of his mother, who, according to all probability, had been destined to shed those of the most bitter sorrow. M. Defeu is now living at Sens, the happy father of three children.

Emboldened by this success, and by the kind expressions of the first consul, I ventured to solicit a pardon for M. de Frotté, a Vendean chief, who had been warmly recommended to me. Count Louis de Frotté had set himself in opposition to every effort for the pacification of La Vendée. At length,

broken down by a succession of unfortunate battles, he was himself obliged to make those advances which he had formerly rejected. He addressed to General Guidal a letter containing proposals for a peace. A safe conduct was sent him to repair to Alençon. Unfortunately for M. Frotté, General Guidal was not the only person with whom he corresponded; for whilst availing himself of the safe conduct he sent a letter to his lieutenants, in which he counselled them on no account to submit, or agree to lay down their arms. This letter being intercepted, gave to his pacific propositions the appearance of a fraud, and the more so, as in a former manifesto he had spoken of the criminal enterprise of Bonaparte, which must soon terminate.

I had more difficulty now than in the affair of M. Defeu, in prevailing on the first consul to exercise his clemency; however, I pressed the affair so much, I exerted myself so warmly in representing the good effects which such an act of mercy would produce, that I at length obtained an order to respite judgment. What a lesson did I then receive of the misfortunes consequent on a loss of time! Not knowing that matters had advanced so far as they had, I did not instantly despatch the courier charged with the order for suspending judgment. The Minister of Police had already marked his victim, and he never lost time when he had in view to inflict an injury; having determined, for what reason I do not know, upon the destruction of M. de Frotté, he forwarded an order for his immediate execution. The count was tried and condemned on the 28th Pluviose, and shot the next day, the horrible precipitation of the minister rendering of no effect the result of my solicitations. I have reason to think that in the interval the first consul had received some fresh secret charge against M. de Frotté, for on learning his death he appeared quite indifferent; he merely said to me, with unusual bitterness, 'You must take your measures better; you see it is not my fault.'

Of all the actions of Louis XIV. that which Bonaparte admired the most was his having obliged the envoys of Genoa to come to Paris, to apologize for the Doge. The least slight offered in a foreign country to the rights and dignity of France put him beside himself. He evinced this desire to make the French government respected in a matter which, at the time, made great noise, but which, notwithstanding, terminated amicably by means of that great peace-maker—Gold.

Two Irishmen, Napper Tandy and Blackwell, domiciled

in France, and whose names appeared in the lists of the officers of the French army, had retired to Hamburg. The English government having claimed them as traitors to their country, they were delivered up; and as the French government considered them also as subjects of France, their surrender gave occasion to violent complaints against the Senate of Hamburg.

Blackwell was said to have been a chief of the United Irishmen; he had become naturalized in France, and had attained the rank of chief of squadron. Sent upon a secret mission to Norway, the vessel in which he embarked was wrecked on the coast of that kingdom. He made his way to Hamburg, where the authorities arrested him on the demand of Mr. Crawford, the English minister; and, after having been confined a year, he was sent to England to be tried. The French government interfered, and saved his life, if not his liberty.

Napper Tandy was one of the founders of the society of United Irishmen; and to escape the persecutions to which his political sentiments subjected him from the English government, he fled to Hamburg with the intention of passing into Sweden. Proscribed by the Irish Parliament, he was given up by the Senate, more anxious at the time to conciliate the government of England than that of France. Being carried a prisoner to Ireland, and condemned to death, he owed the suspension of his sentence to the remonstrances of France. He remained two years in prison, but M. Otto, who negotiated the preliminaries of peace with Lord Hawkesbury, obtained his liberation, and he was sent back to France. The first consul threatened a terrible vengeance; but the Senate of Hamburg addressed him a letter in justification of its conduct, and strengthened this justification by a remittance of four and a half millions of francs. This softened him greatly. It was in some sort a remembrance of Egypt: one of those *pleasing extortions* to which the General had accustomed the pachas, except that this time the Treasury did not see a franc of it.

I kept, during eight days, the four millions and a half in Dutch bonds in my desk. Bonaparte then determined on their distribution. After paying, as we shall presently see, the debts of Josephine, and the heavy expenses incurred at Malmaison, he gave me a list of persons to whom he wished to make presents. He never mentioned my name, and consequently I was spared the pain of writing it; but, some time after, he said to me, with

‘the most engaging kindness, ‘Bourrienne, I gave you none of that Hamburg money; but I am going to make you amends.’ He then took from his drawer a large sheet of paper printed, with blanks filled up in his own writing, and saying, ‘Here is a bill of exchange for 300,000 Italian livres upon the Cisalpine Republic, for the price of cannons sold them; I give it you.’ On casting my eye over it, however, I perceived that the bill was long over due, and that he had allowed it to run out without troubling himself about it. ‘But, General,’ said I, ‘this bill has been long due—the parties are all exonerated.’ ‘France has engaged to pay these sort of debts,’ said he; ‘send the bill to M. Fermont, he will liquidate it for three per cent.’ I thanked him, and I sent the bill, as desired, to M. Fermont. I received for answer that the claim had fallen into arrear, and could not be paid, not falling under any of the classifications provided for by the law. By order of the General I wrote again, but received a second refusal. ‘Well,’ said he, with the tone of a man who appeared to have anticipated such an answer, ‘what the devil am I to do—you see the laws are against us!’ To be short, the Cisalpine Republic kept the cannons and the money, and the first consul kept the bill. For myself I never received any money whatever.

I never had, either from the General-in-chief of the army of Italy, nor from the General-in-chief of the army of Egypt, nor under the first consul for ten years, nor under the first consul for life, any fixed salary; I took from his drawer what I wanted for my own expenses, as well as his. He never asked me for an account. After his present of a bill on the insolvent Cisalpine Republic, he said to me, at the beginning of the winter of 1800, “Bourrienne, the weather grows cold; I shall be but seldom at Malmaison. Go, while I am at the council, for my papers and little effects: here is the key of my desk; bring away whatever you find in it.” I got into a coach at two, and returned at six. He was at dinner. I laid upon the table of his cabinet divers matters which I had taken from his desk, and 15,000 francs in bank notes, which I found in the corner of a little drawer. When he came up, he said, ‘Why, here’s money; where did you get this?’ I replied, that it was in the desk. ‘Ah,’ said he, ‘I had forgotten it; it was for my petty expenses. Here, keep it.’

I have already stated the disbursement of the four millions and a half extorted from the senate of Hamburg, in the affair of Napper Tandy and Blackwell. The whole, however, was not

given away in presents ; there was a considerable sum destined to discharge the debts of Josephine ; but the management of this affair requires some observations.

The estate of Malmaison had cost 160,000 francs : Josephine had purchased it while we were in Egypt. Many improvements had been made, and considerable additions to the beautiful park. All this was not done for nothing ; besides which, a considerable part of the purchase money remained unpaid ; and this was not the only debt of Josephine. Creditors murmured. This had a bad effect in Paris ; and, I confess, I was so apprehensive of the first burst of the consul's displeasure, that I deferred speaking to him on the subject to the very last. It was, therefore, with much satisfaction I learned that this had already been done by M. Talleyrand. No one, as the phrase is, knew better how to gild a pill for Bonaparte. Endowed with as much independence of character as of mind, he did him the service, at the risk of offending him, to tell him, that a great number of creditors expressed their discontent, in bitter complaints, respecting the debts contracted by Madame Bonaparte during his campaign in the East.

Bonaparte felt it advisable to remove promptly the occasion of those complaints. It was one night, at half past eleven o'clock, that Talleyrand broke this delicate matter to him. As soon as he was gone I entered the little apartment where Bonaparte remained alone ; 'Bourrienne,' said he to me, 'Talleyrand has been speaking to me about my wife's debts. I have that Hamburg money ; learn from her their exact amount ; let her state the whole. I wish to finish, and not to begin again ; but do not pay until you shew me the accounts of those rascals. They are a band of robbers.'

Till then the apprehension of a terrible scene, the mere idea of which made Josephine tremble, had always prevented my opening the affair to the first consul ; but happy that Talleyrand had first mentioned it, I resolved to do everything in my power to put an end to this disagreeable affair.

On the morrow I saw Josephine ; she was delighted with the dispositions of her husband ; but this did not last long. When I asked her for the exact amount of what she owed, she entreated me not to insist upon it, and to be satisfied with what she would confess. I said to her, 'Madam, I cannot deceive you as to the dispositions of the first consul. He is aware that you owe a considerable sum, and he is disposed to discharge it. You will have to endure some cutting reproaches, and a violent scene,

I have no doubt ; but this scene will be the same for the sums you may acknowledge, as for a still more considerable amount. If you conceal any material part of your debts, in a short time the murmurs will recommence, and they will reach the ears of the first consul ; then his anger will burst out again with greater violence. Be advised by me ; confess all. The results will be the same, and you will have to hear but once the disagreeable things he will say to you ; by concealment, you will renew them incessantly.' She replied, 'I can never tell all, that is impossible ; do me the favour to conceal what I am about to divulge to you : I owe, I believe, nearly 1,200,000 francs ; but I cannot own to more than 600,000 ; I will contract no more debts, and I will pay the remainder by degrees, out of my savings.' 'Here, madam,' said I, 'I recur to my first observations. As I do not believe that he estimates your debts at so much as 600,000 francs, I will engage that you will not experience more displeasure for 1,200,000 than you will for 600,000, and by stating the full amount you will get rid of the whole at once.' 'I can never do it, Bourrienne,' said she, 'I know him, I could never support his violence.' After a quarter of an hour's discussion on the same subject, I was obliged to yield to her pressing entreaties, and to promise to mention 600,000 francs only to the first consul.

The indignation of the first consul may be imagined, and he rightly judged that his wife had concealed something. He said to me, 'Well, take these 600,000 francs ; but this sum must discharge her debts, and let me be troubled no more about the matter. I authorise you to threaten these tradesmen, if they do not consent to reduce their enormous demands ; and we must teach them not to be so ready in giving credit.' Madame Bonaparte gave me all their bills. The extravagant prices which the fear of having long to wait for their money had induced them to charge, can scarcely be imagined.

At length, I had the good fortune, after the most violent squabbling, to settle the whole for 600,000 francs. But Madame Bonaparte soon fell into similar excesses. Happily, money had become more plentiful. This inconceivable rage for expense became for her almost the sole cause of all her unhappiness ; her thoughtless profusion rendered disorder permanent in her household until the period of the second marriage of Bonaparte, when she became, as I have been informed, more careful. I cannot say so much for her when Empress in 1804.

At Paris, I quitted Bonaparte more rarely than at Malmaison.

Sometimes we walked of an evening in the gardens of the Tuileries. He always waited till the gates were closed. In these evening rambles he wore a gray surtout, and a round hat : when challenged by the sentinels I was instructed to answer, 'The first consul.' These promenades, which were of much benefit both to Bonaparte and myself, as a relaxation from our labours, resembled a good deal those which we had at Malmaison ; but our walks in town were frequently very amusing.

During the early part of our residence at the Tuileries, when I saw Bonaparte enter his cabinet at eight o'clock in the evening, in his gray surtout, I knew that he was about to say to me, 'Bourrienne, let us take a turn.' Sometimes then, instead of going out by the arcade of the garden, we passed by the little gate leading to the apartments of the Duke d'Angoulême. He would take my arm, and we went on making small purchases in the shops of the Rue St. Honore, seldom extending our excursions farther than the Rue de l'Arbre Sec ; whilst I affected to examine the articles we appeared to wish to purchase, he undertook the part of questioner. Nothing could be more amusing than to see him endeavouring to assume the careless manners of the young man of fashion. How awkward his attempts at the airs of a dandy, when, adjusting his cravat, he would say, 'Well, madam, is there anything new to-day ? Citizen, what do they say of Bonaparte ? Your shop appears to be well furnished, you ought to have a great many customers. What do people say of Bonaparte ?' How happy was he one day when we were obliged to retreat with precipitation from a shop, to avoid the abuse which the irreverent manner in which Bonaparte spoke of the first consul had brought upon us !

The destruction of men, and the construction of monuments, were things entirely in unison in the mind of Bonaparte ; and it might be said, that his passion for monuments was nearly equal to his passion for war. But as, in all things, he had a dislike for what was sordid and mean, he preferred vast erections as he loved great battles. The appearance of the colossal ruins of Egypt had contributed not a little to develop in him his natural taste for great erections. It was not the edifices themselves that he valued, but the historical recollections they perpetuate, the great names they consecrate, and the great events they record. Why, in fact, should we value the column which we see, on arriving at Alexandria, were it not the column of Pompey ? It is for artists to descant on its proportions

and its ornaments ; for the learned, to explain its inscriptions ; but the name of Pompey recommends it to the world.

In endeavouring to sketch the character of Bonaparte, I ought to have spoken of his taste for monuments ; for without this characteristic trait, something essential would have been wanting in filling up the portrait. But although this taste, or, to speak more correctly, this passion, held a principal place in his thoughts and projects of glory, it did not prevent him from appreciating equally projects of amelioration of lesser importance. His genius would have great monuments to eternize the recollections of his glory ; but, at the same time, his good sense enabled him to appreciate truly everything that was of real utility. He could seldom be charged with rejecting any plan without examination, and this examination was not long ; for his habitual tact enabled him, at a glance, to see things in their true light.

The recollection of the superb Necropolis of Cairo recurred frequently to Bonaparte's mind. He had admired that city of the dead ; to the peopling of which, he had contributed not a little ; and he designed to establish, at the four cardinal points of Paris, four vast cemeteries, on the plan of that at Cairo, which had so riveted his attention.

Bonaparte determined, that all the new streets in Paris should be forty feet wide, with foot pavements ; in a word, nothing appeared to him too magnificent for the embellishment of the capital of a country which he wished to make the first in the world. Next to war, this was the first object of his ambition. The two ideas were commingled in his mind ; so much so, that he never considered a victory complete till it had received its appropriate monument to carry down its recollections to posterity. Glory—continual glory for France as well as for himself. How often has he said to me, after conversing on his grand schemes, 'Bourrienne, it is for France that I do this ; all that I wish, all that I desire, the object of all my labours, is, that my name shall be for ever connected with the name of France !'

Paris is not the only city, nor is France the only kingdom, which bears traces of the passion of Napoleon for great and useful monuments. In Belgium, in Holland, in Piedmont, in the kingdom of Italy, wherever he had an imperial residence, he executed great improvements. At Turin, a magnificent bridge was constructed over the Po, in place of the old one which had fallen to ruin. How many things undertaken and

executed under a reign so short and so eventful ! The communications were difficult between Metz and Mayence. A magnificent road was formed, as if it were by magic, and carried in a direct line through impassable marshes and trackless forests ; mountains opposed themselves, they were cut through ; ravines presented obstacles, they were filled up ; and very soon one of the finest roads in Europe was opened to commerce. He would not allow nature, any more than man, to resist him.

In his great works of bridges and roads, Bonaparte had always in view to remove the obstacles and barriers which nature had placed to the limits of ancient France, and the better to unite the provinces which he added successively to the empire. Thus, a road, level as the walk of a garden, replaced in Savoy the precipitous passes in the wood of Bramant, and thus the passage of Mont Cenis, on the summit of which he erected a barrack, and intended to have built a town, became a pleasant promenade at almost all seasons of the year. The Simplon was obliged to bow its head before the mattocks and the mines of the engineers of France ; and Bonaparte might say, 'There are now no Alps,' with greater reason than Louis XIV said, 'There are now no Pyrenees.'

CHAPTER XIII.

THE importance of events varies with the times of their occurrence. An affair which passes away unnoticed may be rendered of consequence by events which subsequently ensue. This reflection naturally presents itself to my mind, when I am about to speak of the correspondence which Louis XVIII. sought to open with the first consul. It certainly is not one of the least interesting passages in the life of Bonaparte. While the empire appeared to rest upon a sure foundation, it might be considered but as a matter of curiosity ; but since the happy restoration of the Bourbons, the question of their re-establishment on the throne assumes a more elevated character, and it is necessary to relate facts with a scrupulous exactness. I shall therefore lay before the reader the text of this correspondence, and the curious circumstances connected with it. The letter of Louis XVIII. ran thus :—

'Whatever may be their apparent conduct, men like you,

sir, never inspire alarm. You have accepted an eminent station, and I thank you for it. You know better than any one the strength and power necessary to ensure the happiness of a great nation. Save France from her own violence, and you will have gratified the first wish of my heart ; restore to her her king, and future generations will bless your memory. You will always be too necessary to the state for me to be able to discharge by important appointments, the debt of my family and my own.

‘LOUIS.’

The first consul was much agitated on the receipt of this letter ; although he every day declared his determination to have nothing to do with the princes, he considered whether he should reply to this overture. The pressure of affairs which then occupied his attention favoured this hesitation, and he was in no haste to reply. I ought to mention that Josephine and Hortense entreated him to give the king hopes, as, by doing so, that would not pledge him to anything, and would afford him time to see whether he might not in the end play a more distinguished part than that of Monk. Their entreaties were so urgent, that he one day said to me, ‘These devils of women are mad. The Faubourg St. Germain has turned their heads ; they have made it their guardian-angel ; but that is of no consequence, I will have nothing to do with them.’ Madame Bonaparte told me, that she urged him to this step, lest he should think of making himself king, the expectation of which always raised in her mind a painful foreboding, which she could never overcome.

In the numerous conversations which the first consul had with me, he discussed, with admirable sagacity, the proposition of Louis XVIII. and its consequences. But he said, ‘the partisans of the Bourbons deceive themselves much, if they imagine that I am a man to play the part of Monk.’ The matter rested here, and the king’s letter remained upon the table. During this interval, Louis XVIII. wrote a second letter without date. It was as follows :—

‘For a length of time, General, you must be aware that you possess my esteem. If you doubt my gratitude, name your reward, and fix that of your friends. As to my principles, I am a Frenchman. Merciful by character, I am still more so from the dictates of reason. No, the conqueror of Lodi, of Castiglione, of Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, cannot prefer a

vain celebrity to true glory. But you are losing precious time. We may ensure the glory of France. I say *we*, because I require the assistance of Bonaparte, and he can do nothing without me. General, Europe observes you. Glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people.

(Signed)

‘LOUIS.’

The first consul allowed some time to elapse before he replied to this letter, so noble and dignified. At length he wished to dictate one to me. I begged to observe to him that the letters of the king were autographs, and that it appeared more suitable that he himself should write a reply. He then wrote as follows :—

‘SIR.—I have received your letter : I thank you for the handsome manner in which you have spoken of me.

‘You ought not to wish to return to France : to do so you must march over one hundred thousand dead bodies.

‘Sacrifice your interest to the repose and happiness of France, and history will render you justice.

‘I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family, and shall learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with all that can contribute to the tranquillity of your retirement.

‘BONAPARTE.’

By these general expressions, he pledged himself to nothing, not even in words. Every day that augmented his power, and strengthened his position, diminished, in his opinion, the chances of the Bourbons ; and seven months were allowed to elapse between the receipt of the king’s first letter and the answer of the first consul.

Some days after the receipt of Louis XVIII.’s letter, we were walking in the gardens at Malmaison ; he was in good humour, for everything was going on to his mind. ‘Has my wife been speaking to you of the Bourbons ?’ said he. ‘No, General.’ ‘But when you converse with her, you lean a little to her opinions ; tell me, now, why do you desire their return ? You have no interest in their return ; nothing to expect from them. Your rank is not sufficiently elevated to allow you to look to any great post. You will never be anything with them. It is true, that through the interest of M. de Chambonas, you were named Secretary of Legation at Stuttgart ; but had no change happened, you would have remained there all your life, or in an inferior situation. Have you ever seen men rise under kings by

merit alone ?' 'General,' said I, 'I am quite of your opinion on one point. I have never received anything under the Bourbons ; neither gifts, nor places, nor favours ; neither have I the vanity to suppose that I should have ever risen to any conspicuous station. But it is not myself I consider, but all France. I believe you will continue to hold your power as long as you live ; but you have no children, and it is pretty certain you never will by Josephine. What are we to do when you are gone ? what is to become of us ? You have often said to me that your brothers were not——' Here he interrupted me, 'Ah, as to that you are right ; if I do not live thirty years to finish my work, you will, when I am dead, have long civil wars : my brothers do not suit France, you know them. You will then have a violent contest among the most distinguished generals, each of whom will think he has a right to take my place.' 'Well then, General, why do you not endeavour to remedy those evils which you foresee ?' 'Do you suppose I have never thought of that ? but weigh well the difficulties that are in my way. In case of a restoration, what is to become of those who have voted for the death of the king, the men who were conspicuous in the revolution, the national domains, and a multitude of things done during the last twelve years ? Do you suppose there would be no reaction ?' 'General, need I recall to your recollection, that Louis XVIII., in his letter, guarantees the contrary of all you apprehend ? I know what will be your answer ; but are you not in a situation to impose any conditions you may think fit ? Grant, at that price, but what they ask of you. There is no need of haste. Take three or four years ; you can in that time establish the happiness of France, by institutions conformable to her wants. Custom and habit would give them a force that it would not be easy to destroy, and even if such an intention were entertained, it could not succeed.' 'Depend upon it,' said he, 'the Bourbons will think they have re-conquered their inheritance, and will dispose of it as they please. Engagements the most sacred, promises the most positive, will disappear before force. None but fools will trust them. My mind is made up, let us say no more upon the subject ; but I know how these women torment you,—let them mind their knitting, and leave me to mind my own affairs.' The women knitted—I wrote at my desk—he made himself emperor—the empire has fallen to pieces—he is dead in St. Helena—and the Bourbons have been restored.

'The first relations between Bonaparte and Paul I. commenced

a short time after the accession to the consulate. Affairs then began to look a little less unfavourable : already vague reports from Switzerland and the banks of the Rhine indicated a coldness existing between the Russians and the Austrians ; and, at the same time, symptoms of a misunderstanding between the courts of London and St. Petersburg began to be perceptible. The first consul having, in the meantime, discovered the chivalrous and somewhat eccentric character of Paul I., thought the moment a propitious one to attempt breaking the bonds which united Russia and England. He was not the man to allow so fine an opportunity to pass, and he took advantage of it with his ordinary sagacity. The English had some time before refused to comprehend in a cartel for the exchange of prisoners 7000 Russians taken in Holland. Bonaparte ordered them all to be armed, and clothed in new uniforms appropriate to the corps to which they had belonged, and sent them back to Russia, without ransom, without exchange, or any condition whatever. This judicious munificence was not thrown away. Paul shewed himself deeply sensible of it, and, closely allied as he had lately been with England, he now, all at once, declared himself her enemy. This triumph of policy delighted the first consul.

‘Thenceforth the consul and the Czar became the best friends possible. They strove to outdo each other in professions of friendship ; and it may be believed that Bonaparte did not fail to turn this contest of politeness to his own advantage. He so well worked upon the mind of Paul, that he succeeded in obtaining a direct influence over the cabinet of St. Petersburg.

‘Lord Whitworth, at that time the English ambassador in Russia, was ordered to quit the capital without delay, and to retire to Riga, which then became the focus of the intrigues of the north, which ended in the death of Paul. The English ships were seized in all the ports and, at the pressing instance of the Czar, a Prussian army menaced Hanover. Bonaparte lost no time, and, profiting by the friendship manifested towards him by the inheritor of Catharine’s power, he determined to make that friendship subservient to the execution of the vast plan which he had long conceived : he meant to undertake an expedition by land against the English colonies in the East Indies.

‘The arrival of Baron Sprengporten at Paris caused great satisfaction among the partisans of the consular government, that is to say, almost everyone in Paris. He came on an

extraordinary mission, being ostensibly clothed with the title of plenipotentiary, and, at the same time, appointed confidential minister to the consul. Bonaparte was extremely satisfied with the ambassador whom Paul had selected, and with the manner in which he described the emperor's gratitude for the generous conduct of the first consul.

'We could easily perceive that Paul placed great confidence in M. Sprengporten. As he had satisfactorily discharged the mission with which he had been intrusted, Paul expressed pleasure at his conduct in several friendly and flattering letters, which Sprengporten always allowed us to read. No one could be fonder of France than he was, and he ardently desired that his first negotiations might lead to a long alliance between the Russian and French governments. The autograph and very frequent correspondence between Bonaparte and Paul passed through his hands. I read all Paul's letters, which were remarkable for the frankness with which his affection for Bonaparte was expressed. His admiration of the first consul was so great, that no courtier could have written in a more flattering manner. This admiration was not feigned on the part of the Emperor of Russia : it was no less sincere than ardent, and of this he soon gave proofs.

'Bonaparte never felt greater satisfaction in the whole course of his life, than he experienced from Paul's enthusiasm for him. The friendship of a sovereign seemed to him a step, by which he was to become a sovereign himself. On the other hand, the affairs of La Vendée began to assume a better aspect, and he hoped soon to effect that pacification in the interior, which he so ardently desired.*

* This account agrees precisely with the following, dictated by Napoleon himself at St. Helena :

'The Emperor Paul had succeeded the Empress Catharine. Half frantic with his hostility to the French revolution, he had performed what his mother had contented herself with promising ; and engaged in the second coalition. General Suwarrow, at the head of 60,000 Russians, advanced in Italy, whilst another Russian army entered Switzerland, and a corps of 15,000 men was placed by the Czar at the disposal of the Duke of York for the purpose of conquering Holland. These were all the disposable forces the Russian empire had. Suwarrow, although victorious at the battles of Cassano, the Trebbia, and Novi, had lost half his army in the Saint Gothard, and the different valleys of Switzerland, after the battle of Zurich, in which Korsakow had been taken. Paul then became sensible of the imprudence of his conduct ; and in 1800, Suwarrow returned to Russia with scarcely a fourth of his army. The Emperor Paul complained bitterly of having

‘The first consul, meanwhile, proceeded to turn the friendship of the Russian Emperor to solid account. It has never, in truth, been difficult to excite angry and jealous feelings among the minor maritime powers, with regard to the naval sovereignty of England. The claim of the right of searching neutral ships, and her doctrine on the subject of blockades, had indeed been recognized in many treaties by Russia, and by every maritime government in Europe. Nevertheless, the old grudge remained and Bonaparte most artfully employed every engine of his diplomacy to awaken a spirit of hostility against England ; first, in the well-prepared mind of the Czar, and then in the cabinets of Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. The result was, in effect, a coalition of these powers against England.’

CHAPTER XIV.

‘MUCH had been already done towards the internal tranquillization of France : but it was obvious that the result could not be perfect until the war, which had so long raged on two frontiers of the country, should have found a termination. The fortune

lost the flower of his troops, who had neither been seconded by the Austrians nor by the English. He reproached the cabinet of Vienna with having refused, after the conquest of Piedmont, to replace the King of Sardinia upon his throne ; with being destitute of grand and generous ideas, and wholly governed by calculation and interested views. He also complained that the English, when they took Malta, instead of reinstating the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and restoring that island to the knights, had appropriated it to themselves. The first consul did all in his power to cherish these seeds of discontent, and to make them productive. A little after the battle of Marengo, he found means to flatter the lively and impetuous imagination of the Czar, by sending him the sword which Pope Leo X. had given to l’Ille Adam, as a memorial of his satisfaction for having defended Rhodes against the infidels. From 8000 to 10,000 Russian soldiers had been made prisoners in Italy, at Zurich, and in Holland : the first consul proposed their exchange to the English and Austrians ; both refused ; the Austrians, because there were still many of their people prisoners in France ; and the English, although they had a great number of French prisoners, because, as they said, this proposal was contrary to their principles. “What !” it was said to the cabinet of St. James’s, “do you refuse to exchange even the Russians, who were taken in Holland, fighting in your own ranks under the Duke of York?” And to the cabinet of Vienna it was observed, “How ! do you refuse to restore to their country those men of the north to whom you are indebted for

of the last two years had been far different from that of the glorious campaigns which ended in the treaty—or armistice, as it might more truly be named—of Campo-Formio. The Austrians had recovered the north of Italy, and already menaced the Savoy frontier, designing to march into Provence, and there support a new insurrection of the royalists. The force opposed to them in that quarter was much inferior in numbers, and composed of the relics of armies beaten over and over again by Suwarrow. The Austrians and French were more nearly balanced on the Rhine frontier ; but even there, there was ample

the victories of the Trebbia, and Novi, and for your conquests in Italy, and who have left in your hands a multitude of French prisoners taken by them ? Such injustice excites my indignation," said the first consul. "Well ! I will restore them to the Czar without exchange ; he shall see how I esteem brave men." The Russian officers, who were prisoners, immediately received their swords, and the troops of that nation were assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, where they were soon completely new clothed, and furnished with good arms of French manufacture. A Russian general was instructed to organize them in battalions and regiments. This blow struck at once at London and St. Petersburg. Paul, attacked in so many different directions, gave way to his enthusiastic temper, and attached himself to France with all the ardour of his character. He despatched a letter to the first consul, in which he said, "Citizen, First Consul, I do not write to you to discuss the rights of men or citizens ; every country governs itself as it pleases. Wherever I see at the head of a nation a man who knows how to rule and how to fight, my heart is attracted towards him. I write to acquaint you with my dissatisfaction of England, who violates every article of the law of nations, and has no guide but her egotism and interest. I wish to unite with you to put an end to the unjust proceedings of that government."

'In the beginning of December, 1800, General Sprengporten, a Finlander, who had entered the Russian service, and who in his heart was attached to France, arrived at Paris. He brought letters from the Emperor Paul, and was instructed to take the command of the Russian prisoners, and to conduct them back to their country. All the officers of that nation, who returned to Russia, constantly spoke in the highest terms of the kind treatment and attention they had met with in France, particularly after the arrival of the first consul. The correspondence between the emperor and Napoleon soon became daily ; they treated directly on the most important interests, and on the means of humbling the English power. General Sprengporten was not instructed to make peace : he had no powers for that purpose ; neither was he an ambassador ; peace did not exist. It was, therefore, an extraordinary mission, which allowed of this general's being treated with every distinction calculated to gratify the sovereign who had sent him without the possibility of the occurrence of any inconvenience from such attentions.'—*Napoleon's Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 130.

room for anxiety. On the whole, the grand attitude in which Bonaparte had left the Republic, when he embarked for Egypt, was exchanged for one of a far humbler description ; and, in fact, the general disheartening of the nation, by reason of those reverses, had been of signal service to Napoleon's ambition. If a strong hand was wanted at home, the necessity of having a general who could bring back victory to the tri-colour banners in the field had been not less deeply felt. And hence the decisive revolution of Brumaire.

‘Of the allies of Austria, meanwhile, one had virtually abandoned her. The Emperor Paul, of Russia, resenting the style in which his army under Suwarrow had been supported, withdrew it altogether from the field of its victories. In his new character of chief consul, Bonaparte resolved to have the credit of making overtures of peace to England, ere the campaign with the Austrians should open ; and, discarding the usual etiquette of diplomatic intercourse, he addressed a letter to King George III. in person. The reply was an official note from Lord Grenville, then Secretary of State for the department of foreign affairs, to Talleyrand, which terminated the negotiation.

‘It was Bonaparte's policy, even more clearly than it had been that of his predecessors, to buy security at home by battle and victory abroad. The national pride had been deeply wounded during his absence ; and something must be done in Europe, worthy of the days of Lodi, Rivoli, and Tagliamento, ere he could hope to be seated firmly on his *throne*. On receiving the answer of the British minister, he said to Talleyrand (rubbing his hands, as was his custom when much pleased), “It could not have been more favourable.” On the same day, the 7th of January (just three days after the date of Lord Grenville's note), the first consul issued his edict for the formation of the army of reserve, consisting of all the veterans who had ever served, and a new levy of 30,000 conscripts.’

It was then, in the days of his youth, that the fertility of his genius, and the vigour of his mind, could not fail to command the admiration of even his most bitter enemy. I was astonished at the facility with which he entered into details. Whilst the most important occupations engrossed every moment of his time, he sent 24,000 francs to the hospital of Mont St. Bernard, to purchase provisions. When he saw the army of reserve formed, and that everything went to his wishes, he said to me, ‘I hope to fall on Melas' rear before he is aware that I am in Italy. That is, provided Genoa holds out ; but Massena defends it.’

On the 17th of March, in a moment of gaiety and good humour, he desired me to unroll Chauchard's great map of Italy—he stretched himself upon it, and told me to do the same. He then stuck into it pins, whose heads were tipped with red and black sealing wax. I observed him in silence, and awaited the result of a campaign so inoffensive. When he had stationed the enemy's corps, and drawn up the pins with red heads on the points where he intended to conduct his own troops, he said to me, 'Do you think that I shall beat Melas?' 'Why, how can I tell?' 'You are a simpleton,' said he; 'look you here,—Melas is at Alexandria, where he has his headquarters; he will remain there till Genoa surrenders. He has in Alexandria his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, his reserves. Passing the Alps here' (pointing to the Great St. Bernard) 'I fall upon Melas, I cut off his communications with Austria, and I meet him here in the plains of Scrivia' (sticking a red pin at San Juliano). Perceiving that I looked upon this manœuvring of pins as mere pastime, he addressed to me some of his usual apostrophes, which served as a sort of relaxation, and then recurred to his demonstrations upon the map. We rose in about a quarter of an hour, I replaced the map, and thought no more about it. But when, four months after, I found myself at San Juliano, with his portfolio and despatches which I had saved from the rout which took place in the early part of the day, and when, the same night, I wrote from his dictation, at Torre di Galifolo, a league from thence, the bulletin of the battle, I frankly avowed my admiration of his military plans. He smiled himself at the justness of his foresight.

'At this time France had four armies on her frontiers: that of the North, under Brune, watched the partisans of the house of Orange in Holland, and guarded those coasts against any new invasion from England; the defeat of the Duke of York had enabled the government to reduce its strength considerably. The second was the army of the Danube, under Jourdan, which, after the defeat at Stockach, had been obliged to repass the Rhine: the third, under Massena, styled the army of Helvetia, had been compelled in the preceding campaign to evacuate great part of Switzerland; but, gaining the battle of Zurich against the Russians, now re-occupied the whole of that republic: the fourth was that broken remnant which still called itself the "Army of Italy." After the disastrous conflict of Genola it had rallied in disorder on the Appenine and the heights of Genoa, where the spirit of the troops was already so much

injured, that whole battalions deserted *en masse*, and retired behind the Var. Their distress, in truth, was extreme : for they had lost all means of communication with the valley of the Po, and the English fleet effectually blockaded the whole coasts both of Provence and Liguria ; so that, pent up among barren rocks, they suffered the hardships and privations of a beleaguered garrison.

‘The chief consul sent Massena to assume the command of the “Army of Italy” ; and issued, on that occasion, a general order, which had a magical effect on the minds of the soldiery. Massena was highly esteemed among them ; and after his arrival at Genoa, the deserters flocked back rapidly to their standards. At the same time Bonaparte ordered Moreau to assume the command of the two corps of the Danube and Helvetia, and consolidate them into one great “army of the Rhine.” Lastly, the rendezvous of the “army of reserve” was appointed for Dijon : a central position from which either Massena or Moreau might, as circumstances demanded, be supported and reinforced ; but which Napoleon really designed to serve for a cloak to his main purpose. For he had already, in concert with Carnot, sketched the plan of that which is generally considered as at once the most daring and the most masterly of all the campaigns of the war ; and which, in so far as the execution depended upon himself, turned out also the most dazzlingly successful.

‘In placing Moreau at the head of the army of the Rhine, full 150,000 strong, and out of all comparison the best disciplined as well as the largest force of the Republic, Bonaparte exhibited a noble superiority to all feelings of personal jealousy. That general’s reputation approached the most nearly to his own ; but his talents justified this reputation, and the chief consul thought of nothing but the best means of accomplishing the purposes of the joint campaign. Moreau, in the sequel, was severely censured by his master for the manner in which he executed the charge intrusted to him. His orders were to march at once upon Ulm, at the risk of placing the great Austrian army under Kray between him and France ; but he was also commanded to detach 15,000 of his troops for the separate service of passing into Italy by the defiles of St. Gothard ; and given to understand that it must be his business to prevent Kray, at all hazards, from opening a communication with Italy by way of the Tyrol. Under such circumstances, it is not wonderful that a general, who had a master, should have proceeded more cautiously than

suit the gigantic aspirations of the unfettered Napoleon. Moreau, however, it must be admitted, had always the reputation of a prudent, rather than a daring, commander. The details of his campaign against Kray must be sought elsewhere. A variety of engagements took place, with a variety of fortune. Moreau, his enemies allow, commenced his operations by crossing the Rhine in the end of April ; and, on the 15th of July, had his head-quarters at Augsburg, and was in condition either to reinforce the French in Italy, or to march into the heart of the Austrian states, when the success of Bonaparte's own expedition rendered either movement unnecessary.

'The chief consul had resolved upon conducting, in person, one of the most adventurous enterprises recorded in the history of war. The formation of the army of reserve at Dijon was a mere deceit. A numerous staff, indeed, assembled in that town ; and the preparation of the munitions of war proceeded there as elsewhere with the utmost energy : but the troops collected at Dijon were few ; and,—it being universally circulated and believed, that they were the force meant to re-establish the once glorious Army of Italy, by marching to the head-quarters of Massena at Genoa,—the Austrians received the accounts of their numbers and appearance not only with indifference but with derision. Bonaparte, meanwhile, had spent three months in recruiting his armies throughout the interior of France ; and the troops, by means of which it was his purpose to change the face of affairs beyond the Alps, were already marching by different routes, each detachment in total ignorance of the other's destination, upon the territory of Switzerland. To that quarter Bonaparte had already sent forward Berthier, the most confidential of his military friends, and other officers of the highest skill, with orders to reconnoitre the various passes in the great Alpine chain, and make every other preparation for the movement, of which they alone were, as yet, in the secret.'

The first consul was not satisfied with the administration of General Berthier, as Minister of War : he replaced him by Carnot, who had given great proofs of firmness and integrity, but whom Bonaparte did not like, being too decidedly a republican. Berthier set out for Dijon, where he began the creation of the famous army of reserve, which was nothing in the beginning, but which, in a few weeks after, by a single battle, brought all Italy again under the dominion of the French.

The consular constitution did not permit the first consul to

command an army out of the territory of the Republic. He did not wish it to be known that he had formed the resolution of placing himself at the head of the army of Italy, and which he now for the first time called the grand army. I observed to him, that by appointing Berthier to the command-in-chief, nobody could be deceived ; because all the world would see that, in making such a choice, his intention must have been to command in person. My observation amused him much.

The chief consul remained in Paris until he received Berthier's decisive despatch from Geneva—it was in these words, 'I wish to see you here. There are orders to be given by which three armies may act in concert, and you alone can give them in the lines. Measures decided on in Paris are too late.'

Bonaparte immediately fixed the day of our departure from Paris for the 6th of May. All his arrangements were made, all his orders given, but he did not wish that it should yet be known that he went to take the command of the army. On the preceding evening, in the presence of the other two consuls, and the ministers, he said to Lucien, 'Prepare by to-morrow a circular to the prefects ; you, Fouché, will have it published in the journals. Say that I have set out for Dijon, where I go to inspect the army of reserve ; you may add, that I may perhaps go as far as Geneva, but say positively that I shall not be absent more than fifteen days. You, Cambaceres, will preside to-morrow in the Council of State. In my absence you are the head of the government, and speak in the same way to the Council : you may say that my absence will be short, but specify nothing. Assure the Council of State of my entire satisfaction ; it has rendered great services, which I hope it will continue to do. Stay, I had forgot,—you will at the same time announce that I have named Joseph a councillor of state. If anything should happen I will return like a thunder-bolt. I recommend to you all the great interests of France. I hope in a little time to be spoken of in Vienna and London.'

We set out at two o'clock in the morning, taking the Burgundy road, which we had already so often travelled under very different circumstances.

On the journey Bonaparte conversed much about the warriors of antiquity, especially of Alexander, Cæsar, Scipio, and Hannibal. He shewed himself well acquainted with the localities and with the respective means of these commanders. He had made a special study of strategy, ancient and modern. Nothing, in the great science of war, escaped his genius. I asked him

whether he gave his preference to Alexander or Cæsar. 'I place Alexander,' said he, 'in the first rank ; I admire the fine campaign of Cæsar in Africa. My reason for giving the preference to the king of Macedon is, on account of the conception, and above all for the execution, of his campaign in Asia. He can have no idea of war who blames this prince for having spent seven months in the siege of Tyre. Had it been myself, I would have remained there seven years if necessary. This is a grand subject, but for my part, I consider the siege of Tyre, the conquest of Egypt, and the march to the Oasis of Ammon, as proofs of the genius of this great captain. He wished to afford the king of Persia, whose advanced guard only he had defeated at the Granicus and the Issus, time to assemble all his forces, that he might by a single blow overturn that colossus, which he had as yet only shaken. Alexander, by pursuing Darius into his states, would have separated himself from his reinforcements, would have encountered only scattered parties of troops, who would have drawn him into deserts where his army would have been lost. By persevering in the taking of Tyre he secured his communications with Greece, that country for which he did so much, and which he loved as dearly as I do France, and in whose glory he placed his own. In possessing himself of the rich province of Egypt, at that time so powerful, he forced Darius to come to defend or deliver it, and to march half way to meet him. By representing himself as the son of Jupiter, he worked in a way useful for his designs upon the ardent temper of the Orientals. We know how that assisted him. Finally, he died at the age of thirty-three,—what a name did he leave behind him !'

Although completely a stranger to the noble science of war, I could not avoid admiring the sublime projects of Bonaparte, his shrewd remarks and his ingenious observations on the great captains of ancient and modern times, and I could not help saying to him, 'General, you reproach me often with not being a flatterer, but now I tell you truly, I admire you,' and I told the truth.

'On the 7th of May, we arrived at Dijon, where he reviewed, in great form, some 7000 or 8000 raw and half-clad troops, and committed them to the care of Brune. The spies of Austria reaped new satisfaction from this consular review : meanwhile Napoleon had halted but two hours at Dijon ; and, travelling all night, arrived, the next day, at Geneva. Here he was met by Marescot, who had been employed in exploring the wild passes

of the Great St. Bernard, and received from him an appalling picture of the difficulties of marching an army by that route into Italy. 'Is it possible to pass?' said Napoleon, cutting the engineer's narrative short. 'The thing is barely possible,' answered Marescot. 'Very well,' said the chief consul, '*en avant*—let us proceed.'

While the Austrians were thinking only of the frontier where Suchet commanded an enfeebled and dispirited division,—destined, as they doubted not, to be reinforced by the army, such as it was, of Dijon—the chief consul had resolved to penetrate into Italy, as Hannibal had done of old, through all the dangers and difficulties of the great Alps themselves. The march on the Var and Genoa might have been executed with comparative ease, and might, in all likelihood, have led to victory; but mere victory would not suffice. It was urgently necessary that the name of Bonaparte should be surrounded with some blaze of almost supernatural renown; and his plan for purchasing this splendour was to rush down from the Alps, at whatever hazard, upon the rear of Melas, cut off all his communications with Austria, and then force him to a conflict, in which, Massena and Suchet being on the other side of him, reverse must needs be ruin.

'For the treble purpose of more easily collecting a sufficient stock of provisions for the march, of making its accomplishment more rapid, and of perplexing the enemy on its termination, Napoleon determined that his army should pass in four divisions, by as many separate routes. The left wing, under Moncey, consisting of 15,000 detached from the army of Moreau, was ordered to debouch by the way of St. Gothard. The corps of Thureau, 5000 strong, took the direction of Mont Cenis: that of Chabran, of similar strength, moved by the Little St. Bernard. Of the main body, consisting of 35,000, the chief consul himself took care; and he reserved for them the gigantic task of surmounting, with the artillery, the huge barriers of the Great St. Bernard. Thus, along the Alpine chain—from the sources of the Rhine and the Rhone to Isere and Durance—about 60,000 men, in all, lay prepared for the adventure. It must be added, if we would form a fair conception of the enterprise, that Napoleon well knew not one-third of these men had ever seen a shot fired in earnest.

'The difficulties encountered by Moncey, Thureau, and Chabran, will be sufficiently understood from the narrative of Bonaparte's own march. From the 15th to the 18th of May

all his columns were put in motion ; Lannes, with the advanced guard, clearing the way before them ; the general, Berthier, and the chief consul himself superintending the rear guard, which, as having with it the artillery, was the object of highest importance. At St. Pierre all semblance of a road disappeared. Thenceforth an army, horse and foot, laden with all the munitions of a campaign, a park of forty field-pieces included, were to be urged up and along airy ridges of rock and eternal snow, where the goatherd, the hunter of the chamois, and the outlaw-smuggler, are alone accustomed to venture ; amidst precipices where to slip a foot is death ; beneath glaciers from which the percussion of a musket-shot is often sufficient to hurl an avalanche ; across bottomless chasms caked over with frost or snow-drift. The transport of the artillery and ammunition was the most difficult point ; and to this, accordingly, the chief consul gave his personal superintendence. The guns were dismounted, grooved into the trunks of trees hollowed out so as to suit each calibre, and then dragged on by sheer strength of muscle—not less than a hundred soldiers being sometimes harnessed to a single cannon. The carriages and wheels, being taken to pieces, were slung on poles, and borne on men's shoulders. The powder and shot, packed into boxes of fir wood, formed the lading of all the mules that could be collected over a wide range of the Alpine country. These preparations had been made during the week that elapsed between Bonaparte's arrival at Geneva and the commencement of Lannes's march. He himself travelled sometimes on a mule, but mostly on foot, cheering on the soldiers who had the burden of the great guns. The fatigue undergone is not to be described. The men in front durst not halt to breathe, because the least stoppage there might have thrown the column behind into confusion, on the brink of deadly precipices ; and those in the rear had to flounder, knee deep, through snow and ice trampled into sludge by the feet and hoofs of the preceding divisions. Happily the march of Napoleon was not harassed, like that of Hannibal, by the assaults of living enemies. The mountaineers, on the contrary, flocked in to reap the liberal rewards which he offered to all who were willing to lighten the drudgery of his troops.

‘On the 16th of May Napoleon slept at the convent of St. Maurice ; and, in the course of the four following days, the whole army passed the Great St. Bernard. It was on the 20th that Bonaparte himself halted an hour at the convent of the Hospitallers, which stands on the summit of this mighty

mountain. The good fathers of the monastery had been warned beforehand of the march, and they had furnished every soldier as he passed with a luncheon of bread and cheese and a glass of wine ; for which seasonable kindness, they now received the warm acknowledgments of the Chief. It was here that he took his leave of a peasant youth, who had walked by him, as his guide, all the way from the convent of St. Maurice. Napoleon conversed freely with the young man, and was much interested with his simplicity. At parting, he asked the guide some particulars about his personal situation ; and, having heard his reply, gave him money and a billet to the head of the monastery of St. Maurice. The peasant delivered it accordingly, and was surprised to find that, in consequence of a scrap of writing which he could not read, his worldly comforts were to be permanently increased. The object of this generosity remembered, nevertheless, but little of his conversation with the consul. He described Napoleon as being "a very dark man" (this was the effect of the Syrian sun), and having an eye that, notwithstanding his affability, he could not encounter without a sense of fear. The only saying of the hero which he treasured in his memory was, "I have spoiled a hat among your mountains ; well, I shall find a new one on the other side."—Thus spoke Napoleon, wringing the rain from his covering as he approached the hospice of St. Bernard.—The guide described, however, very strikingly, the effects of Bonaparte's appearance and voice, when any obstacle checked the advance of his soldiery along that fearful wilderness which is called emphatically, "The Valley of Desolation." A single look or word was commonly sufficient to set all in motion again. But if the way presented some new and apparently insuperable difficulty, the consul bade the drums beat and the trumpets sound, as if for the charge, and this never failed. Of such gallant temper were the spirits which Napoleon had at command, and with such admirable skill did he wield them !

‘On the 16th the vanguard, under Lannes, reached the beautiful vale of Aosta, and the other divisions descended rapidly on their footsteps. This part of the progress was not less difficult than the ascent before. The horses, mules, and guns, were to be led down one slippery steep after another—and we may judge with what anxious care, since Napoleon himself was once contented to slide nearly a hundred yards together, *seated*.

‘On the 17th Lannes arrived at Chatillon, where he attacked and defeated a corps of 5000 Austrians—who received the onset

of a French division in that quarter, with about as much surprise as if an enemy had dropped on them from the clouds.'

The first consul ascended Mount St. Bernard with that calm indifference and self-possession, which never left him when he considered it necessary to set an example. He interrogated his guide as to the condition of the inhabitants of the two valleys; what were their means of subsistence, and whether accidents were as frequent as they were said to be? The guide informed him, that long experience, and a succession of recorded facts, had enabled the inhabitants to foresee any change of weather, and that they were seldom deceived. Bonaparte, who wore his gray riding-coat, and had his whip in his hand, walked with somewhat of a pensive air, and appeared to be disappointed at not hearing of the fall of the fort of St. Bard. The army was in full march towards the Great St. Bernard. He waited three days in this frightful solitude, expecting to hear that the fort of St. Bard, which is situated at the other side of the mountain, and which covers the road to Yvrea, had surrendered. The town was carried on the 21st of May, but he learned, three days after, that the fort still held out, and that there was no appearance of its immediate surrender: he broke out into complaints against the siege: 'I am tired waiting,' said he; 'these imbeciles will never take the fort of St. Bard: I must go there myself.'

On the 23rd, we arrived within sight of the fort, which commands the road, having the little river of Dora Baltea to the right, and Mount Albaredo to the left. Arrived on an eminence which commands the fort, Bonaparte levelled his telescope on the grass, and sheltering himself from the shot of the besieged behind some bushes, which concealed him, he attentively examined the fort. After several questions, addressed to different persons who had come to give him information, he pointed out, with a tone of displeasure, the faults that had been committed, and with that *coup d'œil* which seldom deceived him, he ordered a new battery to be constructed, for the attack of a point marked out; and from whence, he said, the firing of a few guns would oblige the fort to surrender. Having given his orders, he descended the mountain, and went to sleep that night at Yvrea. He learned, on the 2nd of June, that the fort had surrendered the day before.

If the passage of Mount St. Bernard deserves to occupy a distinguished place in the annals of fortunate temerity, we cannot too much admire the conception, and, at the same time, the fortune of the first consul, which dazzled the eyes of the enemy.

So little was this enterprise foreseen, that not a single Austrian corps defended the approaches to the fort of St. Bard. The country was stripped of troops, and we only fell in with some feeble parties, incapable of arresting our march towards Milan. Bonaparte knew how to take advantage of a defect in his enemy's defences, whom he astonished and confounded, and who saw no other means of escape than by retracing his steps, and abandoning the invasion of France. It is under such circumstances that rashness in war becomes a veritable proof of genius : but this talented boldness, which inspired Bonaparte, was not to be found in General Melas, who commanded the Austrian army. If Melas had had the firmness which the commander of an army ought to possess ; if he had compared the respective positions of the two armies—if he had considered that it was no longer in his power to regain his line of operations, and to place himself again in communication with the hereditary states—that he was master of all the fortified towns of Italy—that he had nothing to fear from Massena, and that Suchet could offer no resistance ;—if, then, following the example of Bonaparte, he had marched upon Lyons, what would have become of the first consul ? Melas would have encountered but few obstacles, he would have found all the towns undefended, while the French army would have been exhausted, without having had an enemy to fight. This is what Bonaparte would have done if he had been Melas ; but, happily for us, Melas was not a Bonaparte.

We arrived at Milan on the 2nd of June, the day on which the first consul heard that the fort of St. Bard was taken : we remained there six days. The day was now approaching when all was to be lost or won. The first consul made his arrangements, and despatched the different corps of his army to occupy the points marked out. I have already said, that Murat was charged with the occupation of Placentia, and he had scarcely possessed himself of the town, when he intercepted a courier of General Melas. It announced the capitulation of Genoa on the 4th of June, after the long and celebrated defence which reflected so much honour on Massena.

I have read, in different accounts, that the first consul in person had gained the battle of Montebello. This is an error. The first consul did not leave Milan till the 9th of June, and on that same day Lannes was engaged with the enemy. The combat was so terrible, that Lannes, a few days after, described it in these words, which I well remember : ‘ Bones were cracking in my division like hail falling on a skylight.’

By a singular chance, Desaix, who afterwards contributed to the victory, and stopped the rout at Marengo, arrived from Egypt at Toulon, the same day that we left Paris. He wrote me a letter dated 6th May, 1800, informing me of his arrival. I received this letter at Martigny. I shewed it to the first consul. 'Ah,' said he, 'Desaix at Paris !' and immediately despatched an order for him to repair without delay to the headquarters of the Army of Italy. Desaix arrived at Stradella on the morning of the 11th of June. The first consul received him in the kindest manner, as a man for whom he had the most sincere esteem, and whose talents and character gave him a high opinion of what he would one day become. Bonaparte was jealous of some generals, the rivalry of whose ambition he feared ; but Desaix never gave him any uneasiness. He was modest and unassuming, uniting firmness with the mildest manners, and proved by his conduct that he loved glory only for her own sake ; and I affirm, that every sentiment of ambition and political power was a stranger to his breast. Bonaparte's friendship for him amounted to enthusiasm. At their first interview, on his return from Egypt, he was closeted with the first consul for three hours. The day after his arrival, an order of the day informed the army that Desaix commanded the division of Boudet.

I expressed to Bonaparte my surprise at his long interview with Desaix : 'Yes,' said he, 'I have been a long time with him, but I had my reasons. As soon as I return to Paris, I will make him minister-at-law. He shall always be my lieutenant : I would make him a prince if I could. I find him quite an antique character.' Desaix was killed two days after he had completed his thirty-third year.

The first consul slept on the 13th at Torre di Galifolo. In the evening he ordered a staff-officer to ascertain whether the Austrians had a bridge over the Bormida. It was reported to him, late at night, that there was none. This tranquillized his mind, and he went to bed satisfied ; but early next morning the sound of cannon was heard, and he learned that the Austrians had debouched in the plain, and that an engagement had taken place : he testified the greatest dissatisfaction at the conduct of the officer, whom he accused of cowardice, and said he had not advanced far enough. He then mounted his horse, and hastened to the scene of action. I did not see him again until six in the evening. In obedience to his directions, I had repaired to San Giuliano, the village which, in the March preceding, he had

pointed out to me as the site of a future battle. San Juliano was not more than two leagues distant from the place where the battle commenced. In the afternoon, I saw pass through the village a crowd of wounded, with the soldiers who accompanied them, and a short time after a number of fugitives. At San Juliano they spoke of nothing but a retreat, which Bonaparte, it was said, alone opposed with firmness. I was advised to leave San Juliano, where I had just received a courier for the Commander-in-chief. On the morning of the 14th, General Desaix had advanced on Novi, to observe the road to Genoa, which city had unfortunately fallen within the last few days, in spite of the efforts of its illustrious defender. I returned with this division to San Juliano, and was struck with the numerical weakness of the corps which was marching to the assistance of an army already much weakened and dispersed. They looked upon the battle as lost, and so, in fact, it was; for the first consul, having inquired of Desaix what he thought of it, this brave general answered him bluntly, 'The battle is completely lost, but it is only two o'clock, there is still time enough to gain another.' It was the first consul himself, who, the same evening, recounted to me these simple and heroic words of Desaix. Who could have thought that this small column, and the handful of heavy cavalry under Kellerman, should, about five o'clock, have changed the fortune of the day? It cannot be dissembled that it was the instantaneous inspiration of Kellerman which changed a defeat into a victory, and gained the battle of Marengo.

Two hours had scarcely elapsed since the division commanded by Desaix had left San Juliano, when I was agreeably surprised by seeing that army, which since the morning had caused me so much uneasiness, returning triumphant. Never did Fortune within so short a time shew herself under two aspects so different. At two o'clock, it was the desolation of defeat with all its calamitous consequences; at five, victory was again faithful to the flag of Arcola. Italy was reconquered at a single blow; and the crown of France appeared in the perspective.

This memorable battle, of which the results were incalculable, has been the theme of many writers. Bonaparte commenced an account of it three different times; but I must say, that in none of these relations is there more truth than in the account published in the *Memoirs of the Duke de Rovigo*,

who, at that time, was aide-de-camp to Desaix. He makes the following observations on the part Kellerman had in this brilliant affair :—

‘After the fall of the imperial government some pretended friends of General Kellerman have presumed to claim for him the merit of originating the charge of cavalry. That general, whose share of glory is sufficiently brilliant to gratify his most sanguine wishes, can have no knowledge of so presumptuous a pretension. I the more readily acquit him, from the circumstance that, as we were conversing one day respecting that battle, I called to his mind my having brought to him the first consul’s orders, and he appeared not to have forgotten that fact. I am far from suspecting his friends of the design of lessening the glory of either General Bonaparte or General Desaix : they know, as well as myself, that theirs are names so respected that they can never be affected by such detractions, and that it would be as vain to dispute the praise due to the chief who planned the battle, as to attempt to depreciate the brilliant share which General Kellerman had in its successful result. I will add to the above a few reflections.

‘From the position which he occupied, General Desaix could not see General Kellerman : he had even desired me to request the first consul to afford him the support of some cavalry. Neither could General Kellerman, from the point where he was stationed, perceive General Desaix’s division : it is even probable that he was not aware of the arrival of that general, who had only joined the army two days before. Both were ignorant of each other’s position, which the first consul was alone acquainted with ; he alone could introduce harmony into their movements ; he alone could make their efforts respectively conduce to the same object.

‘The fate of the battle was decided by Kellerman’s bold charge : had it, however, been made previously to General Desaix’s attack, in all probability it would have had a quite different result. Kellerman appears to have been convinced of it, since he allowed the Austrian column to cross our field of battle, and extend its front beyond that of the troops we had still in line without making the least attempt to impede its progress. The reason of Kellerman’s not charging it sooner was, that it was too serious a movement, and the consequences of failure would have been irretrievable ; that charge, therefore, could only enter into a general combination of plans, to which he was necessarily a stranger.’

On returning at seven in the evening with the first consul to head-quarters, he expressed the most lively sorrow for the loss of Desaix ; he then said, 'Little Kellerman made a fine charge—he did it just at the right time—we owe him much ; see what trifles decide these affairs.'

These few words shew that Bonaparte knew how to appreciate the service rendered by Kellerman. However, when that general approached the table at which the first consul was seated, surrounded by a number of generals, and other officers, Bonaparte said to him, coldly, 'You made a pretty good charge : ' and as a set-off to this coldness, turning to Bessieres, who commanded the horse grenadiers of the guard, he said to him, audibly, 'Bessieres, the guard has covered itself with glory.' It is, however, true, that the guard had taken no part in the charge of Kellerman, who could not get together more than 500 heavy cavalry. It was this handful of brave men who cut in two the Austrian column which had just crushed Desaix's division, and had made 6000 prisoners. The guard made no charge at Marengo till nightfall.

It was reported the next day, that Kellerman, in his first feelings of dissatisfaction at the dry compliment paid to him, had said to Bonaparte, 'I have placed the crown on your head.' I did not hear this said, and I cannot take upon me to say that it was said at all ; for I could only have ascertained it from the first consul, and of course I could not have reminded him of a thing which must have displeased him. But this I can say, that, whether true or not, it was in general circulation, and Bonaparte knew it. Hence the little favour shewn to Kellerman, who was not made a general of division on the field of battle as a reward for the eminent service he had rendered.

The death of Desaix has been related in different ways, and it is unnecessary to say that the speech attributed to him in the bulletin is imaginary. He did not die in the arms of his aide-de-camp, Lebrun, as I had to write from the dictation of the first consul ; neither did he pronounce that fine discourse which I wrote out in the same manner. The following is the fact, or, at least, what is more probable :—The death of Desaix was not perceived at the moment he was struck by the ball which deprived him of life. He fell without a word, at a short distance from Lefebvre Desnouettes. A battalion-sergeant of the 9th brigade of light infantry, commanded by Barrois, observing him stretched upon the ground, asked permission

to take his cloak ; it was perforated behind, and this circumstance occasioned a doubt, whether Desaix was killed at the head of the troops, through the awkwardness of some of his own men, or whether, in turning round to encourage them, he had been shot by the enemy. However, the onset in which he fell was so short, the disorder so instantaneous, the change of fortune so sudden, that it is not surprising that, in the midst of so much confusion, the circumstances attendant on his death could not be exactly known.

Early the next morning, the Prince of Lichtenstein came from General Melas to open negotiations with the first consul. The proposals of this general did not suit Bonaparte, and he told the prince that the army shut up in Alexandria should march out with the honours of war ; but under conditions well known, and by which the whole of Italy was to be fully restored to the French domination. That day were repaired the blunders of Scherer, the most incapable of men, whose imbecility had paralyzed all, and who had fled, always beaten, from the Adriatic to Mont Cenis. The Prince of Lichtenstein begged to return to his general to give him an account of his mission ; he came back in the evening, and made many observations on the hardness of the conditions : ‘Sir,’ replied the first consul, with marked displeasure, ‘bear my final determination to your general, and return quickly : it is irrevocable. Know, that I am as well acquainted with your position as you are yourselves. I did not begin to make war yesterday. You are shut up in Alexandria ; you are encumbered with sick and wounded ; you want provisions and medicines. I occupy the country in your rear. You have lost in killed and wounded the flower of your army. I might insist upon more, and my position authorizes it ; but I moderate my demands through respect for the gray hairs of your general, whom I esteem.’ This answer was given with as much nobleness as energy. The prince agreed to everything. I conducted him out, when he said to me : ‘These terms are very severe, particularly the giving up Genoa, which surrendered to us only a fortnight ago, after so long a siege.’ This condition turned out still more hard, from the circumstance that the Emperor of Austria heard of the restitution of Genoa at the same time that he was informed of its capitulation.

When the first consul returned to Milan, he took for aides-de-camp Savary and Rapp, who had served as such with Desaix, whom they called their father. The first consul was little disposed to do this, alleging that he had already a sufficiency of

aides-de-camp. But the respect he had for the name of Desaix, and for the choice he had made of these young officers, with some solicitation on my part, soon removed his objections. They both served him to the last hour of his political existence, with a zeal and devotion above praise.

‘The following is Napoleon’s own account of the battle of Marengo, as dictated at St. Helena to General Gourgaud :—

‘During the battle of the 11th, Desaix, who had returned from Egypt, and had been performing quarantine at Toulon, arrived at the head-quarters, at Montebello, with his aides-de-camp, Rapp and Savary.

‘Desaix burned to signalize himself. He thirsted to avenge the ill-treatment he had received from Admiral Keith, at Leghorn ; this lay at his heart. The first consul immediately gave him the command of the division of Boudet.

‘Melas’s head-quarters were at Alexandria : all his army had been two days assembled there : his position was critical, because he had lost his line of operation. The longer he delayed determining what to do, the worse his position became ; for on one side, Suchet’s corps was advancing upon his rear, and on the other, the first consul’s army was daily increasing its fortifications and intrenchments in its position of Stradella.

‘On the 12th, in the afternoon, the first consul, surprised at the inaction of General Melas, became uneasy, and began to fear that the Austrian army had moved on Genoa, or upon the Tesino, or else had marched against Suchet to crush him, with the intention of afterwards returning against the first consul ; the latter determined to quit Stradella, and advance upon Scrivia, in the form of a strong reconnoitring party, in order to be able to act according to the course adopted by the enemy. In the evening the French army took up a position upon the Scrivia, Tortona was surrounded, the head-quarters were stationed at Voghera. During this movement no intelligence of the enemy was obtained ; only some few cavalry scouts were perceived, which did not indicate the presence of an army in the plains of Marengo. The first consul no longer doubted that the Austrian army had escaped him.

‘On the 13th, at daybreak, he passed the Scrivia, and marched to San Juliano, in the midst of the immense plain of Marengo. The light cavalry discovered no enemy ; there was no longer room to doubt that he was in full manœuvre, since, if he had thought proper to wait for the French army, he would not have neglected the fine field of battle presented to him by

the plain of Marengo, advantageous as it was for the development of his immense cavalry : it appeared probable that the enemy was marching on Genoa.

‘Under this impression, the first consul, with all expedition, despatched Desaix’s corps in the form of a vanguard, upon his extreme left, with orders to observe the high-road leading from Novi to Alexandria ; he ordered Victor’s division to enter the village of Marengo, and to send scouts upon the Bormida, to ascertain whether the enemy had any bridge there. Victor arrived at Marengo ; he there found a rear-guard of 3000 or 4000 Austrians, attacked and routed them, and made himself master of the village. His scouts arrived upon the Bormida at nightfall ; they gave information that the enemy had no bridge there, and that there was only an ordinary garrison in Alexandria ; they gave no intelligence of the army of Melas.

‘Lannes’s corps bivouacked diagonally in the rear of Marengo, upon the right.

‘The first consul was very uneasy ; during the night he determined to visit his head-quarters of the preceding day, in order to meet intelligence from General Moncey, General Lapoype, and the agents who had been sent towards Genoa, and who were to rendezvous upon those head-quarters ; but the Scrivia had overflowed its banks. This stream swells considerably in the course of a few hours, and a few hours also are sufficient for its return to its usual state. This circumstance determined the first consul to fix his head-quarters at Torre di Garifolo, between Tortona and Alexandria. In this situation was the night spent.

‘Meanwhile the most dreadful confusion had prevailed in Alexandria, since the battle of Montebello. The Austrian council was agitated by the most sinister presentiments ; they beheld the Austrian army cut off from its line of operation and depôts, and placed between the army of the first consul and that of General Suchet, whose advanced posts had passed the mountains, and began to be felt upon the rear of the right flank of the Austrians. The greatest irresolution pervaded their minds.

‘After much hesitation, Melas, on the 11th, resolved to send a strong detachment against Suchet, the remainder of the Austrian army continuing covered by the Bormida and the citadel of Alexandria ; but, during the fight of the 11th and 12th, Melas heard of the first consul’s movement upon the Scrivia. On the 12th, he recalled his detachment, and passed

the whole day and night of the 13th in deliberation ; at last, after some sharp and stormy discussions, the council of Melas pronounced that the existence of the army of reserve had been unknown to him ; that the orders and instructions of the Aulic Council had mentioned only the army of Massena ; that the unfortunate position in which they found themselves ought, therefore, to be attributed to the ministry, and not to the general ; that, in this unforeseen situation, brave soldiers ought to do their duty ; that they were, then, called upon to cut their way through the army of the first consul, and thus re-open the communications with Vienna ; that, in case of success, everything was gained, since they were masters of Genoa, and by returning promptly upon Nice, they could execute the plan of operations fixed at Vienna ; and, lastly, that if they failed and lost the battle, their position would, no doubt, be dreadful, but that the whole responsibility of it would fall upon the ministry.

‘This train of reasoning settled all opinions ; there was but one cry—To arms ! to arms ! and everyone began to make his dispositions for the next day’s battle.

‘The chances of victory were wholly in favour of the Austrian army, which was very numerous. It had, at least, three times as many cavalry as the French army. The strength of the latter was not exactly known ; but the Austrian army, notwithstanding its losses at the battle of Montebello, and those it had experienced in the neighbourhood of Genoa and Nice after the retreat, was still very superior to the army of reserve.

‘On the 14th, at break of day, the Austrians defiled by the three bridges of the Bormida, and made a furious attack on the village of Marengo. The resistance was obstinately kept up for a long time. The first consul, finding, from the briskness of the cannonade, that the Austrians had commenced the attack, immediately despatched orders to General Desaix to return with his troops upon San Julianò ; he was half a day’s march off to the left. The first consul arrived on the field of battle at ten o’clock in the morning, between San Julianò and Marengo. The enemy had at length carried Marengo ; and the division under Victor having been forced to give way after a firm resistance, was thrown into the utmost disorder. The plain on the left was covered with our fugitives, who spread alarm wherever they went, and many were even exclaiming in dismay, *All is lost.*

‘The corps of General Lannes, a little in the rear of the right of Marengo, was engaged with the enemy, who, after taking

that place, deployed upon its left, and formed its line opposite our right, beyond which it already extended. The first consul immediately despatched his battalion of the cavalry guard, consisting of 800 grenadiers, the best troops in the army, to station themselves at 500 toises distance from Lannes, on the right, in a good position, in order to keep the enemy in check. Napoleon himself, with the 72nd demi-brigade, hastened to the support of Lannes, and directed the division of reserve of Cara Saint-Cyr, upon the extreme right, to Castel-Ceriolo, to flank the entire left of the enemy.

‘In the meantime the army perceived, in the middle of this immense plain, the first consul surrounded by his staff, and 200 horse grenadiers with their fur caps : this sight proved sufficient to inspire the troops with hopes of victory ; their confidence revived, and the fugitives rallied upon San Julianò, in the rear of the left of General Lannes. The latter, though attacked by a large proportion of the enemy’s army, was effecting his retreat through the midst of this vast plain with admirable order and coolness. This corps occupied three hours in retiring three-quarters of a league, entirely exposed to the grape-shot of eighty pieces of cannon ; at the same time that, by an inverse movement, Cara Saint-Cyr advanced upon the extreme right, and turned the left of the enemy.

‘About three o’clock in the afternoon the corps of Desaix arrived : the first consul made him take a position on the road in advance of San Julianò. Melas, who believed the victory decided, being overcome with fatigue, repassed the bridges, and entered Alexandria, leaving to General Zach, the head of his staff, the care of pursuing the French army. The latter, thinking that this army was effecting its retreat by the road from Tortona, endeavoured to reach this road behind San Julianò ; but the first consul had altered his line of retreat at the commencement of the action, and had directed it between Sala and Tortona, so that the high-road from Tortona was of no consequence to the French army.

‘Lannes’s corps, in its retreat, constantly refused its left, thus directing its course towards the new point of retreat : and Cara Saint-Cyr, who was at the extremity of the right, found himself almost upon the line of retreat, at the very time that General Zach imagined the two corps were intersected.

‘The division of Victor had, in the meantime, rallied, and burned with impatience to recommence the contest. All the cavalry of the army was concentrated in the advance of San

Juliano, on the right of Desaix, and in the rear of the left of General Lannes. Balls and shells fell upon San Julian; its left was already gained by a column of 6000 of Zach's grenadiers. The first consul sent orders to General Desaix to charge with his fresh division this column of the enemy. Desaix immediately prepared to execute these orders; but, as he advanced at the head of 200 troopers of the 9th light demi-brigade, he was shot through the heart by a ball, and fell dead at the very moment that he had given the word to charge: by this stroke the first consul was deprived of the man whom he esteemed most worthy of being his lieutenant.

'This misfortune by no means disconcerted the movement, and General Boudet easily inspired the soldiers with the same lively desire of instant revenge for so beloved a chief, which actuated his own breast. The 9th light demi-brigade, who did, indeed, on this occasion, deserve the title of *Incomparable*, covered themselves with glory. General Kellerman, with 800 heavy horse, at the same time charged intrepidly the middle of the left flank of the column: in less than half an hour these 6000 grenadiers were broken, overthrown, dispersed, and put to flight. General Zach and all his staff were made prisoners.

'General Lannes immediately charged forward. Cara Saint-Cyr, who was on our right, and *en potence* with the left flank of the enemy, was much nearer than the enemy to the bridges upon the Bormida. The Austrian army was thrown into the most dreadful confusion in a moment. From 8000 to 10,000 cavalry, which were spread over the field, fearing that Saint-Cyr's infantry might reach the bridge before them, retreated at full gallop, and overturned all they met with in their way. Victor's division made all imaginable haste to resume its former field of battle, at the village of Marengo. The enemy's army was in the most horrible disorder. No one thought of anything but flight. The pressure and confusion became extreme on the bridges of the Bormida, where the masses of fugitives were obliged to crowd together; and at night, all who remained upon the left bank fell into the power of the republic.

'It would be difficult to describe the confusion and despair of the Austrian army. On one side, the French army was on the bank of the Bormida, and was expected to pass it at daybreak; on the other, they had General Suchet with his army on their rear, in the direction of their right.

‘Which way could they effect their retreat? Behind they would be driven to the Alps, and the frontiers of France; they might have moved towards Genoa on the right, before the battle; but they could not hope to do so after their defeat, and closely followed by the victorious army. In this desperate situation, General Melas resolved to give his troops the whole night to rally and repose themselves, availing himself of the screen of the Bormida and the protection of the citidal of Alexandria for this purpose; and afterwards to repossess the Tanaro, if necessary, and thus maintain himself in that position, and endeavour, at any rate, by entering into negotiations, to save his army by capitulating.’

CHAPTER XV

THE battle of Marengo decided the fate of Italy—the discomfiture of the Austrian army was so complete, that, rather than stand the chance of another contest with their victorious enemy, the general-in-chief proposed on the following day to negotiate for peace.

Melas offered to abandon Genoa and all the strong places in Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Legations—provided Bonaparte would allow him to march the remains of his army unmolested to the rear of Mantua. Napoleon accepted this offer, and a suspension of hostilities immediately took place. By one battle he had regained nearly all that the French had lost in the unhappy Italian campaign of 1799: at all events he had done enough to crown his own name with unrivalled splendour, and to shew that the French troops were once more what they had used to be—when he was in the field to command them. He had another motive for closing with the propositions of General Melas. It was of urgent importance to regain Genoa, ere an English army, which he knew was on its voyage to that port, could reach its destination.

As soon as this convention was signed, Bonaparte, dictated to me, at Torre di Galifolo, the following letter to his colleagues:

‘The day after the battle of Marengo, Citizen Consuls, General Melas transmitted a message to our advanced posts, requesting permission to send General Skal to me. During

the day, the convention, of which I send you a copy, was drawn up, and at night it was signed by Generals Berthier and Melas. I hope the French people will be satisfied with the conduct of their army.

‘BONAPARTE.’

The only thing worthy of remark in this letter, would be the concluding sentence, in which the first consul still affected to acknowledge the sovereignty of the people, were it not that the words, ‘Citizen Consuls,’ were evidently foisted in with a particular design. The battle was gained; and even in a trifling matter like this, it was necessary that the two other consuls should feel that they were not so much the colleagues as the inferiors of the first consul.

We returned on the 17th of June to Milan, and our second occupation of that city was marked by continued acclamations, wherever the first consul shewed himself. At Milan, the first consul now saw Massena for the first time since our departure for Egypt. Bonaparte lavished upon him the highest praises, but not higher than he deserved, for his admirable defence of Genoa. He appointed him his successor in the command of the Army of Italy. Moreau was on the Rhine, and therefore none but the conqueror of Zurich could properly have succeeded the first consul in that command. The first blow was struck; but there might still occur an emergency, requiring the presence of a skilful, experienced general, well acquainted with the country. And, besides, we could not be perfectly at ease, until it was ascertained what conditions would be adhered to by the cabinet of Vienna, which was then entirely under the influence of the cabinet of London.

The first consul, confirmed in his power by the victory of Marengo, continued a few days longer at Milan, to settle the affairs of Italy, and then set out on his return to Paris. We took the road by Turin, and in passing through that city the first consul spent some hours in visiting the citadel, which had been surrendered to us in pursuance of the capitulations in Alexandria. In passing over Mount Cenis we met the carriage of Madame Kellerman, who was going to meet her husband. The first consul, on recognizing that lady, ordered his carriage to stop, and congratulated her on the gallant conduct of her husband at Marengo.

I shall say but little of the manifestations of joy and admiration with which Bonaparte was met throughout his journey, for

this was always the case whenever he travelled. On arriving at Lyons we alighted at the Hotel des Celestins, where the acclamations of the people were so great, and the multitude so numerous and so eager to have a sight of the first consul, that Bonaparte was obliged to shew himself at the balcony. The next day he proceeded, amidst the shouts of the Lyonnese, to lay the first stone of the new *Place de Bellecour*, which was to be erected on the ruins of a great square destroyed by the Jacobins during the revolutionary madness.

We left Lyons in the evening, and continued our journey by Dijon ; and there the joy of the inhabitants amounted to frenzy. I have seldom seen a more fascinating sight than that presented by a group of young women of particular beauty and elegance, who, crowned with flowers, accompanied Bonaparte's carriage. It revived all the republican recollections of Greece and Rome, and recalled the chorus of virgins dancing round the victor at the Olympic games.

Bonaparte was rather talkative when travelling ; but his conversation was not at all times equally interesting. On this occasion he said to me, as we traversed Burgundy on our return to Paris—' Well, a few more events like this campaign, and I may perhaps go down to posterity.' ' I think,' I replied, ' that you have already done enough to secure a long and lasting fame.' ' Done enough !' said he, ' you are very good !—it is true, I have conquered, in less than two years, Cairo, Paris, and Milan. Well, my dear fellow, and after all, suppose I was to die to-morrow, I should, after the lapse of ten centuries, have perhaps half a page of general history.' He was right—many ages pass before the eye in the reading of a few hours, and the duration of a reign or of a life is the affair of but a moment.

We arrived at the Tuileries on the 2nd of July, and in an absence of less than two months what wonders had been accomplished !

' The enthusiasm of the Parisians exceeded all that has been recorded of any triumphal entry. Night after night every house was illuminated ; and day following day the people stood in crowds around the palace, contented if they could but catch one glimpse of the preserver of France.

' The effusion of joy was the greater—because the tale of victory came on a people prepared for other tidings. About noontide, on the 14th of June, when the French had been driven out of Marengo, and were apparently in full and disastrous retreat, a commercial traveller left the field, and arriving, after a

rapid journey, in Paris, announced that Bonaparte had been utterly defeated by Melas. It is said that the ill-wishers of the first consul immediately set on foot an intrigue for removing him from the government, and investing Carnot with the chief authority. It is not doubtful that many schemes of hostility had been agitated during Napoleon's absence ; or that, amidst all the clamour and splendour of his triumphant reception in Paris, he wore a gloomy brow ; nor has anyone disputed that, from this time, he regarded the person of Carnot with jealousy and aversion.

‘The tidings of the great battle, meanwhile, kindled the emulation of the Rhenish army ; and they burned with the earnest desire to do something worthy of being recorded in the same page with Marengo. But the chief consul, when he granted the armistice to Melas, had extended it to the armies on the German frontier likewise ; and Moreau, consequently, could not at once avail himself of the eagerness of his troops. The negotiations which ensued, however, were unsuccessful. The emperor, subsidized as he had been, must have found it very difficult to resist the remonstrances of England against the ratification of any peace in which she should not be included ; and it is natural to suppose, that the proud spirit of the Austrian cabinet revolted from setting the seal to an act of humiliation, not yet, as the English government insisted, absolutely necessary. News, meantime, were received of the surrender of Malta to an English expedition under Lord Keith and Sir Ralph Abercrombie ;* and this timely piece of good fortune breathed fresh spirit into the Antigallican league. In fine, insincerity and suspicion protracted, from day to day, a negotiation not destined to be concluded until more blood had been shed.

‘During this armistice, which lasted from the 15th of June to the 10th of November, the exiled princes of the House of Bourbon made some more ineffectual endeavours to induce the chief consul to be the Monk of France. The Comte d’Artois took a delicate method of negotiating. He sent a very beautiful and charming lady, the Duchess de Guiche, to Paris ; she without difficulty gained access to Josephine, and shone, for a time, the most brilliant ornament of the consular court. But the moment Napoleon discovered the fair lady’s errand, she was ordered to quit the capital within a few hours. These intrigues, however, could not fail to transpire ; and there is no doubt

* On the 5th Sept., 1800.

that, at this epoch, the hopes of the royalists were in a high state of excitement.'

The immense number of letters which were at this time addressed to the first consul, is scarcely conceivable. These letters were often exceedingly curious, and I have preserved many of them ; among the rest, was one from Durosol Beaumanoir, an emigrant, who had fled to Jersey. This letter contains some interesting particulars relative to Bonaparte's family. It is dated Jersey, 12th July, 1800, and the following are the most remarkable passages it contains :—

'I trust, General, that I may, without indiscretion, intrude upon your notice, to remind you of what, I flatter myself, you have not totally forgotten, after having lived eighteen or nineteen years at Ajaccio. But you will, perhaps, be surprised that so trifling an affair should be the subject of the letter which I have the honour to address to you. You cannot have forgotten, General, that when your late father was obliged to take your brothers from the college of Autun, from whence he went to see you at Brienne, he was unprovided with money, and he asked me for twenty-five louis, which I lent him with pleasure. After his return he had not an opportunity of paying me, and when I left Ajaccio your mother offered to dispose of some plate, in order to pay the debt. To this I objected, and told her that I would wait until she could pay me at her convenience, and, previous to the breaking out of the revolution, I believe it was not in her power to fulfil her wish of discharging the debt.

'I am sorry, General, to be obliged to trouble you about such a trifle. But, such is my unfortunate situation, that even this trifle is of some importance to me. Driven from my country, and obliged to take refuge in this island, where everything is exceedingly expensive, the little sum I have mentioned, which was formerly a matter of indifference, would now be of great service to me.

'At the age of eighty-six, General, after having served my country for sixty years, without interruption, I am compelled to take refuge here, and to subsist on a scanty allowance granted by the English government to French emigrants ; I say emigrants, for I am obliged to be one against my will.'

I read this letter to the first consul, who immediately said, 'Bourrienne, this is sacred ! Do not lose a minute. Send the old man ten times the sum. Write to General Durosol, that

he shall be immediately erased from the list of emigrants. What mischief those brigands of the convention have done ! I can never repair it all.' Bonaparte uttered these words with a degree of emotion which I rarely saw him evince. In the evening he asked me whether I had executed his orders, which I had done immediately.

Availing myself of the privilege I have already frequently taken, of making abrupt transitions from one subject to another, according as the recollection of past circumstances occurs to my mind, I shall here note down a few details, which may not improperly be called *domestic*, and afterwards describe a conspiracy, which was protected by the very man against whom it was hatched.

At the Tuileries, where the first consul always resided during the winter, and sometimes a part of the summer, the grand saloon was situated between his cabinet and the room in which he received the persons with whom he had appointed audiences. When in this audience-chamber, if he wanted anything, or had occasion to speak to anybody, he pulled a bell, which was answered by a confidential servant named Landoire, who was the messenger of the first consul's cabinet. When Bonaparte's bell rang, it was usually for the purpose of making some inquiry of me, respecting a paper, a name, a date, or some matter of that sort ; and then Landoire had to pass through the cabinet and saloon to answer the bell, and afterwards to return and to tell me I was wanted. Impatient at the delay occasioned by this running about, Bonaparte, without saying anything to me, ordered the bell to be altered, so that it should ring within the cabinet, and exactly above my table. Next morning, when I entered the cabinet, I saw a man mounted upon a ladder. 'What are you doing there ?' said I. 'I am hanging a bell, sir.' I called Landoire, and asked him who had given the order. 'The first consul,' he replied. I immediately ordered the man to come down and remove the ladder, which he accordingly did. When I went, according to custom, to call the first consul, and read the papers to him, I said, 'General, I found a man this morning hanging a bell in your cabinet. I was told it was by your orders ; but being convinced there must be some mistake, I sent him away. Surely the bell was not intended for you, and I cannot imagine it was intended for me : who then could it be for ?'—'What a stupid fellow that Landoire is !' said Bonaparte. 'Yesterday, when Cambaceres was with me, I wanted you. Landoire did not come when I touched the bell. I thought it

was broken, and ordered him to get it repaired. I suppose the bell-hanger was doing it when you saw him, for you know the wire passes through the cabinet.' I was satisfied with this explanation, though I was not deceived by it. For the sake of appearance he reproved Landoire, who, however, had done nothing more than execute the order he had received. How could he imagine I would submit to such treatment, considering that we had been friends since our boyhood, and that I was now living on full terms of confidence and familiarity with him?

Before I speak of the conspiracy of Céracchi, Aréna, Topino-Lebrun, and others, I must notice a remark made by Napoleon at St. Helena. He said, or is alleged to have said, 'The two attempts which placed me in the greatest danger, were those of the sculptor Céracchi, and of the fanatic of Schœnbrun.' I was not at Schœnbrun at the time; but I am convinced that Bonaparte was in the most imminent danger. I have been informed, on unquestionable authority, that Staps set out from Erfurth with the intention of assassinating the emperor; but he wanted the necessary courage for executing the design. He was armed with a large dagger, and was twice sufficiently near Napoleon to have struck him. I heard this from Rapp, who seized Staps, and felt under his coat the hilt of the dagger. On that occasion Bonaparte owed his life only to the irresolution of the young illuminato, who wished to sacrifice him to his fanatical fury. It is equally certain, that, on another occasion, respecting which the author of the St. Helena Narrative observes entire silence, another fanatic, more dangerous than Staps, attempted the life of Napoleon.

About this time various attempts were made to assassinate the first consul, and the following is a correct account of that made by Céracchi.

The plot itself was a mere shadow; but it was deemed advisable to give it substance, to exaggerate, at least in appearance, the danger to which the first consul had been exposed.

There was at that time in Paris an idle fellow, called Harrel; he had been a *chef de bataillon*, but he had been dismissed the service, and was consequently dissatisfied. He became connected with Céracchi, Aréna, Topino-Lebrun, and Demerville. From different motives all these individuals were violently hostile to the first consul, who, on his part, was no friend to Céracchi and Aréna, but scarcely knew the two others. These four individuals formed, in conjunction with Harrel, the design of assassinating the first consul, and the time fixed for the perpetration of the

deed was one evening when Bonaparte intended to visit the opera.

On the 20th of September, 1800, Harrel came to me at the Tuileries. He revealed to me the plot in which he was engaged, and promised that his accomplices should be apprehended in the very act, if I would supply him with money to bring the plot to maturity. I knew not how to act upon this disclosure, which I however could not reject without incurring too great a responsibility. I immediately communicated the business to the first consul, who ordered me to supply Harrel with money.

The 10th of October having been fixed for the visit of the first consul to the opera, the consuls, on the breaking up of the council on that day, assembled in the cabinet of their colleague. Bonaparte asked, in my presence, whether they thought he ought to go to the opera. They observed, that as every precaution was taken, there was no reason to apprehend any danger, and that it was proper to shew how useless were all attempts against his life. After dinner Bonaparte put on a great coat over his green uniform, and got into a coach with Duroc and me. He seated himself in the front of his box, which was at the left entrance between the two columns which separate the front from the side boxes. In about half an hour, the first consul, keeping Duroc only with him, told me to go and see what was going on in the lobby. I had scarcely left the box when I heard a great noise, and was soon informed that a great number of persons, whose names I could not learn, had been arrested. I hastened to inform the first consul, and we immediately returned to the Tuileries. Harrel's name was again placed upon the army list, and he was named commandant of Vincennes. He held that post at the time of the assassination of the Duc d'Enghien. I have heard since that his wife was foster-sister to the unfortunate prince, and that she knew him on his entry into that prison, which in a few hours was to be his tomb. Alas! I cannot mention the Duc d'Enghien, without reflecting upon what it will cost me to relate all that I know of that melancholy catastrophe which put a period to his days;—but I will one day relate it: I owe it to those who have been unworthily calumniated.

As to the conspiracy of Céracchi and Aréna, it is beyond a doubt that those conspirators intended to take the life of the first consul, and that they endeavoured by every means in their power to accomplish their atrocious project. It is, however, but fair to say, that having become acquainted with the

plot through the information of Harrel, it would have been easy to have crushed it without allowing it to come to maturity. Such was then, and such is now, my opinion.

Although three months intervened between the conspiracy of Céracchi and Aréna, and the horrible attempt of the 3rd Nivose, I will not separate these events, which, however, resemble each other only in having the same object in view. The former conspirators belonged to the revolutionary faction. The latter, it must with grief be confessed, were royalists, and in their desire to take away the life of the first consul, these men were not restrained by the fear of sacrificing the lives of a number of citizens. It is for this reason that it is impossible for an author who respects himself to avoid stigmatizing it as one of the most atrocious crimes that has been committed in the world, however well he may wish to that party in whose favour it was intended to operate.

The police knew nothing of the plot of the 3rd Nivose, for two reasons; first, because they were no parties to it, and secondly, because conspirators do not betray and sell each other when they are resolute in their purpose. In such cases, confession can arise only from two causes, the one excusable, the other infamous: viz., the dread of punishment, and the hope of reward. But neither of these causes influenced the conspirators of the 3rd Nivose, the inventors and constructors of that machine which has so justly been denominated *infernal*!

On the 3rd Nivose, the first performance of Haydn's magnificent oratorio of the *Creation* took place at the opera, and the first consul had expressed his intention of being present. I did not dine with him that day; but as he left me he said, 'Bourrienne, you know I am going to the opera to-night, and you may go too; but I cannot take you in the carriage, as Lannes, Berthier, and Lauriston are going with me.' I was very glad of this, for I much wished to hear one of the master-pieces of the German school of composition. I got to the opera before Bonaparte, who, on his entrance, seated himself, according to custom, in front of the box. The eyes of all present were fixed upon him, and he was perfectly calm and self-possessed. Lauriston, as soon as he saw me, came to my box, and told me that the first consul, on his way to the opera, had narrowly escaped being assassinated, in the Rue St. Nicaise, by the explosion of a barrel of gunpowder, the concussion of which had shattered the windows of his carriage. 'Within ten seconds of our escape,' added Lauriston, 'the coachman, having

turned the corner of the Rue St. Honore, stopped to take the first consul's orders, and he coolly said, "Drive to the opera."

On hearing this, I immediately left the theatre, and returned to the palace, under the expectation that I should speedily be wanted. Bonaparte soon returned home, and as intelligence of the affair had spread through Paris, the grand saloon, on the ground floor, was filled with a crowd of functionaries, eager to read in the eye of their master what they were to think and say on the occasion. He did not keep them long in suspense. 'This,' exclaimed he vehemently, 'is the work of the Jacobins: they have attempted my life! There are neither nobles, priests, nor Chouans, in this affair!—I know myself what I am about, and they need not think to impose on me. These are the Septembrizers, who have been in open revolt and conspiracy, and arrayed against every succeeding government. It is scarce three months since my life was attempted by Céracchi, Aréna, Topino-Lebrun, and Demerville. They all belong to one gang! The cut-throats of September, the assassins of Versailles, the brigands of the 31st of May, the conspirators of Prairial, are the authors of all crimes committed against established governments! If they cannot be restrained, they must be crushed! France must be purged of these ruffians!' It is impossible to form any idea of the bitterness with which Bonaparte pronounced these words. In vain did some of the councillors of state, and Fouché in particular, endeavour to point out to him that there was no evidence against anyone, and that before he pronounced people to be guilty, it would be right to ascertain the fact. Bonaparte repeated, with increased violence, what he had before said of the Jacobins; thus adding, not without some ground of suspicion, one crime more to the long catalogue for which they had already to answer.

The following particulars respecting the affair of the infernal machine are related by Rapp, who attended Madame Bonaparte to the opera. He differs from Bourrienne as to the total ignorance of the police:—

'The affair of the infernal machine has never been properly understood by the public. The police had intimated to Napoleon that an attempt would be made against his life, and cautioned him not to go out. Madame Bonaparte, Mademoiselle Beauharnois, Madame Murat, Lannes, Bessieres, the aide-de-camp on duty, and Lieutenant Lebrun, now Duke of Placenza, were all assembled in the saloon, while the first consul was writing in his closet. Haydn's oratorio was to be performed

that evening : the ladies were anxious to hear the music, and we also expressed a wish to that effect. The escort picquet was ordered out ; and Lannes requested that Napoleon would join the party. He consented ; his carriage was ready, and he took along with him Bessieres and the aide-de-camp on duty. I was directed to attend the ladies. Josephine had received a magnificent shawl from Constantinople, and she that evening wore it for the first time. " Allow me to observe, Madame," said I, " that your shawl is not thrown on with your usual elegance." She good-humouredly begged that I would fold it after the fashion of the Egyptian ladies. While I was engaged in this operation, we heard Napoleon depart. " Come, sister," said Madame Murat, who was impatient to get to the theatre, " Bonaparte is going." We stepped into the carriage : the first consul's equipage had already reached the middle of the Place Carrousel. We drove after it : but we had scarcely entered the Place when the machine exploded. Napoleon escaped by a singular chance. Saint-Regent, or his French servant, had stationed himself in the middle of the Rue Nicaise. A grenadier of the escort, supposing he was really what he appeared to be, a water-carrier, gave him a few blows with the flat of his sabre, and drove him off. The cart was turned round, and the machine exploded between the carriages of Napoleon and Josephine. The ladies shrieked on hearing the report ; the carriage windows were broken, and Mademoiselle Beauharnois received a slight hurt on her hand. I alighted, and crossed the Rue Nicaise, which was strewn with the bodies of those who had been thrown down, and the fragments of the walls that had been shattered by the explosion. Neither the consul nor any individual of his suite sustained any serious injury. When I entered the theatre Napoleon was seated in his box, calm and composed, and looking at the audience through his opera-glass. Fouché was beside him. " Josephine," said he, as soon as he observed me. She entered at that moment, and he did not finish his question. " The rascals," said he, very coolly, " wanted to blow me up. Bring me a book of the oratorio."

The atrocity of the conspiracy roused universal horror and indignation, and invested the person of the chief consul with a new species of interest. The assassins were tried fairly, and executed, glorying in their crime : and in the momentary exultation of all men's minds, an edict of the senate, condemning to perpetual exile 130 of the most notorious leaders of the

Terrorists, was received with applause. But Napoleon himself despised utterly the relics of that odious party ; and the arbitrary decree in question was never put into execution.

The chief consul, nevertheless, was not slow to avail himself of the state of the public mind, in a manner more consistent with his prudence and far-sightedness. It was at this moment that the erection of a new tribunal, called the *Special Commission*, consisting of eight judges, without jury, and without revision or appeal, was proposed to the legislative bodies. To their honour the proposal was carried by very narrow majorities ; for after that judicature was established, the chief consul had, in effect, the means of disposing of all who were suspected of political offences, according to his own pleasure. Another law which soon succeeded, and which authorized the chief magistrate to banish disaffected persons, as ‘enemies of the state,’ from Paris or from France, whenever such steps should seem proper, without the intervention of any tribunal whatever, completed (if it was yet incomplete) the despotic range of his power : and the police, managed as that fearful engine was by Fouché, presented him with the most perfect means of carrying his purposes into execution.

A list was drawn up of the persons styled Jacobins, who were condemned to transportation. I was fortunate enough to obtain the erasure of the names of several, whose opinions had, perhaps, been violent, but whose education and private character presented claims to recommendation. Some of my readers may probably recollect them without my naming them, and I shall only mention M. Tissot, for the purpose of recording, not the service I rendered him, but an instance of grateful acknowledgment.

When, in 1815, Napoleon was on the point of entering Paris, M. Tissot came to the prefecture of police, where I then was, and offered me his house as a safe asylum, assuring me I should there run no risk of being discovered. Though I did not accept the offer, yet I gladly seize on this opportunity of making it known. It is gratifying to find that difference of political opinion does not always exclude sentiments of generosity and honour ! I shall never forget the way in which the author of the ‘*Essays on Virgil*’ uttered the words *Domus mea*.

But to return to the fatal list. Even while I write this, I shudder to think of the way in which men, utterly innocent, were accused of a revolting crime, without even the shadow of a proof. The name of an individual, his opinion, perhaps, only

assumed, was sufficient ground for his banishment. A decree of the consul's dated 4th January, 1801, confirmed by a *senatus consultum* on the next day, banished from the territory of the republic, and placed under special inspectors, 130 individuals, nine of whom were merely designated by the qualification of Septembrizers.

The exiles, who, in the reports and in the public acts, were so unjustly accused of being the authors of the infernal machine, were received at Nantes with so much indignation, that the military were compelled to interfere, to save them from being massacred.

The illegality of the proceeding was so evident, that the *senatus consultum* contained no mention of the transactions of the 3rd Nivose, which was very remarkable. It was, however, declared, that the measure of the previous day had been adopted with a view to the preservation of the constitution. This was promising.

The first consul manifested the most violent hatred of the Jacobins ; for this he could not have been blamed, if, under the title of Jacobins, he had not comprised every devoted advocate of public liberty. Their opposition annoyed him, and he could never pardon them for having presumed to condemn his tyrannical acts, and to resist the destruction of the freedom which he had himself sworn to defend, but which he was incessantly labouring to overturn. These were the true motives of his conduct ; and, conscious of his own faults, he regarded with dislike those who saw and disapproved of them. For this reason, he was more afraid of those whom he called Jacobins, than of the Royalists.

I am here recording the faults of Bonaparte, but I excuse him ; situated as he was, any other person would have acted in the same way. Truth now reached him with difficulty, and when it was not agreeable he had no disposition to hear it. He was surrounded by flatterers ; and the greater number of those who approached him, far from telling him what they really thought, only repeated what he had himself been thinking. Hence he admired the wisdom of his counsellors. Thus Fouché, to maintain himself in favour, was obliged to deliver up to his master 130 names chosen from among his own most intimate friends as objects of proscription.

Meanwhile, Fouché, still believing that he was not deceived as to the real authors of the attempt of the 3rd Nivose, set in motion, with his usual dexterity, all the springs of the police.

His efforts, however, were for some time unsuccessful ; but at length, on Saturday, the 31st of January, 1801, about two hours after our arrival at Malmaison, Fouché presented himself, and produced authentic proofs of the accuracy of his conjectures. There was no longer any doubt on the subject ; and Bonaparte saw clearly that the attempt of the 3rd Nivose was the result of a plot hatched by the partisans of royalty. But as the act of proscription against those who were jumbled together under the title of *the Jacobins*, had been executed, it was not to be revoked.

Thus, the consequence of the 3rd Nivose was, that both the innocent and guilty were punished ; with this difference, however, that the guilty, at least, had the benefit of a trial. When the Jacobins, as they were called, were accused, Fouché had not any positive proofs of their innocence ; and therefore their illegal condemnation ought not to be attributed to him. A sufficient load of guilt attaches to his memory, without his being charged with a crime he never committed. Still, I must say, that had he boldly opposed the opinion of Bonaparte, in the first burst of his fury, he might have averted the blow. Every time he came to the Tuileries, even before he had acquired any traces of the truth, Fouché always declared to me his conviction of the innocence of the persons first accused. But he was afraid to make the same observation to Bonaparte. I often mentioned to him the opinion of the Minister of Police ; but as proof was wanting, he replied to me, with a triumphant air, ‘Bah ! bah ! This is always the way with Fouché. Besides, it is of little consequence. At any rate, I shall get rid of them. Should the guilty be discovered among the Royalists, they shall also be punished.’

The real criminals being at length discovered, Saint-Regent and Carbon expiated their crime by the forfeit of their heads. Thus the first consul gained his point and Justice gained hers.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE armistice concluded after the battle of Marengo, which had been first broken and then resumed, continued to be observed for some time between the armies of the Rhine and Italy, and the imperial armies. But Austria, bribed by a subsidy of two millions sterling, would not treat for peace unless England was also included. This was quite in character with her usual

policy—when beaten in the field she was ever ready to make promises, but she evaded them on the slightest advantage being obtained : and at this time she did not despair of again recommencing the war successfully by the assistance of the money of England.

M. de Saint Julien, on the part of Austria, had signed the preliminaries of peace at Paris, but the court of Vienna disavowed them ; and Duroc, whom Bonaparte sent to convey the preliminaries to Vienna for the imperial ratification, was not permitted to pass the Austrian advanced posts. This unexpected proceeding, the result of the powerful influence of England, justly irritated the first consul, who had given proofs of his moderation and his desire for peace.

In his irritation the first consul despatched orders to Moreau to break the armistice, and to recommence hostilities, unless he regained possession of the bridges of the Rhine and the Danube, by the surrender of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. The Austrians then offered to treat on a new basis, and England wished to take part in the negotiations, but the first consul would not consent to treat with them jointly. England would not hear of an armistice by sea, like that which France had concluded with Austria by land. She alleged, that in case of a rupture France would derive from that armistice greater advantage than Austria would gain by that already concluded. The difficulty and delay attending the necessary communications rendered these reasons plausible. The first consul consented to accept other propositions from England, and to allow her to take part in the discussions of Luneville, but on condition that she should sign a treaty with him without the intervention of Austria. This England refused to do. Weary of this uncertainty, and the tergiversation of Austria, which was still under the influence of England, and feeling that the prolongation of such a state of things could only turn to his disadvantage, Bonaparte broke the armistice. He had already consented to sacrifices which his successes in Italy did not justify. The hope of an immediate peace had alone made him lose sight of the immense advantages which victory had given him.

Far from appearing sensible to the many proofs of moderation which the first consul evinced, the combined insolence of England and Austria seemed only to increase. Orders were immediately given for resuming the offensive in Germany and Italy, and hostilities then recommenced.

The French armies of Italy and Germany passed, the one the Mincio, the other the Danube, and the celebrated battle of Hohenlinden brought the French advanced posts to within ten leagues of Vienna. This victory brought peace ; because instructed by past experience, the first consul would not hear of a suspension of arms, until Austria consented to a separate treaty. Driven into her last entrenchments, she was obliged to yield and to abandon England. The English cabinet, which had paid two millions, could not prevent this separation. The impatience and indignation of the first consul at the evasions of Austria and the plots of England can scarcely be conceived, for he was not ignorant of the plans which were carrying on for the restoration of the Bourbons. His joy therefore was great when the victory at Hohenlinden threw all its weight into the scale in his favour. It was on the 3rd of December, 1800, under circumstances by no means favourable, that Moreau gained that celebrated battle,* which put an end to the hesitations of the cabinet of Vienna. On the 6th of December, the first consul received the news ; it was on a Saturday, and he had just returned from the opera when I delivered him the despatches. He literally leaped for joy. I ought to observe that he did not expect so grand a result from the movements of the army of the Rhine. This victory gave a new feature to the negotiations for peace, and decided the opening of the congress of Luneville, which took place on the 1st of January following.

On receiving the news of the battle of Hohenlinden, Madame Moreau hastened to the Tuileries to call on the first consul and Madame Bonaparte. She did not see them, and repeated her call several times without any better success. The last time she came, she was accompanied by her mother, Madame Hulot. She waited a long time in vain, and when going away, her mother, who could no longer restrain her feelings, said aloud in the saloon, before me and several others of the household, 'That it ill became the wife of the conqueror of Hohenlinden to dance attendance in this way.' This remark reached those for whom it was intended. Madame Moreau shortly after joined her husband in Germany. Madame Hulot

* On the eve of the battle of Hohenlinden, Moreau was at supper, with a party of officers, when a despatch was delivered to him. After he had read it, he said to his guests, though he was far from being in the habit of boasting, 'I am here made acquainted with Baron Kray's movements. They are all I could wish. To-morrow we will take from him 10,000 prisoners.'

came afterwards to Malmaison to solicit promotion for her eldest son, since dead, who served in the navy. Josephine received her very well, and invited her to dinner, as well as M. Carbonnet, a friend of Moreau's who had accompanied her: she accepted the invitation. The first consul, who did not see her till dinner, treated her coolly, spoke but little, and after dinner immediately withdrew. His rudeness on this occasion was so marked and offensive, that Josephine considered it necessary to make an apology, and to assign his irritation to some trifling disappointment.

Bonaparte had no dislike to Moreau, because he did not fear him; and after the battle of Hohenlinden he spoke of him in the highest terms, and did not seek to hide the obligations he was under to him on that important occasion, but he could not endure the family of his wife, who, he said, were a set of intriguers.

As M. de Bourrienne has given no details of the celebrated battle of Hohenlinden, we have extracted the following account of it from Napoleon's Memoirs.—

‘On the 1st of December, at break of day, the archduke deployed 60,000 men before the heights of Ampfingen, and attacked Lieutenant-general Grenier, who had only 25,000 men, in front; whilst another of his columns, debouching by the bridge of Crayburg, marched to the heights of Achau, in the rear and on the right flank of Grenier. General Ney was at first obliged to yield to the superior numbers of the enemy, but rallied, returned to the attack, and broke eight battalions; but the enemy continuing to deploy his numerous forces, and debouching by the valleys of the Issen, Lieutenant-general Grenier was compelled to retreat.

‘The manœuvre of the Austrian army was a very fine one, and this first success augured others of great importance. But the archduke did not know how to profit by these circumstances; he did not make a vigorous attack on the corps of Grenier, who only lost a few hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. On the following day, the 2nd of December, he made only petty movements, and gave the French army time to rally and recover from its first surprise. He paid dearly for this error, which was the principal cause of the catastrophe of the following day.

‘Moreau, having had the whole of the 2nd to reconnoitre his forces, began to hope that he should have sufficient time for all his divisions to join. But the Archduke John, although he had committed the capital error of losing the whole of the 2nd,

did not fall into that of losing the 3rd also. At break of day he began to move, and the dispositions made by the French general to effect the junction of his army became useless; neither Lecourbe's corps nor that of Sainte-Suzanne could take part in the battle; the divisions of Richepanse and Decaen fought separately; they arrived too late on the 3rd to defend the forest of Hohenlinden.

'The Austrian army came on in three columns; that of the left, consisting of 10,000 men, between the Inn and the Munich road, directing its march on Albichengen and Saint Christopher; that of the centre, 40,000 strong, proceeded by the road leading from Mühldorf to Munich, by Haag, towards Hohenlinden; the grand park, the waggons and baggage, took this road, the only one which was firm. The column of the right, 25,000 strong, commanded by General Latour, was to march on Bruckrain.

'The roads were much cut up, as is usual in the month of December; the columns of the right and left marched by almost impracticable cross roads; the snow fell heavily. The column of the centre, followed by the parks and baggage, having the advantage of the high road, soon distanced the others; its head penetrated into the forest without impediment. Richepanse, who was to have defended it at Altenpot, had not arrived; but this column was stopped at the village of Hohenlinden, which was the *appui* of Ney's left, and the station of Grouchy's division. The French line, which had thought itself covered, was at first surprised; several battalions were broken, and some disorder prevailed. Ney hastened up; a terrible charge carried death and consternation into the head of a column of Austrian grenadiers; General Spanochi was taken prisoner. At that moment the vanguard of the Austrian right debouched from the heights of Bruckrain. Ney was obliged to gallop to his left in order to face them; his efforts would have been insufficient had Latour supported his vanguard; but he was two leagues distant from it. In the meantime the divisions of Richepanse and Decaen, which ought to have arrived before daybreak, at the *débouché* of the forest, at the village of Altenpot, being embarrassed in the midst of the night in dreadful roads, and the weather being tremendous, were wandering a great part of the night on the edge of the forest. Richepanse, on arriving at the village of Altenpot, with his division, the 8th, the 48th of the line, and the 1st chasseurs, found himself in the rear of the enemy's parks, and of all his artillery, which

had defiled. He passed through the village, and drew up in line on the heights. Eight squadrons of the enemy's cavalry, which formed the rear-guard, deployed; the cannonade commenced; the 1st chasseurs charged, and were repulsed. The situation of General Richepanse became more and more critical; he was speedily informed that he was not to depend on Drouet, whose progress had been arrested by considerable forces; and of Decaen he had no intelligence. In this dreadful predicament he took a desperate resolution; leaving General Walter with the cavalry, to keep the cuirassiers of the enemy in check, he entered the forest of Hohenlinden at the head of the 48th and 8th of the line. Three battalions of Hungarian grenadiers, forming the escort of the parks, formed; they advanced on Richepanse with the bayonet, taking his soldiers for an irregular force. The 48th overthrew them. This petty engagement decided the fortune of the day. Disorder and alarm spread through the convoy: the drivers cut their traces and fled, abandoning eighty-seven pieces of cannon and three hundred waggons. The confusion of the rear spread to the van. Those columns which were far advanced in the defiles fell into disorder; they were struck with the recollection of the disastrous campaign of the summer; besides which they were in great measure composed of recruits. Ney and Richepanse joined. The Archduke John retreated with the utmost confusion and precipitation on Haag, with the wreck of his corps.

‘The evening after the battle, the head-quarters of the French army were transferred to Haag. In this battle, which decided the success of the campaign, six French divisions, composing half the army, alone engaged almost the whole of the Austrian army. The forces on the field of battle were nearly equal, being about 70,000 men on each side. But the Archduke John could not possibly have assembled a greater number, whilst Moreau might have brought twice as many into the field. The loss of the French army was 10,000 men, killed, wounded, and taken, either at the actions of Dorfen, Ampfingen, or at the battle of Hohenlinden. That of the enemy amounted to 25,000 men, exclusive of deserters. Seven thousand prisoners, amongst whom were two generals, one hundred pieces of cannon and an immense number of waggons, were the trophies of this day.’

The hopes of Austria having been again destroyed by the fatal battle of Hohenlinden, she had now no other alternative but to conclude peace on the best terms she could obtain. The definitive treaty was signed at Luneville on the 9th of February,

1801; by which the emperor, not only as the head of the Austrian monarchy, but also in his quality of chief of the German empire, guaranteed to France the boundary of the Rhine; thereby sacrificing certain possessions of Prussia, and other subordinate princes of the empire, as well as his own. Another article, extremely distasteful to Austria, yielded Tuscany; which Napoleon resolved to transfer to a prince of the House of Parma, in requital of the good offices of Spain during the war. The emperor recognized the union of the Batavian Republic with the French;—and acknowledged the Cisalpine and Ligurian commonwealths: both virtually provinces of the great empire, over which the authority of the first consul seemed now to be permanently established.

England was now the only power which continued steadfast in her hostility to France; and the first consul used all the influence which he possessed to bring about the alliance of the northern powers of Europe against her. It has already been stated, that the half-crazy Emperor of Russia had taken up a violent personal admiration for Bonaparte, and under the influence of that feeling had virtually abandoned Austria before the campaign of Marengo. The first consul took every means to flatter the autocrat, and secure him in his interests.

The result was, in effect, a coalition against the mistress of the seas: and, at the opening of the nineteenth century, England had to contemplate the necessity of encountering single-handed the colossal military force of France, and the combined fleets of Europe.

Early in March, 1801, Admiral Sir Hyde Parker and Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson conducted a fleet into the Baltic, with the view of attacking the northern powers in their own harbours, ere they could effect their meditated junction with the fleets of France and Holland. The English passed the Sound on the 13th of March, and reconnoitred the road of Copenhagen, where the Crown-Prince, Regent of Denmark, had made formidable preparations to receive them. It was on the 2nd of April that Nelson, who had volunteered to lead the assault, having at length obtained a favourable wind, advanced with twelve ships of the line, besides frigates and fire-ships, upon the Danish armament, which consisted of six sail of the line, eleven floating batteries, and an enormous array of small craft, all chained to each other and to the ground, and protected by the crown-batteries, mounting eighty-eight guns, and the fortifications of the isle of Amack. The battle lasted for four hours, and ended in a

signal victory. Some few schooners and bomb-vessels fled early, and escaped : the whole Danish fleet, besides, were sunk, burnt, or taken. The Prince Regent, to save the capital from destruction, was compelled to enter into a negotiation, which ended in the abandonment of the French alliance by Denmark. Lord Nelson then reconnoitred Stockholm ; but, being unwilling to inflict unnecessary suffering, did not injure the city, on discovering that the Swedish fleet had already put to sea. Meantime, news arrived that Paul had been assassinated in his palace at St. Petersburg ; and that the policy which he had adopted, to the displeasure of the Russian nobility, was likely to find no favour with his successor. The moving spirit of the northern confederacy was, in effect, no more, and a brief negotiation ended in its total disruption.

Paul I. fell by a revolution of the palace, and under the hands of assassins, on the night of the 24th of March, 1801. This event caused the first consul much pain. In accordance with the feeling which this unexpected event occasioned him, and which had so important an influence on his policy, he directed me to have the following note inserted in the *Moniteur* :—

‘Paul the First died on the night of the 24th of March ; the English squadron passed the Sound on the 30th. History will point out the connexion existing between these two events.’

Thus were united in his mind the crime of the 24th of March, and the not ill-founded suspicion, as I believe, of its authors.

The amicable relations of Paul and Bonaparte had been drawing closer from day to day. Bonaparte said to me, ‘In concert with the Czar, I was sure of striking a mortal blow at the English power in India. A palace revolution has upset all my projects.’ This resolution, and the admiration which the autocrat had for the chief of the French republic, ought, no doubt, to be reckoned among the causes of his death. At this time the persons generally accused were those who had been most perseveringly and most violently threatened, and who had the greatest interest in a change of emperors. I have read a letter from a northern sovereign, which has left no doubt upon my mind in this respect ; and the letter of this august personage even mentioned the price of the crime, as well as the part to be taken by each actor. But it must be acknowledged that the conduct and the character of Paul, his tyrannical acts, his violent caprices, and the frequent excesses of his despotism,

had rendered him the object of general hatred—for patience has its limits. These causes of complaint did not probably create the conspiracy, but they greatly facilitated the execution of the plot which deprived the Czar of his throne and his life.

After Paul had ceased to exist, and Alexander had mounted the throne, the thoughts of the first consul reverted to the dismemberment and partition of Poland, a subject which unceasingly occupied his mind. Already, during the first campaign in Italy, and frequently in Egypt, he had said to Sulkowsky, that his first wish was to re-establish Poland, to avenge the iniquity of its partition, and to restore, by this great act of justice, the ancient balance of Europe. He often dictated to me, for the *Moniteur*, articles which had the tendency to prove, by various arguments, that Europe never could enjoy repose until these great spoliations were repaired and avenged. But he often destroyed these notes without sending them to press. His policy towards Russia changed shortly after the death of Paul. The idea of a war against this empire was constantly present to his mind, and he no doubt already had formed the idea of that fatal campaign which took place eleven years afterwards, and which had other causes than the re-establishment of Poland, which was only a pretext. Since this war, the conception of which dates from the time of which we speak, has unfortunately taken place, it is a melancholy consideration that private views have prevented the regeneration of a generous nation, thrice torn to pieces by the greedy policy of its powerful neighbours.

About this period a powerful party recommended Bonaparte to break with the Pope, and to establish an independent Gallican Church, the head of which should reside in France. They represented, that by doing so he would acquire a great accession of power, and be able to establish a comparison between himself and the first Roman emperors. But his wishes did not coincide with theirs on this subject. 'I am convinced,' said he, 'that a part of France would become Protestant, especially if I was to favour that disposition. I am also certain, that the much greater portion would continue Catholic, and that they would oppose with the greatest zeal the division amongst their fellow-citizens. But by reviving a religion which has always prevailed in the country, and by merely giving the liberty of exercising their worship to the minority, I shall satisfy everyone.'

Bonaparte justly considered, that by re-establishing religion in France, he should procure a powerful support to his govern-

ment; and to accomplish that object he had been much occupied since his return from the field of Marengo. The concordate with the Pope, which re-established the Catholic worship in France, was signed on the 15th of July, 1801, and made a law of the state in April, 1802.

A solemn *Te Deum* was chanted at the cathedral of Notre Dame, on Sunday the 11th of April. The crowd was immense, and the greater part of those present stood during the ceremony, which was splendid in the extreme; but who would presume to say that the general feeling was in harmony with all this pomp? It is unquestionably true, that a great number of the persons present at the ceremony expressed, in their countenances and gestures, rather a feeling of impatience and displeasure, than of satisfaction or of reverence for the place in which they were.

The consular court was, in general, extremely irreligious; nor could it be expected to be otherwise, being composed chiefly of those who had assisted in the annihilation of all religious worship in France, and of men who, having passed their lives in camps, had oftener entered a church in Italy to carry off a painting than to hear the mass. Those who, without being imbued with any religious ideas, possessed that good sense which induces men to pay respect to the belief of others, though it be one in which they do not participate, did not blame the first consul for his conduct, and conducted themselves with some regard to decency. But on the road from the Tuileries to Notre Dame, Lannes and Augereau wanted to alight from the carriage, as soon as they saw that they were being driven to mass, and it required an order from the first consul to prevent their doing so. They went, therefore, to Notre Dame, and the next day Bonaparte asked Augereau what he thought of the ceremony. 'Oh! it was all very fine,' replied the general; 'there was nothing wanting, except the million of men who have perished in the pulling down of what you are setting up.' Bonaparte was much displeased at this remark.

Many endeavours were made to persuade the first consul to perform in public the duties imposed by religion. An influential example, it was urged, was required. He told me once that he had put an end to that request by the following declaration—'Enough of this. Ask me no more. You will not obtain your object. You shall never make a hypocrite of me. Let us remain where we are.'

Bonaparte at length, however, consented to hear mass, and St. Cloud was the place where this ancient usage was first re-established. He directed the ceremony to commence sooner than the hour announced, in order that those who would only make a scoff of it might not arrive until the service was ended.

Whenever the first consul determined to hear mass publicly on Sundays in the chapel of the palace, a small altar was prepared in a room near his cabinet of business. This room had been Ann of Austria's oratory. A small portable altar, placed on a platform one step high, restored it to its original destination. During the rest of the week, this chapel was used as a bathing-room. On Sunday the door of communication was opened, and we heard mass, sitting in our cabinet of business. The number of persons there never exceeded three or four, and the first consul seldom failed to transact some business during the ceremony, which never lasted longer than twelve minutes. Next day all the papers had the news that the first consul had heard mass in his apartments. In the same way Louis XVIII. had often heard it in his.

I have read in a work, remarkable on many accounts, that it was on the occasion of the concordate of the 15th of July, 1801, that the first consul abolished the republican calendar, and re-established the Gregorian. This is an error. He did not make the calendar a religious affair. The *senatus consultum*, which restored the use of the Gregorian calendar, to commence in the French empire from the 11th Nivose, year XIV. (1st of January, 1806), was adopted on the 22nd Fructidor, year XIII. (9th of September, 1805), more than four years after the concordate. The introduction of the ancient calendar had no other object than to bring us into harmony with the rest of Europe, on a point so closely connected with daily transactions, which were much embarrassed by the decadary calendar.

In April, 1801, there arrived one evening, at Malmaison, an English newspaper, which announced the successful landing in Egypt of the English army under Abercrombie, on the 13th of March, and also giving an account of the battle which followed on the 21st, in which our army was defeated, and the English general killed. Bonaparte at first affected not to believe the intelligence, and stated in the midst of the company that it was impossible. But in the evening, when alone, he expressed his fears and his conviction that the accounts were too true. It

seemed to distress him very much ; for of all his conquests, he set the highest value on Egypt, because it spread his fame throughout the East. Accordingly, he left nothing unattempted for the preservation of that colony. In a letter to General Kleber, he said, ‘You are as able as I am to understand how important is the possession of Egypt to France. The Turkish empire, in which the symptoms of decay are everywhere discernible, is at present falling to pieces, and the evil of the evacuation of Egypt by France would now be the greater, as we should soon see that fine province pass into the possession of some other European power.’ The selection of Gantheaume, however, to carry succour to Kleber was not judicious. The first consul, upon finding that he did not leave Brest after he had been ordered to the Mediterranean, repeatedly said to me, ‘What the devil is Gantheaume about ?’

Gantheaume’s hesitation, his frequent tergiversations, his arrival at Toulon, his tardy departure, and his return to that port on the 19th of February, 1801, only ten days prior to Admiral Keith’s appearance with Sir Ralph Abercrombie off Alexandria, completely foiled all the plans which Bonaparte had conceived of conveying succour and reinforcements to a colony on the brink of destruction.

The first consul had long been apprehensive that the evacuation of Egypt was unavoidable. The last news he had received from that country was but little encouraging, and created a presentiment of the dreadful catastrophe. In the negotiations which preceded the peace of Amiens we made a great merit of abandoning our conquests in Egypt ; but the sacrifice would not have been considered great, if the events which took place at the end of August had been known in London, before the signing of the preliminaries on the 1st of October. Under the fear of such an event taking place, the first consul himself answered M. Otto’s last despatch, which contained a copy of the preliminaries ready to be adopted by the English ministry. Neither the despatch nor the answer was communicated to M. de Talleyrand, then Minister for Foreign Affairs. The first consul urged the ratification of the preliminaries with all possible speed ; and it was well for us that his fears were so much excited, for the news of the compulsory evacuation of Egypt arrived in London the day after the signing of the preliminaries. M. Otto informed the first consul, by letter, that Lord Hawkesbury, in communicating to him the news of this event, told him, he was very glad everything was settled, for it would have been

impossible for him to have treated on the same bases after the arrival of such news. In reality, we consented at Paris to the voluntary evacuation of Egypt, and that was something for England, while Egypt was at that very time evacuated by a convention made on the spot. The evacuation of Egypt took place on the 30th of August, 1801 ; and thus the conquest of that country, which had cost so dear, was rendered useless, or rather injurious.

By this treaty England surrendered all the conquests which she had made during the war, except Ceylon and Trinidad. France, on the other hand, restored what she had taken from Portugal, and guaranteed the independence of the Ionian Isles. Malta was to be restored to the Knights of St. John, and declared a free port : neither England nor France was to have any representative in the order, and the garrison was to consist of the troops of a neutral power. This article was that which caused the greatest difficulty, and which was destined to form the pretext for the re-opening of the war at no distant time.

The definitive treaty was signed on the 25th of March, 1802, and nothing could surpass the demonstrations of joy on this occasion, both in London and Paris.

CHAPTER XVII.

PEACE having been concluded on terms which were highly honourable to the national character, all parties hoped that the sanguinary wars in which the country had been engaged would now have terminated, and that France would be left at liberty to adopt those institutions which would be agreeable to herself. But the brilliant position in which the peace of Amiens had placed France, seemed to excite the jealousy of her neighbours, and to produce those feelings which are opposed to the repose of nations. In fact, we shall see that war broke out afresh with unusual animosity, and from very trifling causes.

At this period the consular glory was unsullied, and held in prospect the most flattering hopes ; and it cannot be doubted, but that the first consul was really desirous to promote peace and to give repose to France.

During the struggles of the revolution the island of St. Domingo had declared itself independent of the mother-country. However, it was now determined to send out an expedition to

reduce it again to dependence. This expedition left the shores of France on the 14th of December, 1801 ; the fatal and unsuccessful issue of which is well known. The command was given to General Leclerc, who had no other talent to recommend him for such an appointment than that he was brother-in-law to the first consul, whose personal dislike to him was so great, that he undoubtedly was selected on purpose to remove him to a distance. After the first consul had dictated to me the instructions for this expedition, he sent for Leclerc, and, in my presence, addressed him in the following words : ‘ Here are your instructions. Now is your chance ; go, and get rich : and trouble me no more with your continued importunities for money.’ The St. Domingo expedition is one of the great faults committed by Bonaparte : everyone consulted attempted to dissuade him from it ; but his temper was such that no one could divert him from any purpose he had determined upon.

The first consul dictated to me, for Toussaint, a letter containing the most honourable expressions, and the most flattering promises. He also sent back his two sons, who had completed their education at Paris ; he offered to him the vice-governorship, provided he would use his efforts to bring back the colony to the mother-country.

Toussaint, either dreading deception or entertaining more ambitious views, resolved on war, after having shewn some inclination for an arrangement. He was, however, easily reduced by an army which was well disciplined, and, as yet, vigorous and well supplied. He capitulated, and retired to a plantation, whence he was not to remove without permission from Leclerc. A pretended conspiracy furnished the pretext for sending him a prisoner to France. On arriving in Paris, he was placed under a rigorous confinement, which, together with the change of climate, was sufficient to shorten his days without recourse to poison—a report unworthy of belief. Bonaparte acknowledged him to be possessed of great talent, energy, and courage, and I am certain that he would have rejoiced in a different conclusion of relations with him. Probably, any other than Leclerc would have succeeded in bringing Toussaint to reconcile the interests of the colony and the rights of humanity with the claims of the mother-country, moderated as they had been by time and circumstances. The yellow fever, which carried off Leclerc, spread its ravages among the army, and desertion became general. Rochambeau succeeded Leclerc, and by his severity completed the loss of the colony. He abandoned the island to Dessalines, and

gave himself up to an English squadron, in 1803. Thus terminated this unfortunate expedition, which cost us a fine army, and of which the original expense was furnished by the plunder of the navy chest for the support of invalids.

During this period, Bonaparte often suffered from extreme pain ; and I have no doubt, from the nature of his after sufferings, that they commenced about this time. The pains of which he constantly complained affected him with great severity during the night on which he dictated to me the instructions for General Leclerc.

It was on the 7th of January, 1802, that the marriage of Mademoiselle Hortense with Louis Bonaparte took place. At this time the practice had not been resumed of joining to the civil act the nuptial benediction. The religious ceremony was performed in the private chapel, Rue Victoire, where a priest attended for that purpose. At the same time Bonaparte caused the marriage of his sister Caroline to be religiously solemnized, which had previously only taken place before the magistrates. He did not follow this example himself ; from what motive does not appear. Did he already entertain ideas of a divorce, which the sanction of religion would have rendered more difficult ? It could not proceed from fear of being accused of weakness, since he revived it where his sister and daughter-in-law were concerned. The few words I heard from him on the subject shewed his perfect indifference. He has said at St. Helena, when speaking of the marriage of Louis and Hortense, ‘That it arose from attachment ; each was respectively the other’s choice. As to the rest, this marriage was the result of Josephine’s intrigues, who found her advantage in it.’ The truth is, Louis and Hortense were not attached to each other, as the first consul very well knew : he knew that Hortense had a decided attachment to Duroc, who did not return her affection with equal warmth. He even had consented to their union ; but Josephine looked forward to the marriage with much pain, and used all her influence to prevent it. She said to me, ‘My two brothers-in-law are my most determined enemies ; you see all their intrigues, and know how much uneasiness they have caused me ; this projected marriage will leave me without any support ; besides, Duroc, independent of Bonaparte’s friendship, is nothing ; he has neither fortune, rank, nor even reputation ; he cannot be a protection to me against the declared enmity of the brothers. I must have some more certain reliance for the future. My

husband loves Louis very much ; if I can succeed in uniting my daughter to him, he will prove a strong counterpoise to the calumnies and persecutions of my brothers-in-law.' I replied, that she had too long concealed her intentions from me ; that I had promised my services to the young people the more willingly, knowing the favourable sentiments of the first consul, who had often said to me, 'My wife labours in vain, they are agreeable to each other, they shall be married. I am attached to Duroc ; he is well born : I have given Caroline to Murat, and Pauline to Leclerc ; I can as well give Hortense to Duroc ; he is brave ; he is as good as the others ; he is a general of division—there can be no objection to their union. Besides, I have other views for Louis.' I added, in my conversation with Josephine, that her daughter burst into tears when a marriage with Louis was even mentioned. In anticipation of the projected marriage between Hortense and Duroc, the first consul sent him on a special mission to compliment the Emperor Alexander on his accession to the throne. During this absence, the correspondence of the youthful lovers passed through my hands, at their own request. Almost every evening I made one in a party at billiards with Mademoiselle Hortense, who played extremely well. When I whispered to her, '*I have a letter,*' the game quickly ceased ; she ran to her chamber, where I followed and delivered the billet. Her eyes filled with tears, and she did not descend again to the saloon till long after I had returned.

Josephine was so anxious to gain an additional support against the family, that seeing her resolution was so completely formed, I engaged no longer to oppose her views, which I could not disapprove of ; but I pointed out that it would be impossible for me to preserve silence and neutrality in their domestic disputes any longer. She appeared satisfied. During our stay at Malmaison, intrigues continued, but probabilities still favoured Duroc. I even offered him my congratulations, which he received with wonderful coolness. We returned to the Tuileries a few days after, and there Josephine resolved on the marriage of her daughter with Louis, and used all her influence with the first consul to obtain his consent. On the 4th of January, 1802, after dinner, Bonaparte entered the cabinet where I was at work, and said, 'Where is Duroc ?' I replied, 'Gone out ; I believe, to the opera.' 'Tell him, as soon as he returns, that I have promised him Hortense. He shall marry her, and this must take place at least in two days. I shall give him 500,000

francs (about £21,000), and name him commandant of the eighth military division. He must set out for Toulon, with his wife, the day after the marriage, and we shall live separate. I will have no son-in-law in the house with me. As I wish this affair settled, let him know, and let me have his answer this evening, if it suits him.' 'I don't think it will.' 'Very well; she shall marry Louis.' 'Will she have him?' 'She must have him.'

This proposal was made in such a hasty and intemperate manner, that I could not doubt but that some difference had taken place between him and Josephine. About half-past ten, Duroc returned. I repeated to him, as nearly as possible, every word which had been made use of by the first consul. Duroc replied, 'Since it is so, my friend, he may keep his daughter for me; I am going to visit ——.' So saying, with an air of indifference beyond my comprehension, he took his hat, and went out. The first consul was informed of his refusal, and Josephine received that evening the assurance of her daughter's marriage with Louis; which accordingly took place a few days after. Such is a correct account of this matter as it happened, much to the sorrow of Hortense, and, probably, to the satisfaction of Duroc. Louis suffered the infliction of a wife, and Hortense that of a husband, who had always been personally objectionable to her. The mutual dislike which then existed was not removed by their union, and these sentiments of indifference still remain unchanged.—In mentioning these circumstances, I consider it necessary to allude to a wicked and infamous assertion, which at this time was made by the enemies of the first consul, that he entertained for Hortense other sentiments than those of a father-in-law for his daughter. We shall see afterwards what he said to me on this subject; but we cannot too speedily remove such a base scandal; the insinuation was execrable in the extreme.

In the leisure which the peace afforded to Bonaparte he was desirous to place the Cisalpine republic on a footing of harmony with the government of France. It was necessary to select a president who should perfectly accord with his own views; and, in this respect, no one could be more suitable than himself. He therefore prepared to have himself appointed chief of that republic, and caused a deputation to meet him at Lyons for that purpose. Before our departure I said to him, 'Would it not have been agreeable to you to revisit Italy, the first scene of your glory, and the beautiful capital of Lombardy, where you were the object of so much homage?' 'Yes, it certainly would,'

replied the first consul, 'but the journey to Milan would occupy too much time. I have also reasons for preferring that the meeting should take place in France. My influence over the deputies will be more absolute and certain at Lyons than at Milan ; and besides, I shall be very happy to see again the noble wreck of the army of Egypt which is there collected.'

On the 8th of January, 1802, we left Paris. Bonaparte, who was now ready to ascend the throne of France, wished to prepare the Italians for one day crowning him king of Italy, in imitation of Charlemagne, of whom he prospectively considered himself as successor. He saw that the presidency of the Cisalpine republic was a great advance towards the sovereignty of Lombardy, as he afterwards found that the consulate for life was an important step towards the throne of France. On the 26th he obtained the title of president without much difficulty. The journey and the conferences were only forms, but public opinion had to be captivated by high-sounding words and solemn proceedings.

The attempts recently made on the life of the first consul gave rise to a report that he took extraordinary precautions for his safety during this journey ; I never saw any of these precautions—they were opposed to his disposition. He often repeated, 'That whoever would risk his own life, might take his.' He therefore travelled as a private person, and rarely had arms in his carriage

On the 25th of March of this year, 1802, England signed, at Amiens, a suspension of hostilities for fourteen months, which has been called the treaty of Amiens. The clauses of this treaty were not of a nature to induce the hope of a long peace. It was evident that England would not evacuate Malta ; and that island ultimately proved the chief cause of the rupture of the peace. But this treaty served to consolidate the power of the first consul, for England, formerly so haughty in her bearing towards him, had now treated him as the head of the French government. As he perceived that I appreciated these advantages, he did not dissemble his satisfaction in this particular.

It was at this moment, when he saw his glory and power augmenting, that he said to me, in one of our walks at Malmaison, 'Well, Bourrienne, you will also be immortal !'—'Why, General ?'—'Are you not my secretary ?'—'Tell me the name of Alexander's,'* said I. Bonaparte then turned to me, and laughing, said, 'Hem ! that is not bad.' There was, to be

* Bonaparte did not know the name of Alexander's secretary, and I forgot at the moment to tell him it was Callisthenes.

sure, a little flattery conveyed in my question, but that never displeased him, and I certainly did not in that instance deserve the censure he often bestowed on me, for not being enough of a courtier and flatterer.

Here I may state the grounds of quarrel between the first consul and the English journals, which exhibits a new proof of his love for liberty ! At all times a declared enemy to the freedom of the press, the first consul held the journals under a hand of iron. Often have I heard him say, 'Should I give them the rein, my power would not continue three months.' Unfortunately, too, the same sentiment guided his conduct with respect to all prerogatives of public liberty ; the silence thus forced upon France, he wished, but was unable to impose in England. He was enraged at the insults heaped upon him by the English newspapers and libels, especially by the journal, *L'Ambigu* (*The Medley*), edited by one Peltier, who, at Paris, had formerly been editor of *The Acts of the Apostles*. This newspaper was constantly filled with the most violent attacks against the first consul and the French nation,—doubtless a circumstance very honourable to its author, a Frenchman. Bonaparte had never been accustomed, like the English, to despise newspaper satire : he avenged himself by violent articles in the *Moniteur*. M. Otto even received orders to present an official note on the subject of these systematic calumnies, which the consul believed were authorized by the English government. Besides this official measure, he personally addressed Mr. Addington, Chancellor of the Exchequer, requesting him to support the representation, and urging him to institute legal proceedings against those publications complained of. In order to lose no time in satisfying his hatred against the liberty of the press, he seized, for this purpose, the moment of signing the preliminaries to urge his demand.

Mr. Addington replied, in a long letter, written with his own hand, and which I translated. The English minister forcibly refuted the arguments of the first consul ; admitting, indeed, that the abuse of the press might occasionally become an evil ; but that the constitution left everyone free to use his pen at his own risk and peril. 'One is punished for a delinquency in writing, as for any other crime. Such delinquencies,' Mr. Addington acknowledged, 'sometimes escaped the severity of the laws. But there is no remedy,' continued he ; 'and it is difficult to discover one ; for the liberty of the press, which forms a constituent of the national system, cannot be infringed. The

people owe much to this liberty, and no minister would be found sufficiently bold to hazard the question in Parliament,—so dear is this freedom to the English.’ Mr. Addington afterwards observed to the first consul, that, ‘though a foreigner, he was entitled to bring his complaint before the national tribunals; but that he must then be prepared to see reprinted, as portions of process, all the libellous pieces of which he complained.’ He entreated him, ‘by profound contempt, to suffer these nuisances to remain in their obscurity, and to act like many others, who attached to such calumnies not the slightest importance.’ I was happy, also, in contributing to prevent for a time this scandalous prosecution.

In this state things remained; but after the peace of Amiens, the first consul caused Peltier to be cited before the courts. The defence was conducted by the celebrated Sir James Mackintosh, who, according to the accounts of the time, displayed the greatest eloquence in his pleadings. Peltier, however, was found guilty. This condemnation, which was regarded by public opinion as a triumph, was not carried into execution, because the rupture between the two countries speedily ensued. It is melancholy to think, that this excessive susceptibility to libellous articles in the English journals, should have contributed as much, and perhaps more, than great political interests, to the renewal of hostilities.

After the peace of Amiens, Bonaparte had despatched General Sebastiani to Constantinople, to induce the Grand Seignior to renew his amicable relations with France, and he was very much pleased with his conduct on this occasion.

Previous to the evacuation of Egypt, that country had occupied much of the first consul’s attention, and he had contemplated sending a man, such as Sebastiani, to travel through Northern Africa, Egypt, and Syria, to endeavour to inspire the sovereigns of those countries with a more favourable idea of France than they now entertained, and also to remove the ill impressions which England was endeavouring to produce. Sebastiani was accordingly despatched upon this mission. He visited all the Barbary states, Egypt, Palestine, and the Ionian Isles. Everywhere he drew a highly coloured picture of the power of Bonaparte, and depreciated the glory of England. He strengthened old connexions, and contracted new ones with the chiefs of each country. The secret information which he supplied respecting the means of successfully attacking the English establishments in India was very curious, though not

affording the hope of success. An abstract of these reports was published in the *Moniteur*, which contained many expressions hostile to England; and, among others, that Egypt might be reconquered with 6000 men, and that the Ionian Islands would on the first favourable opportunity declare themselves in favour of France.

The English government complained of the insulting character of this publication; to which the French minister replied, that the English government had permitted the publication of Sir Robert Wilson's Narrative of the Egyptian expedition, which contained statements in the highest degree injurious to the character and honour of the first consul. These mutual recriminations very soon led to the termination of the armistice.

About the commencement of the year 1802, Napoleon began to feel acute pains in his right side, and I have frequently seen him at Malmaison, when sitting up at night, lean against the right arm of his chair, and, unbuttoning his coat and waistcoat, he has exclaimed, 'What pain I feel!' I would then assist him to his bed-chamber, and have often been obliged to support him on the little staircase which led from his cabinet to the corridor. He very frequently, about this time, used to express his fear, that when he should be forty, he would become a great eater and very corpulent. This fear of obesity, which constantly haunted him, did not then appear to have the least foundation, judging from his habitual temperance and spare habit of body. He asked me who was my physician, when I told him that it was Corvisart, who his brother Louis had recommended to me. A few days after he called in Corvisart, who afterwards became first physician to the emperor. He appeared at this time to derive much benefit from his prescriptions. The pain Bonaparte suffered increased his irritability, and influenced many acts of this period of his life. He would often destroy in the morning what he had dictated over-night; and sometimes I would take upon me to keep back articles which were ordered to be sent to the *Moniteur*, which I thought might have a mischievous effect. In the morning, he would sometimes inquire, on not observing it in the *Moniteur*, if the article had been sent. I used to make some excuse for not sending it, and would shew it to him again. He looked it over and usually tore it up, saying it would not do.

After the ratification of peace, the first consul, wishing to send an ambassador to London, cast his eyes, somehow or other, upon General Andréossy. I ventured to make some

observations on a choice which appeared to me not to correspond with the high importance of the mission. Bonaparte replied, 'I have not determined upon it—I shall talk with Talleyrand on the matter when he comes to Malmaison.' In the course of the evening, the proposed appointment of an ambassador was mentioned, and after several persons had been named, the first consul said, 'I believe I must send Andréossy.' Talleyrand, who was not much pleased with the choice, replied in a dry and sarcastic tone, 'You wish to send André *aussi*! Who is this André?'—'I did not mention any André; I said Andréossy! You know him, he is a general of artillery.'—'Ah, true!' replied Talleyrand, 'I did not think of him. I was only thinking of those in the diplomacy.' Andréossy was, however, appointed ambassador, and he repaired to the court of London, but only continued there a few months. He had nothing of consequence to do, which was very fortunate for him.

After the vote for adding a second ten years to the duration of the consulship, on the 4th of May, 1801, Bonaparte brought forward, for the first time officially in the council of state, the question of establishing the Legion of Honour, which on the 19th following was proclaimed a law of the state. The opposition was very strong, and all the power of the first consul, the force of his reasonings, and the influence of his situation, could obtain in the council no more than fourteen votes out of twenty-four. The same feeling was displayed in the tribunate, where the measure passed only by a majority of fifty-six to thirty-eight. The proportion was nearly the same in the legislative body, where the votes were one hundred and sixty-six to one hundred and ten. Surprised at so feeble a majority, he said to me in the evening, 'You were right—prejudices are still against me. I ought to have waited; there was no hurry in bringing it forward; but the thing is done; and you will soon find that the taste for these distinctions is not gone by. It is a taste which belongs to the nature of man. You will see that extraordinary results will arise from it.' As Bonaparte contemplated, this institution wrought prodigies. The noblesse were mightily pleased with it.—Thus, in a short space of time, the concordate to tranquillize consciences and re-establish harmony in the church; the decree to recall the emigrants; the continuance of a consular power for ten years, by way of preparation for the consulship for life, and the possession of the empire; and the creation, in a country

which had abolished all distinctions, of an order which was to engender prodigies, followed closely on the heels of each other. The Bourbons, in reviving the abolished orders, were wise enough to preserve along with them the Legion of Honour.

In April, 1802, the first consul employed all his efforts to get himself declared consul for life. It is, perhaps, at this period that he most completely developed those principles of duplicity and dissimulation, which are commonly called Machiavelian. Never were trickery, falsehood, cunning, and affected moderation, put into practice with more talent or success.

His brother Lucien was the most violent propagator of hereditary power and the stability of a dynasty; but in this he only acted under the directions of his brother. Liberty rejected an unlimited power, and had set bounds as yet, in some degree, to excessive love of war and conquest. 'The decenniality,' said he to me, 'does not satisfy me: I consider it calculated to excite unceasing troubles.' He had formerly observed to me, that 'The question whether France will be a republic is still doubtful; it will be decided in less than five or six years.' It was clear that he thought this too long a term. Whether he regarded France as his property, or considered himself as the defender of the people's rights, I know not, but I am convinced he sincerely desired her welfare; but then that welfare was, in his mind, inseparable from absolute power. It was with pain I perceived him following this course.

The friends of liberty, those who sincerely wished to maintain a government constitutionally free, allowed themselves to be prevailed upon to consent to an extension of ten years of power, beyond the ten years formerly granted by the constitution. They made this sacrifice to glory, and to that power which was its consequence; and they were far from thinking, at the time, that they were lending themselves to intrigue. They were thus far in favour; but only for the time. The senate rejected the nomination of the consulship for life, and only added ten years more.

The first consul was displeased with their decision; but he returned a calm and evasive reply to their address, in which he stated, 'That he would submit to this new sacrifice, if the wish of the people demanded what the senate authorized'—thus nourishing his favourite hope of obtaining more from the people than from them.

An extraordinary convocation of the council of state took

place on Monday, the 10th of May, to which a communication was made, not merely of the senate's consultation, but also of the first consul's reply. The council regarded the first merely as a notification, and proceeded to consider on what question the people should be consulted. Not satisfied with granting to the first consul an extension of ten years, they were so desirous to comply with his wishes, as to decide that the following question should be put to the people :—‘Should the first consul be appointed for life? and shall he have the power of nominating his successor?’ The decisions on these questions were carried as if by storm. The appointment for life passed unanimously, and the right of naming the successor by a majority. The first consul, however, formally condemned this second measure; he declared that it had not originated with himself. On receiving the decision of the council of state, the first consul, to conceal his plan for obtaining absolute power, thought it advisable to reject a part of what had been offered him. He therefore cancelled that part which proposed to give him the power of appointing a successor, and which had passed with so small a majority.

CHAPTER XVIII.

WE have now beheld Bonaparte first consul for life; but, still unsatisfied with this distinction, he very shortly afterwards, in the committee occupied with the consideration of the new code of laws, expressed his opinion in favour of the Roman law of adoption; urging, with his usual tact, that an heir so chosen ought to be dearer than a son. The object of this opinion was not difficult of detection—he no longer had any hope of having children by Josephine, and he meditated the adoption of one of his brother's sons as his heir. In the course of the autumn, a simple edict of the Conservative senate authorized him to appoint his successor in the consulate, by a testamentary deed. By this act (August the 4th, 1802), a new dynasty was called to the throne of France, and from this time the words ‘Liberty, Equality, Sovereignty of the People,’ disappeared from the state papers and official documents of the government.

The republic had now ceased to be anything else than a fiction, or an historical recollection. All that remained of it was a deceptive inscription on the gates of the palace. Even

previously to his installation at the Tuileries, Bonaparte had caused the two trees of liberty which were planted in the court to be thrown down; thus removing the outward emblems before he destroyed the reality. But the moment the *senatus consulta* of the 2nd and 4th of August were published, it was evident to the dullest perceptions that the power of the first consul wanted nothing but a name.

After these *senatus consulta*, Bonaparte readily accustomed himself to regard the principal authorities of the state merely as necessary instruments for the exercise of his power. Interested advisers then crowded round him. It was seriously proposed that he should restore the ancient titles, as being more in harmony with the new power which the people had confided to him, than the republican forms. He was of opinion, however, according to his phrase, that 'the pear was not yet ripe,' and would not hear this project spoken of for a moment. 'All this,' he said to me one day, 'will come in good time; but you must see, Bourrienne, that it is necessary I should, in the first place, assume a title, from which the others that I shall give will naturally take their origin. The greatest difficulty is surmounted. There is no longer any person to deceive. Everybody sees as clear as day that it is only one step which separates the throne from the consulate for life. However, we must be cautious. There are some troublesome fellows in the tribunate—but I will take care of them.'

Whilst these serious questions agitated men's minds, the greater part of the residents at Malmaison took a trip to Plombières. Josephine, Bonaparte's mother, Madame Beauharnois-Lavalette, Hortense, and General Rapp, were of this party. It pleased the fancy of the jocund company to address to me an amusing bulletin of the pleasant and unpleasant occurrences of the journey. But this journey to Plombières was preceded by a scene, which I should abstain from describing, if I had not undertaken to relate the truth respecting the family of the first consul. Two or three days before her departure, Madame Bonaparte sent for me. I obeyed the summons, and found her in tears. 'What a man—what a man is Lucien!' she exclaimed, in accents of grief. 'If you knew, my friend, the shameful proposals he has dared to make to me! "You are going to the waters," said he; "you must get a child by some other person, since you cannot have one by him." Imagine the indignation with which I received such advice.—"Well," he continued, "if you do not wish it, or cannot help it, Bonaparte

must get a child by another woman, and you must adopt it ; for it is necessary to secure an hereditary successor. It is for your interest ; you must know that.”—“What, sir !” I replied, “do you imagine that the nation will suffer a bastard to govern it ? Lucien ! Lucien ! you would ruin your brother ! This is dreadful ! Wretched should I be, were anyone to suppose me capable of listening, without horror, to your infamous proposal ! Your ideas are poisonous ; your language horrible !”—“Well, madame,” replied he, “all I can say to that is, that I am really sorry for you !”

The amiable Josephine was sobbing whilst she described this scene to me, and I was not insensible to the indignation which she felt. The truth is, that at that period, Lucien, though constantly affecting to despise power for himself, was incessantly labouring to concentrate it in the hands of his brother ; and he considered three things necessary to the success of his views, namely, hereditary succession, divorce, and the imperial government.

Lucien had a beautiful seat near Neuilly. Some days before the deplorable scene which I have related, he invited Bonaparte and all the inmates at Malmaison, to witness a theatrical representation. *Alzire* was the piece performed. Eliza played *Alzire*, and Lucien *Zamore*. The warmth of their declamation, the energetic expression of their gestures, the too faithful nudity of costume, disgusted most of the spectators, and Bonaparte more than any other. When the play was over, he was quite indignant. ‘It is a scandal,’ he said to me, in an angry tone ; ‘I ought not to suffer such indecencies—I will give Lucien to understand that I will have no more of it.’ When his brother had resumed his own dress, and came into the saloon, he addressed him publicly, and gave him to understand, that he must, for the future, desist from such representations. When we returned to Malmaison, he again spoke of what had passed with dissatisfaction. ‘What !’ said he, ‘when I am endeavouring to restore purity of manners, my brother and sister must needs exhibit themselves, upon a platform, almost in a state of nudity ! It is an insult !’

Lucien had a strong predilection for theatrical representations, to which he attached great importance. The truth is, he declaimed with a skill which would not have suffered in being compared with the best professional actors. Theatrical representations were not confined to Neuilly. We had our theatre at Malmaison ; but there, at least, everything was conducted with

the greatest decorum ; and now that I have got behind the scenes, I will not quit them until I have let the reader into the secret of our drama.

The first consul had directed a very pretty theatre to be constructed for our use at Malmaison. Our actors were Eugene Beauharnois, Hortense, Madame Murat, Lauriston, Didelot, one of the prefects of the palace, a few others connected with the household, and myself. Forgetting the cares of government, which we confined as much as possible to the Tuileries, we were very happy in the colony at Malmaison ; and besides, we were young, and what is there that youth does not add a charm to ? The pieces which the first consul liked most to see performed were, *Le Barbier de Seville*, and *Defiance et Malice*. Hortense's acting was perfection, Caroline's was middling, Eugene's very well, Lauriston's was rather heavy, and I think I may say that I was not the worst in the company. If we were not good actors, it was not for want of good instruction and good advice. Talma and Michot came to hear us declaim, sometimes together, and sometimes separately.

Bonaparte took great pleasure in our performances. He liked to see plays acted by those with whom he was acquainted. Sometimes he complimented us on our exertions. Although the thing amused me quite as much as the others, I was more than once obliged to remind him that my occupations left me no time to study my parts. Then he would assume his coaxing manner, and say, 'Come, do not vex me ! you have such a memory ! you know that it amuses me ; and Josephine takes much pleasure in them. Rise earlier in the morning :—in fact, I sleep too much ; is not that the case ? Come, Bourrienne, do oblige me.' After a conversation of this sort, I could do nothing but set about to learn my parts.

At this period I had, during summer, half the Sunday to myself. I was, however, obliged to devote a part of this precious leisure to gratify Bonaparte by studying a new part. Sometimes, however, I went to spend the holiday at Ruel. I recollect, that one day when I hurried there from Malmaison, I lost a beautiful watch, made by Breguet. It was four o'clock in the afternoon, and the road was thronged with people. I made my loss known by means of the bellman of Ruel, and in an hour after, as I was sitting down to dinner, a young lad belonging to the village brought my watch, which he had found on the high-road in a wheel-rut. Pleased with the honesty of the young man, I rewarded both him and his father, who accompanied him. I

related the circumstance the same evening to the first consul, who was so struck with this instance of honesty, that he gave me instructions to obtain information respecting the young man and his family. I learned that they were honest peasants. Bonaparte gave three brothers of this family employments, and, what was most difficult to obtain, he exempted the young man who brought me the watch from the conscription. When a fact of this nature came to Bonaparte's knowledge, it was seldom he did not give the principal party in it some proof of his satisfaction.

Two qualities predominated in his disposition—kindness and impatience. Impatience, when he was under its influence, got the better of him, and it was then impossible to control him. Of the former, I have just given an instance, and I shall add another of the latter, which occurred about this very period.

Canova having arrived at Paris, came to St. Cloud to model the figure of the first consul, of whom he was about to execute a colossal statue. This great artist came often, in the hope to get his model to stand in the proper attitude ; but Bonaparte was so tired, disgusted, and impatient, that he very seldom put himself in the proper attitude, and then only for a very short time. Bonaparte, however, retained the highest regard for Canova. Whenever he was announced, the first consul sent me to keep him company until he was at leisure to give him an interview ; but he would shrug up his shoulders and say, 'More modelling,—good heavens ! how tiresome !' Canova often expressed to me his disappointment at not being able to study his model as he wished, and at the little anxiety of Bonaparte on the subject—this damped the ardour of his imagination. Everyone agrees in saying that he has not succeeded, and the above may be considered as the reason. The Duke of Wellington now possesses this colossal statue. It is so high, that, as Lord Byron says, the Duke of Wellington just comes up to the middle of Napoleon's body.

Bonaparte saw in men only helps and obstacles to the designs he had in view. On the 18th Brumaire, Fouché was a help ; but now he was considered an obstacle, and it was necessary to think of dismissing him. Many of the first consul's sincere friends had from the beginning been opposed to Fouché having any share in the government ; but his influence was such, that whoever opposed him was sure to fall into disgrace. Throughout Paris, and, indeed, throughout France, Fouché had obtained an extraordinary credit for ability ; but his principal talent was, in

making others believe that he really possessed it. Bonaparte had been long dissatisfied with his conduct, as he had reason to believe that the police minister had been practising a system of deception upon him so as to increase his own importance. He decided upon his dismissal ; but such was the influence that Fouché possessed over him, that he was desirous to proceed with caution. Therefore, to disguise the removal of the minister, he resolved upon the suppression of the Ministry of Police, and assigned as his reason for so doing, that it would give strength to his government, by shewing his confidence in the security and internal tranquillity of France. Fouché, overpowered by the arguments brought forward by the first consul, was unable to urge any good reason in opposition to them, and only recommended that the execution of the design should be delayed for at least two years. Bonaparte seemed to listen favourably to Fouché's recommendation ; but that was only whilst in his presence ; his dismissal was already decided upon, which accordingly took place on the evening of the 12th of September. After this act, respecting which he had hesitated so long, Bonaparte still endeavoured to modify his rigour, by appointing Fouché a senator ; in the notification of which to the senate he stated, 'That Fouché, as Minister of Police in times of difficulty, had, by his talent, his activity, and his attachment to the government, done all that circumstances required of him. Placed in the bosom of the senate, if events should again call for a Minister of Police, the government cannot find one more worthy of its confidence.' Such is the history of Fouché's disgrace—no one was more afflicted at it than Josephine, who only learned the news when it was announced to the public. She on all occasions defended Fouché against her husband's sallies, for she believed that he was the only minister who told him the truth, and because he was opposed to Bonaparte's brothers.

I have already spoken of Josephine's troubles, and of the bad conduct of Bonaparte's brothers towards her : I will, therefore, describe here, as connected with the disgrace of Fouché, whom Madame Bonaparte regretted as a support, some scenes which occurred about this period at Malmaison. Having been the confidant of both parties, and an involuntary actor in those scenes, now that twenty-seven years have passed since they occurred, what motive can induce me to disguise the truth in any respect ?

Madame Louis Bonaparte was pregnant. Josephine, although

she tenderly loved her children, did not seem to behold the approaching event which the situation of her daughter indicated, with the interest natural to the heart of a mother. She had long been aware of the calumnious reports circulated respecting the supposed connexion between Hortense and the first consul, and that base accusation cost her many tears. Poor Josephine paid dearly for the splendour of her station ! As I knew how devoid of foundation these atrocious reports were, I endeavoured to console her by telling her, what was true, that I was exerting all my efforts to demonstrate their infamy and falsehood. Bonaparte, however, dazzled by the affection which was manifested towards him from all quarters, aggravated the sorrow of his wife by a silly vanity. He endeavoured to persuade her that these reports had their origin only in the wish of the public that he should have a child ; so that these seeming consolations, offered by self-love to maternal grief, gave force to existing conjugal alarms, and the fear of divorce returned with all its horrors. Under the foolish illusion of his vanity, Bonaparte imagined that France was desirous of being governed even by a bastard, if supposed to be a child of his—a singular mode, truly, of founding a new legitimacy.

Josephine, whose susceptibility appears to me, even now, excusable, knew well my sentiments on the subject of Bonaparte's founding a dynasty, and she had not forgotten my conduct when, two years before, the question had been agitated on the occasion of Louis XVIII.'s letters to the first consul. I remember that, one day, after the publication of the parallel of Cæsar, Cromwell, and Bonaparte, Josephine, having entered our cabinet without being announced, which she sometimes did, when, from the good-humour exhibited at breakfast, she reckoned upon its continuance, approached Bonaparte softly, seated herself on his knee, passed her hand gently through his hair and over his face, and, thinking the moment favourable, said to him, in a burst of tenderness, ' I entreat of you, Bonaparte, do not make yourself a king ! It is that Lucien who urges you to it. Do not listen to him.' Bonaparte replied, without anger, and even smiling as he pronounced the last words, ' You are mad, my poor Josephine. It is your old dowagers of the Faubourg Saint-Germain, your Rochefoucaulds, who tell you all these fables ! . . . Come now, you interrupt me—leave me alone.' What Bonaparte said that day good-naturedly to his wife, I often heard him declare seriously. I have been present at five or six altercations on the subject. That there existed, too, an enmity connected with this

question between the family of Beauharnois and the family of Bonaparte, cannot be denied.

Fouché, as I have stated, was in the interest of Josephine, and Lucien was the most bitter of her enemies. One day Rœderer inveighed with so much violence against Fouché in the presence of Madame Bonaparte, that she replied, with extreme warmth—‘The real enemies of Bonaparte are those who feed him with notions of hereditary descent, of a dynasty, of divorce, and of marriage!’ Josephine could not control this exclamation, as she knew that Rœderer encouraged those ideas, which he spread abroad by Lucien’s direction. I recollect one day, that she had come to see us, at our little house at Ruel : as I walked with her along the high-road to her carriage, which she had sent forward, I acknowledged too unreservedly my fears on account of the ambition of Bonaparte, and of the perfidious advice of his brothers. ‘Madame,’ said I, ‘if we cannot succeed in dissuading the General from making himself a king, I dread the future for his sake. If ever he re-establishes royalty, he will, in all probability, labour for the Bourbons, and enable them one day to re-ascend the throne which he shall erect. The ancient system being re-established, the occupation of the throne will then be only a family question, and not a question of government between liberty and despotic power. Why should not France, if it cease to be free, prefer the race of her ancient kings? You surely know it. You had not been married two years, when, on returning from Italy, your husband told me that he aspired to royalty. Now he is consul for life. Would he but resolve to stop there! He already possesses everything but an empty title. No sovereign in Europe has so much power as he has. I am sorry for it, madame; but I really believe that, in spite of yourself, you will be made queen or empress.’

Madame Bonaparte had allowed me to speak without interruption, but when I pronounced the words queen and empress, she exclaimed, ‘My God! Bourrienne, such ambition is far from my thoughts. That I may always continue the wife of the first consul is all I desire. Say to him all that you have said to me. Try and prevent him from making himself king.’—‘Madame,’ I replied, ‘times are greatly altered. The wisest men, the strongest minds, have resolutely and courageously opposed the tendency to the hereditary system. But advice is now useless. He would not listen to me. In all discussions on the subject he adheres inflexibly to the view he has taken. If he be seriously opposed, his anger knows no bounds; his language is harsh and

abrupt, his tone imperious, and his authority bears down all before him.'—'Yet, Bourrienne, he has so much confidence in you, that if you should try once more'—'Madame, I assure you he will not listen to me. Besides, what could I add to the remarks I have made upon the occasion of his receiving the letters of Louis XVIII., when I represented to him that, being without children, he would have no one to whom he could bequeath the throne—that, doubtless, from the opinion which he entertained of his brothers, he could not desire to erect it for them?' Here Josephine again interrupted me by exclaiming, 'My kind friend, when you spoke of children, did he say anything to you?—Did he talk of a divorce?'—'Not a word, madame, I assure you.'

Such was the nature of one of the conversations I had with Madame Bonaparte, on the subject to which she often recurred. It may not, perhaps, be uninteresting to endeavour to compare with this, what Napoleon said at St. Helena, speaking of his first wife. According to the *Memorial*, Napoleon there stated, that when Josephine was at last constrained to renounce all hope of having a child, she often let fall allusions to a great political fraud, and at length openly proposed it to him. I make no doubt Bonaparte made use of words to this effect, but I do not believe the assertion. I recollect one day, that Bonaparte, on entering our cabinet, where I was already seated, exclaimed in a transport of joy impossible for me to describe,—'Well, Bourrienne, my wife is at last * * *.' I sincerely congratulated him, more I own out of courtesy, than from any hope I had of seeing him made a father by Josephine; for I well remembered that Corvisart, who had given medicines to Madame Bonaparte, had nevertheless assured me that he expected no result from them. Medicine was really the only *political fraud* to which Josephine had recourse; and in her situation what other woman would not have done as much? Here, then, the husband and the wife are in contradiction, which is nothing uncommon. But on which side is truth? I have no hesitation in referring it to Josephine. There is, indeed, an immense difference between the statements of a woman intrusting her fears and her hopes to a sole confidant of her family secrets, and the tardy declarations of a man who, after seeing the vast edifice of his ambition levelled with the dust, is only anxious, in his compulsory retreat, to preserve intact and spotless the other great edifice of his glory. Bonaparte should have recollected that Cæsar did not like the idea of his wife being even suspected.

At this dazzling period of his career, the first consul neglected no opportunity of endeavouring to obtain, at the same time, the admiration of the multitude and the approbation of sensible men. Thus he displayed sufficient attachment to the arts, and was sensible that the promotion of industry demanded the protection of the government; but it must be acknowledged that he rendered that protection of little value, by the continual violations he committed on that liberty which is the invigorating principle of all improvement. During the autumn of 1802, there was held at the Louvre, under the direction of M. Chaptal, an exhibition of the products of industry, which was highly gratifying to the first consul. He seemed proud of the high degree of perfection the industrial arts had attained in France, and particularly on account of the exhibition exciting the admiration of the numerous foreigners who, during the peace, resorted to Paris. In fact, during the year 1802, the capital presented an interesting and animated spectacle. All Paris flocked to the Carrousel on review-days, and regarded with delight the unusual sight of the vast number of English and Russians, who drove about in splendid carriages. Never since the assembling of the States General had the theatres been so well frequented, or fêtes so magnificent, and never since that period had the capital presented an aspect so cheering. Every where an air of prosperity was visible, and Bonaparte proudly claimed to be regarded as its author. He viewed with pleasure the rapid advance of the funds, which he considered the great political thermometer. For if he saw them increased in value from seven to sixteen in consequence of the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, he saw even this rise tripled in value after the vote of the consulship for life; and the issuing of the *senatus consultum* of the 4th of August raised them to fifty-two.

While Paris appeared thus flourishing, the departments were in a state of perfect tranquillity, and foreign affairs had every appearance of security. The re-establishment of external worship was, without doubt, one principal cause of such a happy state of things. The court of Rome, which, since the concordate, may be said to have become devoted to the first consul, gave every proof of her submission to the wishes of France. The first consul prided himself on having succeeded, at least in appearance, over the scruples of those around him who were opposed to the re-establishment of worship; and he read with much satisfaction the reports that were made to him, in which it was stated that the churches were well frequented. Indeed

during the whole of the year 1802, he directed his attention to the reformation of manners, which had become very dissolute during the storms of the revolution. The first consul took advantage of the good feeling the Pope had expressed towards him to advance his uncle, Monsieur Fesch, to the highest honours of the Church. On the 15th of August, 1802, he was consecrated bishop, and the following year received the cardinal's hat. Bonaparte afterwards gave him the archbishopric of Lyons, of which he is still the titular.

We were now at peace with all the world, and every circumstance tended to place in the hands of the first consul that absolute power which he desired, and which indeed was the only kind of government of which he was capable of forming any conception. One characteristic distinction of his government, even under the denomination of consular, gave no doubtful evidence of his real intentions. Had he designed to establish a free government, it is quite evident that he would have made the ministers responsible to the country; whereas he took care that there should be no responsibility but to himself. He beheld his ministers only as instruments to carry his intentions into effect, and which he might use as he pleased. This circumstance alone was sufficient to disclose all his future designs; and, in order to make this irresponsibility of ministers perfectly clear to the public, all government acts were signed only by M. Maret, then Secretary of State. Thus the consulship for life was nothing but an empire in disguise, and even this did not long satisfy the ambition of the first consul; he resolved to found a new dynasty. This object was attended with many difficulties, and he felt the delicacy of his position; but he knew how to face obstacles, and he had been accustomed to overcome them. It was not from the interior of France that he apprehended any difficulty to arise, but he had reason to fear that foreign powers would not view with satisfaction the re-establishment of the monarchy in a new family. So long as the throne was unoccupied, the question respecting the Bourbons was, in some measure, kept back, but the monarchical form being revived to their exclusion, naturally created an alarm amongst the family of kings. Bonaparte laboured to establish in France, not only an absolute monarchy, but what is still worse a military one. He considered a decree signed by his hand to be possessed of some magic power, capable of at once transforming his generals into able diplomatists; and so he sent them on embassies, as if to indicate to the sovereigns

to whom they were accredited that he would one day take their thrones by assault. The appointment of Lannes to the court of Lisbon arose out of circumstances which probably will be read with interest, as displaying the character of Bonaparte in its true light, and to point out the means he would often resort to when desirous to remove even his most faithful friends as soon as their presence became disagreeable to him.

Bonaparte had ceased to address Lannes in the second person singular; but that general continued the practice, and it is hardly possible to conceive how much this familiarity offended the first consul. Lannes was the only one who dared to treat Bonaparte as a fellow-soldier, or to tell him the truth without ceremony. This was enough to determine Bonaparte to remove him from his presence. But what pretext could he devise to remove the conqueror of Montebello?—that must be contrived; and in this truly diabolical machination we shall see Bonaparte bring into play that crafty disposition for which he was so remarkable. Lannes, who never looked forward to the morrow, was as prodigal of his money as he was of his blood. Poor officers and soldiers partook largely of his liberality, and these he considered as his children. Thus he had no fortune, but plenty of debts. When he wanted money, which happened very often, he came to the first consul, as if it were a matter of course, to solicit it of him, who, I must confess, never refused him. Bonaparte, though he well knew his circumstances, said to him one day, ‘My good fellow, you should attend a little more to appearances. You should have an establishment suitable to your rank. There is the Hotel de Noailles—why don’t you rent it, and furnish it in a proper style?’ Lannes, whose candour prevented him from suspecting any design, followed the advice of the first consul. The Hotel de Noailles was taken, and splendidly furnished. Odiot supplied a service of plate valued at two hundred thousand francs. After having thus conformed to the wishes of Bonaparte, he came to ask for 400,000 francs (about £16,000), the amount of the expense which had been incurred. ‘But,’ said the first consul, ‘I have not the money.’—‘You have not the money! What the devil am I to do? Is there none in the chest of the guard?’—‘Take from it what you require, and we will settle it hereafter.’ Mistrusting nothing, Lannes went to the treasurer of the guards, who at first made some objection, but gave way when he understood it was with the consent of the first consul.

Twenty-four hours had scarcely elapsed after Lannes had

obtained the 400,000 francs, when the treasurer received from the chief commissary an order to balance his accounts. The receipt for the money advanced to Lannes was not acknowledged as a voucher. It was in vain the treasurer alleged the authority of the first consul : he had on a sudden lost all recollection of the matter ; he had entirely forgotten all that passed. In a word, it was incumbent on Lannes to repay the money to the guards' chest, and, as I have said before, he had none. On this he went to General Lefebvre, who loved him as a son, and to whom he related all that had passed. 'Simpleton,' said Lefebvre, 'why did you not apply to me ? Why did you go and get into debt with that fellow ? Well, it cannot be helped, here are the 400,000 francs, take them to him, and let him go to the devil !' Lannes hastened to the first consul. 'How,' cried he, 'could you condescend to such an unworthy act ? To treat me in such a manner—to lay such a snare for me, after all that I have done for you ; after all the blood I have shed to promote your ambition ! Is this the recompense you have reserved for me ? You forget the 13th Vendemiaire, to the success of which I contributed more than you ! You forget Millesimo : I was a colonel before you ! For whom did I fight at Bassano ? You saw what I did at Lodi and at Governolo, where I was wounded ; and yet playest me such a trick as this ! But for me Paris would have revolted on the 18th Brumaire ; without me you would have lost the battle of Marengo. I alone ! yes, I alone, passed the Po at Montebello, with my whole division, though you wished to give the honour to Berthier, who was not present ; and this is the reward for my humiliation ! This cannot, this shall not, be. I will——' Bonaparte, pale with anger, listened without stirring, and Lannes was on the point of challenging him, when Junot, who heard the uproar, hastily entered. The unexpected presence of this general relieved the embarrassment of the first consul, and calmed the rage of Lannes. 'Well, then,' said Bonaparte, 'go to Lisbon ; you will get money there, and when you return, you will not want any one to pay your debts.' Thus was Bonaparte's object gained. Lannes set off for Lisbon, and, on his return, never used the obnoxious *thee* and *thouing*.

Having described Bonaparte's ill-treatment of Lannes, I may here subjoin a statement of the circumstances which led to a rupture between me and the first consul. So many false stories have been circulated on the subject, that I am anxious to relate the facts as they really were.

It was now nine months since I had tendered my resignation to the first consul. The business of my office had become too great for me, and my health was so much endangered by over-application, that my physician, M. Corvisart, who had for a long time impressed upon me the necessity of relaxation, now formally warned me, that I should not long hold out under the fatigue I underwent.

I had resolved to follow the advice of Corvisart ; my family were urgent in their entreaties that I would do so, but I always put off the decisive step. I was loth to give up a friendship which had subsisted so long, and which had been only once disturbed : on that occasion, when Joseph thought proper to play the spy upon me, at the table of Fouché. I remembered, also, the reception I had met with from the conqueror of Italy ; and I experienced, moreover, no slight pain at the thought of quitting one from whom I had received so many proofs of confidence, and to whom I had been attached from early boyhood. I was thus kept in a state of perplexity, from which some unforeseen circumstances could only extricate me. Such a circumstance at length occurred, and the following is the history of my first rupture with Napoleon :—

On the 27th of February, 1802, at ten at night, Bonaparte dictated to me a despatch, of considerable importance and urgency, for M. de Talleyrand, requesting the Minister for Foreign Affairs to come to the Tuileries, next morning, at an appointed hour. According to custom, I put the letter into the hands of the office messenger, that it might be forwarded to its destination.

This was Saturday. The following day, Sunday, M. de Talleyrand came about mid-day. The first consul immediately began to confer with him on the subject of the letter sent the previous evening, and was astonished to learn that the minister had not received it until the morning. He rang immediately for the messenger, and ordered me to be sent for. Being in very bad humour, he pulled the bell with so much fury, that he struck his hand violently against the angle of the chimney-piece. I hurried to his presence. ‘Why,’ he said, addressing me hastily, ‘why was not my letter delivered yesterday evening?’—‘I do not know : I put it into the hands of the person whose duty it was to see that it was sent.’—‘Go, and learn the cause of the delay, and come back quickly.’ Having rapidly made my inquiries, I returned to the cabinet. ‘Well?’ said the first consul, whose irritation seemed to have increased.—‘Well, General, it is

not the fault of anybody. M. de Talleyrand was not to be found, either at the office, or at his own residence, or at the house of any of his friends, where he was thought likely to be.' Not knowing with whom to be angry, and restrained by the coolness of M. de Talleyrand, yet at the same time ready to burst with rage, Bonaparte rose from his seat, and proceeding to the hall, called the messenger, and questioned him sharply. The man, disconcerted by the anger of the first consul, hesitated in his replies, and gave confused answers. Bonaparte returned to his cabinet, still more irritated than he had left it. I had followed him to the hall, and on my way back to the cabinet I attempted to soothe him, and I begged him not to be thus discomposed by a circumstance, which, after all, was of no great moment. I do not know whether his anger was increased by the sight of the blood which flowed from his hand, and which he was every moment looking at ; but however that might be, a transport of furious passion, such as I had never before witnessed, seized him ; and as I was about to enter the cabinet, after him, he threw back the door with so much violence, that had I been two or three inches nearer him, it must infallibly have struck me in the face. He accompanied this action, which was almost convulsive, with an appellation not to be borne ; he exclaimed, before M. de Talleyrand, 'Leave me alone ; you are a——fool.' At an insult so atrocious, I confess, that the anger which had already mastered the first consul, suddenly seized on me. I thrust the door forward, with as much impetuosity as he had used in attempting to close it ; and scarcely knowing what I said, exclaimed, 'You are a hundred-fold greater fool than I am.' I then went upstairs to my apartment, which was situated over the cabinet.

I was as far from expecting as from wishing such an occasion of separating from the first consul. But what was done could not be undone ; and, therefore, without taking time for reflection, and still under the influence of the anger that had got the better of me, I penned the following positive resignation :

'GENERAL,—The state of my health does not permit me longer to continue in your service. I therefore beg you to accept my resignation.

'BOURRIENNE.'

Some moments after this was written, I saw from my window the saddle-horses of Napoleon arrive at the entrance of the

palace. It was Sunday, and, contrary to his usual custom on that day, he was going to ride out. Duroc accompanied him. He was no sooner gone, than I went down into his cabinet, and placed my letter on his table. On returning, at four o'clock, with Duroc, Bonaparte read my letter. 'Ah ! ah !' said he, before opening it, 'a letter from Bourrienne.' And he almost immediately added, for the note was speedily perused, 'He is in the sulks.—*Accepted.*' I had left the Tuileries at the moment he returned ; but Duroc sent to me, where I was dining, the following billet :

'The first consul desires me, my dear Bourrienne, to inform you, that he accepts your resignation, and to request that you will give me the necessary information respecting your papers.

'Yours, DUROC.'

'P.S. I will call on you presently.'

Duroc came to me at eight o'clock the same evening. The first consul was in his cabinet when we entered it. I immediately commenced giving my intended successor the necessary explanations to enable him to enter upon his new duties. Piqued at finding that I did not speak to him, and at the coolness with which I instructed Duroc, Bonaparte said to me, in a harsh tone, 'Come, I have had enough of this ! Leave me.' I stepped down from the ladder, on which I had mounted for the purpose of pointing out to Duroc the places in which the various papers were deposited, and hastily withdrew. I, too, had had quite enough of it.

I remained two more days at the Tuileries, until I had suited myself with lodgings. On Monday I went down into the cabinet of the first consul to take my leave of him. We conversed together for a long time, and very amicably. He told me he was very sorry I was going to leave him, and that he would do all he could for me.

The following day, Tuesday, the first consul asked me to breakfast with him. After breakfast, while he was conversing with some other person, Madame Bonaparte and Hortense pressed me to make advances towards obtaining a reinstalment in my office, appealing to me on the score of the friendship and kindness they had always shewn me. They told me that I had been in the wrong, and that I had forgotten myself. I answered, that I considered the evil beyond remedy ; and that, besides, I

had really need of repose. The first consul then called me to him, and conversing a considerable time, renewed his protestations of good-will towards me.

At five o'clock I was going downstairs to quit the Tuileries for good, when I was met by the office messenger, who told me that the first consul wished to see me. Duroc, who was in the room leading to the cabinet, stopped me as I passed, and said—'He wishes you to remain. I beg of you, do not refuse ; do me this favour. I have assured him that I am incapable of filling your office. It does not suit my habits ; and besides, to tell you the truth, the business is too irksome for me.' I proceeded to the cabinet without replying to Duroc. The first consul came up to me smiling, and pulling me by the ear, as he did when he was in the best of humours, said to me—'Are you still in the sulks ?' and, leading me to my usual seat, he added—'Come, sit down.' Only those who knew Bonaparte can judge of my situation at that moment. He had at times, and when he chose, a charm in his manners which it was quite impossible to resist. I could offer no opposition, and I reassumed my usual office and my accustomed labours. Five minutes afterwards it was announced that dinner was on the table :—'You will dine with me ?' he said.—'I cannot ; I am expected at the place where I was going when Duroc called me back. It is an engagement that I cannot break.'—'Well, I have nothing to say, then. But give me your word that you will be here at eight o'clock.'—'I promise you.' Thus I became again the private secretary of the first consul, and I believed in the sincerity of our reconciliation.

Not long after this occurrence, the first consul said to me one day in a tone of interest, of which I was not the dupe—'My dear Bourrienne, you cannot really do everything. Business increases, and will continue to increase. You know what Corvisart says. You have a family ; therefore, it is right you should take care of your health. You must not kill yourself with work : therefore, someone must be got to assist you. Joseph tells me he can recommend a secretary, one of whom he speaks very highly. He shall be under your directions : he can make out your copies, and do all that can consistently be consigned to him. This, I think, will be a great relief to you.'—'I ask for nothing better,' replied I, 'than to have the assistance of someone, who, after becoming acquainted with the business, may some time or other succeed me.' Joseph sent to his brother M. Mennevalle, a young man, who, to a good education, added

the recommendations of industry and prudence. I had every reason to be perfectly satisfied with him.

I soon perceived the first consul's anxiety to make M. Mennevalle acquainted with the routine of business, and accustomed to his manner. Bonaparte had never pardoned me for having presumed to quit him after he had attained to so high a degree of power ; he was only waiting for an opportunity to punish me, and he seized upon an unfortunate circumstance as an excuse for that separation which I had previously wished to bring about.

I will explain this circumstance, which ought to have obtained for me the consolation and assistance of the first consul, rather than the forfeiture of his favour. My rupture with him has been the subject of various mis-statements, all of which I shall not take the trouble to correct ; I will merely notice what I have read in the memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo, in which it is stated that I was accused of *peculation*. M. de Rovigo thus expresses himself :—

‘Ever since the first consul was invested with the supreme power his life has been a continued scene of personal exertion. He had for private secretary M. de Bourrienne, a friend and companion of his youth, whom he now made the sharer of all his labours. He frequently sent for him in the dead of the night, and particularly insisted upon his attending him every morning at seven. Bourrienne was punctual in his attendance with the public papers, which he had previously glanced over. The first consul almost invariably read their contents himself ; he then despatched some business, and sat down to table just as the clock struck nine. His breakfast, which lasted six minutes, was no sooner over than he returned to his closet, only left it for dinner, and resumed his close occupation immediately after, until ten at night, which was his usual hour for retiring to rest.

‘Bourrienne was gifted with a most wonderful memory ; he could speak and write many languages, and would make his pen follow as fast as the words were uttered. He could lay claim to many other advantages ; he was well acquainted with the administrative departments, was versed in the law of nations, and possessed a zeal and activity which rendered his services quite indispensable to the first consul. I have known the several grounds upon which the unlimited confidence placed in him by his chief rested : but am unable to speak with equal assurance of the errors which occasioned his losing that confidence.

‘Bourrienne had many enemies ; some were owing to his

personal character ; a greater number to the situation which he held. Others were jealous of the credit he enjoyed with the head of the government ; others, again, discontented at his not making that credit subservient to their personal advantage. Some even imputed to him the want of success that had attended their claims. It was impossible to bring any charge against him on the score of deficiency of talent or of indiscreet conduct : his personal habits were watched ; it was ascertained that he engaged in financial speculations. An imputation could easily be founded on this circumstance. Peculation was accordingly laid to his charge.

‘This was touching the most tender ground ; for the first consul held nothing in greater abhorrence than unlawful gains. A solitary voice, however, would have failed in an attempt to defame the character of a man for whom he had so long felt esteem and affection ; other voices, therefore, were brought to bear against him. Whether the accusations were well-founded or otherwise, it is beyond a doubt that all means were resorted to for bringing them to the knowledge of the first consul.

‘The most effectual course that suggested itself was the opening a correspondence either with the accused party direct, or with those with whom it was felt indispensable to bring him into contact ; this correspondence was carried on in a mysterious manner, and related to the financial operations that had formed the grounds of a charge against him. Thus it is that, on more than one occasion, the very channels intended for conveying truth to the knowledge of a sovereign have been made available to the purpose of communicating false intelligence to him. I must illustrate this observation.

‘Under the reign of Louis XV., and even under the regency, the post-office was organized into a system of minute inspection, which did not indeed extend to every letter, but was exercised over all such as afforded grounds for suspicion. They were opened ; and when it was not deemed safe to suppress them, copies were taken, and they were returned to their proper channel without the least delay. Any individual denouncing another may, by the help of such an establishment, give great weight to his denunciation. It is sufficient for his purpose that he should throw into the post-office any letter so worded as to confirm the impression which it is his object to convey. The worthiest man may thus be compromised by a letter which he has never read, or the purport of which is wholly unintelligible to him.

‘I am speaking from personal experience : it once happened that a letter addressed to myself relating to an alleged fact, which had never occurred, was opened. A copy of the letter so opened was also forwarded to me, as it concerned the duties which I had to perform at that time ; but I was already in possession of the original, transmitted through the ordinary channel. Summoned to reply to the questions to which such productions had given rise, I took that opportunity of pointing out the danger that would accrue from placing a blind reliance upon intelligence derived from so hazardous a source. Accordingly, little importance was afterwards attached to this means of information ; but the system was in full operation at the period when M. de Bourrienne was disgraced : his enemies took care to avail themselves of it ; they blackened his character with M. Barbé Marbois, who added to their accusations all the weight of his unblemished character. The opinion entertained by this rigid public functionary, and many other circumstances, induced the first consul to part with his secretary.’

Peculation is the crime of those who make a fraudulent use of the public money. But as it was not in my power to meddle with the public money, no part of which passed through my hands, I am at a loss to conceive how I can be charged with peculation.

I had seen nothing of the memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo, except their announcement in the journals, when a letter from M. de Barbé Marbois was transmitted to me from my family. It was as follows :

‘SIR,

‘My attention has been called to the enclosed article in a recent publication. The assertion it contains is not true, and I conceive it to be a duty both to you and to myself to declare, that I then was, and still am, ignorant of the causes of the separation in question.—I am, etc.

‘MARBOIS.’

I need say no more in my justification. This unsolicited testimony of M. de Marbois is a sufficient contradiction to the charge of peculation which has been raised against me in the absence of correct information respecting the real causes of my rupture with the first consul.

M. de Rovigo also observes, that my enemies were numerous. My concealed adversaries were indeed all those who were

interested that the sovereign should not have about him, as his intimate confidant, a man devoted to his glory, and not to his vanity. In expressing his dissatisfaction of one of his ministers, Bonaparte had said, in the presence of several individuals, among whom was M. Maret, 'If I could find a second Bourrienne, I would get rid of you all.' This was sufficient to raise against me the hatred of all who envied the confidence of which I was in possession.

The failure of a house in Paris, in which I had invested a considerable sum of money, afforded an opportunity for envy and malignity to irritate the first consul against me. Bonaparte, who had not yet forgiven me for wishing to leave him, at length determined to sacrifice my services to a new fit of ill-humour.

A mercantile house, then one of the most respectable in Paris, had among its speculations undertaken some army contracts. With the knowledge of Berthier, with whom, indeed, the house had treated, I had invested some money in this business. Unfortunately the principals were, unknown to me, engaged in dangerous speculations in the funds, which in a short time so involved them as to occasion their failure. I incurred the violent displeasure of the first consul, who declared to me that he *no longer required my services*.

Such is a true statement of the circumstances which led to my separation with Bonaparte. I defy anyone to adduce a single fact in support of the charge of peculation, or any transaction of the kind: I fear no investigation of my conduct. When in the service of Bonaparte, I caused many appointments to be made, and many names to be erased from the emigrant list before the *senatus consultum* of the 6th Floréal, year X., but I never counted upon gratitude, experience having taught me that it was merely an empty word.

The Duke de Rovigo attributed my disgrace to certain intercepted letters which compromised me in the eyes of the first consul. I did not know this at the time, and though I was pretty well aware of the machinations of Bonaparte's adulators, almost all of whom were my enemies, yet I did not contemplate such an act of baseness. But the spontaneous letter of M. de Barbé Marbois at length opened my eyes, and left little doubt on the subject. I have already given a copy of M. Marbois's letter. The following is a postscript that was added to it:

'I recollect that one Wednesday, the first consul, while presiding in a council of ministers at Saint Cloud, opened a note,

and without informing us what it contained, hastily left the sitting, apparently much agitated. In a few minutes he returned, and observed that your functions had ceased.'

Whether the sudden displeasure of the first consul was excited by a false representation of my concern in the transaction which proved so unfortunate to me, or whether Bonaparte merely made that a pretence for carrying into execution a resolution which I am convinced had been previously adopted, I shall not stop to determine.

I retired to a house which Bonaparte had advised me to purchase at St. Cloud, and for the fitting up and furnishing of which he had promised to pay. We shall soon see how he kept this promise. I immediately sent to direct Landoire, the messenger of Bonaparte's cabinet, to place *all* letters sent to me, in the first consul's portfolio, because many intended for him came under cover for me. In consequence of this message, I received the following letter from M. Menneville :

'I cannot believe that the first consul would wish that your letters should be presented to him. I presume you allude only to those which may concern him, and which come addressed under cover to you.

'The first consul has written to citizens Lavallette and Mollien, directing them to address their packets to him. I cannot allow Landoire to obey the order you sent.

'The first consul yesterday evening evinced great regret. He repeatedly said, "How miserable I am ! I have known that man since he was seven years old."

'I cannot but believe that he will reconsider his unfortunate decision.'

A whole week passed away in conflicts between the first consul's friendship and pride. The least desire he manifested to recall me was opposed by his flatterers. On the fifth day of our separation, he directed me to come to him. He received me with the greatest kindness, and after having good-humouredly told me that I often expressed myself with too much freedom—a fault I was never solicitous to correct—he added, 'I regret your absence much. You were very useful to me. You are neither too noble, nor too plebeian ; neither too aristocratic, nor too jacobinical. You are discreet and laborious. You understand me better than anyone else ; and, between ourselves be it

said, we ought to consider this a sort of court. Look at Duroc, Bessieres, Maret. However, I am very much inclined to take you back ; but by so doing, I should confirm the report that I cannot do without you.'

I am convinced that if Bonaparte had been left to himself, he would have recalled me, and this conviction is warranted by the interval which elapsed between his determination to part with me and the formal announcement of my dismissal. Our rupture took place on the 20th of October, and on the 8th of November following the first consul sent me the following letter :

'CITIZEN BOURRIENNE, MINISTER OF STATE,

'I am satisfied with the services which you have rendered me, during the time you have been with me ; but henceforth they are no longer necessary. I wish you to relinquish, from this time, the functions and title of my private secretary. I shall seize an early opportunity of providing for you in a way suited to your activity and talents, and conducive to the public service.

'BONAPARTE.'

If any proof of the first consul's malignity were wanting, it would be furnished by the following fact : a few days after the receipt of the letter which announced my dismissal, I received a note from Duroc ; but to afford an idea of the petty revenge of him who caused it to be written, it will be necessary first to relate a few preceding circumstances.

When, with the view of preserving a little freedom, I declined the offer of apartments which Madame Bonaparte had prepared at Malmaison, for myself and my family, I purchased a small house at Ruel ; the first consul had given orders for the furnishing of this house, as well as one which I possessed in Paris. From the manner in which the orders were given, I had not the slightest doubt but that Bonaparte intended to make me a present of the furniture. However, when I left his service, he applied to have it returned. At first I paid no attention to his demand, as far as it concerned the furniture at Ruel ; and then, actuated by the desire of taking revenge, even by the most pitiful means, he directed Duroc to write the following letter to me :

'The first consul, my dear Bourrienne, has just ordered me to send him, this evening, the keys of your residence in Paris, from which none of the furniture is to be removed.

‘He also directs me to put into a magazine whatever furniture you may have at Ruel or elsewhere, which you have obtained from government.

‘I beg of you to send me an answer, so as to assist me in the execution of these orders. You promised to have everything settled before the first consul’s return. I must excuse myself in the best way I can. ‘DUROC.’

24 Brumaire, year X.
(15 Nov. 1802).

I shall only add another fact to show the malignity of the persecution Bonaparte was disposed to subject me to. On the 20th of April, Duroc sent me the following note :

‘I beg, my dear Bourrienne, that you will come to St. Cloud this morning. I have something to tell you on the part of the first consul. ‘DUROC.’

This note caused me much anxiety. I could not doubt but that my enemies had invented some new calumny ; but I must say that I did not expect such baseness as I experienced.

As soon as Duroc had made me acquainted with the business which the first consul had directed him to communicate, I wrote, on the spot, the subjoined letter to Bonaparte :

‘At General Duroc’s desire, I have this moment waited upon him, and he informs me that you have received notice that a deficit of 100,000 francs has been discovered in the treasury of the navy, which you require me to refund this day at noon.

‘Citizen First Consul, I know not what this means ! I am utterly ignorant of the matter. I solemnly declare to you that this charge is a most infamous calumny. It is one more to be added to the number of those malicious charges which have been invented for the purpose of destroying any influence I might possess with you.

‘I am in General Duroc’s apartment, where I await your orders.’

Duroc carried my note to the first consul as soon as it was written. He speedily returned. ‘All’s right,’ said he. ‘He has directed me to say it was entirely a mistake !—that he is now convinced he was deceived ! that he is sorry for the business, and hopes no more will be said about it.’

The base flatterers who surrounded Bonaparte wished him

to renew upon me his Egyptian extortions ; but they should have recollected, that the fusillade employed in Egypt for the purpose of raising money was no longer the fashion in France, and that the days were gone when it was the custom to *grease the wheels of the revolutionary car*.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE first consul never calculated upon a long peace with England, but he wished for peace because it was anxiously desired by the people, after ten years of war, and because it would increase his popularity and enable him to lay the foundation of his government. Peace was as necessary to enable Bonaparte to conquer the throne of France, as war was essential to secure it and to extend its boundaries at the expense of the other thrones of Europe. This was the secret of the peace of Amiens, and of the rupture which so suddenly followed, but it must be admitted that the war was resumed much earlier than the first consul wished. On the great questions of peace and war, Bonaparte entertained elevated ideas ; but in discussing the subject he always declared himself in favour of war, and considered as nothing the evils which it occasioned so long as England possessed so much influence in the cabinets of Europe. It was evident that England desired war, and he was anxious to prevent her from anticipating him. He said ‘Why allow her to have all the advantages of the first step ? We must astonish Europe ! We must strike a great and unexpected blow.’ Thus reasoned the first consul, and we are to judge whether his actions were not equal to his sentiments.

England, by neglecting to execute her treaties, encouraged his love for war, and justified the prompt declaration of hostilities in the eyes of the French nation, whom he wished to persuade that if peace was broken it would be contrary to his own wishes. This state of uncertainty did not continue long, for the king of England sent a message to parliament, in which he alluded to armaments preparing in the ports of France, and of the necessity of adopting precautions against meditated aggressions. This instance of bad faith irritated the first consul, and led him one day at a public levee, to address Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, in a very abrupt manner in the presence of all the foreign ambassadors.

‘What is the meaning of all this?’ said Bonaparte; ‘are you tired of peace? Must Europe again be deluged with blood? Preparations for war, indeed! Do you think to overcome us in this manner? You will see that France may be conquered but never intimidated; never!’

The English ambassador was quite astounded at this abrupt attack, to which he made no reply, but satisfied himself with communicating an account of the interview to his government.* This conduct on the part of the first consul was made the excuse for the recall of Lord Whitworth and for the renewal of hostilities, but had England not wished for war, such trifling causes could scarcely have produced it.

When the misunderstanding between France and England took place, each might have reproached the other with a want of faith, but justice was apparently on the side of France. It was evident that England, by refusing to give up Malta, according to the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, had been guilty of a breach of that treaty, whereas all that France could be charged with was an apparent tendency not to adhere to it. But it must be admitted that this tendency on the part of France to increase her territory, was evident by the fact of her having incorporated Piedmont with France, as well as Parma and

* The following is Savary’s description of this extraordinary scene:— ‘One of the receptions of the consular court was the occasion on which Bonaparte vented his displeasure on the conduct of England. He had just been reading the despatches of his ambassador at the court of London, who sent him a copy of the king’s message to parliament, respecting alleged armaments in the ports of France.

‘His mind being wholly biassed by the reflections to which the perusal of the despatches had given rise, he omitted going that day into the second saloon, but went straight up to the ambassadors. I was only at the distance of a few paces from him, when, stopping short before the English ambassador, he put the following hurried questions to him in a tone of anger: “What does your cabinet mean? What is the motive for raising these rumours of armaments in our harbours? How! Is it possible to impose in this manner upon the credulity of nations, or to be so ignorant of our real intentions? If the actual state of things be known, it must be evident to all that there are only two transports fitting out for St. Domingo: that that island engrosses all our attention, all our disposable means. Why then these complaints? Can peace be already considered as a burden to be shaken off? Is Europe to be again deluged in blood? Preparations making for war! To pretend to overawe us! France may be conquered, perhaps destroyed, but never intimidated!”

‘The ambassador made a respectful bow, and gave no reply. The first consul left that part of the saloon; but whether he had been a

Placenza, which was done by the sole authority of Bonaparte. It may therefore be supposed that the internal prosperity of France and the ambition of her ruler was the cause of uneasiness to England. But this was no excuse for her own decided bad faith in refusing to withdraw her troops from Malta within three months from the signing of the treaty ; and now more than a year had elapsed, and the troops were still there. The order of Malta was to be restored as it formerly was ; that is to say, it was to remain a sovereign and independent order under the protection of the Holy See. The three cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, were to guarantee the execution of the treaty.

Bonaparte was at St. Cloud when Lord Whitworth left Paris, on the 12th of May, 1803. Fifteen days were spent in attempts to resume negotiations, but without success, and therefore war was the only alternative. The first consul, before he made his final preparations, addressed a message to the Senate, to the Legislative Body, and to the Tribune. In this message he mentioned the recall of the English ambassador, the renewal of hostilities, the unexpected message of the king of England to the parliament, and the armaments which immediately followed in the British ports. 'In vain,' he said, 'had France tried every means to induce England to abide by the treaty. She

little heated by this explosion of ill-humour, or from some other cause, he ceased his round, and withdrew to his own apartments. Madame Bonaparte followed. In an instant the saloon was cleared of company. The ambassadors of Russia and England had retired to the embrasure of a window, and were still conversing together after the apartments had been cleared of visitors. "Indeed," said one to the other, "you could hardly expect such an attack ; how then could you be prepared to reply to it? All you have to do is to give an account of it to your government ; in the meantime, let what has taken place suggest to you the conduct you ought to pursue."

'He took the advice. The communications became cold and reserved. England had already formed her determination. A spirit of acrimony soon sprang up between the two governments.

'An interchange of notes took place ; categorical explanations were required ; the demands for passports soon followed. The latter were immediately granted by the first consul. I was in his closet at St. Cloud when M. Maret was introduced, who brought with him the corrected draft of the reply which was to accompany the passports. He had it read out to him, and expressed himself in the kindest terms respecting the personal character of Lord Whitworth, for whom he felt great regard. He was quite satisfied that on this occasion the ambassador had not at all influenced the conduct of his government.'—*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo.*

has repelled every overture, and increased the insolence of her demands—but France will not submit to menaces, but will combat for the faith of treaties and for the honour of her name, confidently trusting that the result of the contest will be such as she has a right to expect from the justice of her cause and from the bravery of her people.'

This message was dignified, and free from that boasting in which Bonaparte so frequently indulged. The reply of the Senate was accompanied by a vote of a ship of the line, to be paid for out of the allowance made to the Senate. With his usual address, Bonaparte, in acting for himself, spoke in the name of the people, just as he had done on the question of the consulate for life. But what he did then for his own interest, as I have frequently stated, turned out for the advantage of the Bourbons. Bonaparte though not yet a sovereign, absolutely required that the king of England should renounce the empty title of king of France, which had been always kept up as if to intimate that old pretensions were not abandoned. This proposition was acceded to, and to this circumstance was owing the disappearance of the title of king of France from among the titles of the king of England, at the treaty of Paris on the return of the Bourbons.

The first grievance complained of by England was the prohibition of English merchandise, which had become more rigid since the peace than during the war. This avowal on the part of Great Britain might well have dispensed with any other ground of complaint; but the truth is, she was alarmed at the aspect of our internal prosperity, and at the impulse given to our manufactures. The English government had hoped to obtain such a commercial treaty as would have been a death-blow to our rising trade; but Bonaparte opposed this, and from the very circumstance of his refusal, he might easily have foreseen the rupture at which he appeared surprised.

It was evident that the disappointment in regard to the commercial treaty was the cause of the animosity of the English government, as this circumstance was alluded to in the declaration of the king of England. In that document it was complained that France had sent a number of persons to reside at the ports of Great Britain and Ireland, in the quality of commercial agents, which character and the privileges belonging to it they could only have acquired by a commercial treaty. Such was, in my opinion, the real cause of the complaints of

England ; but as it would have seemed ridiculous to have made it the ground for a declaration of war, she enumerated other grievances, viz.—the union of Piedmont and of the States of Parma and Placenza with France, and the continuance of the French troops in Holland. Much was said about the views and projects of France with respect to Turkey, and this complaint originated in General Sebastiani, of whom I have already spoken, having been sent to Egypt. Upon this point I can take upon me to say that the English government was not misinformed. Bonaparte too frequently spoke to me of his ideas respecting the East, and of his project for finding means of attacking the English power in India, to leave any doubt of his having renounced it. The result of all the reproaches which the two governments addressed to each other was, that neither acted with good faith.

When hostilities recommenced with England, Bonaparte was quite unprepared in most branches of the service—from the numerous grants of leave of absence, the wretched condition of the cavalry, and the temporary nullity of the artillery, in consequence of a project for refounding all the field pieces. But these difficulties were overcome as if by magic. He had recourse to the conscription to complete his army—the project for refounding the artillery was abandoned—money was obtained from the large towns, and the occupation of Hanover, which soon followed, furnished an abundant supply of good horses for mounting the cavalry.

The peace of Amiens had been broken about seven months, when, on the 15th of December, 1803, the first consul sent for me to the Tuileries. His incomprehensible conduct towards me was still fresh in my mind ; and as it was upwards of a year since I had seen him, I confess I did not feel quite at ease when I received his summons. The truth is, I was so much alarmed that I had the precaution of taking with me a nightcap, lest I should be sent to sleep at Vincennes.

On the day appointed for the interview, Rapp was on duty. I did not conceal from him the fears which I entertained as to the possible result of my visit. ‘You need not be afraid,’ said Rapp, ‘the first consul merely wishes to talk with you.’ He then announced me.

Bonaparte came into the grand saloon where I awaited him, and addressing me in the most good-humoured way, inquired, after having made a few trifling observations, ‘What do they say of my preparations for the descent upon England?’

‘General,’ I replied, ‘there is a great difference of opinion on the subject. Everyone speaks as he would wish it. Suchet, for instance, who comes to see me very often, does not doubt but that it will take place, and hopes to give you on that occasion a fresh proof of his gratitude and fidelity.’ ‘But Suchet tells me that you do not believe it.’ ‘That is true, I certainly do not.’—‘Why?’—‘Because you told me at Antwerp, five years ago, that you would not risk France on the cast of a die—that it was too hazardous—and nothing has changed since that time to render it more probable.’ ‘You are right; those who believe in a descent are blockheads. They do not see the affair in its true light. I can doubtless land with one hundred thousand men. A great battle will be fought, which I shall gain; but I must calculate upon thirty thousand men killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. If I march on London, a second battle will be fought; I shall suppose myself again victorious; but what shall I do in London with an army reduced three-fourths, and without a hope of reinforcements? It would be madness. Until our navy acquires superiority, it would be a perilous project. The great assemblage of troops in the north has another object. My government must be the first, or it must fall.’ Bonaparte then evidently wished to deceive with respect to his intentions, and he did so. He wished it to be believed that he intended a descent upon England, merely to fix the attention of Europe in that direction. It was at Dunkirk that he caused all the various plans for improving the ports to be discussed, and on this occasion he spoke a great deal on his ulterior views respecting England, which had the effect of deceiving the ablest around him.

The invasion of England was the great object of attention throughout Europe during the autumn and winter of 1803. But early in the succeeding year Paris itself became the theatre of a series of transactions which for a time engrossed the public mind.

One Fauche-Borel was sent to Paris to bring about a reconciliation between Moreau and Pichegru. The latter general, who was banished on the 18th Fructidor, had not obtained the authority of the first consul to return to France. He lived in England, where he awaited a favourable opportunity for putting his old projects into execution. Moreau was at Paris, but he never appeared at the levees or parties of the first consul, and the enmity of both generals towards Bonaparte, openly avowed on the part of Pichegru, and still disguised by Moreau, was a secret to nobody. But as everything was prosperous with the

first consul, he manifested more disdain than fear of the two generals. The name of Moreau had greater weight with the army than that of Pichegru; and those who were planning the overthrow of the consular government, knew that that measure could not be attended with success without the assistance of Moreau.

The moment was not favourable; but having become initiated into some secrets of the British cabinet, they knew that the peace was but a truce, and they were desirous to profit by this circumstance to effect a reconciliation which might afterwards secure a community of interests. Moreau and Pichegru had been on bad terms since the former sent to the Directory the papers seized in M. de Klingling's carriage which placed the treason of Pichegru in the clearest light. Since that time, the name of Pichegru was without influence with the soldiers, whilst the name of Moreau was dear to all those who had conquered under his command.

The design of Fauche-Borel was to compromise Moreau without determining anything. Moreau's natural indolence, and perhaps his good sense, induced him to adopt the maxim that it is better to let men and things take their course, for temporizing in politics is not less useful than in war. Besides, Moreau was a real republican; and if his irresolution would not permit him to take a part, it is clear that he would not have assisted in re-establishing the Bourbons, which was what Pichegru desired.

What I have stated may be regarded as an indispensable introduction to the knowledge of plots of more importance, which preceded the great event which marked the close of the consulship—that is the conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal, Moreau, and Pichegru, and that indelible stain on the character of Napoleon—the death of the Duke d'Enghien. Different opinions have been expressed concerning Georges' conspiracy. I shall not contradict any of them. I will relate what I learned and what I saw of that horrible affair. I am far from believing, what I have read in many works, that it was planned by the police in order to prepare the way for the first consul mounting the throne. I think that it was projected by those who were interested, but encouraged by Fouché to favour his return to office.

To corroborate my opinion respecting Fouché's conduct and his manœuvres, I must state that towards the close of 1803, some persons conceived the project of reconciling Moreau and

Pichegru. Fouché, who was then out of the ministry, caused Moreau to be visited by men of his own party and his companions, who were induced unintentionally, by Fouché's influence, to irritate the general's mind. It was at first intended that the Abbé David, the mutual friend of Moreau and Pichegru, should undertake to effect their reconciliation ; but he being arrested and sent to the Temple, was succeeded by one Lajolais, who it was generally believed had been employed by Fouché. He proceeded to London, and having prevailed upon Pichegru and his friends to return to Paris, he set off to announce their intention, and to arrange everything for their reception and destruction. The only foundation for this intrigue was the discontent of Moreau. I remember that one day, towards the end of January, 1804, I called on Fouché, who informed me that he had been at St. Cloud, and had had a long conversation with the first consul on the situation of affairs. The first consul observed that he was perfectly satisfied with the existing police, and that it was only to increase his importance that he gave such a colouring to the picture. Fouché asked him, 'What he would say if he told him that Georges and Pichegru had been for some time in Paris to arrange the plot of which he had spoken.' The first consul, as if well pleased at the mistake of Fouché, said with an air of satisfaction, 'You are truly well informed ! Regnier has just received a letter from London, which states that Pichegru had dined at Kingston, near to the city, with one of the king's ministers.'

As Fouché still persisted in his assertion, the first consul sent to Paris for the grand judge, Regnier, who shewed the letter to Fouché. The first consul triumphed at first to see Fouché at fault ; but the latter so clearly proved that Pichegru and Georges were in Paris, that Regnier began to believe that he had been deceived by his agents ; his rival paid better than himself. The first consul seeing clearly that his old minister knew more than the new, dismissed Regnier, and remained a long time in conversation with Fouché, who said nothing as to his being reappointed, for fear of exciting suspicion. He only requested that the management of this affair might be intrusted to Real, with orders to obey all the directions and instructions which he might receive from him.

Previous to relating what I know respecting the arrest of Moreau and the other persons accused, I shall here give an account of a long interview which I had with Bonaparte in the midst of these important events.

On the 8th of March, 1804, some time after the arrest, but before the trial of Moreau, I had an audience of the first consul at eight in the morning, which was not sought by me. After having asked some unimportant questions as to what I was doing, what I expected he should do for me, and assuring me that he would bear me in mind, and other vague remarks respecting the conspiracy, he all at once gave a different turn to the conversation, and said, 'By the bye, the report of my connexion with Hortense is still kept up; and the most abominable rumours have been circulated as to her first child. I believed at the time that these reports were only circulated because the public desired that I should not be childless. Since you and I separated have you heard them repeated?'—'Yes, General, frequently; and I confess that I could not have believed that this calumny would have lived so long.'—'It is truly frightful to think of! You know the truth—you have seen all—heard all, the least circumstance could not have passed without your knowledge; you were in her full confidence when she was in love with Duroc. I therefore expect, if you should ever write anything about me, that you will clear me from this infamous report. I would not have it accompany my name to posterity. I trust to you. You have never believed this odious imputation?'—'No, General, never.' He then entered into a number of circumstances connected with the life of Hortense; on her general conduct, and on the turn which her marriage had taken. 'It has not turned out as I could have desired; their union has not been happy. I am sorry for it, not only because they are both dear to me, but because it countenances the infamous reports that the idle have circulated as to my intimacy with her.' He concluded the conversation with these words, 'Bourrienne, I have sometimes the idea of replacing you; but as there is no good pretext for doing so, it would be said that I could not do without you, and I wish it may be understood that I am not in want of anyone.' After a few other remarks about Hortense, I answered that, 'As it fully coincided with my own conviction, I would do what he desired; but that it did not depend upon me, for the truth was already known.'

Mademoiselle Beauharnois entertained for the first consul a respectful fear, and could not speak to him without trembling—she never dared to ask any favour of him. When she required to solicit anything she always applied to me, and if I found any difficulty in obtaining it, I mentioned her as the person for whom I requested it. 'The little simpleton,' said Bonaparte,

‘why does she not ask me herself? Is the girl afraid of me?’ Napoleon never cherished for her any feeling but a real paternal tenderness. He loved her, after his marriage with her mother, as he would have loved his own child. At least for three years I was a witness to all their most private actions, and I declare I never saw anything that could furnish the least ground for suspicion, nor the slightest trace of a culpable intimacy. This calumny must be classed among those which malice delights to take with the character of men who become celebrated,—calumnies which are adopted lightly and without reflection. I freely declare that, did I entertain the slightest doubt with regard to this odious charge, of the existence of which I knew very well before he spoke to me, I would avow it—but it is not true. He is no more : and let his memory be accompanied only by that, be it good or bad, which really took place ! Let not this reproach be made a charge against him by the impartial historian ! I must say, in conclusion, on this delicate subject, that his principles were rigid in an extreme degree, and that any fault of the nature charged neither entered his mind, nor was it in accordance with his morals or his tastes.

I shall now return to the events of a more public character which succeeded each other so rapidly at the commencement of 1804, and in order to form a just idea of them, it will be necessary to consider them both separately and connectedly.

Everyone possessing the slightest intelligence must be satisfied that the conspiracy of Georges, Moreau, and Pichegru, and the other parties implicated, never could have occurred had it not been for the connivance of the police. Moreau never for a moment desired the restoration of the Bourbons, and I was too well acquainted with M. Carbonnet, his most intimate friend, to be ignorant of his private sentiments. It was therefore impossible that he could entertain the same views as Georges, the Polignacs, Rivière, and others.

Without entering into all the details of this great trial, of which the death of the Duke d’Enghien was a horrible episode, I will relate some facts which may assist in eliciting the truth from a chaos of intrigue and falsehood.

Most of the conspirators were confined either in the Temple or La Force, and one of them, Bouvet de Lozier, who was confined in the Temple, endeavoured to hang himself. He had very nearly succeeded, by making use of his cravat for that purpose, when the turnkey entered and found him at the point of death. When he recovered, he acknowledged that, though he was able

to face death, he was not able to endure the examination on his trial, and that he had determined to kill himself rather than that he might be induced by fear to make any confessions. He did in fact confess, and it was on the morning when that occurred that Moreau was arrested while on his way from his country seat of Grosbois to Paris.

Fouché, by means of his agents, had given Pichegru, Georges, and some other partisans of royalty, to understand that they could count on Moreau, who it was said was quite prepared to join them. It is certain that Moreau informed Pichegru that he had been deceived; for that, as for himself, he had never been spoken to on the subject. Rusillon declared on the trial, on the 14th of March, that the Polignacs had said to someone—‘Everything seems bad—they do not understand each other. Moreau has not kept his word—we are deceived.’ M. Rivière also declared that he soon discovered that they were deceived, and that he was about to return to England when he was arrested—indeed, when they learned Moreau’s declaration from Pichegru, the whole of the conspirators were preparing to leave Paris, when they were all arrested almost at the same time. Georges was going into La Vendée, when he was betrayed by the man who, with the connivance of the police, had accompanied him since his departure from London, and who had preserved him from all surprise so long as it was not necessary to know where he was and what he was about.

The almost simultaneous arrest of the conspirators proved that the police knew well where they were to be found.

When Pichegru was required to sign his interrogations, he refused to do so, as he suspected the police might have discharged the writing by some chemical process, and filled it up with statements which he had never made. Some fear was entertained lest he should have made disclosures respecting his connexion with Moreau, whose destruction was sought for, and as to the means made use of by the police to instigate the conspirators.

On the evening of the 15th of February, I learned that Moreau had been arrested, and early next morning I went to the Rue St. Pierre, where M. Carbonnet resided with his nephew, to learn the particulars of the general’s arrest. What was my surprise! when, before I could put the question to the porter, he informed me that M. Carbonnet and his nephew were both arrested. ‘I advise you, sir,’ said the porter, ‘to retire instantly, for the persons who call upon M. Carbonnet are watched.’ ‘Is he still

at home ?' said I. 'Yes : they are examining his papers. 'Then,' replied I, 'I will go up.' M. Carbonnet, of whose friendship I have reason to be proud, and whose memory is dear to me, was more distressed at the arrest of his nephew and of Moreau than by his own. His nephew was, however, liberated after a few hours, and he himself was sent to solitary confinement at Saint Pelagie.

Thus the police, who knew nothing, quickly became informed of everything. In spite of the numerous police agents throughout France, it was only discovered by the declarations of Bouvet de Lozier that three successive landings had been quietly effected ; and that a fourth was expected, but which did not take place because General Savary was sent by the first consul to seize those who might land. There cannot be a better proof of the devotion of the police to their old chief, and their combined determination to mislead the new minister.

It must be kept in mind that all Bonaparte's schemes tended to one object—the foundation of the French empire in his favour ; and it is also important to consider how the situation of the emigrants, as regards the first consul, had changed since the peace had been broken.

As long as Bonaparte was at peace with other governments, the cause of the Bourbons had no support in foreign cabinets, and the emigrants had no alternative but to submit to circumstances ; but on the renewal of war all was changed. The cause of the Bourbons became that of all the powers at war with France, and the war had also the effect of uniting the emigrants abroad with those who had returned and who were dissatisfied ; there was reason to fear something from their hostility, in conjunction with the powers armed against Bonaparte.

Such was the state of things, with regard to the emigrants, when the chiefs and accomplices of the conspiracy of Georges were arrested at the commencement of the year 1804. The assassination of the Duke d'Enghien took place on the 21st of March ; on the 30th of April the proposition was made to the Tribune to found in France a government in the person of one individual ; on the 18th of May the Senate named Napoleon Bonaparte emperor ; and lastly, on the 10th of June, Georges and his accomplices were condemned. Thus the shedding of the blood of a Bourbon and the placing the crown of France on the head of a soldier of fortune, were two acts interpolated into the bloody drama of Georges' conspiracy.

It must also be borne in mind that at this time we were at

war with England, and on the point of seeing Austria and the Colossus of the North coalescing against our new emperor.

I shall now relate a few of the particulars respecting the melancholy death of the Duke d'Enghien. That unfortunate prince, who was at Ettenheim in consequence of a love affair, had no communication with those parties who were preparing a plot in the interior. Moreau was arrested on the 15th of February, 1804, at which time the conspiracy was known. Pichegru and Georges were also arrested in February, and the Duke d'Enghien not till the 15th of March. Now, if the prince had really been concerned in the conspiracy, or if he had even known of it, would he have remained at Ettenheim for a moment after the arrest of his pretended accomplices, the intelligence of which he could have received in three days? He was so entirely a stranger to it, that when informed of the affair at Ettenheim, he declared, that if it was true his father and grandfather would have informed him of it for his own personal safety. The sentence of death against Georges and his companions was not passed until the 10th of June, 1804, and the Duke d'Enghien was shot on the 21st of March, before the trials had even commenced. How is this precipitation to be explained? If, as Napoleon said, the young Bourbon was their accomplice, why was he not arrested at the same time as the others? Why was he not tried with them, or why was the name of the illustrious accused not once mentioned in the course of that awful trial? or was it that his answers might have thrown light upon the mysterious affair? It is absolutely impossible that any reasonable person can regard the Duke d'Enghien as an accomplice in Cadoudal's conspiracy, and Napoleon has basely attempted to impose upon his contemporaries and posterity by lending his authority to the falsehoods which were invented to screen him from the odium which will ever be attached to his name for this atrocious act.

Had I then been in the first consul's intimacy, I believe that the blood of the Duke d'Enghien would never have stained the glory of Bonaparte, because I believe that I could have succeeded in dissuading him from his fatal design, as I knew that his object was merely to frighten the emigrants from Ettenheim, where great numbers had sought refuge.

It has been said that a letter was written to Bonaparte by the Duke d'Enghien, offering him his services, and soliciting a command in his army, and that it was not delivered until after the execution. This is atrociously absurd. His interrogatory makes no mention of this letter—the truth is, no such

letter ever existed, nor is it to be supposed that the prince would have entertained such sentiments. The individual who was with the prince declares that he never wrote it, and I shall never believe that anyone would have dared to withhold from Bonaparte a letter on which depended the fate of so august and so elevated a victim.

In his declarations at Saint Helena, Napoleon endeavoured to free himself of the crime, by stating that if he had received any application from the prince he would have pardoned him. But if we compare all that he said, which has been transmitted to us by his faithful followers, we shall find so many contradictions that the truth cannot be doubted. Napoleon would not confess the real cause of the death of the Duke d'Enghien ; but inexorable history will relate that he was proclaimed emperor three months after his assassination, and, less indulgent than his contemporaries, she will not attach any blame to chance, to criminal zeal, or to intrigue.

This sanguinary scene took place at the Castle of Vincennes. It was General Ordener, commandant of the horse grenadiers of the guard, who received orders from the minister at war to proceed to the Rhine, to give instructions to the chiefs of the gendarmerie of New Brissac, which was placed at his disposal. This general sent a detachment of gendarmerie to Ettenheim, where the Duke d'Enghien was arrested on the 15th of March. He was immediately conducted to the citadel of Strasbourg, where he remained until the 18th, to give time for orders being received from Paris. These orders were given rapidly, and promptly executed, for the carriage which conveyed the unfortunate prince arrived at the barrier at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 20th. It remained there for five hours, and then departed by the exterior boulevards on the road to Vincennes, where it arrived at night. Every scene of this horrible affair took place during the night—the sun did not even shine upon its tragic close. The soldiers had orders to proceed to Vincennes during the night ; it was at night that the fatal gates were closed upon the prince—at night the council assembled to try him, or rather to condemn him without trial. When the clock struck six in the morning of the 21st of March, the order was given to fire, and the prince ceased to live. Here let me be permitted to make a reflection. When the dreadful intelligence of the death of the Duke d'Enghien reached Paris, it excited a feeling of consternation which recalled the recollection of the days of terror. Ah ! if Bonaparte

could have seen the gloom which pervaded the capital, and compared it with the joy which was exhibited on the day when he returned victorious from the field of Marengo, he would have considered that he had tarnished his glory with a stain which nothing could ever efface.

After receiving the fatal intelligence of this event, I determined to go to Malmaison to wait upon Madame Bonaparte ; knowing, from her sentiments towards the house of Bourbon, that she would be in the deepest affliction. I had sent a messenger to know whether it would be convenient for her to see me, a precaution which I had never previously observed, but which I judged to be proper on the present occasion. On my arrival I was immediately introduced into her boudoir, where she was alone with Hortense and Madame Remusat ; I found them all deeply afflicted. ‘Bourrienne,’ said Josephine, as soon as she perceived me, ‘what a dreadful event ! If you but knew the state of mind he has been in for some time,—he avoids, he fears the presence of anyone. Who could have suggested to him such an act as this ?’ When I acquainted Josephine with the particulars which had come to my knowledge, she exclaimed, ‘What barbarity ! But no reproach can rest with me, for I did everything to dissuade him from this fatal project. He did not confide in me, but you know how I am able to guess—and he acknowledged all. But how harshly he repelled my entreaties ! I clung to him—I threw myself at his feet ! “Meddle with what concerns you !” he exclaimed with violence, “This is not the business of women—leave me.” He repulsed me with a violence which he had not done since our first interview after your return from Egypt. Gracious God ! what will become of us ?’

I had nothing to say to calm the grief of Madame Bonaparte, for I participated in her affliction, and only could express my regret that Bonaparte should have been guilty of such a crime. ‘What,’ said Josephine, ‘is the opinion of Paris ? I am sure he must be hated, for even here his flatterers seem astounded when they are out of his presence. How wretched have we been since yesterday ; and he !—you know what he is when he is dissatisfied with himself—no one dares speak to him, and all is mournful around us. What a commission he gave to Savary ! You know I don’t like him, for he is one of those whose flatteries will contribute to ruin Bonaparte. Ah, well ! Savary came yesterday to me to fulfil a sad commission which the Duke d’Enghien gave to him before his death.—‘Here,’ she continued, ‘is his portrait and

a lock of his hair, which he has requested me to send to one who was dear to him. Savary almost shed tears when he related to me the last words of the duke ; then endeavouring to recover his self-possession, he said, "It was impossible to witness the death of such a man without feeling the bitterest emotion."

CHAPTER XX.

THE immediate consequences of the death of the Duke d'Enghien were not confined to the general consternation which that event produced in the capital. The news spread rapidly through the provinces and foreign countries, and everywhere carried astonishment and sorrow. There is a class of society which possesses great influence in the provinces, called the 'Gentry of the Chateaux,' and who may be said to form the provincial *faubourg Saint Germain*. The opinion of these gentry of the Chateaux had been hitherto not unfavourable to the first consul, for he reduced the rigour of the law of hostages, which had been felt very severely by them. He therefore had succeeded to a great degree in conciliating them, but the news of the death of the Duke d'Enghien alienated from him minds which were still wavering, and even those who had changed. This act of tyranny dissolved the charm which had created hope from his government, and awakened affections which had hitherto slumbered.

The consequences were not less important, and might have become serious, as respected foreign courts. I was informed from very good authority, that so soon as the Emperor Alexander received the news, it was clear that England might entertain hopes of forming a new coalition against France. Alexander openly expressed his indignation ; and I learned that Pitt, when informed of the death of the French prince, had said, that Bonaparte had done himself more mischief than England had been able to do him since the declaration of war. Pitt was not the man to feel much concern for the death of anyone ; but he understood and seized all the advantages which were given him by so great a political error on the part of his most formidable enemy.

The policy of the cabinet of Vienna prevented the manifestation of its displeasure by remonstrances or by any other act ; and the presence of the French troops in Hanover prevented

the court of Berlin from expressing any commiseration, at least, beyond the closet of the queen ; but it is certain that this circumstance changed very much the disposition of the sovereigns towards the first consul, and hastened the negotiations which England was secretly carrying on with Austria and Prussia.

The death of the Duke d'Enghien was a horrible episode to the proceedings of the great trial which was then preparing, and which was quickly followed by the elevation of Bonaparte to the imperial dignity. It was not one of the least singular anomalies of this period, that the judgment by which criminal enterprises against the republic was condemned, was pronounced in the name of the emperor who had so evidently destroyed that republic. By means of this subtlety he at first declared himself Emperor of the Republic, as a preliminary to his proclaiming himself Emperor of the French. Really when we look at both sides, it is impossible not to admire the genius of Bonaparte—his temerity in advancing towards his object, and his skilful employment of suppleness and audacity. It made him sometimes dare fortune and sometimes avoid insurmountable difficulties, to arrive at not merely the throne of Louis XVI. but at the reconstructed throne of Charlemagne.

But it is not my object to reason on history ; I shall merely relate what I saw at the time, and what I have since learned, of the different phases of the trial of Georges, Pichegru, and Moreau, and of other persons accused. I myself heard all the debates and examinations on this trial, and I am therefore enabled to say that from all I heard I was convinced that Moreau was not a conspirator.

It has been stated that Moreau was arrested on the day after Bouvet de Lozier made his confession ; and Pichegru was taken by means of the most infamous treachery of which a man could be capable. The police officers were unable to discover his retreat, when an old friend, who had given him an asylum, was induced to deliver him up for one hundred thousand crowns. This infamous fellow gave an exact description of the chamber which Pichegru occupied ; and, in consequence of this information and by means of false keys, the police were able to seize in bed the conqueror of Holland.

It was on the night of the 22nd of February that Pichegru was arrested, and the deceitful friend who gave him up was named Le Blanc. I had entirely lost sight of Pichegru since we left Brienne, for he was also a pupil of that establishment ; but as he was older than us, he was already a tutor when we

were only scholars ; and I very well recollect that it was he who caused Bonaparte to repeat the four first rules of arithmetic. There is also this other singular circumstance, that Pichegru and Bonaparte were both made lieutenants of artillery at the same time. What a difference in their destiny ! While the one was preparing to mount a throne, the other was a solitary prisoner in a dungeon of the Temple.

Forty days had elapsed since the arrest of Pichegru, when on the morning of the 6th of April he was found dead in the dungeon which he occupied in the Temple. He had undergone ten examinations, but had neither made any confessions nor compromised anyone ; but all his declarations led it to be expected that he would speak out boldly and publicly during the solemnity of his trial. He said, ‘ When I am before my judges, my language will be conformable to truth, and to the interests of my country ’ ; and I am satisfied that he would have kept his promise, for he was distinguished by firmness and resolution of character, differing in this respect from Moreau, who was much influenced by his wife.

There can be no doubt but that Pichegru was strangled in prison to prevent his making any disclosures which might have been disagreeable. His death was therefore considered necessary, and this necessity was its real cause.

Immediately on Pichegru’s death, the other prisoners were informed of the fact ; and, as they were all acquainted with him, none would believe he had committed suicide—what then must have been their horror !

Moreau was not treated with the same rigour as the other prisoners ; nor, indeed, would it have been safe to have done so, for even in his prison he received the homage and respect of the military, not excepting even those who were his guards. Many of the guards had served under him, and they could not forget how much he was beloved by the soldiers. There was in Paris a general conviction, that if Moreau had ventured to say a word to the soldiers in whose charge he was, that that jailer-guard would have immediately formed itself into a guard of honour, ready to execute all that might be necessary for the safety of the conqueror of Hohenlinden. It was, therefore, perhaps, only owing to the respect with which he was treated, and in being indulged in daily seeing his wife and child, as also from his confidence in the injustice of the charges made against him, that he appeared to submit with indifference and resignation.

Napoleon had been declared emperor about ten days, when on

the 28th of May the trials commenced. No similar event which has since occurred can convey any idea of the excitement which pervaded Paris. The indignation caused by the arrest of Moreau was openly manifested, and could not be restrained by the police. Public opinion had been successfully misled with respect to Georges and others, who were considered as assassins in the pay of England, but the case was very different as concerned M. de Polignac, de Rivière, Charles d'Hosier, and, above all, Moreau. It was necessary to surround him with a guard to restrain the curiosity of the people and the anxiety of his friends, but care was taken that it should not be so strong as to become a rallying point, should the voice of a chief, so honoured by the army, call upon it for defence. A movement in favour of Moreau was considered very possible—by some it was desired, by others it was dreaded. I am satisfied that it would have taken place if the judges had capitally condemned him.

It is impossible to form any idea of the crowd which incommoded all the passages of the Palace of Justice on the day the trials commenced, and this crowd continued during the twelve days the trials lasted, and particularly on the day the sentence was passed. Persons of the first rank were desirous to be present.

Two facts most forcibly obtruded themselves on my attention during the proceedings—the one, the violence of the president of the court towards the prisoners; and the other, the innocence of Moreau. But in spite of the most crafty and skilful examination, Moreau never once fell into the least contradiction, and it was perfectly evident that he was an entire stranger to all the plots and intrigues which had been planned in London. In fact, during the whole trial, I did not discover the shadow of a connexion between him and the other prisoners, nor was there scarcely one of the thirty-nine witnesses who were heard for the prosecution who knew him, and he himself declared that there was not one among the accused whom he knew, or whom he had ever seen before. His appearance was as calm as his conscience, and as he sat on the bench he appeared as one led by curiosity to be present, rather than as one of the accused, who might be condemned to death.

But for the shot which killed Moreau in the ranks of the enemy—but for the foreign cockade which disgraced the hat of the conqueror of Hohenlinden, his complete innocence would long ago have appeared beyond a doubt.

There was a circumstance which occurred at one of the sittings

which almost produced an electrical effect. I think I still see General Lecourbe, the worthy friend of Moreau, entering unexpectedly into the court with a young child, and taking it up in his arms, he exclaimed with a strong voice and with considerable emotion—‘Soldiers, behold the son of your general!’ At this unexpected movement, all the military present rose and spontaneously presented arms, and at the same time a murmur of applause spread through the crowd. It is certain, that had Moreau at that moment said a word, such was the enthusiasm in his favour, that the tribunal would have been broken up and the prisoners liberated. But he remained silent, and appeared the only unconcerned person in court.

Georges was far from exciting the same interest as Moreau—he was an object of curiosity rather than of interest, and he regarded his fate with a fierce kind of resolution; he had the manners and bearing of a rude soldier, but under his coarse exterior he concealed the soul of a hero. In all that concerned himself he was perfectly open, but in whatever tended to compromise his associates, he maintained the most obstinate silence notwithstanding every attempt was made to overcome his firmness.

In the course of the trial, the greatest interest was felt for M. de Polignac, d’Hosier and d’Rivière. So short a period had elapsed since the proscription of the nobility, that independently of every feeling of humanity, it was certainly impolitic to bring before the public the heirs of an illustrious name, endowed with that devoted heroism which could not fail to extort the admiration of all. The accused were all young, and their situation created the greatest sympathy. The greater number disdained to have recourse to a denial, and seemed less anxious to preserve their lives than for the honour of the cause in which they had engaged. Even when the sword of the law was suspended over their heads, the faithful servants of the Bourbons displayed on every occasion their attachment and fidelity. I recollect that the court was dissolved in tears, when the president having argued as a proof of the guilt of M. de Rivière, that he had worn a medalion of the Count d’Artois, M. de Rivière requested that he might be allowed to examine it; on its being handed to him he kissed it, and pressed it to his heart, and on returning it, he said that he only wished to render homage to a prince he loved.

The court was still more deeply affected on witnessing the generous fraternal combat which took place during the last

sitting but one, between the two Polignacs. The emotion was general when the eldest of the two brothers, after having declared that his going out alone and during the day did not look like a conspirator anxious for concealment, added these remarkable words, which will always remain engraven on my memory—‘I have now only one wish, which is, that as the sword is suspended over our heads and threatens the existence of several of the accused, you would, in consideration of his youth, if not of his innocence, spare my brother, and upon me let fall the whole weight of your vengeance.’ On the following day, before the fatal sentence was pronounced, M. Jules de Polignac addressed the court, saying, ‘I was so deeply affected yesterday by the discourse of my brother, that I was not able to give my attention so as to be able to make a proper reply, but as I am now perfectly tranquil, I entreat, gentlemen, that you will not regard what he urged in my behalf. I repeat on the contrary and with more justice, if one of us must become a sacrifice, if there is yet time, save him ;—restore him to the tears of his wife ; I am single. Like him I can meet death unappalled,—too young to have tasted the pleasures of life, I cannot regret their loss.’—‘No, no,’ exclaimed his brother, ‘you are still in the outset of your career, it is I who ought to suffer.’

At eight in the morning the members of the tribunal withdrew to the council chamber. Since the commencement of the trial, the crowd in place of diminishing seemed each day to increase, and on this morning, although the sentence was not expected until a late hour, no one quitted the court lest he should be unable to find a place when the court resumed its sitting. Sentence of death was passed upon Georges Cadoudal, Bouvet de Lozier, Rusillon, Rochelle, Armand de Polignac, Charles d’Hosier, de Rivière, Louis Ducorps, Picot, Lajolais, Roger, Coster-Saint-Victor, Deville, Gaillard, Joyaut, Burban, Lemercier, Jean Cadoudal, Lelan, and Merille ; while Jules de Polignac, Leridan, General Moreau, Roland, and Hisay, were only condemned to two years’ imprisonment.

When the sentence was pronounced, it filled the whole assembly with consternation, and it soon spread through Paris. I may well affirm it to have been a day of public mourning ; and although it was Sunday, every place of amusement was deserted. To the horror inspired at the sentence of death wantonly passed upon so many victims, the greater part of whom belonged to the most distinguished classes in society, was

added the ridicule inspired at the condemnation of Moreau, of the absurdity of which no one seemed more sensible than Bonaparte, who expressed himself respecting it in the most pointed terms.

As soon as the special tribunal had pronounced its sentence, Murat, Governor of Paris and brother-in-law to the emperor, sought his presence, and conjured him to spare all the prisoners, observing that such an action would add more to his glory at the commencement of his reign than their death would add security to it. Such was the conduct of Murat, but he did not solicit pardon for anyone in particular. Those who obtained the imperial clemency were Bouvet de Lozier, Rusillon, de Rivière, Rochelle, Armand de Polignac, d'Hosier, Lajolais and Armand Gaillard.

The other unfortunate victims of a sanguinary police underwent their sentence on the 25th of June, two days after the announcement of the pardon of the others. Their courage and resolution never forsook them for a moment; and Georges, knowing that it was rumoured that he was pardoned, entreated that he might die first, that his companions in their last moments might know that he had not survived them.

CHAPTER XXI.

FOR a long time the agents of government had been instructed throughout France to solicit for the first consul, in the name of the people, that which the people did not want, but which Bonaparte wished to take whilst he appeared to yield to the general will, namely, the sovereign power, without restrictions and free from the subterfuge of denomination. The opportunity of the conspiracy which had been discovered, and of which some account has been given in the preceding chapter, was a circumstance not to be omitted; and it was eagerly laid hold of by all the authorities, civil, military, and ecclesiastical, who sent in an immense number of addresses, congratulations, and thanksgivings on the occasion. The greater part of these addressers did not confine themselves to mere congratulation, but they even entreated Bonaparte to consolidate his work; the true meaning of which was that he should assume imperial and hereditary power.

In this scene of the grand drama Bonaparte played his part

with his accustomed talent, and carefully kept himself in the background, and left to others the preparation of his measures.

The Senate, who took the lead in this affair, did not fail, while congratulating the first consul on his escape from '*the daggers of England*,' as they were termed, to entreat him not to delay the completion of his work. For some reason, which is not exactly known, Bonaparte allowed this address of the Senate to remain unanswered for nearly a month, and when he did answer it he merely requested that the intention of the address might be more clearly expressed. These negotiations between the Senate and Bonaparte being secret were not immediately published—he only sought publicity when he wished to communicate results. To obtain the result he desired, it was necessary that the project he was maturing should be proposed in the Tribune, and the tribune Curée had the honour of proposing officially the conversion of the consular republic into an empire, and the elevation of Bonaparte to the title of emperor with the rights of hereditary succession.

Curée developed his proposition to the Tribune in the sitting of the 30th of April, at which I was present. He commenced by describing all the evils which had overwhelmed France during the various governments which had succeeded each other since the constituent assembly, and concluded thus: 'I move, therefore, that we transmit to the Senate our wishes, which are those of the whole nation, and which have for their object, 1st, That Napoleon Bonaparte, now first consul, be declared emperor, and under that title continue at the head of the French republic; 2nd, That the imperial dignity be declared hereditary in his family; 3rd, That those of our institutions, which are as yet but traced out, be definitely settled.' Such was the apologetic harangue of Curée; and I saw a number of the members crowding to the Tribune to have their names enrolled so as to speak on this question—and each enlarged upon what had been said by the producer of the proposition, which had so evidently emanated from him to whom it was finally to return. Each speech was, in short, more adulatory than the preceeding.

The Tribune having adopted the propositions of Curée, there was no longer any motive for concealing the first overtures of the Senate; *the pear was then ripe*, and the address of the Senate was accordingly published forty days after date.

To give greater solemnity to their proceedings, the Senate proceeded in a body to the Tuileries, and Cambacères as president pronounced the address. Speaking in the name of the Senate, he said, among other things, 'That at sight of the danger from which Providence has saved the hero destined to fulfil her designs, the first observation which naturally arose was, that to meditate the destruction of the first consul was to meditate the destruction of France. Give us, then, institutions so combined that their system may survive you. You will found a new era, but you must eternize it ; glory is nothing unless it be permanent. Great man, finish your work, and render it immortal as your glory. You have extricated us from the chaos of the past ; you enable us to enjoy the blessings of the present ; guarantee to us the future.' No one could resist such flattery.

By this reply of the Senate the most important step was performed, and there now remained little but the mere ceremonies to regulate, and the formula to fill up. These various arrangements occasioned a delay of fifteen days ; and at length, on the 18th of May, Napoleon was, for the first time, greeted by the appellation of Sire by his former colleague, Cambacères, who, at the head of the Senate, went to present to the new emperor, the organic *senatus consultum* relative to the foundation of the empire. Napoleon was at St. Cloud, whither the Senate repaired in state. After the speech of Cambacères, in which they had heard applied for the first time the designation of majesty, the emperor replied—

'All that can contribute to the welfare of the country is essential to my happiness. I accept the title which you believe to be useful for the glory of the nation. I submit to the sanction of the people the law of hereditary succession. I hope that France will never repent the honour with which she may surround my family. At all events, my spirit will not be with my posterity, when they cease to merit the love and confidence of the great nation.'

Cambacères then went to congratulate the empress, and thus was realized to Josephine the prediction which I had made to her three years before at Malmaison.

Bonaparte's first act as emperor, on the very day of his elevation to the imperial throne, was the nomination of Joseph to the dignity of grand elector, with the title of imperial highness. Louis was raised to the dignity of constable, with the same title ; and Cambacères and Lebrun were created arch-chancellor and arch-treasurer of the empire.

On the following day the emperor came to Paris to hold a levee at the Tuileries, for he was not a man to delay the gratification that pride and vanity derived from his new title. The assembly was the most brilliant and numerous that had yet been known. Bessières, colonel of the guards, presented an address in their name, to which the emperor replied—‘I know the sentiments the guards cherish towards me, and I repose entire confidence in their bravery and fidelity. I constantly behold, with increasing pleasure, companions in arms who have escaped from so many dangers, and who are covered with honourable wounds. I always feel a sentiment of satisfaction when I look at the guards, when I think that there has not been one battle fought for the last fifteen years in which some of them have not taken a part.’

On the same day, all the generals and colonels in Paris were presented by Louis in his character of constable. In a few days everything assumed a new aspect. The general admiration was loud, but in secret the Parisians laughed at the awkward appearance of the new courtiers, which greatly displeased Bonaparte.

To give all possible solemnity to his accession, Napoleon ordered that the Senate itself should proclaim in Paris the organic *senatus consultum*, which entirely changed the constitution of the state; and the day fixed for this ceremony was Sunday, the 30th Floréal.

The day after Bonaparte’s accession the old formulas were restored. The emperor decided that he should give to the French princes and princesses the title of Imperial Highness, and that his sisters should take the same title; that the grand dignitaries of the empire should be called *Serene Highness*; that the princes and titulars of the grand dignitaries should be addressed by the title of Monseigneur; that the ministers of state should have the title of Excellency, to which should be added that of Monseigneur in the petitions addressed to them; and that the title of Excellency should be given to the president of the senate.

At the same time Napoleon appointed the first marshals of the empire, and determined that they should be called Monsieur le Marshal, when addressed verbally, and Monseigneur in writing. The following are the names of these sons of the republic, transformed by the wish of a brother-in-arms into supports of the empire:—Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Masséna, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier,

Ney, Davoust, Bessières. The title of marshal was also granted to the senators, Kellerman, Lefebvre, Perignon, and Serrurier.

We have seen with what skill Bonaparte avoided the provisions of the consular constitution, by which he was prevented from acting as commander-in-chief beyond the territory of the republic, by giving the title of the army of reserve to the army of Marengo. This constitution was not retained when he was raised to the imperial dignity.

This difficulty having been removed, there can be no doubt that his thirst for war was thereby increased, and that he was desirous to distinguish himself under his new title. From my intimate acquaintance with his character, I believe I am fully warranted in stating that he endeavoured, by means not strictly just, to bring about a continental war. In this respect he had a great advantage in not being restrained by self-love, or any fear of offending any of the other powers—he was desirous of making everything yield to him, and of constantly assuming his own superiority. I have before stated that Bonaparte never seriously contemplated the invasion of England, but merely made use of it as a pretext to assemble together a large army—to mislead the continental powers—to alarm England by the fears of invasion, and to increase the enthusiasm of his army. These projects Bonaparte confided to no one; not even to his ministers; and this plan, of which he alone was capable, appears to me the great miracle of modern times.

During the first year of his reign Napoleon retained the fête of the 14th of July, which recalled the recollection to two great popular triumphs—the taking of the Bastille, and the first federation. This year it fell on a Saturday, but the emperor ordered its celebration to be held on the Sunday; which was in conformity with his sentiments respecting the concordate: ‘What renders me,’ he said, ‘most hostile to the re-establishment of the Catholic worship, are the numerous festivals formerly observed. A saint’s day is a day of idleness, and I do not wish that, as people must labour in order to live. I shall consent to four holidays during the year, but to no more; if the gentlemen from Rome are not satisfied with that, they may take their departure.’ The loss of time appeared to him so great a calamity, that he scarcely ever failed to unite an indispensable solemnity to some day already devoted to sacred purposes.

On Sunday, the 15th of July, the emperor appeared for the first time before the Parisians, surrounded by all the pomp

of royalty. The members of the Legion of Honour, then in Paris, took the oath conformably with the new formula, and on this occasion the emperor and empress appeared attended by a separate and numerous retinue. They proceeded to the Hotel of the Invalids, and were received by M. Segur, who held the office of great chamberlain, and had the direction of the ceremonial. He conducted the empress to a seat prepared for her reception, opposite the imperial throne which Napoleon occupied on the right of the altar. I was present at this ceremony, notwithstanding my repugnance to such splendid exhibitions; but as Duroc had presented me with tickets two days before, I deemed it prudent, lest the searching eye of Napoleon should have remarked my absence, if Duroc had acted by his order.

I spent about an hour in observing the proud, and sometimes ludicrous demeanour of the new *grande*s of the empire; I marked the movements of the clergy, who, with Cardinal Belloy at their head, went to receive the emperor on his entrance. What a strange variety of ideas entered my mind when I beheld my former comrade and schoolfellow of Brienne seated upon an elevated throne, surrounded by a brilliant staff, the grand dignitaries of his empire, his ministers, and his marshals! I involuntarily reverted to the 19th Brumaire, and all this splendid pomp vanished away, when I thought of Bonaparte stammering to such a degree that I was obliged to pull him by the coat to induce him to withdraw. It was neither a feeling of animosity nor of jealousy which called up such reflections—for at no period of our career would I have exchanged situations; but whoever can reflect—whoever has been present at the elevation of one, who before was scarcely your equal, will probably conceive the strange ideas with which, for the first time, I was assailed on this occasion.

During the festival, the emperor announced that he would go in person to distribute the decorations of the Legion of Honour to the army assembled at Boulogne. He was not long before he fulfilled his promise. He left St. Cloud on the 18th, and travelled with such rapidity, that the next morning, whilst everyone was busy in making preparations for his reception, he was in the midst of them examining the works.

At his departure, it was generally believed at Paris that the distribution of the decorations of the Legion of Honour was only a pretext, and that the grand object to be realised was the descent on England. It was indeed only a pretext.

The emperor wished to excite still more the enthusiasm of the army, and to shew himself to the military invested with his new dignity ; to be present at some grand manœuvres, and dispose the army to obey the first signal he might give. How indeed could it be supposed, after such extensive preparations—so many transports—and the whole army ready to embark—that it really was never intended to attempt a descent upon England ? But so it was—the blow was to be struck in another quarter.

It was not far from Cæsar's tower that eighty thousand men of the camps of Boulogne and Montreuil, under the command of Marshal Soult, were assembled in a vast plain to assist in the solemnity of the distribution of the crosses of the Legion of Honour impressed with the imperial effigy. This plain, which I saw with Bonaparte in the first journey we made to the coast, before our departure to Egypt, was circular and hollow, and in the centre was a little hill. This hill formed the Imperial throne of Bonaparte in the midst of his soldiers. There he stationed himself with his brilliant staff, and around this centre of glory the regiments were drawn up in line, and looked like so many diverging rays. From this throne, which had been erected by the hand of nature, Bonaparte delivered in a loud voice the same form of oath which he had pronounced at the Hospital of Invalids a few days before. It was a signal for a general burst of enthusiasm, and Rapp, in speaking of this ceremony, told me that he never saw the emperor appear more pleased. How could he be otherwise ? Fortune then seemed obedient to his wishes. A storm came on during this brilliant day, and it was apprehended that part of the flotilla would have suffered. Bonaparte quitted the hill from which he had distributed the crosses, and proceeded to the port to direct what measures should be taken, when upon his arrival the storm ceased as if by enchantment. The flotilla entered the port safe and sound, and he went back to the camp, where the sports and amusements prepared for the soldiers commenced ; and in the evening the brilliant fire-works that were let off rose in a luminous column, which was distinctly seen from the English coast.

When he reviewed the troops, he asked the officers and often the soldiers in what battles they had been engaged, and to those who had received serious wounds he gave the cross. Here, I think, I may appropriately mention a singular piece of

charlatanism to which the emperor had recourse, and which powerfully contributed to augment the enthusiasm of his troops. He would say to one of his aides-de-camp, 'Ascertain from the colonel of such a regiment whether he has in his corps a man who has served in the campaigns of Italy or of Egypt. Ascertain his name, where he was born, the particulars of his family, and what he has done. Learn his number in the ranks, and to what company he belongs, and furnish me with the information.'

On the day of the review, Bonaparte, at a single glance, could perceive the man who had been described to him. He would go up to him as if he recognized him, address him by his name, and say—'Oh! so you are here! You are a brave fellow—I saw you at Aboukir—how is your old father? What! have you not got the cross? Stay, I will give it you.' Then the delighted soldiers would say to each other, 'You see the emperor knows us all; he knows our families; he knows where we have served.' What a stimulus was this to soldiers, whom he succeeded in persuading that they would all, some time or other, become marshals of the empire!

Lauriston told me, amongst other anecdotes relative to Napoleon's sojourn at the camp of Boulogne, a remarkable instance of intrepidity on the part of two English sailors. These men had been prisoners at Verdun, which was the most considerable depôt of English prisoners in France at the rupture of the peace of Amiens. They effected their escape from Verdun, and arrived at Boulogne without having been discovered on the road, notwithstanding the vigilance with which all the English were watched. They remained at Boulogne for some time, destitute of money, and without being able to effect their escape. They had no hope of getting aboard a boat, on account of the strict watch that was kept upon vessels of every kind. These two sailors made a boat of little pieces of wood, which they put together as well as they could, having no other tools than their knives. They covered it with a piece of sail-cloth. It was only three or four feet wide, and not much longer; and was so light that a man could easily carry it on his shoulders. So powerful a passion is the love of home and liberty! Sure of being shot if they were discovered; almost equally sure of being drowned if they effected their escape, they, nevertheless, resolved to attempt crossing the Channel in their fragile skiff. Perceiving an English frigate within sight of the coast, they pushed off, and endeavoured to reach her. They had not gone a hundred toises from the shore, when they were perceived by

the custom-house officers, who set out in pursuit of them, and brought them back. The news of this adventure spread through the camp, and the extraordinary courage of the two sailors was the subject of general remark. The circumstance reached the emperor's ears. He wished to see the men, and they were conducted to his presence, along with their little boat. Napoleon, whose imagination was struck by everything extraordinary, could not conceal his surprise at so bold a project, undertaken with such feeble means of execution. 'Is it really true,' said the emperor to them, 'that you thought of crossing the sea in this?'—'Sire,' said they, 'if you doubt it, give us leave to go, and you shall see us depart.'—'I will. You are bold and enterprising men—I admire courage wherever I meet with it. But you shall not hazard your lives.—You are at liberty; and, more than that, I will cause you to be put on board an English ship. When you return to London, tell how I esteem brave men, even when they are my enemies.' Rapp, who with Lauriston, Duroc, and many others, was present at this scene, was not a little astonished at the emperor's generosity. If the men had not been brought before him, they would have been shot as spies, instead of which they obtained their liberty, and Napoleon gave several pieces of gold to each. This circumstance was one of those which made the strongest impression on Napoleon, and he recollected it when at St. Helena, in one of his conversations with M. de Las Casas.

It was from the camp at Boulogne that Napoleon decreed the founding of the decennial premiums, the first distribution of which he intended should take place five years afterwards, on the anniversary of the 18th Brumaire, which was an innocent compliment to the date of the foundation of the consular republic. This measure also seemed to promise to the republican calendar a longevity which it did not attain. All these little circumstances passed unobserved; but Bonaparte had so often developed to me his theory of the art of deceiving mankind, that I knew their true value. It was likewise at the camp of Boulogne that, by a decree emanating from his individual will, he destroyed the noblest institution of the republic, the Polytechnic School, by converting it into a purely military academy. He knew that in that sanctuary of high study, a republican spirit was fostered; and whilst I was with him, he had often told me it was necessary that all schools, colleges, and establishments for public instruction, should be subject to military discipline. I frequently endeavoured to controvert this idea, but without success.

England was never so much deceived by Bonaparte as during the period of the encampment at Boulogne. The English really believed that an invasion was intended, and the government exhausted itself in efforts for raising men and money to guard against the danger of being taken by surprise. Such, indeed, is the advantage always possessed by the assailant. He can choose the point on which he thinks it most convenient to act, while the party which stands on the defence, and is afraid of being attacked, is compelled to be prepared in every point. However, Napoleon, who was then in the full vigour of his genius and activity, had always his eyes fixed on objects remote from those which surrounded him, and which seemed to absorb his whole attention. Thus, during the journey of which I have spoken, the ostensible object of which was the organization of the departments on the Rhine, he despatched two squadrons from Rochefort and Boulogne, one commanded by Miniessy, the other by Villeneuve. I shall not enter into any details on those squadrons ; I shall merely mention with respect to them, that while the emperor was still in Belgium, Lauriston paid me a sudden and unexpected visit. He was on his way to Toulon to take command of the troops which were to be embarked on Villeneuve's squadron, and he was not much pleased with the service to which he had been appointed.

Lauriston's visit was a piece of good fortune for me. We were always on friendly terms, and I received much information from him, particularly with respect to the manner in which the emperor spent his time :—'You can have no idea,' said he, 'how much the emperor does, and the sort of enthusiasm which his presence excites in the army. But his anger at the contractors is greater than ever, and he has been very severe with some of them.' These words of Lauriston did not at all surprise me, for I well knew Napoleon's dislike to contractors, and all men who had mercantile transactions with the army. I have often heard him say, that they were a curse and a leprosy to nations : that whatever power he might attain, he never would grant honours to any of them, and that of all aristocracies, theirs was to him the most insupportable. After his accession to the empire, the contractors were no longer the important persons they had been under the Directory, or even during the two first years of the consulate. Bonaparte sometimes acted with them as he had before done with the beys of Egypt, when he drew from them forced contributions.

It was arranged that Josephine and the emperor should meet

in Belgium. He proceeded thither from the camp of Boulogne, to the astonishment of those who believed that the moment for the invasion of England had at length arrived. He joined the empress at the castle of Laken, which the emperor had ordered to be repaired and newly furnished with great magnificence.

The emperor continued his journey by the towns bordering on the Rhine. He stopped first in the town of Aix-la-Chapelle, passed through the three bishoprics, saw, on his way, Cologne and Coblenz, which the emigration had rendered so famous, and arrived at Mentz, where his sojourn was distinguished by the first attempt at negotiation with the holy see, in order to induce the pope to come to France to crown the new emperor, and consolidate his power by supporting it with the sanction of the Church. This journey of Napoleon occupied three months, and he did not return to St. Cloud till October.

On his return Caffarelli was sent on a mission to Rome to sound the Papal court, and to induce his holiness to come to Paris to consecrate Napoleon at his coronation. I have already stated what I conceived to be the emperor's ideas on religion—that they seemed merely to be a sort of vague feeling rather than any belief founded on reflection. Notwithstanding, he had a high opinion of the power of the Church—not in being dangerous to his government, but in its influence on the great body of the people. Napoleon never could conceive how it was possible that any sovereign, wearing a crown and a sword, could submit to kneel to a pope, or to humble his sceptre before any representative of St. Peter. His spirit was too great to admit of such a thought. On the contrary, he regarded the alliance between the Church and his power as a happy means of influencing the opinions of the people, and as an additional tie which was to attach them to a government rendered legitimate by the solemn sanction of the papal authority. Bonaparte was not deceived. In this, as well as in many other things, the perspicuity of his genius enabled him to comprehend all the importance of a consecration imposed on him by the pope; more especially as Louis XVIII., without subjects, without territory, and wearing only an illusory crown, had not received that sacred unction by which the descendants of Hugh Capet became the eldest sons of the Church.

As soon as the emperor was informed of the success of Caffarelli's mission, and that the pope, in compliance with his desire, was about to repair to Paris to confirm in his hands the sceptre of Charlemagne, nothing was thought of but preparations

for that great event, which had been preceded by the recognition of Napoleon as Emperor of the French on the part of all the states of Europe, with the exception of England.

On the conclusion of the concordate Bonaparte said to me, 'I shall let the republican generals exclaim as much as they like against the mass. I know what I am about, I am working for posterity.' He was now gathering the fruits of his concordate. He ordered that the pope should be everywhere treated in his journey through the French territory with the highest distinction, and he proceeded to Fontainebleau to receive his holiness. This afforded an opportunity for Bonaparte to re-establish the example of those journeys of the old court, during which changes of ministers used formerly to be made. The palace of Fontainebleau, now become imperial, like all the old royal houses, had been newly furnished with a luxury and taste corresponding to the progress of modern art. The emperor was proceeding on the road to Nemours when couriers informed him of the approach of Pius VII. Bonaparte's object was to avoid the ceremony which had been previously settled. He had, therefore, made the pretext of going on a hunting-party, and was in the way as it were by chance when the pope's carriage was arriving. He alighted from horseback, and the pope came out of his carriage. Rapp was with the emperor, and I think I yet hear him describing, in his original manner, and with his German accent, this grand interview, upon which, however, he for his part looked with very little respect. Rapp, in fact, was among the number of those who, notwithstanding his attachment to the emperor, preserved independence of character, and he knew he had no reason to dissemble with me. 'Fancy to yourself,' said he, 'the amusing comedy that was played. After the emperor and the pope had well embraced, they went into the same carriage ; and, in order that they might be upon a footing of equality, they were to enter at the same time by opposite doors. All that was settled upon ; but at breakfast the emperor had calculated how he should manage, without appearing to assume anything, to get on the right-hand side of the pope, and everything turned out as he wished it. As to the pope,' said Rapp, 'I must own that I never saw a man with a finer countenance or more respectable appearance than Pius VII.'

After the conference between the pope and the emperor at Fontainebleau, Pius VII. set off first for Paris. On the road the same honours were paid to him as to the emperor, and he was

provided with apartments at the Temple of Flora in the Tuileries. By a delicate attention, the pope found his bedchamber arranged and furnished exactly as in his own palace of Monte-Cavallo, his usual residence in Rome.

The presence of the pope in Paris was an event so truly extraordinary, that it was scarcely believed, though it had been talked of for some time. For what, indeed, could be more singular than to see the head of the Church in a capital where only four years before all the altars had been overturned, and the small number of the faithful who remained had been obliged to worship in secret. The pope became the object of public respect and of general curiosity. I was anxious to see him, and had my wish gratified when he went to visit the imperial printing office, which was then situated where the Bank of France now is. The director of the establishment caused to be printed in the presence of his holiness a volume which was dedicated to him; which contained the *Pater Noster* in one hundred and fifty languages. There was a circumstance occurred which well deserves to be preserved in history. An ill-bred young man kept his hat on in the pope's presence: some persons, indignant at such indecorum, advanced to take it off, which occasioned some disturbance, when the pope, observing the cause, stepped up to the young man, and said to him in a tone of kindness truly patriarchal, 'Young man, uncover that you may receive my blessing. An old man's blessing never yet harmed anyone.' I can say that all who were present were deeply affected by this little incident. Pius VII. possessed a figure that commanded respect, and this may be proved to those who have not seen him, for he lives in the admirable portrait from the pencil of David.

The pope's arrival at Paris produced a great sensation in London, greater indeed than anywhere else, notwithstanding the separation of the English Church from the Church of Rome. The English ministry now attempted by every means to influence public opinion by the circulation of libels against Napoleon. Their object in doing so was, doubtless, to irritate the English people and to divert their attention from such measures as were likely to create clamour and to render themselves unpopular. The emperor's indignation against England was then roused to the extreme; and, indeed, this feeling was in some degree a national feeling in France.

Napoleon had now attained the first object of his ambition, but his ambition expanded before him like the boundless horizon.

The preparations now making for the coronation, which was shortly to take place, gave an impulse to trade which had a very favourable effect upon the mind of the trading classes in Paris. Great numbers of foreigners and people from the provinces visited the capital ; and the return to luxury and the revival of old customs gave occupation to a great variety of tradespeople, who could get no employment under the Directory, such as saddlers, carriage-makers, lacemen, embroiderers, and others. These positive interests created more partisans at Paris than either opinion or reflection, and it is but just to say that trade had not been so good for twelve years. The imperial crown jewels were exhibited to the public for some time at Biennais', the jewellers. The crown itself was of a light form, and, with its leaves of gold, appeared less the crown of France than the antique crown of the Cæsars. These valuable ornaments were deposited in the public treasury, together with the imperial insignia, which had been brought from Aix-la-Chapelle by order of Napoleon.

It can scarcely be expected that I should enter into a detail of the ceremony which took place on the 26th December, 1804—the glitter of gold, the waving plumes, and richly caparisoned horses of the imperial procession ; the mule which preceded the pope's cortège, conformable to the custom of Rome, and which excited so much merriment amongst the Parisians, have already been often described.*

* The following account of the imperial coronation will supply the omission of Bourrienne :—

'The interior of the church of Notre Dame had been newly painted: galleries and pews magnificently adorned had been erected, and they were thronged with a prodigious concourse of spectators.

'The imperial throne was placed at the end of the nave, opposite the principal entrance, and on a very elevated platform. The pontifical throne was in the choir, beside the high altar.

'The pope set out from the Tuileries, and proceeded along the quay to the archiepiscopal palace, whence he repaired to the choir by a private entrance.

'The emperor set out with the empress by the Carrousel. The procession passed along the Rue St. Honore to the Rue des Lombards, then the Pont au Change, the Palace of Justice, the court of Notre Dame, and entered the archbishop's palace. Here rooms were prepared for the whole of the retinue, each of whom were dressed in state for the occasion : some appeared in the costume of their posts of honour, others in their uniforms.

'On the outside of the church had been erected a long wooden gallery from the archiepiscopal palace to the principal entrance of the

The day after the coronation, all the troops then in Paris were assembled in the Champ's-de-Mars, to have distributed to them the eagles which were to replace the republican colours. This spectacle I really enjoyed, for it was very pleasing to see Napoleon in the uniform of a colonel of the guards in the midst of his soldiers. It brought him back to my recollection as the commander-in-chief in Italy, and of the expedition to Egypt.

church. By this gallery came the emperor's retinue, which presented a truly magnificent sight. The procession was opened by the already numerous body of courtiers : next came the marshals of the empire wearing their honours ; then the dignitaries and high officers of the crown ; and lastly, the emperor in a dress of state. At the moment of his entering the cathedral there was a simultaneous shout, which made but one explosion, of *Vive l'Empereur*. The immense quantity of figures which appeared on the sides of this vast edifice formed a tapestry of the most extraordinary kind,

'The procession passed along the middle of the nave, and arrived at the choir facing the high altar. This scene was not less imposing : the galleries round the choir were filled with the handsomest women whom the best company could produce, and most of whom rivalled in the lustre of their beauty that of the jewels with which they were covered.

'His holiness went to meet the emperor at a desk which had been placed in the middle of the choir : there was another on one side for the empress. After saying a short prayer there, they returned, and seated themselves on the throne at the end of the church facing the choir ; there they heard mass, which was said by the pope. They went to make the offering, and came back ; they then descended from the platform of the throne, and walked in procession to receive the holy unction. The emperor and empress, on reaching the choir, replaced themselves at their desks, where the pope performed the ceremony.

'He presented the crown to the emperor, who received it, put it himself upon his head, took it off, placed it on that of the empress, removed it again, and laid it on the cushion where it was at first. A smaller crown was immediately put upon the head of the empress. All the arrangements had been made beforehand ; she was surrounded by her ladies ; everything was done in a moment, and nobody perceived the substitution which had taken place. The procession moved back to the platform. The emperor there heard *Te Deum* ; the pope himself went thither at the conclusion of the service, as if to say, *Ite, missa est*. The Testament was presented to the emperor, who took off his glove, and pronounced his oath, with his hand upon the sacred book.

'He went back to the archiepiscopal palace the same way that he had come, and entered his carriage. The ceremony was very long ; the procession returned by the Rue St. Martin, the Boulevard, the Place de la Concorde, and the Pont Tournant ; it was getting dusk when the emperor arrived at the Tuileries.'

An immense platform had been erected in front of the military school, which, though now transformed into a barrack, could not have failed to recall the associations of early youth ; behind which was to be seen the throne of the emperor and empress. At a given signal all the columns closed, and approached the throne. Then Napoleon, rising, gave orders for the distribution of the eagles ; and delivered the following address to the deputations of the different corps of the army. ‘Soldiers, behold your colours ! These eagles will always be your rallying point. They will always be where your emperor will judge necessary for the defence of his throne and his people. Swear to sacrifice your lives for their defence ; and, by your courage, to keep them constantly in the path of victory—You swear.’ It would be impossible to describe the acclamations which followed this address ; there is something so seductive in popular enthusiasm, that even indifferent persons cannot avoid being carried along by it.

CHAPTER XXII.

Two events of considerable importance in the politics of Europe occurred about the time of Napoleon’s coronation. First, the conclusion of a treaty at Stockholm, on the 3rd of December, 1804, the day after the coronation, between England and Sweden, by which the former agreed to pay to the latter a considerable subsidy ; and secondly, the declaration of war between Spain and England.

The emperor, under these circumstances, was desirous to turn to account the influence of religious ideas, and the importance which the presence of the head of the Catholic Church might give to his coronation. He had affected to appear only as half a sovereign until he was consecrated ; but then he considered that he had obtained the sanction of what has been called the right divine. He therefore, about a month after that event, addressed a letter to the king of England, similar in character to that which he addressed to him immediately after the 18th Brumaire, expressing his desire to be acknowledged by him as Emperor of the French. This letter, commencing with the words, ‘Sir, my brother, called to the throne of France by Providence, by the suffrages of the Senate, the people, and the army, my first desire is peace,’ etc., was

a masterpiece of deceit ; for, most certainly, the emperor would have been very unwilling to have seen peace re-established between France and England, more especially since the declaration of war by Spain had placed at his disposal the Spanish fleet, consisting of upwards of sixty ships of the line, under the command of Admiral Gravina.

England, irritated at the impotence of her efforts against France, sought to avenge herself in a way that could not be justified ; for I consider it to be the duty of all governments to respect the rights of neutral states. Whatever might have been the submission of the cabinet of Madrid to that of the Tuileries, France alone was at war with England, nor had any of her allies, with the exception of Holland, made any demonstration of hostilities. Nothing, therefore, could justify the conduct of the British government in their interference with Spain.

Without any previous declaration of war, Admiral Moore insisted on searching four Spanish frigates, returning from Mexico to Cadiz with treasure. The Spanish commander refused to submit to the demand, when an engagement ensued, in which the Spaniards being opposed to a superior force were obliged to submit ; three of the frigates struck, and the fourth blew up. These outrages were not the only injuries which they experienced from the English cruisers ; they burned even the Spanish merchant ships in the very harbours of the Peninsula, and intercepted and captured various convoys, although M. d'Anguade was still in London, as ambassador from Charles IV. These aggressions, which were contrary to the law of nations, irritated to such a degree the Spanish king, or rather, to speak truly, his minister, the too famous Prince of Peace, that war was declared against England.

The conduct of England on this occasion seems to have been not only ill-judged, but impolitic ; and if the English government had been better informed as to the secret designs of Napoleon, they would not, in all probability, have committed such an error as to oblige Spain to join the fortunes of Napoleon. It was under these circumstances, that the letter which we have just alluded to was addressed to the king of England. Its object was to induce the belief, that he was desirous of peace, but he could not possibly be deceived as to the effect which that communication would produce in London ; and he could not be surprised when, instead of a letter from George III., whom he had styled his brother, he received a letter from the English

minister, addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It commenced thus :—‘ His majesty has received the letter addressed to him by the head of the French government ’ ; and went on to state, ‘ that nothing was nearer his majesty’s heart than the restoration of peace to his people ; but that he declined to reply, particularly without consulting the continental powers, and especially the emperor of Russia.’

This letter of the English minister made little impression upon the emperor ; for, it was delivered to him while he was at the very height of his glory, and loaded with the congratulations which poured in from all quarters. The Senate and city of Paris gave magnificent fêtes, at which the emperor and empress were present ; and, in short, his consecration was celebrated everywhere. Before the close of the year he convoked the legislative body, whose sittings he himself opened on the 27th of December, with all the pomp of the new ceremonial of the empire.

The year 1804 was fertile in great events, and it would be difficult to find in history so many circumstances exercising so great an influence on the destinies of Europe, crowded together within the short space of twelve months. The first half of the year offered the melancholy spectacle of the police machinations, of the cruel death of a young prince, and of a criminal trial which was followed by executions and pardons. The second half of the year was marked by the elevation of Bonaparte to the imperial throne ; his journey through the new departments annexed to the French territory ; and finally, by an event the most extraordinary, perhaps, of modern times—the pope’s journey to France, to dispose, in name of the Church, of a throne unoccupied, but not vacant. This eventful year was terminated by the opening of the Legislative Assembly by the emperor in person, whose speech on this occasion made a most powerful impression throughout Europe. Among other things he said—

‘ It would have afforded me pleasure, on this solemn occasion, to have seen peace reign throughout the world ; but the political principles of our enemies—their recent conduct towards Spain, sufficiently shew the difficulty of fulfilling that wish. I have no desire to aggrandize the territory of France, but to maintain her integrity. I have no ambition to exercise a greater influence over the rest of Europe, but I will not lose any of that which I have acquired. No state will be incorporated with the empire,

but I will not sacrifice my rights nor the ties which connect us with the states which I have created.'

Scarcely had the pope returned to Italy, when it was reported that the emperor intended to make a journey to Milan for the purpose of transforming the Cisalpine republic into the kingdom of Italy. This was merely a corollary from the transmutation of the consular republic into the French empire. By this, Napoleon completed the assimilation between himself and Charlemagne.

Previous to referring further to the object of this journey, I shall here briefly refer to my own appointment as minister plenipotentiary to the Dukes of Brunswick and Mecklenburg Schwerin, and to the Hanse Towns.

This appointment took place on the 22nd of March, 1805. Josephine, who had kindly promised to inform me of what the emperor intended to do for me, so soon as she should know those intentions, sent a messenger to acquaint me with my appointment, and to tell me that the emperor wished to see me.

I had not visited Josephine since her departure for Belgium, and I was so dazzled with the pomp and ceremony of the coronation, and the etiquette which was afterwards introduced, that I was deterred from presenting myself at the imperial palace.

On my arrival at Malmaison I was astonished at the good-natured familiarity with which I was received by the emperor. He came up to me with a smile, and took me by the hand, which he had never done since he was consul, and pressed it affectionately, and it was impossible for me to believe that I saw the emperor of the French and the future king of Italy. But I was too well aware of his fits of pride to allow his familiarity to lead me beyond the bounds of a proper respect. 'My dear Bourrienne,' said he, 'surely you do not think that the elevated rank which I have attained has altered my feelings towards you? No, it is not the trappings of the imperial throne which constitute my value; all those are meant for the people, but I must be valued for myself. I have been very well satisfied with your services, and have appointed you to a situation where I shall have occasion for them. I know I can rely upon you.'

He then inquired in the most friendly manner after my family, and what I had been about. In short, I never had

seen him display less reserve, or more familiarity or unaffected simplicity, which he did the more readily, because his greatness was now unquestionable. 'You know,' added Napoleon, 'that in eight days I set out for Italy; I make myself king there, but that is only a stepping-stone, I have greater designs regarding Italy. It must be a kingdom comprising all the transalpine states, from Venice to the maritime Alps. The junction of Italy with France can only be temporary; but it is necessary to accustom the population of Italy to live under common laws. The Genoese, the Piedmontese, the Venetians, the Milanese, the Tuscans, the Romans, and the Neapolitans, detest each other. None of them will acknowledge the superiority of the others, and yet Rome is, from the recollections connected with it, the natural capital of Italy. But to make it so, it is necessary to confine the power of the pope to affairs purely spiritual. I cannot accomplish all this at present, but we shall reflect upon it hereafter. On this subject I have but vague ideas, but they will be matured in time—everything depends upon circumstances. What was it that told me, when we were strutting about like two idle fellows, that I should be one day master of France? My wish—but then a vague wish. Circumstances have done the rest. It is therefore wise to be prepared for what may come, and it is what I am doing. With respect to Italy, as it will be impossible to unite her at once into one power, we shall begin by making her French, so as to accustom her to submit to one uniform law. All the small states will insensibly become assimilated, and then there will be an Italy, and I shall give her independence. But for that I must have twenty years, and who can count on that? Bourrienne, I feel pleasure in telling you all this. It was locked up in my mind; but with you I think aloud.'

I do not believe that I have altered two words of what Bonaparte said to me respecting Italy, so perfect, I may now say so without vanity, was my memory then, and so confirmed was my habit of fixing in it all that he said to me. After having informed me of his vague projects, Bonaparte, with one of those transitions so common to him, said, 'By the bye, Bourrienne, I have something to tell you. Madame de Brienne has begged that I will pass through Brienne, and I have promised that I will. I will not conceal from you that I shall feel great pleasure in again beholding the spot which for six years was the scene of our boyish sports and studies.' Taking advantage of the emperor's good-humour, I ventured to tell him what

happiness it would give me if it were possible that I could share with him the revival of recollections which were mutually dear to us. But Napoleon, after a moment's pause, said with extreme kindness, 'Hark ye, Bourrienne, in your situation and mine this cannot be. It is more than two years since we parted. What would be said of so sudden a reconciliation? I tell you frankly that I have regretted you, and the circumstances in which I have frequently been placed have often made me wish to recall you. At Boulogne I was quite resolved upon it. Rapp, perhaps, has informed you of it. He likes you, and he assured me that he would be delighted at your return. But if upon reflection I changed my mind, it was because, as I have often told you, I will not have it said, that I stand in need of anyone. No. Go to Hamburg.'

The emperor remained silent for a moment, and I was preparing to retire, but he detained me, saying in the kindest manner, 'What, are you going already—are you in a hurry? Let us have a little more chat. God knows when we may see each other again!' Then, after two or three moments' silence, he said, 'The more I reflect on our situation, on our former intimacy, and on our subsequent separation, the more I see the necessity of your going to Hamburg. Go, my dear fellow, you will find it your interest to do so. When do you think of setting out?' 'In May.' 'In May—ah, I shall be in Milan then, for I wish to stop at Turin. I like the Piedmontese, for they are the best soldiers in Italy.' 'Sire, the king of Italy will be the junior of the emperor of the French.*' 'Ah, you recollect what I said to you one day at the Tuileries—but, my dear fellow, I have got a great deal to do before I gain my point.' 'At the rate you are advancing you will not be long in accomplishing it.' 'Longer than you imagine. I see all the obstacles in my way, but they do not alarm me. England is everywhere, and the struggle is between her and me. I see what will happen. The whole of Europe will be our instruments—sometimes for one and sometimes for the other. But upon the whole, the question is entirely between France and England.

* This alluded to a conversation which I had with Napoleon when we first went to the Tuileries. He spoke to me about his projects of royalty, and I stated the difficulties which I thought he would experience in getting himself acknowledged by the old reigning families of Europe. 'If it comes to that,' he replied, 'I will dethrone them all, and then I shall be the oldest sovereign among them.'

All things considered, go to Hamburg—you know the country, and, what is better, you speak the language.'

Such are my recollections of this conversation, which lasted for more than an hour and a half. We walked about the whole of the time, for Bonaparte was indefatigable in this sort of audience, and would have walked and talked for a whole day without being aware of it.

Voltaire has somewhere said, that it is very well kissing the toes of popes providing their hands are tied. Bonaparte had little esteem for Voltaire, and, perhaps, did not recollect this remark, but at any rate he very soon found himself called to act upon it. The pope, or rather the cardinals, thinking that such a great act of condescension as the journey of his holiness to Paris ought not to go for nothing, demanded a compensation, which, had they been better acquainted with Napoleon's policy, they would not have ventured to solicit. They demanded the restoration of Avignon and Bologna, with some territories in Italy which had formerly been subject to the pope. It may be imagined in what manner their demand was received by Napoleon, particularly after he had obtained what he wanted from the pope. It was, it must be confessed, a great mistake on the part of the court of Rome not to make their demand until after the coronation. Had the court of Rome made it the condition of the pope's journey to France, perhaps Bonaparte would have consented to give up Avignon, and, perhaps, the Italian territory, but certainly with the intention of taking them back. Be this as it may, they were peremptorily rejected, and this created a coolness between Napoleon and Pius VII. The public did not immediately perceive it; but as they generally judge correctly on passing events, all eyes were opened when it was known that the pope had refused to crown the emperor as king of Italy.

Napoleon left Paris on the 1st of April to take possession of the iron crown at Milan. The pope remained some time longer in the French capital. The prolonged stay of the pope had a very favourable influence on the religious feelings of the people, so great was the respect inspired by the benign countenance and mild manners of the pope. When the period of his persecutions arrived, it had been better for Napoleon that the pope had not come to Paris; for it was impossible to view, in any other light than as a victim, the man who appeared so meek and truly evangelical.

Bonaparte did not shew any impatience to seize the crown

of Italy, because he knew it could not escape from him. He stayed a long time at Turin, where he occupied the elegant Stupini palace, which may be called the St. Cloud of the kings of Sardinia ; it is situated at the same distance from the capital of Piedmont that St. Cloud is from Paris. The emperor cajoled the Piedmontese, and gave them General Menou as a governor, who continued until he founded the general government of the transalpine departments in favour of his brother-in-law Prince Borghese, of whom it would have been difficult to have made anything but a Roman prince. Napoleon was still at Turin, when the pope passed through that city on his return to Rome ; and there he had a final interview with his holiness, to whom he shewed the greatest personal respect. From Turin Napoleon proceeded to Alessandria, where he commenced those immense works upon which such vast sums of money were expended. It was one of his favourite projects, and had been long entertained. I recollect his having observed to Berthier when we were at Milan, after the battle of Marengo, 'With Alessandria in my possession, I should always be master of Italy. It might be made the strongest fortress in the world ; it is capable of containing a garrison of 40,000 men, with provisions for six months. If a revolt should take place, or should Austria send a formidable force here, the French troops might retire to Alessandria and stand a six months' siege, which would be sufficient to enable me to fall upon Italy, beat the Austrians, and raise the siege of Alessandria.'

As he was so near the field of Marengo, the emperor did not fail to visit that celebrated field of battle ; and, to give greater solemnity to the occasion, he reviewed on the field all the French troops who were in Italy. Rapp told me that he had brought from Paris, expressly for that purpose, the uniform and hat which he had worn on that memorable day. He afterwards proceeded by way of Casal to Milan.

At Milan the emperor occupied the palace of Monza. The ancient crown of the kings of Lombardy was brought from the dust in which it had been buried ; and the new coronation took place in the cathedral of Milan, the largest in Italy after that of St. Peter's at Rome. Napoleon received the crown from the hands of the archbishop of Milan, and placed it upon his own head, calling aloud, '*Dieu me l'a donnée ; gare à qui la touche.*' This became the motto of the order of the iron crown, which the emperor afterwards founded in commemoration of his coronation as king of Italy.

It was during the emperor's stay at Milan that he received the first intelligence of the dissatisfaction of Austria and Russia ; the cabinet of Berlin were not strangers to it, but Prussia was constrained to conceal her discontent in consequence of the presence of the French troops in Hanover.

On returning from Milan, the emperor ordered the erection of a monument on the Great St. Bernard, in commemoration of the victory of Marengo. M. Denon, who accompanied Napoleon, told me that he made a useless search to discover the body of Desaix, which Bonaparte wished to be buried beneath the monument ; and that it was at length found by General Savary. It is therefore certain that the ashes of the brave Desaix repose on the summit of the Alps.

The emperor arrived in Paris about the end of June, and instantly set off for the camp at Boulogne. It was now once more believed that the project of invading England would be accomplished. This idea obtained the greater credit, because Bonaparte caused some experiments for embarkation to be made in his presence. These experiments, however, led to no result. About this period, a fatal event but too effectually contributed to strengthen the opinion of the inferiority of our navy. A French squadron, consisting of fifteen ships, fell in with the English fleet commanded by Admiral Calder, who had only nine vessels under his command, and in an engagement, which there was every reason to expect would terminate in our favour, we had the misfortune to lose two ships. The invasion of England was as little the object of this, as of the previous journey to Boulogne : all Napoleon had in view, was to stimulate the enthusiasm of the troops, and to hold out those threats against England which he conceived necessary for diverting attention from the real motive of his hostile preparations, which was to invade Germany, and repulse the Russian troops, who had begun their march towards Austria. Such was the true object of Napoleon's last journey to Boulogne. And we shall soon see him fall upon Germany, and render himself master of the Austrian monarchy by the day of Austerlitz, in the same manner as he rendered himself master of Italy on the day of Marengo.

I left Paris on the 20th of May, 1805 ; and on the 5th of June following, I delivered my credentials to the Senate of Hamburg, which was represented by the syndic Doormann and the senator Schutte. As I was also accredited to the reigning Dukes of Mecklenburg Schwerin and Brunswick, I announced

my arrival to them, and in return was acknowledged by them in my capacity of minister plenipotentiary. I had not been long at Hamburg when I found myself in the midst of the important events which preceded the campaign of Austerlitz ; and I was not allowed to forget what the emperor had said to me at my audience of leave—‘ You will be useful to me in Germany ; I have views on that country.’ These views placed me in continual contradiction with the amicable assurances of friendship and protection which I had been instructed to give. And in many respects my situation at Hamburg was attended with great labour, while affairs succeeded and crossed each other with great rapidity. My occupations were different, but not more numerous than those which formerly devolved upon me in the cabinet of the emperor ; while my present duties incurred a responsibility which was not attached to the situation of private secretary. I had to keep a watchful eye upon the emigrants at Altona ; to correspond almost daily with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and also with the Minister of Police ; to confer with the foreign ministers resident at Hamburg ; to maintain an active correspondence with the generals of the French armies ; to examine my secret agents and to be constantly on the alert to prevent the insertion of those cursed articles in the *Hamburg Correspondent* which annoyed the emperor so much. The editor sent me the proofs of the paper every evening as it was to appear on the following morning, a favour which was only conceded to the minister of France ; but even then it was impossible constantly to keep out articles which might be objectionable. The enmity of the foreign princes against Napoleon encouraged all sorts of abusive writings, which greatly added to the difficulty of my situation. This hatred had greatly increased since the death of the Duke d’Enghien, a fact which was not concealed by any of the ministers or foreigners of distinction who were then resident at Hamburg.

On my arrival in Germany the emperor of Austria had not acknowledged Napoleon as king of Italy, though his ambassador still remained at Paris. Now that Piedmont was united to France, and Italy subject to her laws, Austria could not see Napoleon at the head of so great a nation, and possessed of absolute power, without dreading the consequences of his ambition. She therefore from that moment began to think of war. England, who was anxious to remove the threat of invasion, encouraged the dissatisfaction of the Austrian cabinet. And I have reason to believe that Napoleon was not sorry when

the hostility of Austria was manifested ; and he relinquished, without regret, his expensive and useless expedition against England.

According to my instructions I had, on my arrival at Hamburg, given assurance that his imperial majesty would guarantee the constitution and tranquillity of Germany, and that he regarded this as a sacred duty. Yet scarcely had I entered upon my functions when Germany was ravaged by war, and the continental system was ruining every town.

Experience has long since proved that it is not at their source that secret transactions are most readily known. The intelligence of an event frequently resounds at a distance, while the event itself is almost entirely unknown at the place where it occurred. The direct influence of political events on commercial speculators renders them exceedingly attentive to what is passing around them. And as they form a corporation uniting all together by the strongest of all bonds—common interest, I resolved to form a connexion with some of the mercantile houses which carried on an extensive and frequent communication with the northern states. I knew that by obtaining their confidence I might gain a knowledge of all that was going on in Russia, Sweden, England, and Austria. Among the subjects upon which it was desirable to obtain information, I included negotiations, treaties, military measures, such as recruiting above the peace establishment, military movements, the formation of camps, the forming of magazines, and the fitting out of ships.

In the beginning of August, 1805, I obtained intelligence that a treaty of alliance between Russia and England was under negotiation, but from some circumstances which had occurred it was not completed at that time. I also learned that the Emperor Alexander had solicited General Moreau to enter his service, and take the command of the Russian infantry. He offered him twelve thousand rubles to defray his travelling expenses, but he did not accept the offer at that time ; and afterwards, when he unfortunately did so, he died in the enemy's ranks.

There was now no longer any doubt of the hostile intentions of the northern powers ; and it became necessary for Napoleon to take the hint in time lest he should be overwhelmed. He, therefore, gave orders to the different commanders of army corps to concentrate on certain points, and to hold themselves in readiness to advance on the first act of hostility on the part of Austria.

The army of Hanover, which was now commanded by Marshal Bernadotte, and occupied a vast extent of ground, was concentrated, in order to bring it nearer the line of military operations, which it was evident must soon be commenced. Bernadotte was thus obliged to abandon Cuxhaven, which belonged to Hamburg, and in order to take advantage of this necessity he applied to the city for assistance, under pretext that the evacuation was a mark of respect to the municipality. The army was soon after in full march for the south of Germany ; and as he was ordered to advance by the shortest route, he passed through the territory of Anspach, which gave great offence to the king of Prussia ; but at that time he was not prepared to quarrel with France.

The junction of the marshal's corps of 70,000 men was of too much importance to Napoleon not to be expedited by all means and by the shortest route. Gustavus of Sweden, always engaging in some scheme, proposed to form an army composed of his own troops, the Prussians and English ; and certainly, had a vigorous attack been made in the north, it would have prevented Bernadotte from quitting the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, and reinforcing the grand army which was marching on Vienna. But the king of Sweden's coalition produced no other result than the siege of the little fortress of Hameln. Prussia would not come to a rupture with France, the king of Sweden was abandoned, and Bonaparte's resentment against him increased. This abortive project of Gustavus contributed not a little to alienate the affections of his subjects, who feared that they might be the victims of the revenge excited by the extravagant plans of their king, and the insults he heaped upon Napoleon, particularly since the death of the Duke d'Enghien.

CHAPTER XXIII.

SUCH was the state of affairs after I had been three months at Hamburg, when at length intelligence reached me, that the emperor had set out on the 23rd of September for the army. This event was preceded by the abolition of all that remained of the republic, namely, its calendar.

This calendar was one of the most foolish inventions of the revolution, the new names of the months not being applicable

to all places even in France, the harvests of Provence not waiting to be ripened by the sun of Messidor. On the 9th of September a *senatus consultum* decreed, that after the 1st of January following, the months should resume their ancient names. I read with interest the report of La Place to the Senate, and I confess that I was well pleased to see the Gregorian calendar established by law, as it had already been in fact. It was particularly in foreign countries that we felt the inconvenience of a system different from that of all the world.

At Hamburg I was, as may be supposed, extremely anxious to receive news, of which I had plenty from the interior of Germany, and from some friends at Paris, and it is this correspondence that enables me to furnish my readers with a comprehensive and true statement of affairs, till the moment when Napoleon took the field. I have already stated that it was his constant practice, when he declared war, to endeavour to persuade the world that he was anxious for peace, of which artifice his career furnishes few examples more striking than that preceding the first conquest of Vienna. It was evident enough that the transformation of the Cisalpine republic into the kingdom of Italy, and the union of Genoa to France, were acts in violation of treaties ; the emperor, however, asserted that all the violations were on the part of Austria. The truth is, that Austria was arming as secretly as possible, and collecting her troops on the frontiers of Bavaria. An Austrian corps had even penetrated into some provinces of the electorate, and this was made use of by Napoleon as a pretext for coming to the assistance of the allies of France.

I received at Hamburg the copy of a very curious note, in which the emperor enumerates his complaints against Austria, and boasts of his moderation, in having allowed Austria to take possession of Lindau, subsequently to the treaty of Luneville. The note was intended for the Diet at that time assembled at Ratisbon. 'The emperor,' it stated, 'had affected not to notice that the debt of Venice had not only not been paid, but had been actually cancelled, in violation not only of the letter, but of the spirit of the treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville. He was silent as to the denial of justice which his subjects of Milan and Mantua experienced at Vienna, where in spite of formal stipulations none of them had been paid, and upon the partiality of Austria in recognizing the monstrous right of blockade set up by England ; and when the neutrality of the Austrian flag, so often violated to the

detriment of France, had not occasioned on the part of the court of Vienna any complaint, he had made a sacrifice to his love of peace by preserving silence.'

The facts stated in this note were true ; but Napoleon did not say that his complaisance in shutting his eyes, arose solely from his wish to allow Austria to commit herself so far as to afford him a reasonable pretext for attacking her, whilst he held up in contrast the moderation and forbearance of the French government. 'The emperor of the French,' says he in the same note, 'has evacuated Switzerland, rendered tranquil and happy by the act of mediation ; he has only left in Italy the number of troops necessary to protect the commerce of the Levant. Solely occupied in the operations of a war which he had not provoked, and which he carried on as much for the interests of Europe as his own, he had assembled his forces on the coast far from the Austrian frontiers, and this was the time chosen by Austria to make a diversion more favourable to England and prejudicial to France, than she could do by an open and declared warfare.'

In the memorable sitting which preceded the departure of the emperor for the army, he caused to be presented a project of a *senatus consultum*, relative to the re-organization of the national guards. The Minister of Foreign Relations read an *exposé* of the reciprocal conduct of France and Austria, subsequent to the peace of Luneville, in which the offences of France were veiled with wonderful address. Finally, before the sitting broke up, the emperor addressed the senators, stating that he was about to leave his capital to place himself at the head of his army, to afford succour to his allies, and to defend the dearest interests of his people.

This address occasioned a powerful sensation in Hamburg ; for my part, I recognized in it the usual boasting of Napoleon, but this time events seemed determined to justify it. The emperor may have made more scientific campaigns than that of Austerlitz, but none accompanied by such wonderful results. Everything appeared to partake of the marvellous, and I have often thought of the secret joy which Bonaparte must have felt, in being at length on the point of commencing a great war in Germany, for which he had so often expressed an ardent desire.

All the reports which I received agreed with my private correspondence, in describing the astonishing enthusiasm of the army, on learning that it was to march into Germany.

For the first time Bonaparte had recourse to artificial means of transport, and 20,000 carriages conveyed his army as it were by enchantment from Boulogne to the banks of the Rhine. All the ambitious youths were on fire at the idea of an approaching campaign. All dreamed of glory and a speedy promotion, all hoped to signalize themselves under a chief, the idol of his army, who knew so well how to hurry away men into the sphere of his own incredible activity.

It was during his short stay at Strasburg, that the emperor, on hearing of the position of the Austrian army, ventured to predict the success which awaited him under the walls of Vienna, which, as Rapp informed me, he did in the presence of a great many persons. He said, 'The plan of Mack's campaign is settled, the Caudine Forks are at Ulm.' This was a favourite expression with Napoleon when he saw an enemy's army concentrated upon a point, and foresaw its defeat. Experience proved that he was correct, and I must here affirm, that there is no truth in the report that Mack sold himself at Ulm; he was so placed that he could not have done otherwise. What might have given rise to this report was, that Napoleon humanely interfered to prevent his being tried by a court-martial.

On commencing the campaign, Napoleon placed himself at the head of the Bavarians, with whom he fought the enemy previous to the arrival of his own troops. When all had joined, he issued a proclamation to excite still more the zeal and devotion of this admirable army.

In the confidential notes addressed to his diplomatic agents, in his speeches, and in his proclamations, Napoleon always described himself as having been attacked, and it might happen that his earnestness on this point would have sufficed to reveal the truth, to those who had learned how much his thoughts differed from his expressions.

At the commencement of this campaign, a circumstance took place from which may be dated the good fortune of a very meritorious man. While the emperor was at Strasburg, he inquired of General Marescot, who commanded the engineers, whether he had in his corps a brave, prudent, and intelligent young officer, capable of being intrusted with an important reconnoitring mission? The officer chosen by General Marescot was a captain of engineers, named Bernard, who had been educated in the polytechnic school. This young man set out upon his mission and advanced almost to Vienna, and

returned to the emperor's head-quarters at the time of the capitulation of Ulm. Bonaparte examined him himself, and was well pleased with his answers. But not content with replying verbally to the inquiries of Napoleon, Captain Bernard had drawn up a report of what he had observed, and of the routes which might be followed. Among other things he observed, that it would be a great advantage to direct the army upon Vienna, passing by the fortified places, and that, once master of the capital, the emperor might dictate laws to the whole Austrian monarchy. 'I was present,' said Rapp to me, 'at this officer's interview with the emperor. After he had read his report, could you believe it, that he flew into a violent passion? "What," said he, "you are very bold, very presumptuous, a young officer to pretend to trace out a plan of campaign for me! Go, and await my orders."'

In what I have already written, and in what I am about to add respecting Captain Bernard, we have a complete view of Bonaparte. Rapp told me, that as soon as the young officer had left, the emperor all at once changed his tone. 'There,' said he, 'is a young man of merit, he has observed correctly. I shall not expose him to the risk of being shot; I shall have occasion for him by-and-by. Tell Berthier to despatch an order for his departure for Illyria.'

The order was despatched, and Captain Bernard, who like his companions was ardently looking forward to the approaching campaign, saw himself prevented from taking any part in it, and considered as a punishment what, on the part of the emperor, was a precaution to preserve the life of a young man whose merit he had appreciated. At the close of the campaign, on the Emperor's promoting those officers who had the most distinguished themselves, the name of Captain Bernard, who was thought to be in disgrace, did not appear upon the list of Berthier among those captains of engineers whom it was proposed to raise to the rank of chief of battalion, but the emperor with his own hand inserted Bernard's name before all the rest. However, the emperor had forgotten him for a length of time, and it was only by accident that he recalled him to his memory. I never had any personal acquaintance with M. Bernard, but I learned from Rapp that he afterwards became his colleague as aide-de-camp to the emperor, and I shall here relate the particulars of this circumstance, though it refers to a later period.

The emperor being at Paris some time previous to his

departure for the campaign of 1812, wished to have exact information respecting Ragusa and Illyria. He sent for Marmont, whose answers were not satisfactory. He then interrogated different generals, but the result of his inquiries always was, 'All this is very well, but it is not enough, I do not know Ragusa.' He then sent for General Dejean, who had succeeded Marescot as inspector-general of engineers. 'Have you,' he inquired, 'among your officers, anyone who is acquainted with Ragusa?' Dejean, after a moment's reflection, answered, 'Sire, there is a chief of battalion, who has been a long time forgot, who is well acquainted with Illyria.'—'What do you call him?' 'Bernard.'—'Ah, stop a little—Bernard, I recollect that name. Where is he?' 'Sire, he is at Antwerp, employed upon the fortifications.'—'Send notice by the telegraph, that he instantly mount his horse and repair to Paris.'

The promptitude with which the emperor's orders were always executed is well known. A few days afterwards Bernard was in Paris at the house of General Dejean, and shortly after in the cabinet of the emperor. He was graciously received, and Napoleon immediately said, 'Tell me about Ragusa.' He told me once that this manner of interrogating was the surest way of drawing out any observations which a party might have made upon a country. However, he was entirely satisfied with the information which M. Bernard gave him about Illyria, and when the chief of the battalion had done speaking, Napoleon said to him, 'Colonel Bernard, I now know Ragusa.' He then conversed familiarly with him, entered into details respecting the fortifications of Antwerp, had a plan of the works laid before him, and showed how, in case of his besieging the town, he would baffle the defence. The new colonel explained so well to the emperor, in what manner he would defend himself against his attacks, that Bonaparte was delighted, and immediately bestowed upon him a mark of distinction; which he never, to my knowledge, granted but upon this one occasion. As the emperor was going to preside in the council, he desired Colonel Bernard to accompany him, and several times during the sitting he asked his advice upon the points under discussion. On the breaking up of the council Napoleon said to him, 'Bernard, you are my aide-de-camp.' At the end of the campaign he was made general of brigade, shortly after general of division, and he is now known throughout Europe, as the first officer of engineers in existence. A piece of folly of Clarke's has deprived France of the services of this distinguished man, who, after refusing

most brilliant offers made to him by different sovereigns of Europe, has retired to the United States of America, where he commands the engineers, and where he has constructed, on the side of the Floridas, fortifications which are, by engineers, declared to be masterpieces of military art.*

I have been informed of all I have here related, not only by Rapp, but by other persons worthy of credit, and here I have found, so to say, the entire character of Napoleon. I moreover observe a remarkable example of that eagle glance, which enabled him to detect merit wherever it was to be found, and to seize upon it as if it were an emanation from himself, which must return to him.

Were I to attempt to describe the brilliant campaign of 1805, I must, like the almanac makers, set down a victory for every day, or one of those rapid movements which the presence of Napoleon imposed upon his army, and which contributed so powerfully to the prodigious triumphs of a warfare of only three months. In effect, was not the rapidity of the emperor's first operations a thing hitherto unheard of? On the 24th of September he left Paris, hostilities commenced on the 2nd of October, on the 6th and 7th the French had passed the Danube, and turned the enemy's army. On the 8th Murat, at the battle of Wertingen upon the Danube, made 2000 Austrians prisoners, among whom, with other generals, was the Count Auffenberg. Next day the defeated Austrians retreated upon Gunzburg, flying before our victorious legions, who, following up the course of their triumphs, entered on the 10th into Augsburg, and on the 12th into Munich. When I received my despatches it appeared to me as if I was reading some fabulous history. On the 14th, two days after the entry of the French into Munich, an Austrian corps of 6000 men surrendered to Marshal Soult at Memingen, whilst Ney conquered, sword in hand, his future duchy of Elchingen. Finally, on the 17th of October, the famous capitulation of Ulm took place; and on the same day hostilities commenced in Italy between the French and Austrians, the former commanded by Massena, and the latter by the Archduke Charles. I am confident that Napoleon greatly regretted that this prince had not the command of the troops to which he was personally opposed, for I have often heard him lament the incapacity of the enemies' generals: ready at all times to profit by their

* This distinguished officer has returned to France, and was lately named Minister at War, but did not continue to hold the appointment.

blunders, he appeared to think that their want of talent detracted from his glory, in rendering success less difficult ; and never, perhaps, had any man been more anxious to meet with an enemy in every way worthy of himself.

Bonaparte, after remaining a short time at Augsburg for the purpose of forming an opinion as to the probable movements of the Austrian army, then advanced upon it with such wonderful rapidity, that the Archduke Ferdinand considered himself fortunate in being able to repass the Danube ; but all the other Austrian forces were driven into Ulm, the garrison of which place, hitherto deemed impregnable, now amounted to 30,000 men.

General Segur, who was afterwards in the service of Murat at Naples, was employed to make the first proposals to Mack to induce him to surrender. Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein had also been sent to negotiate at the imperial head-quarters, to which he was conducted, according to established usage, on horseback, with his eyes bandaged. Rapp gave me the particulars of this interview, at which he was present with others of the emperor's aides-de-camp ; I think he told me that Berthier was also there. 'Picture to yourself,' said Rapp, 'the confusion, or rather the astonishment, of the poor prince, when they had removed the bandage from his eyes—he knew nothing, not even that the emperor had joined the army. When he learned that he was in the presence of Napoleon, he could not suppress an exclamation of surprise, which did not escape the emperor, and he candidly confessed that General Mack was not aware of his presence under the walls of Ulm. The Prince of Lichtenstein proposed to capitulate, on the condition that the garrison of Ulm should have permission to return into Austria. This proposal, in the then situation of the garrison,' said Rapp, 'made the emperor smile. "You cannot suppose," said he, "that I can entertain such a proposition : what should I gain by it?—eight days ! In eight days you must surrender at discretion. Do you suppose that I am not informed of everything ? You expect the Russians—they are scarcely yet in Bohemia. If I allow you to march out, who is to assure me that you will not go and join them, and afterwards fight against me ? Your generals have so often deceived me that I will not again be their dupe. At Marengo I was weak enough to allow the troops of Melas to march out of Alessandria. He promised to treat of peace, but what happened?—two months after, Moreau had to combat the garrison of Alessandria.

Besides, this is not an ordinary war ; after the conduct of your government I am not bound to keep any terms with it. I have no faith in your promises—you have attacked me. If I consent to what you propose, Mack will promise—but, relying upon his good faith, will he be able to keep his promise ? for himself, yes—but as regards his army, no. If the Archduke Ferdinand were here with you, I could depend upon his word, because he would be answerable for the conditions, and would not dishonour himself ; but I know that he has quitted Ulm, and passed the Danube. I know, however, where to find him.”

‘You cannot picture to yourself,’ continued Rapp, ‘the embarrassment of the Prince Lichtenstein while the emperor was speaking ; however, he recovered himself a little, and observed, that unless the conditions he was charged to propose were granted, the army would not capitulate. “In that case,” said Napoleon, “you may go back to Mack, for I will never grant you such conditions. Are you jesting with me ? Stay, here is the capitulation of Memingen ; shew that to your general, let him surrender on the same conditions, I will let him have no other. Your officers may return to Austria, but the soldiers must be prisoners. Tell him he must decide quickly, for I have no time to lose. The longer he delays the worse will his situation become. To-morrow I shall have here the corps of the army to which Memingen capitulated, and then we shall decide what is to be done. Let Mack clearly understand that he has no alternative but to surrender on my terms.”’

The imperious tone which Napoleon employed towards his enemies generally succeeded ; and at this time it had the desired effect upon Mack. On the same day that Prince Lichtenstein had been at our head-quarters, Mack wrote to the emperor, stating that he would accept his terms, but that he would not have treated with any other than himself. On the following day Berthier was sent to Ulm, from whence he returned with the capitulation. The garrison were permitted to march out with the honours of war, and sent prisoners into France. Thus Napoleon was not mistaken when he said that the Caudine Forks of the Austrian army were at Ulm.

Napoleon, who was so violently irritated by any obstacle which opposed him, and who treated with so much severity everyone who ventured to resist his will, became completely changed when he was the conqueror ; he received the vanquished with kindness ; nor was this the result of a feeling of pride, concealed under the mark of hypocrisy. I am sure he pitied them

sincerely, for I have often heard him remark, 'How much to be pitied is a general on the day after a lost battle !' He had himself experienced this feeling when he was obliged to raise the siege of Acre, after having made extraordinary efforts to accomplish his object. I believe at that moment he would have strangled Djezzar ; but if Djezzar had surrendered, he would have treated him with the same attention which he showed to Mack and the other generals of the garrison of Ulm. These generals were seventeen in number, and among them was Prince Lichtenstein, who the day before was so much surprised at finding himself in the presence of the emperor. There were also General Klenau, Baron de Giulay, who had acquired considerable military reputation in former wars, and General Fresnel, who stood in a more critical situation, for he was a Frenchman and an emigrant.

Rapp told me that it was quite painful to see those generals. They bowed respectfully to the emperor as they passed along with Mack at their head. They preserved a mournful silence, and Napoleon was the first to speak ; he said, 'Gentlemen, I am sorry that such brave men as you have shown yourselves, should become the victims of the follies of a cabinet which cherishes insane projects, and which does not hesitate to compromise the dignity of the Austrian nation, and to trifle with the services of its generals. Your names are known to me—they are honourably known wherever you have fought. Examine the conduct of those who have compromised you. What could be more unjust than to attack me without a declaration of war ? Is it not unjust to bring foreign invasion upon a country ? Is it not betraying Europe to introduce Asiatic barbarians into her disputes ? If good faith had been kept, the Aulic Council, instead of attacking me, ought to have sought my alliance to force the Russians back into the north. The present alliance is that of dogs, shepherds, and wolves against sheep—such a scheme could not have been devised by any statesman. It is fortunate for you that I have been successful ; had I been defeated, the cabinet of Vienna would have soon perceived its error, and would then have regretted it.'

CHAPTER XXIV.

WHILE Napoleon flattered his prisoners at the expense of their government, he was desirous to express his satisfaction at the conduct of his own army ; and for this purpose he published

the following remarkable proclamation, which contained an abstract of all that had taken place since the opening of the campaign.

SOLDIERS OF THE GRAND ARMY,

In fifteen days we have finished our campaign. What we proposed to do has been done. We have chased the Austrian troops from Bavaria, and restored our ally to the sovereignty of his dominions.

That army, which with so much presumption and imprudence marched upon our frontiers, is annihilated.

But what does this signify to England? She has gained her object. We are no longer at Boulogne, and her subsidies will not be the less great.

Of a hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they will supply our conscripts in the labour of husbandry.

Two hundred pieces of cannon, ninety flags, and all their generals, are in our power. Not more than fifteen thousand have escaped.

Soldiers! I announce to you a great battle; but thanks to the ill-devised combinations of the enemy, I was able to secure the desired result without any danger; and, what is unexampled in the history of nations, these results have been gained at the loss of scarcely fifteen hundred men, killed and wounded.

Soldiers! this success is due to your entire confidence in your emperor, to your patience in supporting fatigue and privations of every kind, and to your remarkable intrepidity.

But we will not stop here. You are impatient to commence a second campaign.

The Russian army, which the gold of England has brought from the extremity of the world, we have to serve in the same manner.

In the conflict in which we are now to be engaged, the honour of the French infantry is especially concerned. We shall then see decided, for the second time, that question which has already been decided in Switzerland and Holland; namely, whether the French infantry is the first or second in Europe?

There are no generals among them, in contending against whom I can acquire any glory. All I wish is to obtain the victory with the least possible bloodshed. My soldiers are my children.

This proclamation always appeared to me a masterpiece of military eloquence. Napoleon, while he praised his troops, excited their emulation, by hinting that the Russians were capable of disputing with them the first rank among the soldiers of Europe. The second campaign, to which he alludes, speedily commenced, and was hailed with enthusiasm. The most extraordinary reports were circulated respecting the Russians; they were represented as half-naked savages, pillaging, destroying, and burning wherever they went. It was even asserted that

they were cannibals, and had been seen to eat children. It was at this time that they were denominated the northern barbarians, which has since been so generally applied to the Russians.

Two days after the capitulation of Ulm, Murat, on his part, obliged General Warneck to capitulate at Trochtelfingen, and made 10,000 prisoners : so that, without counting killed and wounded, the Austrian army found itself diminished by 50,000 men after a campaign of twenty days.

On the 27th, the French army crossed the Inn, and thus penetrated into the Austrian territory, and immediately occupied Salzburg and Braunau. The army of Italy, under Massena, also obtained important advantages, having, on the same day that these fortresses surrendered, that is to say, on the 30th of October, gained the sanguinary battle at Caldiero, and taken 5000 prisoners from the Austrians.

The Austrian emperor now sought to retard Napoleon's progress by negotiation ; and sent M de Giulay, one of the generals included in the capitulation of Ulm, who had returned home to acquaint his sovereign with that disastrous event, to propose an armistice preliminary to a peace, of which the Austrian government professed itself sincerely desirous. He had not concealed from the Emperor Francis, or his cabinet, the destruction of the Austrian army, or the impossibility of arresting the rapid advance of the French. This snare was too glaring not to be immediately discovered by Napoleon. He always pretended a love for peace, but he was very desirous to continue a war so successfully commenced ; he therefore directed General Giulay to assure the Emperor of Austria, that he was no less anxious for peace than himself, and that he would be ready to treat with him without suspending his operations. Napoleon could not have acted otherwise without a degree of imprudence, of which he was incapable, since Giulay, whatever powers he had from Austria, had clearly none from Russia. Russia might therefore disavow the armistice, and arrive in time to defend Vienna, the occupation of which was so important to the French army. The Russians were now rapidly advancing to oppose us, and the division of our army commanded by Mortier, on the left bank of the Danube, received a check in the first encounter, which very much vexed the emperor, as it was the first reverse which had been sustained. It was very slight, but still the Russians had captured three of the French eagles, the first that had fallen into the hands of the enemy,

which was very mortifying to Napoleon, and caused him to prolong his stay for a few days at Saint-Polten.

In the extraordinary campaign which has been named the campaign of Austerlitz, the exploits of our troops succeeded each other with the rapidity of thought. Each courier that I received brought news much more favourable than I could have expected ; still I was not prepared to receive a letter by an extraordinary courier from Duroc, commencing laconically with the words, 'We are in Vienna ; the emperor is well.' Duroc had left the emperor before the camp at Boulogne was raised on a mission to Berlin, and this being terminated, he had now rejoined the army at Lintz.

The rapid capture of Vienna was due to the successful temerity of Lannes and Murat, two men who yielded to each other in nothing where bravery and daring were concerned. A bold artifice of these marshals prevented the destruction of the bridge of the Thabor at Vienna ; without this our army could not have gained possession of the capital without considerable difficulty. This act of courage and presence of mind, which had so great an influence on the events of the campaign, was afterwards related to me by Lannes, who spoke of it with an air of gaiety, and was more delighted with having outwitted the Austrians than proud of the brilliant action which he had performed. Bold enterprises were so natural to him, that he was frequently the only person who saw nothing extraordinary in his own exploits. Alas ! what men have been the victims of Napoleon's ambition !

The following is the story of the bridge of the Thabor, as I received it from Lannes :—

'I was one day walking with Murat, on the right bank of the Danube, and we observed on the left bank, which was occupied by the Austrians, some works going on, the evident object of which was to blow up the bridge on the approach of our troops. The fools had the impudence to make these preparations under our very noses ; but we gave them a good lesson. Having arranged our plan, we returned to give orders, and I intrusted the command of my column of grenadiers to an officer on whose courage and intelligence I could rely. I then returned to the bridge, accompanied by Murat, and two or three other officers. We advanced unconcernedly, and entered into conversation with the commander of a post in the middle of the bridge. We spoke to him about an armistice which was to be speedily concluded. While conversing with

the Austrian officers, we contrived to make them turn their eyes towards the left bank, and then, agreeably to the orders we had given, my column of grenadiers advanced on the bridge. The Austrian cannoneers, on the left bank, seeing their officers in the midst of us, did not dare to fire, and my column advanced at a quick step. Murat and I at the head of it, gained the left bank. All the combustibles, prepared for blowing up the bridge, were thrown into the river ; and my men took possession of the batteries erected for the defence of the bridge head. The poor devils of Austrian officers were perfectly astounded when I told them they were my prisoners.'

Such, as well as I can recollect, was the account given by Lannes, who laughed immoderately in describing the consternation of the Austrian officers on discovering the blunder they had committed. When Lannes performed this exploit he had no idea of the important consequences which would result from it ; but these were soon perceived. Not only was a sure and easy entrance into Vienna secured for the remainder of the French army, but, without being aware of it, an insurmountable impediment was created to prevent the junction of the Russian army with that division of the Austrian army under the command of the Archduke Charles, who, being pressed by Massena, had retreated into the heart of the hereditary states, where he expected a great battle would soon be fought.

As soon as the divisions of Murat and Lannes had taken possession of Vienna, the emperor ordered all the other divisions of the army to march upon the capital. Napoleon established his head-quarters at Schoenbrun, where he planned his operations for compelling the Archduke Charles to retire into Hungary, and for leading his own army against the Russians. Murat and Lannes always commanded the advanced guard during these forced and next to miraculous marches.

Among the anecdotes of Napoleon connected with this campaign, I find the following which was related to me by Rapp : Some days previous to his entrance into Vienna, Napoleon was riding on horseback along the road, dressed in his usual uniform, when he met in an open carriage a lady and a priest. The lady was in tears, and Napoleon could not refrain from stopping to inquire the cause of her distress :— 'Sir,' she replied, for she did not know the emperor, 'I have been pillaged at my estate, two leagues from hence, by a party of soldiers, who have murdered my gardener ; I am going to

wait upon your emperor, who knows my family, and to whom he was once under great obligations.' 'What is your name?' inquired Napoleon; 'De Bunny; I am the daughter of M. de Marbœuf, formerly governor of Corsica.' 'Madame,' replied Napoleon, 'I am delighted to have the opportunity of serving you. I am, myself, the emperor.' You cannot imagine, continued Rapp, with what distinction the emperor treated Madame de Bunny. He consoled her, pitied her, and apologized for the misfortune which had overtaken her. He requested her to have the goodness to go and wait for him at his head-quarters, where he would speedily return, and concluded by stating that every member of M. de Marbœuf's family had a claim upon his respect. He then gave her a piquet of chasseurs from his guard to escort her. He saw her again during the day, and loaded her with attention, and liberally rewarded her for the losses she had sustained.

On the 2nd of November, 1805, the King of Sweden arrived at Stralsund. I immediately intimated to our government that this circumstance would probably give a new turn to the operations of the combined army; for hitherto its movements had been very uncertain, and the frequent counter-orders afforded no possibility of ascertaining any determined plan.

The first column of the grand Russian army passed through Warsaw on the 1st of November, and on the 2nd the Grand Duke Constantine was expected with the guards. This division, which amounted to 6000 men, was the first that passed through Prussian Poland.

At this time we hourly expected to see landed on the banks of the Weser or the Elbe the Hanoverian army, increased by some thousands of English. Their design obviously was either to attack Holland or to act on the rear of our grand army.

For some time previous to the battle of Austerlitz, French columns were traversing Germany and Italy in all directions, all tending towards Vienna as a central point; and about the beginning of November the corps commanded by Bernadotte arrived at Salzburg, at the moment when the emperor had advanced his head-quarters to Braunau. This junction had been anxiously desired, and was considered of so much importance by Bonaparte, that he desired Bernadotte to hasten forward by the nearest route, which order obliged Bernadotte to pass through the territory of the two Margravates.

At this time we were at peace with Naples. In September,

the emperor had concluded with Ferdinand IV. a treaty of neutrality. This treaty enabled Cara St.-Cyr, who occupied Naples, to evacuate that city, and to join Massena in Upper Italy; and both joined the grand army on the 28th of November. But no sooner had the troops commanded by Saint-Cyr quitted the Neapolitan territories, than the king, influenced by his ministers, and above all by Queen Caroline, broke the treaty of neutrality, ordered hostile preparations against France, opened his ports to the enemies of the emperor, and received into his states 12,000 Russians and 8000 English.

It was on learning these occurrences that Napoleon, in one of his most violent bulletins, stigmatized the Queen of Naples as the modern Frédégonde; and the victory of Austerlitz succeeding decided the fate of Naples, and shortly after Joseph was seated on the Neapolitan throne.

At length the great day arrived, when, according to the expression of Napoleon, '*the sun of Austerlitz arose*'; all our forces were concentrated upon the same point at about forty leagues beyond Vienna. There remained only the wreck of the Austrian army; the division under Prince Charles having been kept at a distance by the skilful manœuvres of Napoleon. The most extraordinary illusion prevailed in the enemy's camp. On the very eve of the battle the Emperor Alexander sent one of his aides-de-camp, Prince Dolgorowski, as a flag of truce to Napoleon. This prince conducted himself in such a self-sufficient manner in the presence of the emperor, that, on dismissing him, he said to him, 'If you were on the heights of Montmartre, I would answer such impertinence only with cannon-balls.' This observation was very remarkable, inasmuch as events occurred which rendered it a prophecy.

As to the battle itself, I am able to describe it almost as correctly as if I had been present; for some time after I had the pleasure of seeing in Hamburg my friend Rapp, who had been sent on a mission to Prussia. He gave me the following account:—

'When we arrived at Austerlitz, the Russians, ignorant of the emperor's skilful dispositions to draw them to the ground which he had marked out, and seeing our advanced guards give way before their columns, they conceived the victory won. According to their notions, the advanced guard would suffice to secure an easy triumph. But the battle begun, they found what it was to fight, and on every point were repulsed. At one o'clock

the victory was still uncertain ; for they fought admirably. They resolved on a last effort, and directed close masses against our centre. The imperial guard deployed : artillery, cavalry, infantry, were marched against a bridge which the Russians attacked, and this movement, concealed from Napoleon by the inequality of the ground, was not observed by us. At this moment I was standing near him, waiting orders. We heard a well-maintained fire of musketry ; the Russians were repulsing one of our brigades. Hearing this sound, the emperor ordered me to take the Mamelukes, two squadrons of chasseurs, one of grenadiers of the guard, and to observe the state of things. I set off at full gallop, and, before advancing a cannon-shot, perceived the disaster. The Russian cavalry had penetrated our squares, and were sabring our men. In the distance could be perceived masses of Russian cavalry and infantry in reserve. At this juncture, the enemy advanced ; four pieces of artillery arrived at a gallop, and were planted in position against us. On my left I had the brave Morland, on my right General d'Allemagne. "Courage, my brave fellows !" cried I to my party ; "behold your brothers, your friends butchered ; let us avenge them, avenge our standards ! Forward !" These few words inspired my soldiers ; we dashed at full speed upon the artillery, and took them. The enemy's horse, which awaited our attack, were overthrown by the same charge, and fled in confusion, galloping, like us, over the wrecks of our own squares. In the meantime the Russians rallied ; but a squadron of horse grenadiers coming to our assistance, I could then halt, and await the reserves of the Russian guard. Again we charged, and this charge was terrible. The brave Morland fell by my side. It was absolute butchery. We fought man to man, and so mingled together, that the infantry on neither side dared to fire, lest they should kill their own men. The intrepidity of our troops finally bore us in triumph over all opposition : the enemy fled in disorder in sight of the two Emperors of Austria and Russia, who had taken their station on a rising ground, in order to be spectators of the contest. They ought to have been satisfied, for I can assure you they witnessed no child's play. For my own part, my good friend, I never passed so delightful a day. The emperor received me most graciously when I arrived to tell him that the victory was ours ; I still grasped my broken sabre, and as this scratch upon my head bled very copiously, I was all covered with blood. He named me general of division. The Russians returned not

again to the charge,—they had had enough ; we captured everything,—their cannon, their baggage, their all, in short ; and Prince Ressina was among the prisoners.’

CHAPTER XXV.

ON the day after the battle, the emperor, who was at the castle of Austerlitz, received a visit from Prince de Lichtenstein, the same whom Mack had sent to negotiate when before the walls of Ulm. On this occasion the prince was sent by the Emperor Francis II. to request an interview with Napoleon. This request was immediately agreed to, and the ceremonies to be observed on the occasion were arranged at once. On the 4th of December Napoleon proceeded on horseback to the place appointed, which was a mill about three leagues from Austerlitz. The Emperor of Austria arrived in a calash ; and as soon as he was observed Napoleon alighted from his horse and advanced to meet him, attended by his aides-de-camp. Napoleon embraced Francis II. on meeting him. During the interview Napoleon had only Berthier beside him, and the Emperor of Austria was attended by Prince de Lichtenstein. What a situation for the heir of Charles V. ! The emperors remained about two hours, and again embraced at parting.

On his return from this interview, Napoleon, who never for a moment lost sight of his policy, roused himself from the meditation in which he seemed to be absorbed, to despatch an aide-de-camp to the Emperor of Austria. Savary was intrusted with this mission, the object of which was to acquaint the Emperor Francis, that on leaving him he was going by order of Napoleon to the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia, to obtain his adhesion, as far as he was concerned, to the conditions agreed upon in the conference between the Emperors of France and Austria. Alexander consented to everything, and observed, since the King of the Romans was satisfied, he had no conditions to ask, as he had taken the field only to assist his ally.

The chanceries of France and Austria met at Presburg, and as one of the two parties had the power of demanding everything, and the other could scarcely refuse anything, the negotiations did not continue long. On the 25th of December, that is to say, only three months after Napoleon’s departure from

Paris, all was arranged.* Russia, who had taken part in the war, took no part in the negotiations. Hostilities ceased between her and France, but without any treaty of peace being concluded. After the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon remained for a few days at Brunn, to superintend the execution of his orders relative to the cantonment of his troops. Here he ascertained his losses, and sent his aides-de-camp to visit the hospitals, and to present, in his name, each wounded soldier with a Napoleon (16s. 8d.). To the wounded officers he caused gratuities to be distributed from five hundred to three thousand francs (£21 to £125), according to their rank.

The emperor then set out for Schoenbrun, where he arrived without stopping at Vienna, through which he passed during the night. On the day after his arrival he received, for the first time, M. Haugwitz, who had been for some time in Vienna, negotiating with M. de Talleyrand, and who, it must be confessed, found himself in the most critical situation in which a diplomatist could be placed. He was very ill received, as may be supposed. He was at Vienna to wait the issue of events, and those events had not taken a turn favourable to Prussia. Napoleon, whom victory had placed in the most triumphant situation, treated the envoy with great haughtiness and severity. 'Do you think,' said Napoleon, 'that your master has kept faith with me? It would have been more honourable in him to have declared war against me openly, even though he had no motive

* 'By the treaty of Presburg, Austria yielded the Venetian territories to the kingdom of Italy: her ancient possessions of the Tyrol and Voralberg were transferred to Bavaria, to remunerate that elector for the part he had taken in the war; Wirtemberg, having also adopted the French side, received recompense of the same kind at the expense of the same power; and both of these electors were advanced to the dignity of kings. Bavaria received Anspach and Bareuth from Prussia, and, in return, ceded Berg, which was erected into a grand-duchy, and conferred, in sovereignty, on Napoleon's brother-in-law, Murat. Finally, by the treaty concluded at Vienna on the 26th, Prussia added Hanover to her dominions, in return for the cession of Anspach and Bareuth, and acquiescence in the other arrangements above mentioned.

'Eugene Beauharnois, son of Josephine, and Viceroy of Italy, received in marriage the eldest daughter of the new King of Bavaria: this being the first occasion on which Napoleon manifested openly his desire to connect his family with the old sovereign houses of Europe. It was announced at the same time, that in case the emperor should die without male issue, the Crown of Italy would descend to Eugene.'

for doing so. He then would have served his new allies, for I should have had to look two ways before I gave battle. You wish to be the friends of all parties, but that is impossible—you must choose between them and me. If you wish to go with them I do not object, but if you remain with me I must have sincerity. I would rather have avowed enemies than false friends. What does this mean? You call yourselves my allies, and you permit a body of thirty thousand Russians to communicate through your states with the grand army; nothing can justify such conduct; it is an open act of hostility. If your powers do not permit you to treat of all these questions, get them extended. As for myself, I shall march against my enemies wherever they are to be found.' I was informed by Lauriston, that the emperor was so excited during this conversation, that he could be heard distinctly by those who were in the adjoining room.

The situation of M. Haugwitz must have been peculiarly delicate, especially as Napoleon's complaints against Prussia were not without foundation. The truth is, that Haugwitz had come from Berlin solely in quality of observer, and having only conditional instructions. Had the emperor been beaten by the coalition, the cabinet of Berlin had instructed its representative to declare openly the alliance of Prussia with Russia and Austria; but the result of the battle being so disastrous, he was obliged to conceal the object of his mission. Haugwitz seeing no other means of averting the storm which was ready to burst upon Prussia, took upon himself, without the authority of his sovereign, to sign a treaty, by virtue of which the Margravates of Bareuth and Anspach were exchanged for Hanover.

While all this was going on at Vienna, I received the Berlin bulletins, which informed me that Von Hardenberg had just signed, *by order of his master*, another treaty with England, which rendered the situation of Prussia with respect to her two allies extremely difficult and complicated. It was impossible for her to continue in her present situation, for with Napoleon there was no possibility of her screening herself under the plea of neutrality. Thus Prussia could not avoid war, and all that remained to her was, the choice of maintaining it against France or England. By her treaty with England she received a subsidy of £1,500,000; and while nothing was known at the French head-quarters respecting this second negotiation, or any doubt entertained respecting

the validity of the treaty concluded by Haugwitz, the Russian general Buxhoevden, at the head of thirty thousand men, crossed the Vistula at Warsaw, and advanced upon Bohemia by Breslau. This was one of the results of the Emperor Alexander's visit to Berlin, he having succeeded in inducing the King of Prussia to make common cause along with Russia, Austria, and England, never expecting that France could triumph over them all ; but the fortune of Napoleon ordained otherwise.

Napoleon received at Vienna intelligence of the disastrous battle of Trafalgar. In France, that event was only known by report, and through the medium of the foreign newspapers, which were then prohibited. So completely did Napoleon succeed in veiling that disaster in obscurity, that previous to the restoration it was scarcely known in France. It was, however, very well known at Hamburg, it having been communicated by the merchants. The issue of the battle was to us equivalent to the destruction of our fleet, for we lost eighteen ships ; and the other thirteen returned to Cadiz dreadfully damaged. The battle of Trafalgar was fatal to the three admirals engaged in it. Nelson was killed, Gravina died of his wounds, and Villeneuve was made prisoner, and on his return to France put a period to his life.

Napoleon was profoundly afflicted at this event, but at the time he did not express his mortification, for he never allowed himself to be engrossed with two subjects of equal interest at the same time. He shewed the same self-command at Vienna, when he received intelligence of the financial crisis which occurred at Paris during his absence.

This depreciation of the bank paper and general disquietude originated in some extensive speculations of M. Ouvrard, who was then one of the greatest capitalists in Europe. He told me, that before the 18th Brumaire he was possessed of sixty millions, without owing a franc to anyone. I had been made acquainted, through the commercial correspondence between Hamburg and Paris, with the operation, planned by M. Ouvrard, in consequence of which he was to obtain piastres from Spanish America, at a price much below the real value, and had learned that he was obliged to support this enterprise by the funds which he and his partners previously employed in victualling the forces. A fresh investment of capital was therefore necessary for this service, which, when on a large scale, requires extensive advances, and the tardy payment of the treasury at that period was well known.

This celebrated financier has been the object of great public attention. The prodigious variations of fortune which he has experienced, the activity of his life, the immense commercial operations in which he has been engaged, the extent and the boldness of his enterprises, render it necessary, in forming a judgment of M. Ouvrard, to examine his conduct with due care and deliberation. The son of a paper-maker, who was able merely through his own resources to play so remarkable a part, could be no ordinary man. It may be said of M. Ouvrard, what Beaumarchais said of himself, that his life was really a combat. I have known him long, and I saw much of him in his relations with Josephine. He always appeared to me to possess great knowledge of the world, accompanied by honourable principles, and a high degree of generosity, which added greatly to the value of his prudence and discretion. No human power, no consideration, not even the ingratitude of those whom he had obliged, could induce him to disclose any sacrifice which he had made at the time when, under the Directory, the public revenue may be said to have been always at the disposal of the highest bidder, and when no business could be brought to a conclusion except by him who set about it with his hands full of money. To this security, with which M. Ouvrard impressed all official persons who rendered him services, I attribute the facility with which he obtained the direction of the numerous enterprises in which he engaged, and which produced so many changes in his fortune. The discretion of M. Ouvrard was not quite agreeable to the first consul, who found it impossible to extract from him the information he wanted. He tried every method to obtain from him the names of persons to whom he had given those kind of subsidies, which, in vulgar language, are called sops in the pan, and by ladies, pin-money. Often have I seen Bonaparte resort to every possible contrivance to gain his object. He would sometimes endeavour to alarm M. Ouvrard by menaces, and at other times to flatter him by promises, but he was in no instance successful.

While we were at the Luxembourg, on, as I recollect, the 25th of January, 1800, Bonaparte said to me during breakfast, 'Bourrienne, my resolution is taken. I shall have Ouvrard arrested.'—'General, have you proofs against him?'—'Proofs, indeed! He is a money-dealer, a monopolizer, we must make him regorge. All the contractors, all the provision agents, are rogues. How have they got their fortunes? at the expense

of the country, to be sure. I will not suffer such doings. They possess millions, they roll in an insolent luxury, while my soldiers have neither bread nor shoes ! I will have no more of that. I intend to speak on the business to-day in the council, and we shall see what can be done.'

I waited with impatience for his return from the council to know what had passed :—' Well, General,' said I. . . .—' The order is given.' On hearing this I became anxious about the fate of M. Ouvrard, who was thus treated more like a subject of the Grand Turk than a citizen of the republic ; but I soon learned that the order had not been executed, because he could not be found.

Next day I learned that a person, whom I shall not name, who was present at the council, and who probably was under obligations to Ouvrard, wrote him a note in pencil, to inform him that a vote for his arrest had been carried by the first consul. This individual stepped out for a moment, and despatched his servant with the note to Ouvrard. Having thus escaped the writ of arrest, Ouvrard, after a few days had passed over, re-appeared, and surrendered himself prisoner. Bonaparte was at first furious, on learning that he had got out of the way ; but on hearing that Ouvrard had surrendered himself, he said to me, ' The fool ! he does not know what is awaiting him. He wishes to make the public believe that he has nothing to fear ; that his hands are clean. But he is playing a bad game : he will gain nothing in that way with me. All talking is nonsense. You may be sure, Bourrienne, that when a man has so much money, he cannot have got it honestly, and then all those fellows are dangerous with their fortunes. In the time of a revolution, no man ought to have more than three millions, and that is a great deal too much.'

Before going to prison Ouvrard took care to secure against all the searches of the police, any of his papers which might have compromised persons with whom he had dealings ; and I believe that there were individuals connected with the police itself, who had good reason for not regretting the opportunity which M. Ouvrard had taken for exercising this precaution. Seals, however, were put upon his papers ; but on examining them, none of the information Bonaparte so much desired to obtain was found. Nevertheless, on one point his curiosity was satisfied, for on looking over the documents, he found that Madame Bonaparte had been borrowing money from Ouvrard.

I do not recollect to what circumstance he was indebted for

his liberty ; but it is certain that his captivity did not last long. Some time after he had left prison, Bonaparte asked him for twelve millions, which M. Ouvrard refused.

On his accession to the consulate, Bonaparte found M. Ouvrard contractor for supplying the Spanish fleet under the command of Admiral Massaredo. This business introduced him to a correspondence with the famous Prince of Peace. The contract lasted three years, and M. Ouvrard gained by it a net profit of fifteen millions.

In 1802 a dreadful scarcity afflicted France, and to remedy the distress was urgent. M. Ouvrard took upon himself, in concert with Wanlerberghe, the task of importing foreign grain to prevent the troubles which might otherwise have been expected. In payment of the grain, the foreign houses which sent it drew upon Ouvrard and Wanlerberghe for twenty-six millions of francs in treasury-bills, which, according to the agreement with the government, were to be paid. But when the bills of the foreign houses became due there was no money in the treasury, and payment was refused. After six months had elapsed, payment was offered ; but on condition that the government should retain half the profit of the commission. This Ouvrard and Wanlerberghe refused, upon which the treasury thought it most economical to pay nothing, and the debt remained long unsettled. Notwithstanding this transaction, Ouvrard and Wanlerberghe engaged to victual the navy, which they supplied for six years and three months. After the completion of these different services, the debt due to them amounted to sixty-eight millions.

In consequence of the long delay of payment by the treasury, the disbursements for supplies of grain amounted at last to more than forty millions ; and the difficulties which arose had a serious effect on the credit of the principal dealers with those persons who supplied them. The discredit spread and gradually reached the treasury, the embarrassments of which augmented with the general disquietude. Ouvrard, Wanlerberghe, and Seguin, were the persons whose capital and credit rendered them most capable of relieving the treasury. And they agreed to advance for that purpose one hundred and two millions, in return for which they were allowed bonds of the receivers-general to the amount of one hundred and fifty millions. M. Desprez undertook to be the medium through which the one hundred and two millions were to be paid into the treasury, and the three partners transferred the bonds to him.

Spain had concluded a treaty with France, by which she was bound to pay a subsidy of seventy-two millions of francs.

Thirty-two millions had become due without any payment being made. It was thought advisable that Ouvrard should be sent to Madrid to obtain a settlement. It was on this occasion he entered into the immense speculation for trading with Spanish America.

Spain wished to pay the thirty-two millions which were due to France as soon as possible, but her coffers were empty, and good-will does not ensure ability; besides, in addition to the distress of the government, a dreadful famine raged in Spain. In this state of things, Ouvrard proposed to the Spanish government to pay the debt due to France, to import a supply of corn, and to advance funds for the relief of the Spanish treasury. For this he required two conditions:—1. The exclusive right of trading with America. 2. The right of bringing from America on his own account all the specie belonging to the crown, with the power of making loans guaranteed and payable by the Spanish treasuries.

About the end of July, 1805, the embarrassment which some time before had begun to be felt in the finances of Europe was alarmingly augmented. Under these circumstances, it was obviously the interest of Ouvrard to procure payment as soon as possible of the thirty-two millions which he had advanced for Spain to the French treasury. He therefore redoubled his efforts to bring his negotiation to a favourable issue, and at last succeeded in getting a deed of partnership between himself and Charles IV. signed, which contained the following stipulation: 'Ouvrard and Company are authorised to introduce into the ports of the New World, every kind of merchandise and production necessary for the consumption of those countries, and to export from the Spanish colonies, during the continuance of the war with England, all the productions and all specie derivable from them.' This treaty was only to be in force during the war with England, and it was stipulated that the profits arising from the transactions of the company should be equally divided between Charles IV. and the rest of the company; that is to say, one half to the king and the other half to his partners.

The consequences of this extraordinary partnership between a king and a private individual remain to be stated. On the signing of the deed, Ouvrard received drafts from the treasury of Madrid to the extent of 52,500,000 piastres; making

262,500,000 francs ; but the piastres were to be brought from America, while the terms of the treaty required that the urgent wants of the Spanish government should be immediately supplied ; and, above all, the progress of the famine checked. To accomplish this object, fresh advances to an enormous amount were necessary ; for M. Ouvrard had to begin by furnishing two millions of quintals of grain at the rate of twenty-six francs the quintal. Besides all this, before he could realize a profit, and be reimbursed for the advances he had made to the treasury of Paris, he had to get the piastres conveyed from America to Europe. After some difficulty, the English government consented to facilitate the execution of the transaction by furnishing four frigates for the conveyance of the piastres.

Ouvrard had scarcely completed the outline of his extraordinary enterprise, when the emperor suddenly broke up his camp at Boulogne, to march for Germany. It will readily be conceived that Ouvrard's interests then imperatively required his presence at Madrid ; but he was recalled to Paris by the minister of the treasury, who wished to adjust his accounts with him. The emperor wanted money for the war on which he was entering, and to procure it for the treasury, Ouvrard was sent to Amsterdam to negotiate with the house of Hope. He succeeded, and Mr. David Parish became the company's agent.

Having concluded this business, Ouvrard returned in all haste to Madrid : but in the midst of the most flattering hopes and most gigantic enterprises, he suddenly found himself threatened with a dreadful crisis. M. Desprez had, with the concurrence of the treasury, been allowed to take upon himself all the risk of executing the treaty, by which 150 millions were to be advanced for the year 1804, and 400 millions for the year 1805. Under the circumstances which had arisen, the minister of the treasury considered himself entitled to call upon Ouvrard to place at his disposal ten millions of the piastres which he had received from Spain. The minister at the same time informed him, that he had made arrangements on the faith of this advance, which he thought could not be refused at so urgent a moment.

The embarrassment of the treasury, and the well-known integrity of the minister, M. de Barbé-Marbois, induced Ouvrard to remit the ten millions of piastres. But a few days after he had forwarded the money, a commissioner of the treasury arrived at Madrid with a ministerial despatch, in which Ouvrard was requested to deliver to the commissioner

all the assets he could command, and to return immediately to Paris.

The treasury was then in the greatest difficulty, and a general alarm prevailed. This serious financial distress was occasioned by the following circumstances. The treasury had, by a circular, notified to the receivers-general that Desprez was the holder of their bonds. They were also authorized to transmit to him all their disposable funds, to be placed to their credit in an account current. Perhaps the giving of this authority was a great error; but, be that as it may, Desprez, encouraged by the complaisance of the treasury, desired the receivers-general to transmit to him all the sums they could procure for payment of interest under eight per cent., promising to allow them a higher rate of interest. As the credit of the house of Desprez stood high, it may easily be conceived that, on such conditions, the receivers-general, who were besides secured by the authority of the treasury, would enter eagerly into the proposed plan. In short, the receivers-general soon transmitted very considerable sums. Chests of money arrived daily from every point of France. Intoxicated by this success, Desprez engaged in speculations, which, in his situation, were extremely imprudent. He lent more than fifty millions to the merchants of Paris, which left him no command of specie. Being obliged to raise money, he deposited with the bank the bonds of the receivers-general which had been consigned to him, but which were already discharged by the sums transmitted to their credit in the account current. The bank wishing to be reimbursed for the money advanced to Desprez, applied to the receivers-general whose bonds were held in security. This proceeding had become necessary on the part of the bank, as Desprez, instead of making his payments in specie, sent in his acceptances. The directors of the bank, who conducted that establishment with great integrity and discretion, began to be alarmed, and required Desprez to explain the state of his affairs. The suspicions of the directors became daily stronger, and were soon shared by the public. At last the bank was obliged to stop payment, and its notes were soon at a discount of twelve per cent.

The minister of the treasury, dismayed, as well may be supposed, at such a state of things, during the emperor's absence, convoked a council, at which Joseph Bonaparte presided, and to which Desprez and Wanlerberghe were summoned. Ouvrard, being informed of this financial convulsion, made all possible

haste from Madrid, and on his arrival at Paris, sought assistance from Amsterdam. Hope's house offered to take fifteen millions of piastres at the rate of three francs seventy-five centimes each. Ouvrard having engaged to pay the Spanish government only three francs, would very willingly have parted with them at that rate, but his hasty departure from Madrid, and the financial events at Paris, affected his relations with the Spanish treasury, and rendered it impossible for him to afford any support to the treasury of France ; thus the alarm continued, until the news of the battle of Austerlitz, and the consequent hope of peace, tranquillized the public mind. The bankruptcy of Desprez was dreadful ; it was followed by the failure of several houses, the credit of which was previously undoubted.

To temper the exultation which victory was calculated to excite, the news of the desperate situation of the treasury and the bank reached the emperor on the day after the battle of Austerlitz. The alarming accounts which he received hastened his return to France ; and on the very evening on which he arrived in Paris, he pronounced, while ascending the stairs of the Tuileries, the dismissal of M. de Barbé-Marbois. Such was the financial catastrophe which occurred during the campaign of Vienna ; but all was not over with Ouvrard, and, in so great a confusion of affairs, it was to be expected that the imperial hand, which was not always the hand of Justice, should make itself be somewhere felt.

In the course of the month of February, 1806, the emperor issued two decrees, in which he declared Ouvrard, Wanlerberghe, and Michel, contractors for the service of 1804, and Desprez, their agent, debtors to the amount of eighty-seven millions, which they had misapplied in private speculations, and in transactions with Spain 'for their personal interests.' Who would not suppose from this phrase, that Napoleon had taken no part whatever in the great financial operation between Spain and South America ? He was, however, intimately acquainted with it, and was himself really personally interested. But whenever any enterprise was unsuccessful, he always wished to disclaim all connection with it. Possessed of title-deeds made up by himself, that is to say, his own decrees, the emperor seized all the piastres, and other property belonging to the company, and derived from the transaction great pecuniary advantage—though such advantage never could be regarded by a sovereign as any compensation for the dreadful state into which public credit had been brought.

CHAPTER XXVI.

I HAVE been somewhat diffuse respecting the enterprises of M. Ouvrard, and on the disastrous state of the finances during the campaign of Vienna ; but I shall now return to the minister plenipotentiary's cabinet, and state such circumstances as came within my knowledge. The facts will not always be stated in a connected series, because they often had no more particular connexion than the pleadings of the barristers who succeed each other in a court of justice.

On the 5th of January, 1805, the King of Sweden arrived before the gates of Hamburg. The Senate, surrounded on all sides by English, Swedish, and Russian troops, determined to send a deputation to the Swedish monarch, who, however, hesitated so long about receiving this homage, that fears were entertained lest his refusal should be accompanied by some act of aggression. He, however, at last permitted two deputies to come to him, and they returned well satisfied with their reception.

His complaint against the Senate of Hamburg arose from my having demanded and obtained the removal of the colours which used to be suspended over the door of the house for receiving Austrian recruits. The poor Senate was kept in constant alarm by so dangerous a neighbour. He had fixed his head-quarters at Boetzenburg, on the northern bank of the Elbe ; and in order to amuse himself, he sent for Dr. Gall, who was at Hamburg, where he delivered a series of lectures on his system. I had the pleasure of knowing Dr. Gall, and on one occasion, when he went to the head-quarters of the King of Sweden, I said to him, 'My dear Doctor, you will certainly discover the bump of vanity.' The truth is, that had the doctor at that period been permitted to examine the heads of the sovereigns of Europe, they would have afforded very curious craniological studies. It was not the King of Sweden alone who gave uneasiness to Hamburg, for the King of Prussia had threatened to seize it, and to subject it to his fiscal regulations, which would have had the effect of destroying the commercial prosperity of the city.

Hanover, no longer occupied by the French troops, was used by the English as a sort of recruiting station, where every man

who presented himself was enlisted, in order to complete the Hanoverian regiment which was then about being raised. They scattered gold in handfuls. The English employed in this service a hundred and fifty carriages, with six horses to each, which confirmed me in my former opinion, that they in conjunction with the Russians were about to undertake an expedition against Holland. On the first indication of this intention, I sent off information to the emperor by express. The aim of the Anglo-Russians, who were not aware that peace had been concluded at Presburg, was to create a diversion in the movements of the French armies in Germany. The advanced guard of the Russians soon arrived at Affersburg, four leagues from Bremen, and the whole of the allied forces marched through the bishopric of Osnaburg; not a moment therefore was to be lost in reuniting all the troops at our disposal for the preservation of Holland; but it is not my purpose at present to treat of this expedition; I only wish to afford an idea of our situation at Hamburg, surrounded as we were on all sides by Swedish, English, and Russian troops. I frequently received from the Minister of Marine letters and packets to be forwarded to the Isle of France, for the retention of which place the emperor evinced considerable anxiety; and I had much difficulty in finding vessels bound for that colony who would take charge of the minister's despatches. The death of Pitt and the nomination of Mr. Fox to the ministry, opened a fair prospect of peace. It was well known that this latter statesman, in succeeding to the office of Mr. Pitt, did not inherit his violent hatred against France and its emperor; a mutual esteem existed between them, and Mr. Fox had shewn himself really sincere in his professions for peace. Its practicability he had always insisted upon whilst in opposition to Mr. Pitt; and Bonaparte himself, from the high regard he had for Mr. Fox, might have been induced to yield in some points the very idea of which he would otherwise have rejected with indignation. But two obstacles (I might almost say insurmountable ones) were opposed to it. The first was, the conviction on the part of England, that this peace would never be anything more than a truce of longer or shorter duration, and that Bonaparte would still continue to pursue his scheme of universal dominion. And the other, the belief which was firmly entertained that Napoleon meditated the invasion of England. Could this have been effected, it would have been less with a view of giving a mortal blow to her commerce and destroying her maritime supremacy

over France, than of abolishing the liberty of the press, which he had totally annihilated on his own side of the Channel. The sight of a free people separated from them only by one-and-twenty miles of sea, was, in his opinion, a tempting aspect to the French, and a most powerful incentive to such of them as bore the yoke with reluctance.

Almost at the commencement of Mr. Fox's ministry, a Frenchman proposed to him the assassination of the emperor : the minister wrote immediately to M. de Talleyrand to inform him of the circumstance. He intimated to him, that although the English laws forbade the detention of an individual not actually convicted of any crime, yet, on this occasion, he would take it upon himself not to suffer such a wretch to go at large, until such time as the head of the French government could be put on his guard against his attempts. Mr. Fox added, that he had at first done this individual 'the honour to take him for a spy,' an expression which sufficiently marked the indignation and disgust with which the English minister regarded him.

This information, so honourably imparted, was the key which opened the door to fresh negotiations. M. de Talleyrand was directed to express to Mr. Fox that the emperor was deeply affected with this proof of the principles by which the British cabinet was governed. Nor did Napoleon confine himself to this diplomatic courtesy ; he considered it a favourable opportunity to create an impression that on his part the desire for peace was sincere. He summoned to Paris Lord Yarmouth, the most distinguished amongst those English subjects who had been so unjustly detained prisoners at Verdun, on the infraction of the treaty of Amiens. He commissioned his lordship to propose to the British government to enter into negotiations, offering on his part to recognize the possession by England of the Cape of Good Hope and Malta. By some, this concession of Bonaparte has been extolled as a mark of his moderation—by others, he has been blamed as willing to make too great a sacrifice ; as if the cession of the Cape of Good Hope and Malta were to be put in competition with the recognition of his title of emperor, the establishment of the kingdom of Italy, the acquisition of Genoa and of all the Venetian states, the dethronement of the King of Naples and the gift of his kingdom to Joseph, and, finally, the new partition of Germany. All these events, which had taken place subsequently to the treaty of Amiens, were not even alluded to by Bonaparte, and certainly

were advantages which he had no intention to forego. The letters which I received from Paris frequently dwelt on the prospect of peace, a sentiment in which I could not participate, being too well acquainted with the emperor to repose any faith in his sincerity, especially after the successful campaign of Vienna, which opened a wider prospect to his ambition, a passion which appeared to increase in proportion as it was gratified. Every day, indeed, afforded me fresh proofs that this ambition was insatiable. The fact was, Napoleon coveted the possession of the Hanse Towns. My instructions, however, were at first merely to make overtures to the senates of each of these three towns, and to endeavour to make them sensible of the advantage it would be to them to enjoy the protection of Napoleon in exchange for the trifling sacrifice of six millions to be advanced to him. On this subject I had several conferences with the magistrates, who at first objected to the sum as being too exorbitant, representing to me at the same time that the city was by no means so rich as formerly, as the war had created so many obstacles to their commerce ; and the Senate at length, for which I could not greatly blame them, signified to me, in the most delicate manner possible, that their circumstances would not permit them to accept the 'generous proposal' of the emperor. For my own part I could not but consider the proposition I had to make as in the highest degree absurd ; since, in fact, there was no real advantage whatever I could offer to the Hanse Towns as an equivalent for their money. Against whom too could he offer to protect them ? Prussia, Sweden, Russia, and England, might be and probably were desirous of obtaining possession of these towns, but the very wish which those powers entertained in common, proved the real security of the former ; for it is very certain, that if the attempt had been made by either, the other three would immediately have interposed to prevent it. The truth is, that Napoleon even then wished to make an open seizure of these places, a pretext for which, however, he was not able to find till about four years afterwards.

The emperor arrived at Paris about the end of January, 1806. Having created kings in Germany, he deemed it a favourable opportunity for surrounding his throne with a new race of princes. At this period, therefore, he created Murat Grand Duke of Cleves and Berg ; Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo ; M. de Talleyrand, Duke of Benevento, and his two former colleagues, Cambacères and Lebrun, Dukes of Parma and

Placenza. He likewise gave to his sister Pauline, who had a short time before contracted a second marriage with the Prince Borghèse, the title of Duchess of Guastalla. How extraordinary the course of events ! Who could then have foreseen that the Duchy of Cambacères would afford a refuge to a princess of Austria, the widow of Napoleon, ere death had made her so ?

The affairs of the Bourbon princes now wore every day a more unfavourable aspect, and such was the exhausted state of their finances, that it was intimated to the emigrants at Brunswick, that the pretender could no longer continue their pensions. This produced the greatest consternation amongst them, as it deprived many of their sole means of existence, who, notwithstanding their fidelity to the royal cause, were by no means disinclined that it should be strengthened by a pension. Amongst these emigrants was an individual whose name will occupy no ambiguous place in history ; I allude to Dumouriez, of whom I have before spoken, and who was now busying himself in the peaceful employment of distributing pamphlets. He was then at Stralsund, and it was supposed the King of Sweden would entrust him with a command. The unsettled life of this general, who wandered from place to place soliciting, but in vain, to be employed against his native country, rendered him an object of general ridicule ; in fact, he was everywhere looked upon with contempt.

With a view to put an end to all disputes, as regarded Holland,—which Dumouriez dreamed of conquering with an army which existed only in his own imagination,—and dissatisfied, moreover, with the Dutch, who had not excluded English vessels from their ports so rigorously as he desired, the emperor formed these states into a kingdom, which he conferred upon his brother Louis.

When, with other official matters, I communicated to the states of the circle of Lower Saxony the accession of Louis to the throne of Holland, and the nomination of Cardinal Fesch as coadjutor and successor of the Arch-Chancellor of the Germanic empire, I remarked that the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was the only one who made no reply to me, and I learnt afterwards that he had applied to the court of Petersburg for instructions, ‘whether, and in what way, he should reply.’ He at the same time sent information to the emperor of the marriage of his daughter, the Princess Charlotte Frederica, with Prince Christian Frederick of Denmark.

At this period it would have been difficult to foresee in what

way this union was destined to terminate. The prince was young, possessed of an agreeable exterior, and amiable disposition; everything seemed to promise that he would prove a good husband. As to the princess, she was in person exceedingly beautiful, but her mind was thoughtless and volatile in the extreme; in short, she was completely a spoiled child. She adored her husband, and for several years their union was perfectly happy; little indeed did they imagine that they were afterwards to be separated for ever. The princess was at this time in all the height of her beauty; fêtes were frequently given in her honour on the banks of the Elbe, at which the prince always opened the ball with Madame de Bourrienne. Lovely as she was, however, the Princess Charlotte could not secure the affection of the Danish court, which was occupied in intrigues against her. I am not aware that there were any real grounds of reproach in her behaviour, but the stately dames of the court objected to her continual levities, and, whether with reason or not, her husband considered himself obliged to separate from her; she was accordingly sent at the commencement of 1809 to Altona, attended by a chamberlain and a maid of honour. On her arrival, she gave herself up to despair; hers, however, was not a silent grief, for she related her history to everybody. The unfortunate lady really excited commiseration when she wept for her son, three years of age, whom she was destined never to see again. But her natural levity soon gained the ascendancy; she did not continue to observe the decorum becoming her station, and some months afterwards was sent into Jutland, where, I believe she is still living.

CHAPTER XXVII.

IN September, 1806, it was pretty evident that, as soon as war should break out between France and Prussia, Russia would not be long in forming an alliance with the latter. Peace, however, had been re-established between Napoleon and Alexander by virtue of a treaty just signed at Paris, by which Russia engaged to evacuate the mouths of the Cataro, a condition which she shewed no great readiness to fulfil. I received, too, a number of the *St. Petersburg Court Gazette* containing an ukase of the Emperor of Russia, in which he pointed out the

dangers which again menaced Europe ; and shewed the necessity which existed of watching over the general tranquillity and the security of his own empire, declaring his intention, in consequence, not only of completing, but augmenting his army. A levy therefore was ordered of four men out of every five hundred inhabitants.—Before the commencement of hostilities Duroc was sent to the King of Prussia in order to discover if there were yet a possibility of renewing negotiations ; but affairs were already too much embarrassed, and all his endeavours were ineffectual. Perhaps, too, the King of Prussia had it no longer in his power to avoid a war with France ; but be that as it may, he certainly had just grounds of complaint against her emperor. For although the latter, as we have seen, had given Hanover to him in exchange for the two Margravates, he had nevertheless offered the restitution of that province to England, as one of the conditions of the treaty entered into with Mr. Fox. These clandestine proceedings were not unknown to the Berlin cabinet, and thus Duroc's mission was rendered useless by Napoleon's duplicity.

The King of Prussia was at this time at Weimar. The period was now approaching when the horrors of war were to be renewed in Germany, and in proportion as the hopes of peace were diminished the threats of Prussia redoubled. Inspired by the memory of the great Frederic, she was utterly averse to peace. Her measures, which hitherto had been sufficiently moderate, all at once assumed a menacing character, upon learning that the minister of the King of England had announced to parliament that France had consented to the restitution of Hanover. The French minister intimated to Prussia that this was a preliminary step towards a general peace, and that she would be liberally indemnified in return. But the King of Prussia, well aware how pertinaciously the house of Hanover clung to this ancient domain, which gave to England a certain preponderance in Germany, considered himself trifled with, and determined on war. He was, moreover, ambitious of the character of the liberator of Germany, and rejected every offer of compensation. Under these circumstances, Lord Lauderdale, having been recalled from Paris by his government, the war with England continued, and was about to commence with Prussia. The cabinet of Berlin sent an ultimatum, couched in terms which almost amounted to a defiance. From the well-known character of Napoleon, we may judge of his irritation at this ultimatum ; and after a stay of eight months in Paris,

passed in ineffectual negotiations, he set out on the 25th of September for the Rhine. On the 10th of October, 1806, hostilities commenced between France and Prussia, and I demanded of the Senate that a stop should be put to the Prussian recruiting. The news of a great victory gained by the emperor over the Prussians on the 14th of October, was brought to Hamburg on the 19th by some fugitives, who gave such contradictory and exaggerated accounts of the loss the French army had sustained, that it was not till the 28th of October, when the official despatches arrived, that we knew whether to mourn or rejoice at the victory of Jena.

The Duke of Brunswick, who was dangerously wounded at the battle of Auerstaedt, arrived on the 29th of October at Altona. His entrance into that city presented a new and striking illustration of the vicissitudes of fortune. A sovereign prince, of high military reputation, but lately in the peaceable enjoyment of power in his own capital, now vanquished and wounded, was brought into Altona on a wretched litter borne by ten men, without officers or attendants, followed by a crowd of children and vagabonds drawn together by curiosity. He was lodged in a miserable inn, so much exhausted by fatigue and the pain in his eyes, that the day after his arrival his death was very generally reported. Doctor Unzer was immediately sent for to relieve the sufferings of the unfortunate duke; who, during the few days that he survived his wounds, saw no one but his wife, who joined him on the 1st of November. No visitors were admitted to see him, and on the 10th of the same month he expired. At this juncture Bernadotte returned to Hamburg. I asked him what construction I was to put on his conduct while he was with Davoust, who had left Nauemburg to attack the Prussian army; and whether it were true that he had refused to march with that general, and afterwards to assist him in his attack upon the Prussians on the Weimar road. 'My letters inform me,' I observed, 'that you took no part in the battle of Auerstaedt. To this statement I gave no credit, but doubtless you have seen the bulletin which I received a short time after the battle, in which it is mentioned that Bonaparte said at Nauemburg, in the presence of several officers, "Were I to bring him before a court-martial he would be shot. I shall say nothing to him about it, but he shall be at no loss to understand what I think of his behaviour. He has too nice a sense of honour not to be himself aware that he has acted disgracefully."' 'I think him very capable,' replied Bernadotte,

‘of making these observations. He hates me, because he knows I have no great love for him ; but let him speak to me himself on the subject, and he shall have his answer. Gascon as I may be, he is a greater one than myself. I do not deny feeling piqued at receiving something like orders from Davoust, but I did my duty notwithstanding.’ About the beginning of November, the Swedes entered Lubeck, but on the 8th of the same month the town was taken by assault, and the Swedes, as well as the rest of the corps that had escaped from Jena, were made prisoners.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

VICTORY everywhere declared in favour of the French. Prince Hohenlohe, who commanded a division of the Prussian army, was obliged to capitulate at Prentzlau. After this capitulation General Blucher took the command of the remains of the corps, to which he reunited those troops who, being absent from Prentzlau, were not included in the capitulation. These corps, in addition to those which Blucher had at Auerstaedt, were then almost the only ramparts of the Prussian monarchy. Soult and Bernadotte received orders from Murat for the close pursuit of Blucher, who, on his part, was using every effort to draw the forces of those two generals from Berlin. Blucher marched upon Lubeck, of which he took possession. Marshal Murat pursued the wreck of the Prussian army which had escaped from Saxony by way of Magdeburg, and Blucher was driven back upon Lubeck. To the army at Berlin the destruction of this corps was of the first consequence, being under the command of a brave and skilful general, who drew from the centre of military operations numerous troops, with which he might throw himself into Hanover, or Hesse, or even Holland, and by a junction with the English forces greatly harass the rear of the grand army. The Grand Duke of Berg explained to me his plans and expectations, and shortly afterwards announced their completion. His letters, among other particulars, informed me of the taking of Lubeck. In two of these letters, Murat, who was probably misinformed by his agents or made the dupe of some intriguer, sent me word that Morcau had arrived at Hamburg, and that he had passed through Paris on the 28th of October. His only proof of this fact was a letter of Fauche-Borel, which he had intercepted. I recollect a curious circum-

stance, which threw some light on this matter, and shews the necessity of mistrusting the intelligence which on slight surmises is often furnished to persons in authority. About a fortnight before I received Murat's first letter, a person came to acquaint me that General Moreau was in Hamburg. I gave no credit whatever to the information, though I used every means in my power to discover if there were any foundation for such a report, but without success. Two days afterwards I was assured that a certain individual had met General Moreau, that he had spoken to him, and knew him well from having served under him, together with several other circumstances which appeared sufficiently credible. I, in consequence, immediately sent for the individual in question, who repeated to me that he knew Moreau—that he had lately met him—that the general had inquired of him the way to the Jungfersteige (a public walk in Hamburg)—that he had pointed it out to him, adding afterwards, 'Have I not the honour of addressing General Moreau?' upon which the latter replied, 'Yes, but take no notice of having seen me, I am here incognito.' All this appeared so absurd to me, that, pretending not to know Moreau, I requested the man to give me a description of him. The person he described bore no resemblance whatever to Moreau, whom he represented as wearing a braided French coat, with the national cockade in his hat. I at once perceived that the whole was an imposture for the purpose of getting a little money, and quickly sent the fellow about his business. In about a quarter of an hour afterwards, I received a visit from M. Chevardiere, who came to introduce M. Belland, the French consul at Stettin. This gentleman wore a braided coat and the national cockade. He was the hero of the tale told by my late informer. In fact, a slight resemblance between the consul of Stettin and General Moreau had occasioned several persons to mistake them for each other.

During the campaign in Prussia nothing was talked of throughout Germany but the generous conduct of Napoleon in regard to Prince Hatzfeld. I became possessed of many interesting particulars relative to this event, and was fortunate enough to obtain a copy of a letter which the emperor wrote to Josephine on the subject, which I shall presently lay before the reader. I must promise that, in conformity with the inquisitorial system which too often characterized the emperor's government, and which extended to every country of which he had taken military possession, the first thing done on entering a

town was to take possession of the post office—and then, Heaven knows how little the privacy of correspondence was respected ! Berlin was not exempted from this system, and among the letters thus intercepted and forwarded to Napoleon, was one addressed to the King of Prussia by Prince Hatzfeld, who had imprudently ventured to remain in the Prussian capital. In this letter the prince communicated to his sovereign everything of importance that had transpired in Berlin since he had been obliged to leave it, together with the strength and situation of the divisions of which the French army was composed. The emperor, after reading this letter, gave orders that the prince should be arrested, and tried by a court-martial as a spy. The court had assembled and its decision could hardly be a matter of doubt, when Madame Hatzfeld had recourse to Duroc, who on such occasions was always happy to facilitate an interview with the emperor. On that day Napoleon had been at a review in the environs of the city. Duroc was acquainted with Madame Hatzfeld, having frequently seen her during his visits to Berlin. On Napoleon's return from the review he was astonished to find Duroc at the palace at such an hour, and inquired if he had brought any news. Duroc replied in the affirmative, and followed the emperor into his closet, into which he shortly introduced Madame Hatzfeld. The remainder of the scene is related in Napoleon's letter before alluded to. This letter is evidently in reply to one from Josephine, reproaching him for the manner in which he spoke of women, and very probably of the beautiful and unfortunate Queen of Prussia, with regard to whom he had in one of his bulletins expressed himself in terms not sufficiently respectful. Napoleon's letter runs thus : 'I have received your letter, in which it seems you reproach me for speaking ill of women. True it is that, above all things, I dislike female intriguers. I have been used to kind, gentle, and conciliatory women. Them I love, and if they have spoiled me, it is not my fault, but yours. However, you will see that I have acted indulgently towards one sensible and deserving woman. I allude to Madame de Hatzfeld. When I shewed her her husband's letter she burst into tears, and in a tone of the most exquisite grief and candour exclaimed, "It is indeed his writing !" This was too much, it went to my heart, and I said, "Well, Madame, throw the letter into the fire, and then I shall have no proof against your husband." She burned the letter, and was restored to happiness. Her husband is now safe ; two hours later, and he would have been lost. You see, therefore,

that I like women who are feminine, simple, and amiable, for they alone resemble you. November 6th, 1806, 9 o'clock, p.m.'

When Marshal Bernadotte had forced Blucher into Lubeck, and made him prisoner, he sent me information of the circumstance, but I was far from expecting that the prisoner would be intrusted to my charge. Such, however, was the case. After his surrender he was sent to Hamburg, where he had the whole city for a prison. During the whole time Blucher was under my surveillance at Hamburg, so far from seeking to add to the severity of his captivity, I was anxious to spare him those annoyances which a strict enforcement of my instructions would have occasioned. I was curious to become acquainted with this extraordinary man, and saw him very frequently. I found him an enthusiastic Prussian patriot, a man of unquestionable bravery, and enterprising even to rashness, but of defective education, and an extreme lover of pleasure, of which he took his full share during his stay at Hamburg. It was his custom to remain whole hours at table, and notwithstanding his exclusive patriotism he rendered ample justice to the wines of France. To pleasures of a more licentious nature he was likewise immoderately addicted, and spent a considerable part of his time at the gaming-table. His disposition was extremely gay, and considered merely as a boon companion he was agreeable enough. The original style of his conversation amused me much. In spite of the disasters of the Prussian army his confidence in the deliverance of Germany remained wholly unshaken. He often said to me, 'I place great reliance in the public spirit of Germany, in the enthusiasm which prevails in our universities. The events of war are uncertain, and even defeats tend to keep alive in a people principles of honour, and a concern for the national glory. You may depend upon it, that when once a whole nation has determined to free itself from a humiliating yoke, it will succeed in doing so. There is no doubt but we shall end by having a *land-wehre* very different from any levy which the worn-out spirit of the French could produce. England will always lend us the aid of her navy and her subsidies, and we will renew alliances with Austria and Russia. From my own certain knowledge I can pledge myself to the truth of one fact which you may rely upon, namely, that none of the allied powers engaged in the present war entertain views of territorial acquisition. All they unanimously desire is to put an end to the system of aggrandizement established by your emperor, and which he pursues with such alarming rapidity. In our first

war against France, at the commencement of your revolution, we fought about questions respecting the rights of kings, for which I assure you I care very little ; the case is now widely different ; the whole population of Prussia makes common cause with its government. The people fight in defence of their hearths and homes, and reverses destroy our armies without changing the spirit of the nation. I am tranquil as to the result, because I foresee that fortune will not always favour your emperor. It is impossible but that the time will come when all Europe, humbled by his extortions and impatient of his encroachments, will rise up together against him. The greater the number of nations that wear his chains, the more fearful will be the reaction, when they burst those chains asunder. I cannot be denied that he is tormented with an insatiable desire of acquiring new territories. To the war of 1805 against Austria and Russia, the present has almost immediately succeeded. We have fallen ; Prussia is occupied, but Russia still remains to be conquered. What will be the event of the war it is not in my power to foresee, but admitting that the issue should be favourable to you, it will terminate only to be speedily renewed. If we but persevere, depend upon it France, exhausted even by her conquests, must eventually fall. Do you wish for peace ? Recommend it, and you will give the strongest proof of your love to your country.' In this manner did Blucher constantly talk to me, and as I never deemed it necessary to carry my official character into the drawing-room, I replied frankly to his observations, preserving merely the degree of reserve requisite in my situation. I did not tell him how often my anticipations accorded with his own, but I never hesitated to acknowledge to him how greatly I desired to see a reasonable peace concluded. Before Blucher's arrival at Hamburg, it was visited by Prince Paul of Wirtemberg, the second son of one of the two kings created by Napoleon, whose crowns had not yet been worn a year. The young prince, who was imbued with the ideas of liberty and independence which then agitated Germany, had adopted a headlong proceeding. He had quitted Stuttgart to serve in the Prussian campaign without asking his father's permission, and this inconsiderate step might have exposed the King of Wirtemberg to Napoleon's resentment. The King of Prussia advanced Prince Paul to the rank of general, but he was taken prisoner at the very commencement of hostilities. The Prince of Wirtemberg was not, as has been falsely stated, conducted to Stuttgart by a captain of gendarmerie.

He came to Hamburg, where I received several visits from him. At that time he did not appear to have any settled intentions, for after he was made prisoner he expressed to me his earnest desire to enter into the French service, and often asked me to solicit for him an interview with the emperor. This he obtained, and remained for a long time in Paris, where I know he has frequently resided since the restoration.

When the King of Prussia found that defeat awaited him at every turn, he repented of having undertaken a war which had delivered his states into the power of Napoleon, in less time even than that in which Austria had fallen the year preceding. He wrote to the emperor requesting a suspension of hostilities. Rapp was present when Napoleon received the King of Prussia's letter. 'It is too late,' said he; 'but no matter, I wish to put a stop to further bloodshed, and am ready to listen to any terms by which neither the honour nor the interests of the nation will be compromised.' Then calling Duroc, he gave him orders to visit the wounded, and see that they wanted for nothing. 'Visit each individual,' he added, 'on my behalf, and give them all the consolation of which they stand in need; afterwards seek the King of Prussia, and if he offers reasonable proposals, you will let me know.' Negotiations were accordingly commenced, but Napoleon's conditions were considered wholly inadmissible. Prussia still hoped for assistance from the Russian forces; besides which the emperor's demands extended to England, who at that moment had no motive to accede to the pretensions of France. The emperor required that England should make restitution to France of all the colonies she had captured since the commencement of the war; that Russia should restore to the Porte Moldavia and Wallachia, which she then occupied; in short, he adopted the advice of the king in some tragedy or other, who told his ambassador to 'ask everything, that you may obtain nothing.' The emperor's demands were in fact so unreasonable, that it was scarcely possible to suppose that he himself expected they would be listened to.

Negotiations, alternately resumed and abandoned, were carried on with coldness on both sides, until the moment that England had persuaded Russia to assist Prussia against France. They then altogether ceased, and it was only for the purpose of appearing to wish for their renewal, on terms still more favourable to France, that Duroc was sent to the King of Prussia, whom he found at Osterade, on the other side of the

Danube. The only answer he received from that monarch was, 'The time is passed,' an observation nearly similar to Napoleon's, 'It is too late,' when he received his majesty's letter. Whilst Duroc was fulfilling his mission to the King of Prussia, I was myself negotiating at Hamburg. Bonaparte was extremely anxious to detach Sweden from the coalition, and to terminate the war with her by a separate treaty. Sweden, indeed, might prove very useful to him, if Prussia, Russia, and England, should assemble any considerable forces in the north. Denmark was already with us, and, could we gain Sweden also, the union of those two powers might create a diversion, and occasion serious alarm to the coalition which would be obliged to concentrate its principal force to withstand the attack of the grand army in Poland. The opinions of M. Peyron, the Swedish minister at Hamburg, were altogether averse to the war in which his sovereign was engaged with France, and of those opinions he made no secret. I much regretted that this gentleman left Hamburg upon leave of absence for a year, at the very time that I received the emperor's instructions upon the subject I have just mentioned. M. Peyron was succeeded by M. Netzel, and I soon had the satisfaction of discovering that his ideas differed in no respect from those of his predecessor. Immediately on his arrival, M. Netzel requested an interview to speak to me on the subject of the Swedes who had been taken prisoners on the Trave. He begged permission for the officers to return to Sweden on their parole. I was anxious to oblige M. Netzel in this respect, and availed myself of so favourable an opportunity to lead him gradually to the subject of my instructions. I had every reason to be satisfied with the success of my first overtures, and he himself was well convinced of the truth of the remarks I made to him. I saw he understood that his sovereign would have everything to gain by an accommodation with France, and he told me that all Sweden called for peace. Emboldened by the success of this first attempt, I told him frankly that I was authorized to treat with him. In return for this confidence on my part, he assured me that M. de Wetterstedt, the King of Sweden's private secretary, with whom he was intimate, and from whom he shewed me several letters, entertained the same opinions as himself. He added, that he had permission to correspond with the king, to whom, as well as to M. de Wetterstedt, he promised to write the same evening, and acquaint them with our conversation. From the foregoing statement it will

appear, that never was a negotiation commenced under more favourable auspices ; but who could foresee what caprice would enter into the head of the King of Sweden ? That unlucky prince took M. Netzel's letter in very ill part, and M. de Wetterstedt himself received a most ungracious command, to signify to M. Netzel his sovereign's displeasure at his having presumed to visit a French minister, and still more to enter into a political conversation with him, although it amounted to nothing more than *conversation*. The king did not confine himself to reproaches. M. Netzel, in great affliction, came to inform me that he had received orders to quit Hamburg immediately, without even awaiting the arrival of his successor. He looked upon his disgrace as complete. I had the pleasure of seeing M. Netzel again in 1809, at Hamburg, charged with a mission from Charles XIII.

CHAPTER XXIX.

'NAPOLEON had achieved the total humiliation of the Prussian monarchy in a campaign of a week's duration : yet severe as the exertions of his army had been, and splendid his success, and late as the season was now advanced, there ensued no pause of inaction ; the emperor himself remained but a few days in Berlin.

'This brief residence, however, was distinguished by the issue of the famous *decrees of Berlin* ; those extraordinary edicts by which Bonaparte hoped to sap the foundations of the power of England—the one power which he had no means of assailing by his apparently irresistible arms.

'Napoleon declared the British Islands to be in a state of blockade : any intercourse with that country was henceforth to be a crime ; all her citizens found in any country in alliance with France to be prisoners ; every article of English produce or manufacture, wherever discovered, to be confiscated. In a word, wherever France had power, the slightest communication with England was henceforth to be treason against the majesty of Napoleon ; and every coast of Europe was to be lined with new armies of *douaniers* and *gens d'armes*, for the purpose of carrying into effect what he called the *continental system*.'

I shall here bestow a few remarks on the famous continental system, as, perhaps more than any other person, I had oppor-

tunities of witnessing its fraud, and estimating its ruinous consequences. This system originated in the war of 1806, and was brought into operation on the 21st of November of that year, by a decree dated at Berlin. The plan was conceived by weak-minded counsellors, who, perceiving the emperor's just indignation against the duplicity of England, her repugnance to enter into serious negotiations with him, and her incessant endeavours to arm the continent against him, had prevailed on him to issue this decree, which I can never view in another light than as an act of tyranny and madness. It was not a decree, but fleets that were necessary. Without a navy, it was ridiculous to declare the British Isles in a state of blockade, whilst the English fleets were actually blockading all the French ports. This declaration, however, was made by Napoleon in the Berlin decree, and this is what was called the continental system ! a system of fraud, of speculation, and pillage. One can scarcely now conceive how Europe could endure for a single day that fiscal tyranny, which extorted exorbitant prices for articles which the habits of three centuries had rendered equally indispensable to rich and poor. So far from true is it, that this system had for its sole and exclusive object the prevention of the sale of English goods, that licenses for that purpose were granted to any who were rich enough to pay for them. The quantity and quality of exported French goods were magnified to an extravagant degree. In order to comply with the emperor's wishes, it was necessary to take out a certain quantity of those articles, but it was only to throw them into the sea. And yet no one had the honesty to tell the emperor, that England found a market for her goods on the continent, but bought scarcely anything. The speculation in licenses was carried to a scandalous extent, merely to enrich a favoured few, and to satisfy the short-sighted views of its besotted contrivers. This system proves what is written in the annals of the human heart and mind, that the cupidity of the one is insatiable, and the errors of the other incorrigible. Of this I will cite an example, though it relates to a period subsequent to that in which this detestable system originated. At Hamburg, in 1811, under Davoust's government, a poor man narrowly escaped being shot for having brought into the department of the Elbe a small loaf of sugar for the use of his family, whilst at the same moment, perhaps, Napoleon was signing a license for the importation of a million of sugar loaves. Smuggling on a small scale was punished by death.

whilst the government carried it on wholesale. Thus the effect of the same law was to fill the treasury with money, and the prisons with victims.

The excise laws of this period, which carried on a war of extermination against rhubarb, and kept a coastguard along the continent to prevent the introduction of senna, could not preserve the continental system itself from destruction. Ridicule attended the installation of the detested prevotal courts. At Hamburg, the president of one of them, who was a Frenchman, delivered an oration, in which he attempted to prove, that in the time of the Ptolemies there had existed extraordinary tribunals for the regulation of the customs, and that to them Egypt was indebted for her prosperity. Thus, insulting irony and the most absurd folly were added to intimidation. The ordinary excise officers, formerly so much abhorred in Hamburg, truly observed, that they would soon be regretted, and that the difference between them and the prevotal courts would very shortly be felt. Bonaparte's counsellors led him to commit so gross an absurdity as to require, that every vessel which had obtained a license, should export merchandise equivalent to the colonial produce licensed to be imported. And what was the consequence? Old stores of silks, which the change of fashion had rendered wholly unsaleable, were bought up at a low price, and being prohibited in England were thrown into the sea. The slight loss this occasioned was amply recompensed by the profits of the speculation.

The continental system, which was worthy only of the dark and barbarous ages, and which, had it been even admissible in theory, was perfectly impracticable in its application, can never be sufficiently stigmatized. No real friends to the emperor were they who could recommend to him such a system, calculated, as it infallibly was, to excite the indignation of Europe, and eventually to produce the most terrible reaction. To tyrannize over the human species, and at the same time to expect their uniform admiration and submission, is clearly to require an impossibility. It would seem as if Fate, which had still some splendid triumphs in store for Napoleon, was already, too, preparing those causes which were at once to wrest them from him, and plunge him into disasters even greater than the good fortune which had favoured his elevation. The prohibition of trade, the constant severity in the execution of this detested system, amounted to nothing short of a continental impost. Of this I will give a proof,

and I state nothing but from personal observation. The custom house regulations were strictly enforced at Hamburg, and along the two lines of Cuxhaven and Travemunde. Mr. Eudel, the director of this department, performed his duty with zeal and disinterestedness, and I am happy in rendering him this deserved testimony. Immense quantities of English merchandise and colonial produce were accumulated at Holstein, where they almost all arrived by way of Kiel and Hudsum, having been brought over the line at the expense of a premium of from thirty-three to forty per cent. Convinced of this fact, by a thousand proofs, and weary of the vexations of the system, I took upon myself to lay my ideas on the subject before the emperor. He had given me permission to write to him direct, without any intermediate agency, upon whatever I might consider essential to his service. I sent an extraordinary courier to Fontainebleau, where he then was, and in my despatch informed him, that, in spite of his preventive guard, contraband goods were smuggled in, because the profits on their sale in Germany, Poland, Italy, and even France, to which they found their way, were too considerable not to induce persons to run all hazards to obtain them. I recommended, at the very time that he was about to unite the Hanse Towns to the French empire, that such merchandise should be openly imported upon paying a duty of thirty-three per cent., which was about equal to the rate of their insurance. The emperor did not hesitate to adopt my suggestion ; and, in 1811, the measure produced a revenue in Hamburg alone of upwards of sixty millions of francs. This system embroiled us with Sweden and Russia, who could but ill endure that a strict blockade should be required from them, whilst Napoleon himself was distributing licenses at his pleasure. Bernadotte, on his way to Sweden, passed through Hamburg in October, 1810. He stayed with me three days, during which he scarcely saw anyone but myself. He asked my opinion as to what he should do relative to the continental system. I did not hesitate in telling him, not of course as a minister of France, but as a private individual to his friend, that, in his place, at the head of a poor nation, which could only exist by the exchange of its natural productions with England, I would open my ports, and give the Swedes gratuitously that general license which Bonaparte was selling in detail to intrigue and cupidity. The ill-advised Berlin decree could not but produce a reaction fatal to the emperor's fortune, by making whole nations his enemies. The hurling of twenty

kings from their thrones would have excited less hatred than this contempt for the wants of the people. This profound ignorance of the maxims of political economy was the source of general privation and misery, which in their turn produced general hostility. The system could only succeed in the impossible event of all the powers of Europe honestly making common cause to carry it into effect. A single free port would destroy it. To ensure its complete success, it was necessary to conquer and occupy every country, and never to withdraw from any. As a means of ruining England it was perfectly ridiculous, since by prohibiting all intercourse with that country the interests of every other must have suffered. It was necessary too that the whole of Europe should be compelled, by force of arms, to enter into his absurd coalition, and that the same force should constantly be maintained to support it. Was this possible? This system has been styled the essence of despotism, an expression which correctly defines it. The captain reporter of a court-martial had sanctioned the acquittal of a poor peasant, convicted of having purchased a loaf of sugar beyond the custom-house limits. This officer being some time afterwards at a grand dinner given by Marshal Davoust, in the midst of the entertainment, the latter said to him, 'You have a very tender conscience, sir'; and upon the captain's attempting to explain, he interrupted him, adding, 'Go to head-quarters, and you will find an order there for you.' This order sent him eighty leagues from Hamburg. It is necessary to have witnessed as I did the countless vexations and miseries occasioned by this deplorable system, to form a due conception of the mischief its authors did in Europe, and how greatly the hatred and revenge which it produced contributed to Napoleon's fall.

CHAPTER XXX.

'NAPOLEON received at Berlin a deputation of his senate, sent from Paris to congratulate him on the successes of his campaign. To them he announced these celebrated decrees: he made them the bearers of the trophies of his recent victories, and, moreover, of a demand for the immediate levying of 80,000 men, being the *first* conscription for the year 1808—that for the year 1807 having been already anticipated. The subservient senate recorded and granted whatever their master pleased to dictate;

but the cost of human life which Napoleon's ambition demanded, had begun, ere this time, to be seriously thought of in France. He, meanwhile, prepared, without further delay, to extinguish the feeble spark of resistance which still lingered in a few garrisons of the Prussian monarchy beyond the Oder; and to meet, before they could reach the soil of Germany, those Russian legions, which were now advancing, too late, to the assistance of Frederick William. That unfortunate prince sent Lucchesini to Berlin, to open, if possible, a negotiation with the victorious occupant of his capital and palace; but Bonaparte demanded Dantzic, and two other fortified towns, as the price of even the briefest armistice; and the Italian envoy returned to inform the king, that no hope remained for him except in the arrival of the Russians.

'Napoleon held in his hands the means of opening his campaign with those allies of Prussia, under circumstances involving his enemy in a new, and probably endless train of difficulties. The Partition of Poland—that great political crime, for which every power that had a part in it has since been severely, though none of them adequately punished—had left the population of what had once been a great and powerful kingdom, in a state of discontent and irritation, of which, had Napoleon been willing to make full use of it, the fruits might have been more dangerous for the Czar than any campaign against any foreign enemy. The French emperor had but to announce distinctly that his purpose was the restoration of Poland as an independent state, and the whole mass of an eminently gallant and warlike population would have risen instantly at his call. But Bonaparte was withheld from resorting to this effectual means of annoyance by various considerations; of which the chief were these: first, he could not emancipate Poland without depriving Austria of a rich and important province, and consequently provoking her once more into the field: and secondly, he foresaw that the Russian emperor, if threatened with the destruction of his Polish territory and authority, would urge the war in a very different manner from that which he was likely to adopt while acting only as the ally of Prussia.

'Before re-opening the great campaign, Bonaparte received the submission and explanation of the Elector of Saxony, who truly stated that Prussia had forced him to take part in the war. The apology was accepted, and from this time the elector adhered to the league of the Rhine, and was a faithful ally of Napoleon.'

Bonaparte was not only beyond all comparison the greatest captain of modern times, but he may be said to have entirely changed the art of war. Formerly, even the most skilful generals were governed by the almanac as to the proper season for fighting ; and it was the settled custom in Europe to brave the battle's roar only from the first fine days of spring to the last fine days of autumn. The months of rain, frost, and snow, were passed in what were termed winter quarters. Pichegru, in Holland, had set the example of indifference to the atmosphere. Bonaparte too, at Austerlitz, had dared the inclemency of the season ; and so perfect was his success, that he determined on the same course of action at the commencement of the winter of 1806. His military genius and incredible activity seemed to increase, and, confident of his troops, he resolved to commence a winter campaign in a climate more rigorous than any in which he had hitherto fought. The men chained to his destiny were now to brave the northern blast as they had formerly Egypt's scorching sun. Skilful above every other general in the choice of his fields of battle, he was not willing to await tranquilly until the Russian army, which was advancing towards Germany, should come to measure its strength with him in the plains of conquered Prussia, ; he resolved to march to meet it, and to reach it before it should have crossed the Vistula. But previous to his departure from Berlin to explore as a conqueror the territory of Poland and the confines of Russia, he addressed a proclamation to his troops, in which he dwelt on their past achievements, and announced his intentions for the future. A forward movement was now indispensable ; since, had he waited until the Russians had passed the Vistula, there would probably have been no winter campaign, and he must of necessity either have taken up miserable winter quarters between that river and the Oder, or have recrossed the Oder to combat the enemy in Prussia. His military genius and indefatigable activity served him admirably on this occasion, and the proclamation just alluded to, which was dated from Berlin, before his departure for Charlottenburg, proves that he did not, as was sometimes the case, act from the impulse of the moment, but that his calculations had been carefully made. A rapid and immense impulse given to great masses of men by the will of a single individual may produce a transient lustre, and, like the lightning's flash, dazzle for a moment the eyes of the multitude ; but when, at a distance from the theatre of glory, we witness only the melancholy results, the genius of conquest can only be considered

as the genius of destruction. How sad a spectacle was often presented to my view!—continually obliged to listen to complaints of the general distress, and yet to execute orders which augmented the immense sacrifices already made by the city of Hamburg! Thus, for example, the emperor desired me to furnish him with fifty thousand cloaks, which I immediately did. I felt the importance of such a demand at the approach of winter, and in a climate the rigour of which our soldiers had not yet experienced. I also received orders to seize at Lubeck (which, as I have already said, had been alternately taken and retaken by Blucher and Bernadotte) four hundred thousand lasts of corn, and to send them to Magdeburg. This corn belonged to Russia. Marshal Mortier, too, seized some timber for building, belonging to the same State, the value of which was estimated at fourteen hundred thousand francs. Meanwhile our troops continued to advance with such rapidity, that before the end of November, Murat, who indeed was an enthusiast in war, had arrived at Warsaw, at the head of the advanced guard of the grand army, of which he had the command. The emperor's head-quarters were then at Posen, where deputations from all parts came to solicit him for the re-establishment and independence of the kingdom of Poland. Rapp informed me, that, after receiving the deputation from Warsaw, the emperor said to him, 'I like the Poles, their enthusiastic character pleases me: I should like to make them an independent people, but that is no easy matter. The cake has been shared among too many; there is Austria, and Russia, and Prussia, who have each had a piece; besides, when the match is once kindled, who knows where the conflagration may stop? My first duty is towards France, I must not sacrifice her interests for Poland—in short, we must refer this matter to the universal sovereign—Time; he will shew us by-and-by what we are to do.' Had Sulkowsky lived, Napoleon would doubtless have remembered what he said to him in Egypt, and in all probability would have raised up a power, the dismemberment of which towards the close of the last century, began to break up that political equilibrium which had subsisted in Europe ever since the treaty of Westphalia. The emperor made his entry into Warsaw on the 1st of January. The reports which he had previously received concurred, for the most part, in describing the dissatisfaction of his troops, who for some time past had been forced to contend with bad roads, bad weather, and all sorts of privations. Bonaparte inquired of those generals who told him

of the discontent and despondency which had succeeded to the usual enthusiasm of his troops, 'Does their spirit fail them when they come in sight of the enemy?'—'No, Sire.'—'I was sure of it. My troops are always the same.' Then, turning to Rapp, he observed, 'I must rouse them,' and shortly after dictated to them a most inspiring proclamation. When Bonaparte dictated his proclamations, and Heaven knows I have written enough from his dictation, he appeared for the moment inspired, and exhibited in some sort the excitement of the Italian Improvisatori. In order to follow him, it was necessary to write with inconceivable rapidity. Frequently when reading over to him what he has dictated, I have known him smile as in triumph at the effect which he imagined any particular passage would produce. In general, his proclamations turned on three distinct points—praising his soldiers for what they had done, shewing them what they had yet to do, and vilifying his enemies. The proclamation I have just alluded to was circulated profusely throughout Germany, and without having witnessed it, it is scarcely possible to conceive the effect it produced on the whole army. The corps stationed in the rear burned to pass, by forced marches, the space which still separated them from headquarters, and those who were nearer the emperor, forgot their fatigues, their miseries, and privations, and longed to engage the enemy. It not unfrequently happened that they were unable to comprehend what Napoleon meant in these proclamations; but that gave them no sort of disturbance, it was the emperor's proclamation, and, though hungry and barefooted, they marched uncomplainingly along, recounting to one another the battles in which each had fought and bled. Such was the enthusiasm, or rather the fanaticism, which Napoleon could inspire among his soldiers, when he deemed it necessary, as he said, 'to arouse them.' I do not pretend here to trace out a picture of Europe at the close of 1806. I will merely throw together a few facts of which I then became possessed, and which I find on referring to my correspondence of that period.

It has been already mentioned, that the emperor arrived at Warsaw on the 1st of January. During his stay at Posen, he had, by virtue of a treaty concluded with the Elector of Saxony, founded a new kingdom, and consequently extended his power in Germany by the annexation of the new kingdom of Saxony to the confederation of the Rhine. According to the terms of this treaty, Saxony, so justly celebrated for her cavalry, was to

furnish the emperor with a contingent of 20,000 men and horses. This alliance proved very advantageous, not so much on account of the men, as of the horses, which Saxony supplied in abundance to the French army.

It was quite a new spectacle to the princes of Germany, accustomed as they all were to ancient habits of etiquette, to see an upstart sovereign treat them as subjects, and even oblige them by his boldness to consider themselves as such. Those famous Saxons, who had made Charlemagne tremble, threw themselves on the protection of the emperor; nor was it a matter of indifference to Bonaparte, to see the head of the house of Saxony courting his alliance; for the new king was, on account of his age, his tastes, and his character, more revered than any other prince in Germany.

From the moment of the emperor's arrival at Warsaw until hostilities had commenced against the Russians, he was continually solicited to re-establish the throne of Poland, and to restore its chivalrous independence to the ancient empire of the Jagellons. An individual who was at that time in Warsaw has told me, that the emperor was in the greatest uncertainty as to the measures he should adopt with regard to Poland. He was besieged by entreaties to re-establish that ancient and heroic kingdom; but he came to no decision, choosing, as was customary with him, to submit to events, that he might the more appear to command them. In fact, Napoleon passed a great part of his time at Warsaw in fêtes and drawing-rooms, which, however, did not prevent him from watching, with his eagle eye, that nothing was defective in any department of the public service, whether interior or exterior. He himself, it is true, was in the capital of Poland, but his mighty influence was everywhere present. I heard Duroc say, when we were conversing together about the campaign of Tilsit, that Napoleon's activity and address were never more conspicuously displayed. The emperor employed the month of January in military preparations for the approaching attack of the Russians, but, at the same time, he did not neglect the business of the cabinet; with him nothing was ever in arrears. I had seen him too often on the field of battle to be surprised at the instantaneous orders he gave, and though his situation at Warsaw was critical, I had known it still more so at Acre and Marengo on the eve of victory. In truth, while Napoleon was at Warsaw an expected engagement was not the only business in hand; affairs were far more complicated than during the campaign of Vienna. It was

necessary on the one hand to observe Prussia, which was occupied, and on the other to anticipate the Russians, the whole of whose movements indicated their intention to strike the first blow.

In the preceding campaign, Austria, before the taking of Vienna, was alone engaged. The case was very different now : Austria had only soldiers, and Prussia, as Blucher told me, was beginning to have citizens. There had been no difficulty in returning from Vienna ; from Warsaw, in case of failure, there might be a great deal, notwithstanding the creation of the kingdom of Saxony, and the provisional government given to Prussia and the other conquered states of Germany. None of these considerations escaped the penetration of Napoleon : nothing was omitted in the notes, letters, and official correspondence, which I received from all quarters. Possessing as I did the minutest information from my own correspondence of all that was passing in Germany, it often happened that I transmitted to the government the same intelligence which it transmitted to me, not imagining that I was already acquainted with it. Thus, for example, I thought I was apprizing the government that Austria was arming, but received the same information from head-quarters a few days after.

During the Prussian campaign, Austria played precisely the same game as Prussia had done during the campaign of Austria. There was indecision in the one case, and indecision in the other. As Prussia had before the battle of Austerlitz awaited the success or defeat of the French army, to decide whether she should remain neuter, or declare against France ; so Austria, no doubt supposing that Russia would be more fortunate as the ally of Prussia, than she had been as her ally, assembled in Bohemia a body of 40,000 men. That corps was called an army of observation, but the nature of these armies of observation is pretty well known ; they belong to the same class as armed neutralities, and those ingenious inventions, sanitary cordons. The fact is, that the army assembled in Bohemia was destined to aid and assist the Russians in the event of the latter proving successful ; and who can reasonably blame the Austrian government for wishing for the opportunity of a revenge which might wash away the disgrace of the treaty of Presburg ? Under such circumstances, Napoleon had not a moment to lose, but the activities of his mind required no further incitement, and as he had hastened the battle of Austerlitz to anticipate Prussia, so he now deemed it expedient

to anticipate Russia, in order to keep Austria in a state of indecision.

The emperor, therefore, left Warsaw about the end of January, and immediately gave orders for the attack of the Russian army in the beginning of February; but in spite of his desire to be the first to engage, he was anticipated. The attack was made on the part of the Russians on the 8th of February, at seven in the morning, during a terrible storm of snow, which fell in large flakes. They approached Preussich Eylau, where the emperor was, and the imperial guard stopped the progress of the Russian column. Nearly the whole of the French army was engaged in that battle, one of the most sanguinary ever fought in Europe. The corps commanded by Bernadotte took no part in the engagement, having been stationed on the left at Mohrungen, whence it menaced Dantzic. The issue of this battle would have been very different, had the four divisions of infantry and the two of cavalry, of which Bernadotte's corps was composed, arrived in time; but, unfortunately, the officer intrusted with the orders to Bernadotte, directing him to march without loss of time upon Preussich Eylau, was made prisoner by a troop of Cossacks, and Bernadotte, in consequence, did not arrive. Bonaparte, who always contrived to throw the blame on someone, if things did not turn out exactly as he wished, attributed the doubtful success of the day to the absence of Bernadotte; this, in itself, was undoubtedly true, but to make that absence a matter of reproach to the marshal, was the most cruel injustice. Bernadotte was accused of not being willing to march on Preussich Eylau, although, as was asserted, General d'Hautpoult had informed him of the necessity of his assistance. But how could that fact be verified, since General d'Hautpoult was among the slain? Those who knew Bonaparte, his cunning, and the advantage he sometimes took of words which he attributed to the dead, will be at no loss to solve the enigma.

The battle of Eylau was terrible; the French held out, constantly, though vainly, expecting the arrival of Bernadotte; and, after a considerable loss, night came on, which the French army had the melancholy honour of passing on the field of battle. Bernadotte at length arrived, but too late, and met the enemy quietly retreating towards Königsberg, the only capital now remaining to Prussia.

After the battle of Eylau both sides remained stationary, and several days elapsed without any incident of importance. The

offers of peace made by the emperor, with no great earnestness it is true, were scornfully rejected, as if a victory disputed with Napoleon was to be regarded as a triumph. In short, it would seem as if the battle of Eylau had turned the heads of the Russians, who chanted *Te Deum* on the occasion. But whilst the emperor was making fresh preparations to advance, his diplomacy had succeeded in a distant quarter, and raised up against Russia an old and formidable enemy. Turkey declared war against her. This was a powerful diversion, and obliged Russia to expose her western frontiers, in order to form a line of defence on the south. Some time after General Gardanne departed on the famous embassy to Persia; for which the way had been prepared by the successful mission of my friend Amédée Jaubert. This embassy was not merely one of those pompous legations such as Charlemagne, Louis XIV. and Louis XVI. severally received from the Empress Irene, the King of Siam, and Tippoo Saib. It was connected with ideas which Bonaparte had cherished in the very dawn of his power. It was indeed the light from the East which afforded him the first glimpse of his future greatness; and that light never ceased to engage his thoughts and dazzle his imagination. I have reason to know that Gardanne's embassy was at first conceived on a much grander scale than that on which it was executed. Napoleon had resolved to send to the Shah of Persia four thousand infantry, commanded by chosen and experienced officers, ten thousand muskets, and fifty pieces of cannon; and I likewise know that orders were given for the execution of this design. The object which the emperor had in view, and which he scrupled not to avow when his plan had reached maturity, was to enable the Shah of Persia to make an important diversion in the eastern provinces of Russia; but there was likewise another, a long-cherished, constant object, which was ever uppermost in his thoughts, namely, the desire of striking England in the very heart of her Asiatic possessions. Such was the principal motive of Gardanne's mission; but circumstances did not permit the emperor to give it all the importance he desired. He contented himself with sending a few officers of engineers and artillery to Persia, who, on their arrival, were astonished at the number of English they found there.

CHAPTER XXXI

AFTER the battle of Eylau, I received a despatch from M. de Talleyrand, to which was added an account of that memorable battle, more disastrous to the conqueror than to the other party. I cannot in conscience say the conquered, when speaking of the Russians, particularly when I recollect the precautions which were then taken throughout Germany to make known the French account before the Russian should become known. The emperor rightly considered it of great importance, that the event of that day should be viewed by everyone as he himself professed to view it. But if the battle of Eylau was doubtful, that at Friedland could not be questioned, for its results were soon felt throughout Europe. 'The Emperor Alexander sought an armistice, which was agreed to and ratified on the 23rd June; and on the 25th the Emperors of France and Russia met personally, each accompanied by a few attendants, on a raft moored on the river Niemen, near the town of Tilsit. The sovereigns embraced each other, and retiring under a canopy had a long conversation, to which no one was a witness. At its termination the appearances of mutual good-will and confidence were marked: immediately afterwards the town of Tilsit was neutralised, and the two emperors established their courts there, and lived together, in the midst of the lately hostile armies, more like old friends who had met on a party of pleasure, than enemies and rivals attempting by diplomatic means the arrangement of differences which had for years been deluging Europe with blood.'

The interview at Tilsit is one of the culminating points of modern history, and the waters of the Niemen reflected the image of Napoleon at the very height of his glory. Although not present on that remarkable occasion, I learnt, in common with the rest of the world, what took place in public at Tilsit. The interview between the two emperors, and the unhappy situation of the King of Prussia, are facts generally known, but few secret particulars connected with those events ever came to my knowledge.* Rapp had been sent to Dantzic, and he it

* Savary gives the following interesting account of this interview:—

'The Emperor Napoleon, whose courtesy was manifest in all his actions, ordered a large raft to be floated in the middle of the river, upon which was constructed a room well covered in and elegantly

was who most readily communicated to me all that the emperor said and did, together with all that was passing around him. I was made acquainted, however, with one circumstance worthy of note, which occurred in the emperor's apartments at Tilsit, the first time he received a visit from the King of Prussia. That unfortunate monarch, accompanied by his queen Wilhelmina, had taken up his temporary abode in a mill a little way out of the town. This was his sole habitation, whilst the emperors occupied the two quarters of the town, which is divided by the Niemen. The fact I am about to relate was communicated to a person on whose veracity I can depend, by an officer of the imperial guard, who was then on duty in Napoleon's apartment, and an eye-witness of it. When the Emperor Alexander visited Napoleon, they continued conversing a long time in a balcony, beneath which an immense crowd hailed their meeting with enthusiastic shouts. Napoleon commenced the conversation, as he had done the year preceding, with the Emperor of Austria, by alluding to the uncertain fate of war. In the midst of their conversation, the King of Prussia was announced. He was evidently much affected, as may easily be conceived, since, hos-

decorated, having two doors on opposite sides, each of which opened into an ante-chamber. The roof was surmounted by two weather-cocks; one displaying the eagle of Russia, and the other the eagle of France.

'The raft was precisely in the middle of the river.

'The two sovereigns appeared on the banks of the river, and embarked at the same moment. But the Emperor Napoleon arrived first on the raft, entered the room and went to the opposite door, which he opened, and then stationed himself on the edge of the raft to receive the Emperor Alexander.

'The two emperors met in the most amicable way. They remained together for a considerable time, and then took leave of each other with as friendly an air as that with which they had met.

'Next day the Emperor of Russia established himself at Tilsit with a battalion of his guard, and orders were given for evacuating that part of the town where he and his battalion were to be quartered.

'On the day the Emperor Alexander entered Tilsit, the whole army was under arms. The imperial guard was drawn out in two lines of three deep from the landing-place to the Emperor Napoleon's quarters, and from thence to the quarters of the Emperor of Russia. A salute of one hundred guns was fired the moment Alexander stepped ashore, on the spot where the Emperor Napoleon was waiting to receive him.

'This meeting attracted visitors to Tilsit from a hundred leagues round. M. de Talleyrand arrived, and after the observance of the usual ceremonies, business began to be discussed.'—*Memoirs of the Duke de Rovigo*.

tilities being suspended, and his territories in possession of the French, his only hope was in the generosity of the conqueror. Napoleon himself, it is said, appeared touched by his situation, and invited him and the queen to dinner. On sitting down to table, Napoleon, with much gallantry, signified to the beautiful queen, that he would restore to her Silesia, a province which she greatly desired should be retained in the new arrangements which were necessarily about to take place. The treaty of peace concluded at Tilsit between France and Russia, on the 7th of July, and ratified two days after, was productive of a change in the geography of Europe, no less remarkable than that effected by the treaty of Presburg in the year preceding. The latter, however, contained no stipulation dishonourable to Russia, whose territory was preserved inviolate ; but unhappy Prussia, how had she been treated ? And yet there are historians, who, for the empty pleasure of flattering, by posthumous praises, the pretended moderation of Napoleon, have all but reproached him for suffering some few shreds of the monarchy of the great Frederick to survive.* There is, however, one point on which Napoleon has been

* By the treaty of Tilsit, 'Napoleon restored to Frederick William, Ancient Prussia, and the French conquests in Upper Saxony—the king agreeing to adopt "the continental system" ; in other words, to be henceforth the vassal of the conqueror. The Polish provinces of Prussia were erected into a separate principality, styled "the Grand Duchy of Warsaw," and bestowed on the Elector of Saxony ; with the exception, however, of some territories assigned to Russia, and of Dantzic, which was declared a free city, to be garrisoned by French troops until the ratification of a maritime peace. The Prussian dominions in Lower Saxony and on the Rhine, with Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and various other small states, formed a new kingdom of Westphalia, of which Jerome Bonaparte, Napoleon's youngest brother, was recognized as king. The Elector of Saxony was recognized as another king of Napoleon's creation ; Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples ; and Louis, of Holland. Finally, Russia accepted the mediation of France for a peace with Turkey, and France that of Russia for a peace with England.

'Such were the public articles of the peace of Tilsit ; but it contained secret articles besides ; of which the English government were fortunate enough to ascertain the import.—These were, that the Emperor of Russia had agreed not only to lay English commerce, in case his mediation for a peace should fail, under the same ban with that of the decrees of Berlin, but to place himself at the head of a general confederation of the Northern Maritime Powers against the naval supremacy of England—in other words, resign his own fleets, with those of Denmark, to the service of Napoleon. In requital of this obligation the French emperor unquestionably agreed to permit the Czar to conquer Finland from Sweden—thereby adding immeasurably to the security of St. Petersburg.'

condemned, I think unjustly, at least as regards the campaign of 1807. It has been urged, that he ought at that period to have re-established the kingdom of Poland; and certainly, for my own part, I shall never cease to regret, both for the interests of France and Europe, that it was not re-established. But when a desire, however reasonable in itself, is not carried into effect, have we a right to conclude that it ought to be so, in defiance of every obstacle? And at that time, that is to say, during the campaign of Tilsit, insurmountable obstacles did exist. At a somewhat later period, Napoleon was prevented by the intriguing ambition of some of his chiefs and underlings, from carrying into effect his long-meditated intention, of placing the brave Poniatowski at the head of his heroic nation. If, however, by the treaty of Tilsit the throne of Poland was not restored, to serve as a barrier between old Europe and the empire of the Czars, Napoleon founded a kingdom of Westphalia, which he gave to the young under-lieutenant whom he had snubbed as a schoolboy, and whom he now made a king, that he might have another crowned prefect under his orders.

The kingdom of Westphalia was at first composed of the states of Hesse-Cassel, which formed its nucleus; of a part of the provinces taken from Prussia by the *moderation* of the emperor, and of the states of Paderborn, Fulde, Brunswick, and a part of the electorate of Hanover. Napoleon, at the same time, though he was not fond of half measures, to avoid touching the Russian and Austrian provinces of ancient Poland, planted on the banks of the Vistula the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he gave to the King of Saxony; reserving to himself the liberty of increasing its territory, or destroying it altogether, as he might find most convenient. By this policy, he allowed the Poles to look forward with hope for the future, and secured to himself partisans in the north, should the chances of war call him thither. Alexander, seduced even more than his father had been by the political coquetry of Napoleon, consented to all these arrangements, and acknowledged at once all the kings who had received their crowns from the hand of the emperor; he accepted some provinces which had belonged to his despoiled ally, to console himself, no doubt, for not having been able to get more restored to him. The two emperors parted the best friends in the world; but the continental system continued notwithstanding.

It was about this time that the Danish consul communicated to me an official report from his government. He announced,

that on Monday, the 3rd of August, a squadron, consisting of twelve ships of the line and twelve frigates, under the command of Admiral Gambier, had passed the Sound, and that the rest of the squadron had been seen in the Cattegat. At the same time the English troops, which were in the island of Rügen, had re-embarked. We could not at first conceive what enterprise so considerable a force had been sent upon. But our uncertainty did not long continue. M. Didelot, the French ambassador at Copenhagen, arrived at Hamburg at nine o'clock in the evening of the 12th of August. He had had the good fortune to pass through the Great Belt, in sight of the English, without being stopped. I forwarded his report to Paris by an extraordinary courier. The English had sent 20,000 men under the command of Lord Cathcart, and twenty-seven vessels, into the Baltic. The coasts of Zealand were blockaded by ninety vessels. Mr. Jackson, who had been sent by England to negotiate with Denmark, which she feared would be invaded by the French troops, strengthened the demand he was instructed to make by a reference to the powerful armament which could enforce it. Mr. Jackson's proposition amounted to nothing less than a requisition that the King of Denmark should place in the custody of England the whole of his ships and naval stores. They were, it is true, to be kept in deposit, but in the condition appeared the word 'until,' which afforded no security for their future restoration. They were to be detained, until such precautions should be no longer necessary. A menace, and its execution, followed close upon this insolent demand. After a noble, though useless resistance, and a terrific bombardment, Copenhagen surrendered, and the Danish fleet was destroyed. It would be difficult to discover in history a more flagrant and revolting instance of the abuse of power against weakness. I have stated what were the principal consequences of the treaty of Tilsit; and it is more than probable, that if the bombardment of Copenhagen had preceded the treaty, the emperor would have used Prussia even worse than he did. He might have erased her from the list of kingdoms, but he did not do so from regard to the Emperor Alexander. The destruction of Prussia, however, was by no means a new project of Napoleon's. I remember an observation of his to M. Lemer cier upon this very subject, when we first took up our residence at Malmaison. M. Lemer cier had been reading to the first consul some poem in which Frederick the Great was mentioned. 'You seem to admire him greatly,' said Bonaparte to M. Lemer cier: 'what

do you find in him so astonishing ? He is not equal to Turenne.' 'General,' replied M. Lemer cier, 'it is not merely the warrior I esteem in Frederick, but one cannot refuse one's admiration of a man, who, even on the throne, was a philosopher.' To this the first consul replied, in a half-displeased tone, 'True, true, Lemer cier, but all his philosophy shall not prevent me from striking out his kingdom from the map of Europe.' The kingdom of Frederick the Great, however, was not struck out of the map, because the Emperor of Russia would not basely abandon a faithful ally, who had incurred with him the chances of fortune. Prussia had then ample reason to lament the subterfuge, which had prevented her from declaring against France during the campaign of Austerlitz.

Napoleon returned to Paris at the end of July, after an absence of ten months, the longest he had yet made since he had been at the head of the French government, whether as consul or emperor. The interview at Tilsit, the friendship of the Emperor Alexander, which was everywhere spoken of in the most exaggerated terms, and the establishment of peace on the continent, procured for Napoleon a degree of moral influence over public opinion which he had not possessed since his coronation. Fixed in his aversion towards deliberative assemblies, which I have often heard him term a mere collection of babblers, prozers, and pettifoggers, Napoleon, on his return to Paris, abolished the Tribune, which had been an annoyance to him from the first day of his elevation. The emperor, who, above all men, was skilful in speculating on the favourable disposition of opinion, took advantage on this occasion of the enthusiasm produced by his interview on the Niemen. Thus disappeared from the fundamental institutions of the government the last shadow which remained of a popular character Bonaparte wished to possess a senate, merely for the purpose of voting men ; a mute legislative body to vote money—that there should be no opposition in the one, and no discussion in the other ; no control over him whatever ; the power of legislating according to his own arbitrary will and pleasure ; and, lastly, an enslaved press : this was what Napoleon desired, and this he obtained ; but the month of March, 1814, resolved the question of absolute power. Peace being concluded with Russia, it was necessary to make choice of an ambassador, not only to maintain the new relations of amity between Napoleon and Alexander, but above all to urge on the promised mediation of Russia with England, with a view to effect reconciliation and peace between the

cabinets of Paris and London. The emperor intrusted this mission to Caulincourt, with respect to whom there existed an unfounded prejudice relative to some circumstances which preceded the death of the Duke d'Enghien. This opinion, equally unfortunate and unjust, had preceded Caulincourt to St. Petersburg; and it was feared his reception at that court would not be such as was due to the ambassador of France, and his own personal qualities deserved. I learnt, however, from positive information at the time, that after a short explanation with Alexander, that monarch retained no suspicion unfavourable to our ambassador, for whom he conceived and preserved the greater friendship and esteem. Caulincourt's mission was not altogether easy of fulfilment, for the invincible repugnance and reiterated refusal of England to enter into negotiations with France, through the mediation of Russia, was one of the remarkable circumstances of the period of which I am speaking. I well knew that England was determined to prevent Napoleon from becoming master of the entire continent, a project which he pursued with so little disguise, that no one could doubt his intention respecting it. For two years he had certainly made rapid strides towards it; but England was not discouraged. Her calculations were founded on the irritation of the sovereigns and the discontent of the people; and she was well aware that, whenever she desired it, her golden lever would again raise up and arm the continent against the encroachments of Napoleon. He, on his part, perceiving that his attempts were all to no purpose, and that England would listen to none of his proposals, set himself to devise fresh schemes for raising up new enemies against England.

It, probably, is not forgotten, that in 1801 France had obliged Portugal to make common cause with her against England. In 1807, the emperor repeated what the first consul had done formerly. By an inexplicable fatality, Junot obtained the command of the troops which were marching against Portugal—I say against Portugal, for such was the fact, although France represented herself as a protector to deliver Portugal from the influence of England. Be that as it may, the emperor's choice of a commander was the astonishment of everybody. Was Junot, a ridiculous compound of vanity and ignorance, a fit person to be intrusted with the command of an army in a distant country, under circumstances in which great political as well as military talents were indispensable? For my own part, knowing as I did Junot's incapacity, I was, I confess, absolutely

astonished at his appointment. I remember, when I was one day speaking on the subject to Bernadotte, he shewed me a letter he had just received from Paris, in which it was said that the emperor had sent Junot into Portugal that he might have a pretext for depriving him of the government of Paris. Junot had become offensive to Napoleon on account of his bad conduct, his folly, and his unbounded extravagance. He was a man utterly devoid of personal dignity, or elevation of sentiment. Thus did Portugal twice become the place of exile chosen by consular and imperial caprice; once, when the first consul wished to rid himself of the familiarity of Lannes, and afterwards, when, as emperor, he had grown disgusted with the extravagance and misconduct of a favourite. The invasion of Portugal presented no difficulty, it was merely a warlike promenade and not a war; but what events were connected with the occupation of that country! Not willing to act dishonourably towards England, to which he was bound by treaty, and unable to oppose the whole power of Napoleon, the Prince Regent of Portugal embarked for Brazil, declaring that all defence was useless. At the same time, he advised that the French troops should be received in a friendly manner; and referred to the will of Providence the consequences of an invasion, which, on his part, he had done nothing to provoke.

It was in the month of November, 1807, that the French code of laws, upon which the most profound legislators had indefatigably laboured since the commencement of the consulate, was established, as the law of the state, under the title of the *Code Napoleon*. This monument of jurisprudence will no doubt be mentioned to Napoleon's honour in history; but could it be supposed that the same system of legislation would be equally applicable in the vast extent of empire which France then comprised? How absurd to imagine, that the same laws were suitable to the crafty Genoese, and to the frank and simple-hearted Hamburger; and yet, as soon as the *Code Napoleon* was promulgated, I received orders to establish it in the Hanse Towns! The long and frequent conversations I had on this subject with the senators and most able lawyers of the country, soon convinced me of the difficulties I should have to encounter, and the danger of making any sudden alteration in habits and usages which had been long and firmly established. The jury system was tolerably well received; but the inhabitants, not accustomed to such severe punishments as the Code awarded to certain offences, were exceedingly unwilling to have any share in their

infliction. Hence resulted the frequent and serious abuse of men being acquitted, whose guilt was evident enough to the jury, but who chose rather to pronounce them not guilty, than condemn them to a punishment they considered too severe. Another reason, too, assigned for their leniency was, that the people, not being as yet fully acquainted with the new laws, were not sensible of the penalties they incurred for particular offences. I remember that a man who was accused of stealing a cloak, pleaded, as his excuse before the Hamburg jury, that the offence was committed in a moment of intoxication. When the jury consulted together, M. Von Einingen, one of them, declared the prisoner not guilty, because, as he said, the syndic Doormann, when dining with him one day, having drunk somewhat more than was his custom, took away his cloak. This defence, worthy of the court of Bacchus, was completely successful. An argument founded on the similarity of the case between the syndic and the accused could not but triumph ; otherwise, the little irregularity of the former must have been condemned in the person of the latter. This trial, which terminated so ludicrously, nevertheless serves to prove, that the best and most solemn institutions may become objects of ridicule, when all at once introduced into a country whose habits are not prepared to receive them. Great, indeed, is the folly of supposing that the affections of a people can be obtained by violently breaking through all their preconceived notions and usages. The Romans acted far more wisely in their schemes of empire ; they reserved a place in the Capitol for the gods of the nations they had conquered. Their only wish was to annex provinces and kingdoms to their empire. Napoleon, on the contrary, was desirous that his should comprise every other state, and to realize the impossible Utopia of ten different nations, all having different customs and languages, forming but one kingdom. How, for instance, could justice, that safeguard of human rights, be properly administered in the Hanse Towns, after they had been converted into French departments ? In these new departments many judges had been appointed who knew not a word of German, and were perfectly ignorant of law. The presidents of the tribunals of Lubeck, Stade, Bremerleke, and Minden, were so totally unacquainted with the German language, that it was necessary to explain to them all the pleadings of the council chamber. Was it not absurd to establish such a judicial system, and above all to appoint such individuals in a country of so much

importance to France as Hamburg and the Hanse Towns ? Add to this the impertinence of some young favourites who were sent from Paris to serve their official or legal apprenticeships in the conquered provinces, and it may easily be conceived what affection existed on the part of the people towards Napoleon the Great.

CHAPTER XXXII

TOWARDS the close of 1807, commenced the troubles in Spain, and the affairs of that country soon presented a most complicated aspect. Although at a distance from the theatre of events, I obtained the most accurate information, both from private and official sources, of all those extraordinary transactions which were then taking place in the Peninsula. However, as this point of history is one of the best and most generally known, I shall omit from my notes and memoranda many things which, to the well-informed reader, would be mere useless repetitions. I may mention, however, one remarkable fact from my own knowledge, which is, that Bonaparte, who by turns cast his eyes on all the states of Europe, never fixed his attention on Spain as long as his greatness was confined to mere projects. In his conversations with me respecting his future destiny, his allusions applied always to Italy, Germany, the East, and the destruction of the English power, but never to Spain. Consequently, when he heard of the first symptoms of disorder in that country, he paid but little attention to the matter, and it was not till a considerable time afterwards that he took an active share in those events, which, in the sequel, had so great an influence on his fortune. Let us take a brief survey of the state of things at that period. Godoy reigned in Spain, under the name of the weak-minded Charles IV. This favourite was an object of execration to all but his own creatures, and even those whose fortunes were bound up with his entertained for him the most profound contempt. The hatred of the people is almost always the just reward of favourites, the very character appearing to announce abjectness of sentiment and base servility. If this be true, as respects favourites in general, what must have been the feeling excited by a man, who, to the knowledge of all Spain, owed the favour of the king only to the favours of the queen ? Godoy's ascendancy over the

royal family was boundless, his power was absolute ; the treasures of America were at his disposal, and he applied them to the most infamous purposes. In short, he had made the court of Madrid one of those places to which the indignant muse of Juvenal conducts the mother of Britannicus. There is no doubt that Godoy was one of the principal causes of all the misfortunes which, under so many different forms, afflicted Spain. The hatred of the Spaniards against the Prince of the Peace was general. This hatred was shared by the Prince of the Asturias, who openly declared himself the enemy of Godoy. The latter entered into an alliance with France, from which he hoped to obtain powerful assistance against his numerous enemies. Such an alliance, however, was highly displeasing to Spain, and occasioned her to look on France with no very favourable eye. The Prince of the Asturias was encouraged and supported by the complaints of the Spaniards who were desirous of Godoy's overthrow. Charles IV., on his part, considered every attempt against the Prince of the Peace as directed against himself, and in the month of November, 1807, accused his son of wishing to dethrone him.* The French ambassador, M. de Beauharnois, a relation of Josephine's first husband, was a very circumspect man. His situation at Madrid at that period was most delicate

* This accusation was conveyed to Napoleon in the following letter, addressed to him by Charles IV.

'SIRE, MY BROTHER,

'At the moment when I was occupied with the means of co-operating for the destruction of our common enemy, when I believed that all the plots of the late Queen of Naples had been buried with her daughter, I perceive with a horror that makes me tremble, that the most dreadful spirit of intrigue has penetrated even into the heart of my palace. Alas ! my heart bleeds at reciting so dreadful an outrage. My eldest son, the presumptive heir to my throne, entered into a horrible plot to dethrone me ; he even went to the extreme of attempting the life of his mother. So dreadful a crime ought to be punished with the most exemplary rigour of the laws. *The law which calls him to the succession ought to be revoked ; one of his brothers will be more worthy to occupy his place, both in my heart and on the throne.* I am at this moment in search of his accomplices, in order to sift thoroughly this plan of most atrocious wickedness ; and I would not lose a moment in informing your imperial and royal majesty of it, and to beseech you to assist me with your knowledge and counsel.

'For which I pray, &c.,

'CHARLES.

San Lorenzo, November 29, 1807.

and difficult ; and with every disposition to render full justice to his high personal qualities, I cannot but confess that he was unequal to the situation in which he was placed. Still, however, without being gifted with any extraordinary talent, he possessed a tact which enabled him to observe very correctly, and it was he who gave the first information to government of the misunderstanding which existed between the King of Spain and the Prince of the Asturias. I have been assured that he frequently interposed with the whole weight of his official authority, before he communicated the subject to the emperor ; but things had now come to that pass, that it would have been highly improper to have remained silent any longer. He therefore communicated to the emperor, that the king, in the excess of his irritation against his son, had openly declared his wish to revoke the law which called the Prince of the Asturias to the succession of one of the thrones of Charles V. The King of Spain did not confine himself to verbal complaints ; but he, or rather the Prince of the Peace acting in his name, caused the warmest partisans of the Prince of the Asturias to be arrested. The latter, well acquainted with the sentiments of his father, wrote to Napoleon requesting his support. Thus the father and son, at open war, were appealing one against the other for the support of him who desired only to get rid of both, and to put one of his brothers in their place, that he might have one more junior in the college of European kings ; but, as I have already mentioned, this fresh scheme of ambition was not premeditated, and if he gave the throne of Spain to his brother Joseph, it was only on the refusal of his brother Louis.

The emperor promised to support Charles IV. against his son, and not wishing to commit himself in these family disputes, he did not answer the first letters of the Prince of the Asturias. But finding that the intrigues of Madrid were assuming a serious character, his first step was to send troops into Spain. This gave offence to the Spaniards, who, taking no part in the intrigues of Godoy, or the misunderstanding between the king and his son, were jealous of the interference of France. In the provinces through which the French troops passed it was asked, what was the pretence for this invasion ? Some attributed it to the Prince of the Peace, and others to the Prince of the Asturias, but the indignation of all parties was equally excited by it, and troubles broke out at Madrid, attended by those violent outrages which are peculiar to the Spanish character. Under these alarming circumstances, Godoy proposed

that Charles IV. should remove to Seville, where he would have it more in his power to punish the factious. A proposition from Godoy to his master was less a counsel than a command, and the latter accordingly resolved to depart : but from that moment the people looked on Godoy as a traitor. An insurrection took place ; the palace was surrounded ; and the Prince of the Peace would have been killed in an upper apartment, in which he had taken refuge, had not one of the insurgents invoked in his favour the name of Prince of the Asturias, which had the effect of saving him from certain destruction.

Charles IV. did not preserve his crown ; he was easily intimidated, and advantage was taken of a moment of alarm to demand that abdication which he had not the spirit to refuse. He made a surrender of his rights in favour of his son, and thus terminated the insolent power of the Prince of the Peace. The latter was made prisoner, and the Spaniards, who like all other ignorant people are easily excited, manifested their joy on the occasion with a barbarous enthusiasm. The unfortunate king, who owed to his very weakness his escape from dangers which, after all, were more imaginary than real, and who at first appeared satisfied with having exchanged his crown for the privilege to live, no sooner saw himself in safety than he changed his mind. He wrote to the emperor, protesting against his abdication, and appealed to him as the arbiter of his future fate.

During these internal dissensions, the French army was pursuing its march towards the Pyrenees. These mountains were soon passed, and Murat entered Madrid in the beginning of April, 1808.

Before receiving any despatch from government, I learned that Murat's presence in Madrid, so far from producing a good effect, had only increased the evil. This information was communicated to me by a merchant of Lubeck, who had received it from his correspondent at Madrid. In this letter, Spain was represented as a prey which Murat was desirous of seizing for himself ; and, from the information which I afterwards received, I found that the writer was correct. It is certainly true, that Murat imagined he was to conquer Spain for himself, and it was by no means astonishing that the inhabitants of Madrid should have become acquainted with his designs, since he carried his indiscretion so far as openly to express his wish to become King of Spain. The emperor was soon informed of this, and gave him to understand, in

very plain terms, that the throne of Spain and the Indies was not intended for him, but that he should not be forgotten.

Napoleon's remonstrances, however, had no effect in restraining Murat's imprudence; and, although he did not gain the crown of Spain for himself, he powerfully contributed to make Charles IV. lose it. That monarch, whom long custom had attached to the Prince of the Peace, solicited the liberation of his favourite from the emperor, declaring that he and his family would be satisfied to live in any place of security provided Godoy was with them. The unhappy Charles appeared to be completely disgusted with greatness.

Both the king and queen were so earnest in their entreaties for Godoy's liberation, that Murat, whose vanity was highly flattered by these royal solicitations, took the Prince of the Peace under his protection; and declared that, notwithstanding the abdication of Charles IV., he would not acknowledge anyone but that prince as King of Spain, until he should receive contrary orders from the emperor. This declaration placed Murat in formal opposition to the Spanish people; who, mortally hating the Prince of the Peace, embraced the cause of the heir to the throne, in whose favour Charles IV. had abdicated.

It has been said, that Napoleon was placed in a difficult situation in this dispute between the king and his son. Such was not the fact. Although Charles declared that his abdication had been extorted from him by violence and threats, he had, nevertheless, actually agreed to it. In virtue of this act, Ferdinand was king; but Charles insisted that it was done against his will, and retracted. The recognition of the emperor was wanting, who was perfectly at liberty either to give or to withhold it.

In this state of things, Napoleon arrived at Bayonne, and he invited Ferdinand to come and meet him there, under the pretence of arranging the differences which existed between his father and himself. It was some time before he could come to the resolution to do so; but at length his deluded advisers prevailed on him, and he set off for Bayonne. On his arrival at Vittoria, he hesitated to proceed, under the impression that if he once entered Bayonne, he would not be allowed to depart from it again. But he was induced to continue his journey on receiving a letter from the emperor, which was filled with the most deceitful promises, and the most positive assurances that the crown of Spain should be placed on his head, and that

everything had been arranged for that purpose at Bayonne. What happened to him afterwards, as well as to his father, who came shortly after with his inseparable friend the Prince of the Peace, is well known. Napoleon, who had engaged to be arbiter between the father and the son, settled the matter at once, by giving the disputed throne to his brother Joseph.

The revolution in Madrid, on the 2nd of May, hastened the fate of Ferdinand, who was accused of being the author of it; at least this suspicion fell on his friends and adherents. It was also said, that Charles IV. would not return to Spain, but had solicited an asylum in France. At any rate, he signed a renunciation of his rights to the crown of Spain, which was also signed by the Infanta.

The Prince Royal of Sweden, who was at Hamburg at this period, and the ministers of all the European powers, loudly condemned the conduct of Napoleon as regarded Spain. I cannot take it upon me to say, whether or not M. de Talleyrand dissuaded Napoleon from attempting the overthrow of a branch of the house of Bourbon; his good sense and elevated views might probably have suggested such advice; but the general opinion was, that had he retained the portfolio of foreign affairs, the Spanish revolution would have terminated with a greater show of decency and good faith, and more creditable to the character of Napoleon.

The following may be given as a summary of the proceedings in Spain and Portugal, which led to the occupation of these countries by the French, and which preceded the interference of England in the affairs of the Peninsula.

‘The secret history of the intrigues of 1807, between the French court and the rival parties in Spain, has not yet been clearly exposed. According to Napoleon, the first proposal for conquering Portugal by the united arms of France and Spain, and dividing that monarchy into three separate prizes, of which one should fall to the disposition of France, a second to the Spanish king, and a third reward the personal exertions of Godoy, came not from him, but from the Spanish minister. The suggestion has been attributed, by every Spanish authority, to the emperor; and it is difficult to doubt that such was the fact. The treaty, in which the unprincipled design took complete form, was ratified at Fontainebleau on the 29th of

October, 1807, and accompanied by a convention, which provided for the immediate invasion of Portugal by a force of 28,000 French soldiers, under the orders of Junot, and of 27,000 Spaniards; while a reserve of 40,000 French troops were to be assembled at Bayonne, ready to take the field by the end of November, in case England should land an army for the defence of Portugal, or the people of that devoted country presume to meet Junot by a national insurrection.

‘Junot forthwith commenced his march through Spain, where the French soldiery were received everywhere with coldness and suspicion, but nowhere by any hostile movement of the people. He would have halted at Salamanca to organize his army, but, in consequence of a peremptory order from Paris, he advanced at once into Portugal, and arrived there in the latter part of November. Godoy’s contingent of Spaniards appeared there also, and placed themselves under Junot’s command. Their numbers overawed the population, and they advanced, unopposed, towards the capital. The feeble government, meantime, having made, one by one, every degrading submission which France dictated, became convinced at length that no measures of subserviency could avert the doom which Napoleon had fulminated. A *Moniteur*, proclaiming that “the House of Braganza had ceased to reign,” reached Lisbon. The Prince Regent re-opened his communication with the English admiral off the Tagus (Sir Sydney Smith) and the lately expelled ambassador (Lord Strangford), and being assured of their protection, embarked on the 27th of November, and sailed for the Brazils on the 29th, only a few hours before Junot made his appearance at the gates of Lisbon.

‘Napoleon thus saw Portugal in his grasp: but that he had all along considered as a point of minor importance, and he had accordingly availed himself of the utmost concessions of the treaty of Fontainebleau, without waiting for any insurrection of the Portuguese, or English debarkation on their territory. His army of reserve, in number far exceeding the 40,000 men named in the treaty, had already passed the Pyrenees, in two bodies, under Dupont and Moncey, and were advancing, slowly but steadily, into the heart of Spain. Nay, without even the pretext of being mentioned in the treaty, another French army of 12,000, under Duhesme, had penetrated through the eastern Pyrenees, and being received as friends among the unsuspecting garrisons, obtained possession of Barcelona, Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, and the other fortified places in the north of Spain,

by a succession of treacherous artifices, to which the history of civilised nations presents no parallel.

‘It seems impossible that such daring movements should not have awakened the darkest suspicions at Madrid ; yet the royal family, overlooking the common danger about to overwhelm them and their country, continued, during three eventful months, to waste what energies they possessed in petty conspiracies, domestic broils, and, incredible as the tale will hereafter appear, in the meanest diplomatic intrigues with the court of France. A sudden panic at length seized the king or his minister, and the court, then at Aranjuez, prepared to retire to Seville, and, sailing from thence to America, seek safety, after the example of the house of Braganza. The servants of the Prince of Asturias, on perceiving the preparations for this flight, commenced a tumult, in which the populace of Aranjuez readily joined, and which was only pacified (for the moment) by a royal declaration that no flight was contemplated. On the 18th of March 1808, the day following, a scene of like violence took place in the capital itself. The house of Godoy in Madrid was sacked. The favourite himself was assaulted at Aranjuez, on the 19th ; with great difficulty saved his life by the intervention of the royal guards ; and was placed under arrest. Terrified by what he saw at Aranjuez, and heard from Madrid, Charles IV. abdicated the throne ; and on the 20th, Ferdinand, his son, was proclaimed king at Madrid, amidst a tumult of popular applause. Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, had before this assumed the chief command of all the French troops in Spain ; and hearing of the extremities to which the court factions had gone, he now moved rapidly on Madrid, surrounded that capital with 30,000 men, and took possession of it in person, at the head of 10,000 more, on the 23rd of March.

‘The emperor heard with much regret of the precipitancy with which his lieutenant had occupied Madrid—for his clear mind had foreseen ere now the imminent hazard of trampling too rudely on the jealous pride of the Spaniards. He, therefore, sent Savary, in whose practised cunning and duplicity he hoped to find a remedy for the military rashness of Murat, to assume the chief direction of affairs at Madrid ; and the rumour was actively spread, that the emperor was about to appear there in person without delay.

‘Madrid occupied and begirt by 40,000 armed strangers, his title unrecognised by Murat, his weak understanding and tumultuous passions worked upon incessantly by the malicious

craft of Savary, Ferdinand was at length persuaded, that his best chance of securing the aid and protection of Napoleon lay in advancing to meet him on his way to the capital, and striving to gain his ear before the emissaries of Godoy should be able to fill it with their reclamations. Savary eagerly offered to accompany him on this fatal journey, which began on the 10th of April. The infatuated Ferdinand had been taught to believe that he should find Bonaparte at Burgos ; not meeting him there, he was tempted to pursue his journey as far as Vittoria : and from thence, in spite of the populace, who, more sagacious than their prince, cut the traces of his carriage, he was, by a repetition of the same treacherous arguments, induced to proceed stage by stage, and at length to pass the frontier and present himself at Bayonne, where the arbiter of his fate lay anxiously expecting this consummation of his almost incredible folly. He arrived there on the 20th of April—was received by Napoleon with courtesy, entertained at dinner at the imperial table, and the same evening informed by Savary that his doom was sealed—that the Bourbon dynasty had ceased to reign in Spain, and that his personal safety must depend on the readiness with which he should resign all his pretensions into the hands of Bonaparte.

‘He, meanwhile, as soon as he was aware that Ferdinand had actually set out from Madrid, had ordered Murat to find the means of causing the old king, the queen, and Godoy, to repair also to Bayonne ; nor does it appear that his lieutenant had any difficulty in persuading these personages that such was the course of conduct most in accordance with their interests. They reached Bayonne on the 4th of May, and Napoleon, confronting the parents and the son on the 5th, witnessed a scene in which the profligate rancour of their domestic feuds reached extremities hardly to have been contemplated by the wildest imagination.

‘Charles IV. resigned the crown of Spain for himself and his heirs, accepting in return from the hands of Napoleon a safe retreat in Italy, and a large pension. Godoy, who had entered into the fatal negotiation of Fontainebleau, with the hope and the promise of an independent sovereignty carved out of the Portuguese dominions, was pensioned off in like manner, and ordered to partake of the Italian exile of his patrons. A few days afterwards, Ferdinand VII., being desired to choose at length between compliance and death, followed the example of his father, and executed a similar act of resignation.

‘Ferdinand, before he left Madrid, had invested a council of regency with the sovereign power, his uncle, Don Antonio, being president, and Murat one of the members. Murat’s assumption of the authority thus conferred, the departure of Ferdinand, the liberation and departure of the detested Godoy, the flight of the old king—these occurrences produced their natural effects on the popular mind. A dark suspicion that France meditated the destruction of the national independence, began to spread ; and, on the 2nd of May, when it transpired that preparations were making for the journey of Don Antonio also, the general rage at last burst out. A crowd collected round the carriage meant, as they concluded, to convey the last of the royal family out of Spain ; the traces were cut ; the imprecations against the French were furious. Colonel La Grange, Murat’s aide-de-camp, happening to appear on the spot, was cruelly maltreated. In a moment the whole capital was in an uproar : the French soldiery were assaulted everywhere—about 700 were slain. The mob attacked the hospital—the sick and their attendants rushed out and defended it. The French cavalry, hearing the tumult, entered the city by the gate of Alcala—a column of 3000 infantry from the other side by the street Ancha de Bernardo. Some Spanish officers headed the mob, and fired on the soldiery in the streets of Maravalles : a bloody massacre ensued : many hundreds were made prisoners : the troops, sweeping the streets from end to end, released their comrades ; and, to all appearance, tranquillity was restored ere nightfall. During the darkness, however, the peasantry flocked in, armed from the neighbouring country ; and, being met at the gates by the irritated soldiery, not a few more were killed, wounded, and made prisoners. Murat ordered all the prisoners to be tried by a military commission, which doomed them to instant death.

‘This commotion had been preceded by a brief insurrection, easily suppressed and not unlikely to be soon forgotten, on the 23rd of April, at Toledo. The events in the capital were of a more decisive character, and the amount of the bloodshed, in itself great, was much exaggerated in the reports which flew, like wildfire, throughout the Peninsula. In almost every town of Spain, and almost simultaneously, the flame of patriotic resentment broke out in the terrible form of assassination. The French residents were slaughtered without mercy : the supposed partisans of Napoleon and Godoy were sacrificed in the first tumult of popular rage. At Cadiz, Seville, Carthagena, above all in Valencia, the streets ran red with blood.

‘Napoleon received the intelligence with alarm ; but he had already gone too far to retract without disturbing the magical influence of his reputation. He, moreover, was willing to flatter himself that the lower population of Spain alone took an active part in these transactions ; that the nobility, whose degradation he could hardly over-estimate, would abide by his voice ; in a word, that with 80,000 troops in Spain, besides Junot’s army in Portugal, he possessed the means of suppressing the tumult after the first effervescence should have escaped. He proceeded, therefore, to act precisely as if no insurrection had occurred. Tranquillity being re-established in Madrid, the Council of Castile were convoked, and commanded to elect a new sovereign ; their choice had of course been settled beforehand : it fell on Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples ; and ere it was announced, that personage was already on his way to Bayonne. Ninety-five *Notables* of Spain met him in that town ; and swore fealty to him and a new constitution.

‘The patriotic feeling which had been thus exhibited throughout the country was encouraged by the British commanders on the coast of Spain ; and, without waiting for orders from home, they openly espoused the cause of the insurgents.

‘The King of England on the 4th of July addressed his parliament on the subject, and said, “The Spanish nation, thus nobly struggling against the usurpation and tyranny of France, can no longer be considered as the enemy of Great Britain, but is recognised by me as a natural friend and ally.” The Spanish prisoners of war were forthwith released, clothed, equipped, and sent back to their country. Supplies of arms and money were liberally transmitted thither : and, Portugal at the same time bursting into general insurrection also, a formal treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was soon concluded between England and the two kingdoms of the Peninsula.

‘This insurrection furnished Great Britain with what she had not yet possessed during the war, a favourable theatre whereon to oppose the full strength of her empire to the arms of Napoleon ; and the opportunity was embraced with zeal, though for some time but little skill appeared in the manner of using it. At the moment when the insurrection occurred, 20,000 Spanish troops were in Portugal under the orders of Junot ; 15,000 more, under the Marquis de la Romana, were serving Napoleon in Holstein. There remained 40,000 Spanish regulars, 11,000 Swiss, and 30,000 militia ; but of the

best of these the discipline, when compared with French or English armies, was contemptible. The nobility, to whose order the chief officers belonged, were divided in their sentiments—perhaps the greater number inclined to the interests of Joseph. Above all, the troops were scattered, in small sections, over the face of the whole country, and there was no probability that any one regular army would be able to muster so strong as to withstand the efforts of a mere fragment of the French force already established within the kingdom. The fleets of Spain had been destroyed in the war with England: her commerce and revenues had been mortally wounded by the alliance with France and the maladministration of Godoy. Ferdinand was detained a prisoner in France. There was no natural leader or chief, around whom the whole energies of the nation might be expected to rally. It was amidst such adverse circumstances that the Spanish people rose everywhere, smarting under intolerable wrongs, against a French army, already 80,000 strong, in possession of half the fortresses of the country, and in perfect communication with the mighty resources of Napoleon.

‘The Spanish arms were at first exposed to many reverses; the rawness of their levies, and the insulated nature of their movements, being disadvantages of which it was not difficult for the experienced generals and overpowering numbers of the French to reap a full and bloody harvest. After various petty skirmishes, in which the insurgents of Arragon were worsted by Lefebvre Desnouettes, and those of Navarre and Biscay by Bessières, the latter officer came upon the united armies of Castile, Leon, and Gallicia, commanded by the Generals Cuesta and Blake, on the 14th of July, at Riosecco, and defeated them in a desperate action, in which not less than 20,000 Spaniards died.

‘But the fortune of war, after the great day of Riosecco, was everywhere on the side of the patriots. Duhesme, who had so treacherously possessed himself of Barcelona and Figueras, found himself surrounded by the Catalonian mountaineers, who, after various affairs, in which much blood was shed on both sides, compelled him to shut himself up in Barcelona. Marshal Moncey conducted another large division of the French towards Valencia, and was to have been further reinforced by a detachment from Duhesme. The course of events in Catalonia prevented Duhesme from affording any such assistance: and the inhabitants of Valencia, male and female, rising *en masse*,

and headed by their clergy, manned their walls with such determined resolution, that the French marshal was at length compelled to retreat.

‘A far more signal catastrophe had befallen another powerful *corps d’armée*, under General Dupont, which marched from Madrid towards the south, with the view of suppressing all symptoms of insurrection in that quarter, and, especially, of securing the great naval station of Cadiz, where a French squadron lay. Dupont’s force was increased as he advanced, till it amounted to 20,000 men ; and with these he took possession of Baylen and La Carolina, in Andalusia, and stormed Jaen. But before he could make these acquisitions, the citizens of Cadiz had universally taken the patriot side ; the commander of the French vessels had been forced to surrender them ; and the place, having opened a communication with the English fleet, assumed a posture of determined defence. General Castanos, the Spanish commander in that province, who had held back from battle until his raw troops should have had time to be disciplined, began at length to threaten the position of the French. Jaen was attacked by him with such vigour, that Dupont was fain to evacuate it, and fall back to Baylen, where his troops soon suffered severe privations, the peasantry being in arms all around them, and the supply of food becoming from day to day more difficult. On the 16th of July, Dupont was attacked at Baylen by Castanos, who knew from an intercepted despatch the extent of his enemy’s distress : the French were beaten, and driven as far as Menjibar. They returned on the 18th, and attempted to recover Baylen ; but, after a long and desperate battle, in which 3,000 of the French were killed, Dupont, perceiving that the Spaniards were gathering all around in numbers not to be resisted, proposed to capitulate. In effect, he and 20,000 soldiers laid down their arms at Baylen, on condition that they should be transported in safety to France. The Spaniards broke this convention, and detained them as prisoners—thus imitating the perfidy of Napoleon’s own conduct to Spain. The richest part of Spain was freed wholly of the invaders : the light troops of Castanos pushed on, and swept the country before them ; and within ten days, King Joseph perceived the necessity of quitting Madrid, and removed his head-quarters to Vittoria.

‘In the meantime, Lefebre Desnouettes, whose early success in Arragon has been alluded to, was occupied with the siege of Saragossa—the inhabitants of which city had risen in the

first outbreak, and prepared to defend their walls to the last extremity. Don Jose Palafox, a young nobleman, who had made his escape from Bayonne, was invested with the command. The importance of success in this enterprise was momentous, especially after the failure of Moncey at Valencia. Napoleon himself early saw, that if the Valencians should be able to form an union with the Arragonese at Saragossa, the situation of the Catalonian insurgents on the one side would be prodigiously strengthened ; while, on the other hand, the armies of Leon and Galicia (whose coasts offered the means of continual communication with England), would conduct their operations in the immediate vicinity of the only great road left open between Madrid and Bayonne—the route by Burgos. He therefore had instructed Savary to consider Saragossa as an object of the very highest importance ; but the corps of Lefebre was not strengthened as the emperor would have wished it to be, ere he sat down before Saragossa. The siege was pressed with the utmost vigour ; but the immortal heroism of the citizens baffled all the valour of the French. There were no regular works worthy of notice : but the old Moorish walls, not above eight or ten feet in height, and some extensive monastic buildings in the outskirts of the city, being manned by crowds of determined men, whose wives and daughters looked on, nay, mingled boldly in their defence—the besiegers were held at bay week after week, and saw their ranks thinned in continual assaults without being able to secure any adequate advantage. Famine came and disease in its train, to aggravate the sufferings of the townspeople ; but they would listen to no suggestions but those of the same proud spirit in which they had begun. The French at length gained possession of the great convent of St. Engracia, and thus established themselves within the town itself : their general then sent to Palafox this brief summons : “ Head-quarters, Santa Engracia—Capitulation ” ; but he received for answer, “ Head-quarters, Saragossa—War to the knife.” The battle was maintained literally from street to street, from house to house, and from chamber to chamber. Men and women fought side by side, amidst flames and carnage ; until Lefebre received the news of Baylen, and having wasted two months in his enterprise, abandoned it abruptly, lest he should find himself insulated amidst the general retreat of the French armies. Such was the first of the two famous sieges of Saragossa.

‘The English government meanwhile had begun their

preparations for interfering effectually in the affairs of the Peninsula. They had despatched one body of troops to the support of Castanos in Andalusia ; but these did not reach the south of Spain until their assistance was rendered unnecessary by the surrender of Dupont at Baylen. A more considerable force, amounting to 10,000, sailed early in June, from Cork, for Corunna, under the command of the Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley. Sir Arthur, being permitted to land at what point of the Peninsula he should judge most advantageous for the general cause, was soon satisfied that Portugal ought to be the first scene of his operations, and accordingly lost no time in opening a communication with the patriots, who had taken possession of Oporto. Here the troops which had been designed to aid Castanos joined him. Thus strengthened, and well informed of the state of the French armies in Spain, Sir Arthur resolved to effect a landing, and attack Junot while circumstances seemed to indicate no chance of his being reinforced by Bessières.

‘It was on the 8th of August, 1808—a day ever memorable in the history of Britain—that Sir Arthur Wellesley effected his debarkation in the bay of Mondego. He immediately commenced his march towards Lisbon, and on the 17th came up with the enemy under General Laborde, strongly posted on an eminence near Roriça. The French contested their ground gallantly, but were driven from it at the point of the bayonet, and compelled to retreat. The British general, having hardly any cavalry, was unable to pursue them so closely as he otherwise would have done : and Laborde succeeded in joining his shattered division to the rest of the French forces in Portugal. Junot (recently created Duke of Abrantes) now took the command in person ; and finding himself at the head of full 24,000 troops, while the English army were greatly inferior in numbers, and miserably supplied with cavalry and artillery, he did not hesitate to assume the offensive. On the 21st of August he attacked Sir Arthur at Vimiero. In the language of the English general’s despatch, “a most desperate contest ensued” ; and the result was “a signal defeat.” Junot, having lost thirteen cannon and more than 2000 men, immediately fell back upon Lisbon, where his position was protected by the strong defile of Torres Vedras.

‘It is to be regretted that, in the moment of victory, Sir Arthur should have been superseded by the arrival of an officer of superior rank, who did not consider it prudent to follow up the victory. Junot a few days after sent Kellerman to

demand a truce, and propose a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the troops under his orders. General Sir Hugh Dalrymple, who had succeeded Sir Arthur Wellesley in the command, granted the desired armistice. Junot offered to surrender his magazines, stores and armed vessels, provided the British would disembark his soldiers, with their arms, at any French port between Rochefort and L'Orient, and permit them to take with them their private property; and Dalrymple did not hesitate to agree to these terms, although Sir John Moore arrived off the coast with a reinforcement of 10,000 men during the progress of the negotiation. The famous *Convention of Cintra* was signed accordingly on the 30th of August; and the French army wholly evacuated Portugal in the manner provided for. Thus Portugal was freed from the presence of her enemies; and England obtained a permanent footing within the Peninsula. The character of the British army was also raised, not only abroad, but at home; and had the two insurgent nations availed themselves, as they ought to have done, of the resources which their great ally placed at their command, and conducted their own affairs with unity and strength of purpose, the deliverance of the whole Peninsula might have been achieved years before that consummation actually took place.'

CHAPTER XXXIII.

I HAVE no wish to detail the many disgraceful actions committed by intriguers of the second class, who hoped to come in for their share in the partition of the continent. It would be a tedious matter to give an account of all the tricks and treacheries which they practised either to augment their fortunes or to secure the favour of their chief, who wished to have kings for his subjects. It is scarcely to be conceived with what eagerness the princes of Germany sought to range themselves under the protection of Napoleon, by joining the Confederation of the Rhine. I received letters from them continually, which served to shew both the influence which Napoleon exercised in Germany, and the facility with which men stoop beneath the yoke of a new power.

Bernadotte had proceeded to Denmark, to take the command of the Spanish and French troops, who had been sent from the

Hanse Towns to occupy that kingdom, which was then menaced by England. His departure was a great loss to me, for we had always taken the same views on whatever measures were to be adopted, and I became still more sensible of his loss when enabled to form a comparison between him and his successor. It is painful to me to detail the misconduct of those who compromised the French name in unhappy Germany, but, in fulfilling the task I have undertaken, I am determined to adhere strictly to the truth.

In April, 1808, General Dupas arrived as governor of Hamburg, but only under the orders of Bernadotte, who retained the chief command of the French troops in the Hanse Towns. By the nomination of General Dupas, the emperor cruelly disappointed the wishes and hopes of the inhabitants of lower Saxony. That general, a scourge to the people of Hamburg, was wont to say of them, 'As long as I see those—rolling in their carriages, I will have money from them.' It is but just, however, to state, that his extortions were not for his own advantage; his most unjustifiable actions were all committed for the benefit of the man to whom he owed his rank, and to whom he had in some measure devoted his existence.

I shall here state the way in which the generals, who commanded the French troops at Hamburg, had been provided for. The Senate of Hamburg granted to the marshals thirty *friederichs*, and to the generals of divisions twenty *friederichs* per day, for the expenses of their table, exclusive of the hotel in which they were lodged by the city. General Dupas wished to be provided for on the same footing as the marshals. The Senate having, with reason, rejected such a claim, Dupas was highly offended, and in revenge insisted that he should be served daily with a breakfast and dinner of thirty covers. This was a most extravagant and intolerable expenditure, and Dupas cost the city more than any of his predecessors.

The ill-humour which Dupas had conceived on the resistance of the Senate, he visited on the inhabitants. Among other vexations there was one to which the people could not easily submit. In Hamburg, which had formerly been a fortified town, though now laid out more like an English garden, the custom is still preserved of closing the gates at nightfall. On Sundays they were shut three quarters of an hour later, that the amusements of the people might not be interrupted.

An event, which excited great irritation in the public mind, and which might have been attended with even more serious

consequences, was occasioned by the perverse conduct of Dupas. From some unaccountable whim or other, the general ordered the gates to be shut at seven in the evening, and, consequently, while it was broad daylight, the season being the middle of spring. From this regulation not even the Sunday was excepted ; and on that day a great number of the peaceable inhabitants, on their return from the outskirts of the city, presented themselves for admittance at the gate of Altona. The first comers were greatly surprised to find it closed, as it was a greater thoroughfare than any other gate in Hamburg. The number of persons thus excluded was continually increasing, and a considerable crowd soon collected in front of the gate. After useless entreaties addressed to the officers of the station, the people determined to send to the commandant for the keys. The commandant arrived, accompanied by the general, and on their appearance, as it was supposed they had come to order the gate to be opened, they were saluted by a general 'Hurrah !' which, throughout almost all the north, is the popular cry expressive of satisfaction. General Dupas, notwithstanding its intention, conceived this cry to be the signal for an insurrection, and instead of opening the gates, commanded the soldiers to fire on the peaceable citizens, who were only anxious to return to their homes. Several persons were killed, and others more or less seriously wounded. Fortunately, after this first discharge, the brutal fury of Dupas was appeased, but he persisted in keeping the gates closed till the morning ; when an order was posted about the city prohibiting the cry of 'hurrah !' under the severest penalties. It was also forbidden, that more than three persons should collect together in the streets. In this manner was the French yoke imposed by certain individuals upon towns and provinces hitherto contented and happy. Dupas was as much execrated in the Hanse Towns as Clarke had been at Berlin, of which capital he was governor, during the campaign of 1807. Clarke had heaped every species of oppression and exaction on the inhabitants of Berlin ; and Heaven knows what epithets accompanied his name when uttered from the lips of a Prussian !

On the day following this outrage, fearful of the fatal consequences which might still ensue, I wrote to inform the Prince of Ponte-Corvo of what had taken place, soliciting, at the same time, the suppression of an extraordinary tribunal which had been created by General Dupas ; his answer was almost immediate, and my request complied with.

When Bernadotte returned to Hamburg he sent Dupas to Lubeck. That city, much less rich than Hamburg, suffered cruelly from such a guest. Dupas levied all his exactions in kind, and affected the highest indignation at any offer of a compensation in money, the very idea of which he said was offensive to his delicacy of feeling. But his demands had become so extravagant, that the city of Lubeck was actually unable to satisfy them. Besides his table, which he required to be furnished in the same style of profusion as at Hamburg, he was supplied with plate, linen, wood, and candles—in short, with the most trivial articles of household consumption.

The Senate deputed to this disinterested and incorruptible general, M. Notting, a venerable old man, who mildly represented to him the abuses which were everywhere committed in his name, and entreated that he would condescend to accept twenty louis per day, for the expenses of his table alone. At this proposal, General Dupas became enraged. To offer money to him—to him !—it was an insult not to be endured. In the most furious manner he drove the terrified senator out of the house, and gave immediate orders to his aide-de-camp, Barral, to imprison him. M. de Barral, endowed with a greater share of humanity than his general, and alarmed at so extraordinary an order, offered some remonstrances, but in vain; and, though much against his inclination, was obliged to obey. The aide-de-camp accordingly repaired to the house of the aged senator, but, withheld by that feeling of respect which grey hairs never fail to inspire in the well-ordered minds of youth, instead of arresting him, he requested the old man not to leave his house until he could prevail on the general to retract his orders. It was not till the following day that M. de Barral succeeded in getting these orders revoked, that is to say, the release of M. Notting from prison; for Dupas would not forego his revenge, until he heard that the senator had suffered at least the commencement of the punishment to which his capricious fury had doomed him.

Notwithstanding these fine professions of disinterestedness, M. Dupas yielded so far as to accept the twenty louis per day for the expenses of his table, which M. Notting had offered him on the part of the Senate of Lubeck; but it was not without murmurings, complaints, and menaces, that he made this generous concession, exclaiming on more than one occasion, 'Those rascals have limited my subsistence.' Lubeck was not freed from the presence of this general before the month of

March, 1809, when he was summoned to take the command of a division in the emperor's new campaign against Austria. Strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that, however oppressive his presence had been at Lubeck, the Hanse Towns soon had reason to regret him.

The year 1808 was fertile in remarkable events. Occupied as I was with my own official duties, I still contrived to amuse a few leisure moments in observing the course of those great actions by which Bonaparte sought to distinguish every day of his life. At the commencement of 1808, I received one of the first copies of the *Code of Commerce*, promulgated on the 1st of January by the emperor's order. This Code appeared to me an absolute mockery; at least it was extraordinary to publish a Code respecting a subject which all the other imperial decrees tended to destroy. What trade could possibly be supposed to flourish under the cruel continental system, and the ruinous severity of the customs? The line was already sufficiently extended, when by a decree of the Senate it was still further widened. The emperor, who was all-powerful on the continent, had recourse to no other formality in order to annex to the empire the towns of Kehl, Cassel, near Mentz, Wessel, and Flushing, with the territories dependent on them, than his decrees and senatorial decisions, which at least had the advantage of being obtained without bloodshed. Intelligence on all these matters was immediately forwarded to me, by the ministers with whom I was in correspondence; for my situation at Hamburg had acquired such importance, that it was necessary I should be informed of everything.

My correspondence relative to what was passing in the south of France and of Europe afforded me merely an anecdotal interest. But not so the news which came from the north. At Hamburg I was like the sentinel of an advanced post; always on the alert. More than once I sent information to the government of what was about to take place, before the event actually happened. I was one of the first that gained intelligence of the plans of Russia relative to Sweden. The courier whom I sent to Paris must have arrived there at the very moment when Russia declared war against that power. About the end of February, the Russian troops entered Swedish Finland, and possessed themselves of the capital of that province, which had long been coveted by the Russian government. It has been since asserted that, at the interview at Erfurt, Bonaparte consented to the usurpation of that province by Alexander,

in return for the latter's complaisance in acknowledging Joseph as King of Spain and the Indies. Joseph was succeeded at Naples by Murat, and that accession of the brother-in-law of Napoleon to one of the thrones of the house of Bourbon, gave Bonaparte another junior in the college of kings, of which he would infallibly have become the senior, had fortune still sided with him. Bonaparte, when his brow was encircled with a double crown, after creating princes, at length realized the idea he had so long entertained of being the founder of a new nobility, endowed with hereditary rights. It was at the commencement of March, 1808, that he accomplished this notable project ; and I saw, in the *Moniteur*, a long catalogue of princes, dukes, counts, barons, and knights of the empire. Viscounts and marquises were alone wanting to the list.

At the time that Napoleon was founding a new nobility, he determined to build up again the ancient edifice of the university, but upon a fresh foundation. The education of youth had always been one of his ruling ideas, and I had an opportunity of remarking how much he was changed by the exercise of sovereign power, when I received at Hamburg the new statutes of the university, and compared them with the ideas which he formerly, when general and first consul, had often expressed respecting the education of youth. Though the natural enemy of everything like liberty, the system of education which Bonaparte had at first conceived was upon a vast and extended scale, comprehending the study of history, and those positive sciences, such as geology and astronomy, which afford the utmost scope for development of which the human mind is susceptible. The sovereign, however, shrunk from the first ideas of the man of genius, and his university, confided to the elegant subserviency of M. de Fontanes, was but a mere school, which might indeed send forth well-informed, but scarcely high-minded and enlightened men.

About this time Rome was occupied by French troops under the command of General Miollis, which was the commencement of a long series of troubles, by which Pius VII. expiated the condescension he had shewn in going to Paris to crown Napoleon.

Rome now became the second city of the empire ; but until this time the boasted moderation of Bonaparte had contented itself with dismembering from the Papal states the legations of Ancona, Urbino, Marcerata, and Camerino, which were divided into three departments, and added to the kingdom of Italy.

The patience and long-suffering of the Holy See could no longer hold out against this act of violence, and Cardinal Caprara, who had remained in Paris since the coronation, at length quitted that capital. Shortly afterwards the Grand Duchies of Parma and Placentia were united to the French empire, and annexed to the government of the Trans-Alpine departments. These transactions took place about the same time as the events in Spain and Bayonne, before mentioned.

After the disgraceful conduct of the emperor at Bayonne, he returned to Paris on the 14th of August, the eve of his birthday. Scarcely had he arrived in the capital, when he conceived fresh subjects for uneasiness, on account of the conduct of Russia, which, as I have stated, had declared open war against Sweden, and made no secret of the intention of seizing Finland. The emperor, however, desirous of prosecuting the war in Spain with the utmost vigour, felt the necessity of withdrawing his troops from Prussia to the Pyrenees. He then hastened the interview at Erfurt, where the two Emperors of France and Russia had appointed to meet. By this interview he hoped to secure the tranquillity of the continent, while he should complete the subjugation of Spain to the sceptre of Joseph. That Prince had been proclaimed on the 8th of June, and on the 21st of the same month he made his entry into Madrid; but ten days after, having received information of the disaster of Baylen, he was obliged to leave the Spanish capital.

The interview at Erfurt having been determined on, the emperor again quitted Paris about the end of September, and arrived at Metz without stopping, except for the purpose of reviewing the regiments which he met on his route, and which were on their march from the grand army to Spain. I had received previous intelligence of this intended interview, so memorable in the life of Napoleon; and such was the interest it excited in Germany, that the roads were covered with the equipages of the princes who were going to Erfurt to be present on the occasion. The emperor arrived at the place of rendezvous before Alexander, and went forward three leagues to meet him. Napoleon was on horseback, and Alexander in his carriage. They embraced, it is said, with every demonstration of the most cordial friendship. I shall not dwell on other well-known particulars relating to this interview, at which most of the sovereign princes of Germany were present, with the exception, however, of the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria. The latter sovereign sent a letter to Napoleon, which

to me appeared a perfect model of ambiguity, though it was scarcely possible that Napoleon could be deceived by it. He had not as yet, however, any suspicion of the hostile intentions of Austria, which soon afterwards became apparent ; his grand object at that time was the Spanish business ; and, as I have before observed, one of the secrets of Napoleon's genius was, that he gave his attention to only one thing at a time.

By the interview at Erfurt, Bonaparte obtained the principal object he had in view, namely, Alexander's recognition of his brother Joseph in his new character of King of Spain and the Indies. It has been said that, as the price of this acknowledgment, Napoleon consented that Alexander should have Swedish Finland ; for the truth of this I cannot vouch, having no positive proofs of the fact. I remember, however, that when, after the interview at Erfurt, Alexander had given orders to his ambassador to Charles IV. to continue his functions under King Joseph, the Swedish chargé d'affaires at Hamburg told me, that confidential letters, which he had received from Erfurt, led him to apprehend, that the Emperor Alexander had communicated to Napoleon his designs on Finland, and that the latter had consented to its occupation. Be this as it may, Napoleon, after the interview, returned to Paris, where he presided with great pomp at the opening of the Legislative Body, and again set out in the month of November for Spain.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

PREVIOUS to the interview at Erfurt, an event took place which produced a considerable sensation at Hamburg, and, indeed, throughout Europe ; an event which was planned and executed with inconceivable secrecy. I allude to the defection of the Marquis de la Romana, which I have hitherto forbore to mention, in order that I might not separate the different facts which came to my knowledge relative to that defection, and the circumstances which accompanied it.

The Marquis de la Romana had come to the Hanse Towns at the head of 18,000 men, which the emperor, in the last campaign, claimed in virtue of treaties previously concluded with the Spanish government. This demand for men was the result of the disastrous battle of Eylau. The Spanish troops were at first well received by the inhabitants of the Hanse Towns,

but the difference of language was soon productive of discord between them. The Marquis de la Romana was a little, dark-featured man somewhat unprepossessing and even vulgar in his appearance, but of considerable talent and information. He had travelled in almost every part of Europe, and being a close observer, his conversation was both instructive and agreeable. During his stay at Hamburg, General Romana spent most of his evenings at my house, and whilst at the whist table, constantly fell asleep over the game. Madame de Bourrienne was usually his partner, and I recollect he continually apologized for his involuntary breach of good manners, though sure to be guilty of the same offence the next evening. I shall shortly explain the cause of this regular siesta.

On the birthday of the King of Spain, the Marquis de la Romana gave a magnificent entertainment ; the ball-room was decorated with warlike implements and allusions. The marquis did the honours with infinite grace, and was particularly courteous to the French generals. He spoke of the emperor in the most respectful terms, without any affectation of homage, so that it was almost impossible for anyone to suspect him of any clandestine intention. In short, he played his part to the last with the most consummate address. We had already heard at Hamburg of the fatal result of the battle at Sierra Morena, and of the capitulation of Dupont, which caused his disgrace at the very moment when the whole army had marked him out as the man most likely to receive the baton of Marshal of France.

Meanwhile the Marquis de la Romana departed for the Danish Island of Fünen, agreeably to the orders which had been transmitted to him by Marshal Bernadotte. There, as at Hamburg, the Spaniards were well liked ; for their general obliged them to observe the strictest discipline. Great preparations were then making at Hamburg on the approach of Saint Napoleon's day, which at that time was celebrated with much solemnity in every town in which France had representatives. The Prince de Ponte-Corvo was then taking the baths at Travemünde, a small seaport near Lubeck ; but that did not prevent him from giving directions for the festival of the 15th of August. The Marquis de la Romana, the better to deceive the marshal, had despatched a courier to him, requesting permission to visit Hamburg on the day of the fête, in order to join his prayers to those of the French, and to receive on this occasion, from the hands of the prince, the grand cordon of the

Legion of Honour, which he had solicited, and which Napoleon had granted him. Three days after, the marshal received intelligence of what had taken place. The marquis had collected a great number of English vessels on the coast, and escaped with all his troops, except a depôt of 600 men, left at Altona. It was afterwards ascertained that he met with no interruption in his passage, and that he landed with his troops at Corunna. I could now account for the drowsiness which always overcame the Marquis de la Romana when he sat down to take a hand at whist. The fact was, he used to sit up all night making preparations for the escape which he had long meditated, and during the day shewed himself everywhere as usual, in order to avoid the least suspicion of his intentions.

On the defection of the Spanish troops, I received letters from government, requiring me to augment my vigilance, and to seek out those persons who might be supposed to have shared the confidence of the Marquis de la Romana. I was informed that the agents of England, dispersed through Holstein and the Hanseatic territories, were endeavouring likewise to spread discord and dissatisfaction among the troops of the King of Holland.

These manœuvres were connected with the treason of the Spaniards, and the arrival of Danican in Denmark. Insubordination had already broken out, but it was promptly repressed. Two Dutch soldiers were shot for striking their officers; but notwithstanding this severity, desertion among the troops increased to an alarming degree. Indefatigable agents, in the pay of the English government, laboured incessantly to seduce the soldiers of King Louis from their duty. Some of these agents, being denounced to me, were taken almost in the fact, and positive proof being adduced of their guilt, they were condemned to death.

These indispensable examples of severity did not check the manœuvres of England, though they served to cool the zeal of her agents. I used every endeavour to second the Prince of Ponte-Corvo in tracing out the persons employed by England. It was chiefly from the small island of Heligoland that they found their way to the continent. This communication was facilitated by the numerous vessels scattered about the small islands which lie thick along that coast. Five or six pieces of gold defrayed the expense of the passage to or from Heligoland. Thus the Spanish news, which was printed and often fabricated at London, was profusely circulated in the north of Germany.

Napoleon was so well aware of the effect produced by his presence that, after a conquest, he loved to shew himself amongst the people whose territories he had annexed to his empire. To Napoleon himself, these were, in some sort, journeys of pleasure, in which he enjoyed the fruits of his enterprises, at the same time that his presence imparted the greatest possible activity to every proceeding. Duroc, who always accompanied him, unless engaged in any mission, gave me an interesting account of the emperor's journey in 1807 to Venice, and the other Italian provinces, which, in conformity with the treaty of Presburg, were annexed to the kingdom of Italy.

Napoleon had many very important motives for this journey. He was planning great alliances; and he loaded Eugene with favours in order to sound him, and prepare him as much as possible for his mother's divorce.

There can be no doubt that Bonaparte now seriously contemplated his divorce from Josephine. Had there been no other proof of this, I, who from constant attention had learned to read Napoleon's thoughts in his actions, found a sufficient one in the decree of Milan, by which, in default of lawful male heirs, he adopted Eugene as his son, and successor to the crown of Italy. It was during this journey that Napoleon united Tuscany to the empire.

Whilst Bonaparte was the chief of the French republic, he did not object to the existence of a Batavian republic to the north of France, and was equally tolerant of the Cisalpine republic in the south. But after his coronation, all the republics, which like satellites revolved round the grand republics, were converted into kingdoms, subject to the empire, if not avowedly, at least in fact. In this respect there was no difference between the Batavian and Cisalpine republics. The latter having been metamorphosed into the kingdom of Italy, it was necessary to find some pretext for transforming the former into the kingdom of Holland. The government of the Batavian republic had been for some time past merely the shadow of a government; but still it preserved, even in its submission to France, those internal forms of freedom, which console a nation for the loss of its independence. In this state of things, the emperor, who maintained a host of agents in Holland, found no great difficulty in getting up a deputation, whose object should be, to solicit him to choose a king for the Batavian Republic. This submissive deputation came to Paris in the month of May, 1806, to solicit the emperor, as a favour, to place Prince Louis on

the throne of Holland. The address of the deputation, with Napoleon's gracious reply, and the speech of Louis, on the occasion, will be found among the official records of the period.

Louis thus became King of Holland, though greatly against his inclination ; he offered all the opposition he dared, alleging as an objection, the state of his health, to which, certainly, the climate of Holland was not favourable ; but Bonaparte sternly made this unbrotherly reply—'It is better to die a king than live a prince.' He had then no alternative but to accept the crown. He went to Holland, taking with him Hortense, who, however, did not stay long there. The new king wished to make himself beloved by his subjects, and as they were entirely a commercial people, there was no better means of doing so than by not adopting Napoleon's rigid laws against commercial intercourse with England. Hence the first coolness between the two brothers, which, in the sequel, led to the abdication of Louis, and his withdrawing from his brother's threatened vengeance.

I know not whether Napoleon recollected the motive assigned by Louis for at first refusing the crown of Holland, namely, the climate of the country, or whether he reckoned upon greater submission in another of his brothers ; but this is certain, that Joseph was not called from the throne of Naples to that of Spain, until after the refusal of Louis. I have before me a copy of the letter written to him by Napoleon on the subject. It is without date either of time or place, but its contents unquestionably refer it to the month of March, or April, 1808. It is as follows :—

'BROTHER,

'The King of Spain, Charles IV., has just abdicated. The Spanish people loudly appeal to me. Convinced that no lasting peace can be obtained with England, unless I cause a great movement on the continent, I have determined to place a French king on the throne of Spain. The climate of Holland does not agree with you ; besides, Holland cannot rise from her ruins. In the whirlwind of political events, whether we have peace or not, there is no possibility of maintaining it. In this state of things I have thought of the throne of Spain for you. Tell me decidedly what is your opinion of this measure. If I were to name you King of Spain, would you accept the offer ? May I count on you ? Answer me simply on these two points. Say, "I have received your letter of such a day,

I answer, *Yes*"; and then I shall count on your doing what I wish; or say, *No*; if you decline my proposition. Admit no third person into your confidence, and mention to no one the object of this letter. The thing must be done before we confess having thought about it.

‘NAPOLEON.’

Before taking final possession of Holland, Napoleon formed the project of separating from it Brabant and Zealand, in exchange for other provinces, the possession of which was doubtful; but Louis made a firm and successful stand against this first act of usurpation. Bonaparte was too intent on the great business in Spain, to risk any commotion in the north, where, as I have said, the declaration of Russia against Sweden already sufficiently occupied him. He consequently did not insist on the measure, and even affected indifference to the proposed augmentation of territory to the empire.

On the 20th of December, however, Napoleon wrote to Louis a very remarkable letter, in which appears the undisguised expression of that tyranny which he wished to exercise over all his family, in order to make them the instruments of his own ambition. In this letter he reproached Louis for acting in opposition to his system of policy, telling him that he had forgotten he was a Frenchman, and wished to become in all respects a Dutchman.

About the end of 1809, the emperor summoned to Paris the sovereigns who might properly be styled the vassals of his empire. Among the number was Louis, who, however, shewed no great willingness to quit his states. He called a council of his ministers, who were of opinion that, for the interest of Holland, it was necessary he should make this fresh sacrifice. He submitted to it with resignation; indeed, every day passed on the throne was a sacrifice to Louis.

He lived at Paris very retired, under the constant observation of the police; for it was supposed, that as he had come against his will, he would not prolong his stay so long as Napoleon desired. In this respect they were not much deceived, but any such attempt on his part was useless. This surveillance and constraint, however, had the effect of displaying in him a strength of character which he was not previously supposed to possess. Amidst the general silence of the high servants of the empire, and even of the kings and princes assembled in the capital, he ventured to say, ‘I have been deceived by promises

which were never intended to be kept. Holland is weary of being the plaything of France.' The emperor, little accustomed to such language as this, was terribly incensed at it. From that moment Louis had no alternative—he must either yield to the incessant exactions of Napoleon, or see Holland united to France. He chose the latter, but not till he had exerted all his feeble power in behalf of the subjects whom Napoleon had consigned to him; but he would not be the accomplice of the man who had resolved to make those subjects the victims of his hatred against England.

Louis, however, was permitted to return to his states to contemplate the misery arising from the continental blockade, which pressed with an iron hand on every branch of trade and industry, hitherto so flourishing in the provinces of Holland. At length, his feeling heart being no longer able to support the sight of evils which it was not in his power to relieve, he endeavoured, by cautious and respectful remonstrances, to avert the utter ruin with which Holland was threatened. On the 23rd of March, 1810, he wrote the following letter to Napoleon:—

‘If you wish to consolidate the present state of France, to obtain maritime peace, or to attack England with success, it is not by measures like the blockading system that these objects can be obtained—it is not by the destruction of a kingdom of your own creation, by the enfeebling of your allies, and setting at defiance their most sacred rights, and the first principles of the law of nations. On the contrary, you should render them the friends of France, and consolidate and strengthen your allies till, like your own brothers, you might depend upon them. The destruction of Holland, far from being a means of assailing England, will but add the more to her strength, by all the industry and riches which will take refuge with her. In reality, there are but three methods of assailing England; namely, by detaching Ireland from her, getting possession of the East Indies, or by actual invasion. These two latter modes, which would be the most effectual, cannot be executed without a naval force. But I am astonished that the first should have been so easily relinquished. It would be a surer mode of obtaining peace on good conditions than the system of injuring one’s self and friends in the attempt to inflict a greater injury upon the enemy.’

‘LOUIS.’

Written remonstrances were not more to Napoleon’s taste

than verbal ones, at a time when, as I was informed by my friends whom fortune had enchained to his destiny, no one ever ventured to address a word to him, except to answer his questions. Cambacères, who, as his old colleague in the consulate, had alone retained that privilege in public, lost it after Napoleon's marriage with the descendant of the Austrian emperors. His brother's letter excited his highest displeasure. Two months after its reception, being on a journey in the north, he addressed to him from Ostend a letter, a very model of haughty insolence, which cannot be read without a painful feeling, proving as it does how weak are the most sacred ties of blood in comparison with the interests of an insatiable ambition. This letter was as follows :—

‘BROTHER,

‘In our situation, frankness is the best course. I know your secret sentiments, and all that you can say to the contrary will avail nothing. Holland unquestionably is in a melancholy situation. I believe you are anxious to extricate her from her difficulties, and it is you, and you alone, who can do so. When you conduct yourself in such a way as to induce the people of Holland to believe that you act under my influence—that all your measures and all your sentiments are conformable to mine—then you will be loved, you will be esteemed and you will acquire the power necessary for re-establishing Holland. When to be known as my friend, and the friend of France, shall be a title of recommendation at your court, Holland will be in her natural situation. Since your return from Paris, you have done nothing to effect this object. What will be the result of your conduct? Your subjects, bandied about between France and England, will throw themselves into the arms of France, and will demand to be united to her rather than remain in a state of such uncertainty. If your knowledge of my character, which is to go straight forward to my object, unimpeded by any consideration, is not sufficient for you—say what would you have me do? I can dispense with Holland, but Holland cannot dispense with my protection. If under the dominion of one of my brothers, but looking to me alone for her welfare, she does not find in her sovereign my image, all confidence in your government is at an end; by your own hands your sceptre is broken. Love France, love my glory—that is the only way to serve Holland. If you had acted as you ought to have done, that country having become a part of my

empire, would have been the more dear to me, seeing I had given her a sovereign whom I looked upon almost as my son. In placing you on the throne of Holland, I thought I had placed a French citizen there: you have followed a course diametrically opposite to what I had expected. I have been forced to prohibit you from coming to France, and to take possession of a part of your territory. In proving yourself a bad Frenchman, you are less to the Dutch than a Prince of Orange, to which dynasty they owe their rank as a nation, and a long succession of prosperity and glory. It is evident to the Dutch that, by your banishment from France, they have lost what they would not have done, under a Schimmelpennick, or a Prince of Orange. Shew yourself a Frenchman and the brother of the emperor, and be assured that you will thereby advance the interests of Holland. But your fate seems fixed, you are incorrigible, you would drive away the few Frenchmen who remain with you. Affection and advice are lost upon you—you must be dealt with by threats and compulsion. What mean the prayers and mysterious fasts you have ordered? Louis, you will not reign long. Your actions disclose better than your confidential letters the sentiments of your soul. Return from your wilful course. Be a Frenchman in heart, or your people will banish you; and you will leave Holland an object of their ridicule. States must be governed by reason and policy, and not by visionary schemes, the offspring of acrid and vitiated humours.

‘NAPOLEON.’

This letter had scarcely reached Louis, when Napoleon was informed of a petty affray that had taken place at Amsterdam, and to which Count de la Rochefoucauld, knowing he could not better please his master than by affording him a pretext for being angry, contrived to give a sort of diplomatic importance. It appeared that the honour of the count's coachman had been compromised by the insult of a citizen of Amsterdam. The sensitive feelings of the gentleman in livery had been so deeply wounded that a quarrel ensued, which, but for the interference of the guard of the palace, might have led to very serious consequences, since it assumed the character of a national affair between the French and the Dutch. M. de la Rochefoucauld sent off a report of his coachman's quarrel to the emperor, who was then at Lille. The illustrious author of the *Maxims* related the affair with as much warmth and

earnestness as in his literary crusade against royalty. Napoleon, in consequence, instantly despatched a most violent letter to Louis, declaring at the same time it should be the last he would ever write to him.

Thus reduced to the cruel alternative of crushing Holland with his own hands, or leaving that task to the emperor, Louis did not hesitate to lay down a sceptre which he was not suffered to wield for the happiness of his people. His resolution being made, he addressed a message to the legislative body of the kingdom of Holland, explaining the motives of his abdication. What, indeed, could be more reasonable than such a step, when he found an armed force in possession of his dominions, which had been united to the empire by what was formerly called a family alliance? But at that time, no consideration seemed capable of arresting the course of Napoleon's arbitrary proceedings. The French troops entered Holland under the command of the Duke de Reggio; and that marshal, who was more king than the king himself, threatened to occupy Amsterdam. Louis then descended from the throne, and, four years after, Napoleon in his turn was forced to descend from his.

After his message to the legislative body, Louis published his act of abdication, in which he dwelt on the unhappy state of his kingdom, attributing it to his brother's unfavourable feeling towards himself. He declared that he had shrunk from no effort or sacrifice, useless as they had proved, to put an end to so painful a state of things; and that, finally, he considered himself as the unhappy cause of the continual misunderstanding between the French empire and Holland. It is worthy of remark, that Louis imagined he could abdicate the crown of Holland in favour of his son, as Napoleon wished four years after to abdicate his crown in favour of the King of Rome. How often do these coincidences occur in the history of Napoleon! in the depth of his reverses, how often was he assailed with precisely the same blows which, in the height of his fortune, he relentlessly aimed at others!

Louis bade farewell to the people of Holland in a proclamation, after the publication of which he retired to the waters of Toplitz. He was living there in tranquil retirement, when he learned that his brother, so far from respecting the terms of his abdication, had united Holland to the empire. Against this arbitrary proceeding Louis published a protest, the circulation of which was strictly forbidden by the police.

Thus there seemed to be an end of all intercourse between these two brothers, who were so opposite in character and disposition. But Napoleon, who was enraged that Louis should have presumed to protest, and that too in energetic terms, against the union of his kingdom with the empire, ordered him to return to France, to which he was summoned in his character of constable and French prince. Louis, however, did not think proper to obey this summons; and Napoleon, in the excess of his passion, though faithful to his promise of never writing to him again, ordered the following letter to be addressed to him by M. Otto, who had been ambassador from France to Vienna, since the still recent marriage of the emperor with Maria Louisa :—

‘SIRE,

‘The emperor directs me to write to your Majesty as follows :—

‘It is the duty of every French prince, and every member of the imperial family, to reside in France : whence they cannot absent themselves without the permission of the emperor. Before the union of Holland to the empire, the emperor permitted the king to reside at Toplitz in Bohemia. His health appeared to require the use of the waters ; but now the emperor requires that Prince Louis shall return at the latest by the 1st of December next, under pain of being considered disobedient to the constitutions of the empire, and the head of his family, and being treated accordingly.

‘I fulfil, Sire, word for word, the mission with which I am entrusted, and I send the chief secretary of the embassy, to be assured that this letter is carefully delivered. I beg your Majesty to accept the homage of my profound respect, etc, etc.

‘OTTO.’

What a letter was this to be addressed by a subject to a prince, who had scarcely yet ceased to be a king ! When on a subsequent occasion I saw M. Otto at Paris, knowing the esteem which I had ever felt for Louis, he spoke to me on the subject, telling me how much he had been distressed at the necessity of writing such a letter to the brother of the emperor. He stated, however, that he had employed the very expressions dictated by Napoleon, in that irritation which he could never restrain whenever his will was in the slightest degree opposed.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE emperor, enraged at the first positive disgraces which had ever befallen his arms, and foreseeing that unless the Spanish insurrection were crushed ere the patriots had time to form a regular government and to organize their armies, the succours of England, and the growing discontents of Germany, might invest the task with insurmountable difficulties, determined to cross the Pyrenees in person, at the head of a force capable of sweeping the whole Peninsula clear before him. Hitherto no mention of the unfortunate occurrences in Spain had been made in any public act of his government, or suffered to transpire in any of the French journals. It was now necessary to break this haughty silence. The emperor announced, accordingly, that the peasants of Spain had rebelled against their *king*; that treachery had caused the ruin of one corps of his army; and that another had been forced, by the English, to evacuate Portugal: demanding two new conscriptions each of 80,000 men—which were of course granted without hesitation. Recruiting his camps on the German side, and in Italy, with these new levies, he now ordered his veteran troops, to the number of 200,000, including a vast and brilliant cavalry, and a large body of the Imperial Guards, to be drafted from those frontiers, and marched through France towards Spain.

On his return from the conference at Erfurt, which had terminated on the 14th of October, Napoleon opened in person on the 24th, the sittings of the Legislative Session in Paris; and two days after he left that capital to take the command of the armies in Spain, and reached Bayonne on the 3rd of November. He remained there for a few days, directing the movements of the last columns of his advancing armies, and on the 8th arrived at Vittoria. He immediately obtained a detailed report of the position of the French and Spanish armies, and instantly drew up a plan for the prosecution of the war; and in a few hours the whole machinery of his intended operations was put in motion. The presence of Napoleon everywhere restored victory to the French standards, and in less than two months he had cleared the Peninsula of any opposing force, and obliged the English army, under Sir John Moore, to make a precipitate retreat upon Corunna. Napoleon, after enjoying the

sight of an English army in full retreat, no longer considered it worthy of his own attention, but intrusted the consummation of its ruin to Soult ; and immediately proceeded to Paris with his utmost speed. The cause of this sudden change of purpose and extraordinary haste was a sufficient one ; and ere long it transpired.

It was in the midst of the operations of the Spanish war that Napoleon learned that Austria had, for the first time, raised the *landwehre*. I obtained the most certain information that Austria was preparing for war, and that orders had been issued, in all directions, to collect and put in motion all the resources of that powerful monarchy. I communicated these particulars to the French government, and strongly suggested the necessity of increased vigilance and precautionary measures. Preceding aggressions, particularly that of 1805, were not to be forgotten. It is probable that similar information was furnished from other quarters. Be that as it may, the emperor committed the military operations in Spain to his generals, and set out for Paris, where he arrived at the end of January, 1809. He had been in Spain only since the beginning of November, and though the insurgent troops were defeated, the inhabitants, still unsubdued, shewed themselves more and more unfavourable to Joseph's cause, and it did not appear very probable that he would ever seat himself tranquilly on the throne of Madrid.

Before commencing a relation of what came to my knowledge respecting the German campaign which was about to begin, I must be permitted to refer back to one of the most important events preceding it. When speaking of the interview at Erfurt, it will be remembered that I alluded to a somewhat ambiguous letter transmitted from the Emperor Francis to Napoleon. The answer to this letter, which I purposely omitted in its proper place, that it might serve as an introduction to the events of 1809, seemed to be written in the spirit of prophecy, clearly pointing out what actually took place in that year. It was in the following terms :—

‘SIRE, MY BROTHER,

‘I thank your royal and imperial majesty for the letter you have been so good as to write me, transmitted by Baron Vincent. I have never doubted the upright intentions of your majesty, but I was not the less fearful, for the moment, that hostilities would be renewed between us. There is, at Vienna, a faction which affects alarm in order to drive your cabinet to violent

measures, which would entail misfortunes greater than those which are past. I had it in my power to dismember your majesty's monarchy, or at least to diminish its power. I did not do so. It exists, as it is, by my consent. This is the best proof that our accounts are settled, and that I have no wish to injure you. I am always ready to guarantee the integrity of your monarchy, I will never do anything adverse to the important interests of your state. But your majesty ought not to bring again under discussion, what a war of fifteen years had settled. You ought to avoid every proclamation or act calculated to provoke hostility. The last levy in mass might have had this effect, if I had apprehended that the levy and preparations were made in conjunction with Russia. I have just disbanded the camp of the confederation. I have sent 100,000 men to Boulogne, to renew my projects against England. I had reason to believe, when I had the happiness of seeing your majesty, and had concluded the treaty of Presburg, that our disputes were terminated for ever, and that I might undertake the maritime war without interruption. I beseech your majesty to distrust those, who, by speaking of the dangers of the monarchy, disturb your happiness, and that of your family and people. Those persons alone are dangerous, they create the dangers they pretend to fear. By a straightforward, plain, and ingenuous line of conduct, your majesty will render your people happy ; will yourself enjoy that tranquillity which, after so many troubles, you must doubtless require ; and will be sure of ever finding me disposed to abstain from whatever might be injurious to your best interests. Let your conduct bespeak confidence, and you will inspire it. The best policy at the present time is simplicity and truth. Confide to me whatever troubles may distress you, and I will instantly banish them. Will your majesty allow me to make one observation more—listen to your own judgment, your own feelings, they are much more correct than those of your advisers. I beseech your majesty to read my letter in the same spirit in which it is written, and to see nothing in it which has not for its object the welfare and tranquillity of Europe and your majesty.'

From this letter of Napoleon, I had no doubt that a new war would soon ensue between France and Austria. The tone of superiority assumed by Napoleon, as if he had been writing to one of the princes subject to his Confederation of the Rhine, was indeed of a nature to irritate the wounded pride of the heir of the

Cæsars. The cabinet of Vienna was also attacked in a manner calculated to irritate all its members against Napoleon. Illusion, however, that last resource of misfortune, appeared in a seducing form before the eyes of Austria. True, she had been conquered once, but it did not therefore follow that she should be conquered again. She might recover what she had lost, and the war which Napoleon was obliged to maintain, at an immense expense of men and money, in the Peninsula, gave her chances of success which she had not possessed on the former occasion, when England alone was at war with France ; and when, above all, England had not, as she had at that moment, a part of Europe where she could employ her land forces against the power of Napoleon. Whether undesignedly, or from a wish that, in the new war about to take place, it might evidently appear that he was not the aggressor, Napoleon suffered himself to be anticipated.

The Emperor Francis, however, notwithstanding the instigations of his counsellors, hesitated about taking the first step, but at length yielding to the open solicitations of England, and the secret insinuations of Russia, and, above all, seduced by the subsidies of Great Britain, he declared hostilities, not at first against France, but against her allies of the Confederation of the Rhine. On the 9th of April, Prince Charles, who was appointed commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops, addressed the following note to the commander-in-chief of the French army in Bavaria :—

‘In conformity with a declaration made by his majesty, the Emperor of Austria, to the Emperor Napoleon, I hereby apprise the general-in-chief of the French army that I have orders to advance with my troops, and to treat as enemies all who oppose me.’

A courier carried a copy of this declaration to Strasburg with the utmost expedition, from which place it was transmitted by telegraph to Paris. The emperor, surprised, but not disconcerted by this intelligence, received it at St. Cloud on the 11th of April, and two hours after he was on his road to Germany. The complexity of affairs in which he was then engaged seemed to give a fresh impulse to his activity. When he reached the army, neither the troops nor his guard having been able to keep up with him, he placed himself at the head of the Bavarian regiments, thus adopting, as it were, the soldiers of Maximilian.

Six days after his departure from Paris, the army of Prince Charles, which had passed the Inn, was threatened. The emperor's head-quarters were at Donawerth, and from thence he addressed to his soldiers one of those energetic and concise proclamations, which made them perform so many prodigies. This complication of events could not but be fatal to Europe and to France, whatever might be the results, but it afforded an opportunity favourable to the development of the emperor's genius. As his favourite poet, Ossian, loved best to tune his lyre to the noise of the roaring tempest, Napoleon, in like manner, required political tempests and opposing elements to display his wonderful abilities.

During the campaign of 1809, and more especially at its commencement, Napoleon's course was even more rapid than it had been in the campaign of 1805. Every courier who arrived at Hamburg, brought us news of further prodigies. As soon as the emperor was informed of the attack made by the Austrians upon Bavaria, orders were despatched to all the generals having troops under their command to proceed with the utmost expedition to the theatre of war. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo was summoned to the grand army with the Saxon troops under his command, and temporarily resigned the government of the Hanse Towns.

I shall not enter into any longer details respecting the second campaign of Vienna than I did of the first, and the campaign of Tilsit. I shall confide myself, as before, to relating such information as I obtained at Hamburg, where my functions always became more difficult whenever any fresh movement took place in Germany. I can declare that in 1809 it required all the promptitude of the emperor's march upon Vienna, to defeat the conspiracies which were formed against his government; for, in the event of his arms being unsuccessful, the blow was ready to be struck. England had entertained the project of an expedition in the north of Germany, and her forces there already amounted to about 10,000 men. The Archduke Charles had formed the plan of concentrating in the middle of Germany a large body of troops, consisting of the corps of General Am Ende, of General Radizwowitz, and of the English, with whom were to be joined the people who were expected to rise on their approach. But all the attempts and contrivances of England on the continent were fruitless, for with the emperor's new system of war, which consisted in making a push on the capital, he soon obtained negotiations for

peace. He was master of Vienna before England had even organized the expedition to which I have just alluded. He left Paris on the 11th of April, was at Donawerth on the 17th, and on the 23rd he was master of Ratisbonne. In the engagement which preceded his entrance into that town, Napoleon was wounded in the heel. The injury, however, was too slight to cause him to leave the field of battle for a moment. Between Donawerth and Ratisbonne also was effected that bold and skilful manœuvre by which Davoust gained and merited the title of Prince of Eckmühl.

At this period, it seemed as if Fortune was so allied to Napoleon's arms that she took pleasure even in realizing his boasting predictions ; for, within a month after his proclamation to that effect, the French troops did really make their entry into the Austrian capital.

Rapp, who, during the campaign of Vienna had resumed his duties as aide-de-camp, related to me one of those striking remarks of Napoleon, which, when his words are compared with the events that followed them, would almost appear to indicate a foresight of his future destiny. The emperor, when within a few days' march of Vienna, procured a guide to explain to him the names of every village, or ruin, however insignificant, that presented itself on his road. The guide pointed to an eminence, on which were still visible a few remaining vestiges of an old fortified castle. 'Those,' said the guide, 'are the ruins of the castle of Diernstein.' Napoleon suddenly stopped, and remained for some time silently contemplating the ruins, then turning to Marshal Lannes, who was with him, he said, 'See ! yonder is the prison of Richard Cœur de Lion. He, too, like us, went to Syria and Palestine. But Cœur de Lion, my brave Lannes, was not more brave than you. He was more fortunate than I at St. Jean d'Acre. A duke of Austria sold him to an emperor of Germany, who shut him up in yonder castle. Those were the days of barbarism. How different the civilization of our own times ! The world has seen how I treated the Emperor of Austria whom I might have imprisoned—and I would treat him so again. I take no credit to myself for this. In the present age crowned heads must be respected. A conqueror imprisoned !'

A few days after the emperor was at the gates of Vienna, but on this occasion his access to that capital was not so easy as it had been rendered in 1805, by the ingenious bravado of Lannes. The Archduke Maximilian, who was shut up

in the capital, wished to defend it, although the French army already occupied the principal suburbs. In vain were flags of truce sent one after the other to the archduke. They were not only sent back unheard, but were even ill-treated, and one of them was almost killed by the populace. The city was then bombarded, and was fast becoming a prey to the flames, when the emperor, hearing that one of the archduchesses remained in Vienna, on account of ill-health, ordered the firing to cease. Singularly capricious were the events of Napoleon's destiny—this archduchess was no other than Maria Louisa! Vienna at length opened her gates to Napoleon, who, for some days, took up his residence at Schoenbrunn. He lost no time in addressing the following proclamation to his troops :—

‘SOLDIERS,

‘One month after the enemy passed the Inn, on the same day, and at the same hour, we have entered Vienna! Her *land-wehres*, her levies in mass, her ramparts, created by the impotent fury of the princes of the house of Lorraine, have vanished at your approach. The princes of that house have abandoned their capital, not like honourable warriors yielding to the circumstances of war, but like perjurers, pursued by their own remorse. In flying from Vienna, their farewell to its inhabitants were murder and conflagration. Like Medea, they have, with their own hands, massacred their children.’

Who would have believed that, after the manner in which Napoleon had spoken of the Emperor of Austria in this proclamation, he would finish the campaign with a proposal to marry his daughter? I had always been of opinion, that this propensity of Bonaparte to abuse his enemies in these public addresses, was, to say the least of it, impolitic, and by no means added to his reputation. And if it be remarked, that I am at pains to present Napoleon's proclamations to the reader, and say nothing with regard to his bulletins, the reason is this—his proclamations were founded on truth, almost to their prophecies, which, however, were not always realized like that of his entrance into Vienna. Their groundwork was the great historical events which had taken place before the eyes of the army to which they were addressed; while his bulletins, which were intended to impose on the people of the interior of France, and foreign countries, too fully justified the proverb, ‘to lie like a bulletin.’

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FIVE days after the bombardment of Vienna, namely, on the 17th of May, the emperor published a decree, by virtue of which the States of the Pope were united to the French empire, and Rome was declared an imperial city. The States of the Church had already been dismembered for the sake of enlarging the three Italian departments ; but the Holy See was now entirely erased from the list of temporal powers. I shall not now stop to inquire how far such a measure was politic, or otherwise ; but it certainly was a mean usurpation on the part of Napoleon, for the time had long passed when a Julius the Second laid down the keys of St. Peter, to take up the sword of St. Paul. It was, besides, an injustice, and after the condescension of the pope towards Napoleon, an act of the blackest ingratitude. The decree of union did not deprive the pope of his residence ; but he was now nothing more than the first Bishop of Christendom, with a revenue of two millions. The virtues of this persecuted old man, however, inspired universal respect, and even Protestants were loud in their condemnation of Napoleon's scandalous behaviour to Pius VII.

Napoleon, while at Vienna, heard of the affair of Talavera de la Reyna. I was informed by a letter from head-quarters, that he was very much affected by the news, and did not conceal the chagrin it caused him. I verily believe, that he had determined on the conquest of Spain, precisely on account of the difficulties it presented. At Talavera commenced the European reputation of a man who, perhaps, would not have been without some glory, even had less pains been taken to build him up a fabric of renown. In that battle commenced the career of Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose victories have since been attended with such important consequences. Whilst we experienced this check in Spain, the English were attempting an expedition against Holland, where they had already made themselves masters of the island of Walcheren. It is true, they were obliged to evacuate it shortly afterwards, but as, at that time, the French and Austrian armies were in a state of inaction, in consequence of an armistice concluded at Znaim in Moravia, the news unfavourable to Napoleon raised the hopes of the Austrian negotiators, who held back in the expectation that

fresh defeats would afford them better chances. These delays were borne with much impatience by the emperor, who longed for the opportunity of directing his whole strength against Spain and England, the only two enemies that would remain after peace had been concluded with Austria.

It was during the course of these negotiations, the termination of which seemed every day to be further distant, that Napoleon was exposed to a more real danger than the wound he had received at Ratisbonne. Germany was in a state of distress difficult to describe; her sufferings were aggravated by the presence of numerous French troops, whose support, whatever discipline might be enforced by their chiefs, was not the less burdensome and oppressive. Illuminism, too, was making great progress, and had filled some youthful minds with an enthusiasm equal to that religious fanaticism to which Henry IV. fell a victim. A young man, named Staps, formed the design of assassinating Napoleon, in order to rid Germany of one whom he considered her scourge. Rapp and Berthier were with the emperor when the assassin was arrested; and I feel assured that, in repeating exactly their statement to myself, I am giving the most faithful account of all the circumstances connected with that event.—‘We were at Schoenbrunn,’ said Rapp, ‘when the emperor had just reviewed the troops. I had before observed a young man at the extremity of one of the columns, when, just as the troops were about to defile, I perceived him advancing towards the emperor, who was then between Berthier and myself. The Prince de Neufchatel, supposing he had a petition to present, went forward to tell him that I was the person to receive it, being the aide-de-camp for the day. The young man replied, that he wished to speak to Napoleon himself, and Berthier again told him he must apply to me. He then withdrew a little, still repeating that he wished to speak to Napoleon. He again advanced, and came very near the emperor. I ordered him to fall back, telling him in German to wait till after the parade, when, if he had any petition to make, he would be attended to. I surveyed him attentively, for the importunity of his behaviour began to make me suspect him. I remarked that he kept his right hand in the breast-pocket of his coat, out of which appeared one end of a roll of paper. I know not how it was, but, at that moment, our eyes meeting, I was struck with a certain expression in his look and air, which seemed to imply some fixed and unalterable determination. Perceiving an officer of gendarmerie on the spot, I desired him

to seize the young man, and without any unnecessary severity, to convey him to the castle until the parade was over. All this passed in less time than I have taken in relating it, and at this moment the attention of everyone being fixed on the parade, the scene passed unnoticed. Shortly after, I was told that a large carving-knife had been found concealed about the person of the young man; and going immediately to find Duroc, I proceeded with him to the apartment to which Staps had been taken. We found him sitting on a bed, seemingly in deep thought, but exhibiting not the least appearance of alarm. Near him was the portrait of a young female, his pocket-book and purse, in which were two gold pieces, if I remember right, old French louis d'ors. I asked him his name, but he replied he would tell it to no one but Napoleon; I next inquired, what he intended to do with the knife found upon him. His answer was the same as before—"I shall tell no one but Napoleon." "Did you intend to attempt his life?" "Yes." "Why?" "I cannot tell anyone but Napoleon."

'This circumstance altogether appeared so strange to me, that I thought it right the emperor should be informed of it. When I told him what had taken place, he appeared somewhat disconcerted, for you know,' said Rapp, 'how much he was haunted by the idea of assassination. He desired that the young man should be taken into his cabinet, but this order was given to me in a tone that neither you nor myself ever heard before; he passed his right hand several times along his forehead, and fixed a scrutinizing look on all present. Two gendarmes conducted Staps into the presence of Napoleon. In spite of his criminal intention, there was something so prepossessing in the countenance of the unhappy youth, that it was impossible not to feel interested in his fate. I wished that he would deny the intention, but how was it possible to save a man who was determined to sacrifice himself? The emperor asked the prisoner if he could speak French? to which he replied, he had but a slight knowledge of it; and as you know,' continued Rapp, 'that next to yourself I am the best German scholar in Napoleon's court, I was ordered to act as interpreter on the occasion. I may add, that such was Napoleon's anxiety to be made acquainted with the prisoner's answers, that I took no part in the following dialogue, except as the mouth-piece of the emperor, in translating his questions and their several replies.

'The emperor began—"Where do you come from?" "From Narremburg." "What is your father?" "A Protestant

minister." "How old are you?" "Eighteen." "What did you intend to do with your knife?" "To kill you." "You are mad, young man; you are one of the illuminati." "I am not mad, nor do I know what is meant by the illuminati." "You are ill, then?" "I am not ill, I am very well." "Why did you wish to kill me?" "Because you have ruined my country." "Have I done you any harm?" "The same harm as all other Germans." "Is this the first time you have seen me?" "I saw you at Erfurt, at the time of your interview with the Emperor of Russia." "Did you intend to kill me then?" "No, I thought you would not again wage war against Germany. I was one of your greatest admirers. I came to Schoenbrunn, a week ago, with the intention of killing you, but the parade was just over on my arrival. I therefore deferred the execution of my design till to-day." "I tell you, young man, you are either mad or in ill-health."

'At this point of the examination, the emperor ordered Corvisart to be sent for. Staps asked who Corvisart was. I told him he was a physician, upon which he replied, "I have no need of him." No further conversation ensued until the arrival of the doctor, and during this interval Staps evinced the utmost indifference. As soon as Corvisart arrived, Napoleon directed him to feel the young man's pulse, which he immediately did, and Staps then very coolly said, "Is it not true, Sir, that I am quite well?" "The gentleman is in perfect health," said Corvisart to the emperor. "I told you so," exclaimed Staps, pronouncing the words with a sort of exultation.

'I was really astonished at the coolness and stoicism of Staps, and the emperor himself seemed for a moment utterly confounded by the young man's behaviour. He, at length, ordered the prisoner to be removed, and when he was gone, observed, "This is the effect of fine principles, they convert young men into assassins."

'This event, in spite of all endeavours to keep it secret, became the subject of conversation in the castle of Schoenbrunn. One evening the emperor sent for me, and said, "Rapp, I cannot get this wretched Staps out of my head. The more I think of the subject, the more I am perplexed. I can never believe that a young man of his age, a German, one who has received a good education, a Protestant too, could have conceived and attempted such a crime. The Italians are said to be a nation of assassins, but no Italian ever attempted my life. The thing is really beyond my comprehension. Inquire in what manner he met his fate, and let me know."

‘I obtained from General Lauer the information which the emperor desired. I learned that Staps, whose rash attempt was made on the 23rd of October, was executed at seven o’clock in the morning of the 27th, having refused to take any sustenance since the 24th. Whenever food was offered to him, he rejected it, saying, “I am quite strong enough to walk to the scaffold.” On being told that peace was concluded, he evinced the utmost sorrow, and was seized with a universal tremor. When at the place of execution, he exclaimed with a loud voice, “Liberty for ever ! Germany for ever ! Death to the tyrant !” and these were his last words.’

It is well known that, after the battle of Wagram, conferences were opened at Raab. Although peace was almost absolutely necessary for both powers, and the two emperors appeared equally anxious for it, still the treaty was not concluded. The Austrian commissioner had consented to all the most important conditions, but, what is worthy of remark, delays were still occasioned by Bonaparte. In fact, he was not sincerely desirous for the conclusion of a treaty which should affix any limit to his conquests, or the aggrandizement of his power. Negotiations were therefore suspended ; and M. de Champagny had ceased for several days to see the Prince of Lichtenstein, when the affair of Staps took place. Immediately after Napoleon’s examination of the young fanatic, he sent for M. de Champagny. ‘How are the negotiations going on ?’ he inquired. The minister having informed him, the emperor added, ‘I wish them to be resumed immediately, I wish for peace : do not hesitate about a few millions more or less in the indemnity demanded from Austria. Yield on that point ; I wish to come to a conclusion. I leave it all to you.’ The promptness with which the emperor’s orders were executed on this occasion, gave him no opportunity to recall them. The minister wrote immediately to the Prince of Lichtenstein ; and on the same night, the two negotiators having met at Raab, the clauses of the treaty which had been suspended were at once discussed, agreed upon, and signed. The next morning M. de Champagny attended the emperor’s levee with the treaty of peace as it had been agreed on. Napoleon, after hastily glancing over it, expressed his approbation of every particular, and highly complimented his minister on the quickness with which his wishes had been attended to, and the treaty concluded. By this act, known by the name of the treaty of Schoenbrunn, the ancient edifice of the empire of Germany was overthrown, and Francis II. became

Francis I., Emperor of Austria. He, however, could not say, like his namesake of France, '*Tout est perdu hors l'honneur*,' 'All is lost but honour,' for honour had been somewhat compromised to avoid losing all. Still, however, Austria was compelled to make very heavy sacrifices. The territories ceded to France were immediately united into a new general government, under the collective denomination of the Illyrian provinces. Napoleon thus became master of both shores of the Adriatic, under his two-fold title of Emperor of France and King of Italy. Austria, thus crippled in her external commerce, had no longer any direct communication with the sea. The loss of Fiume, Trieste, and the sea-coast, appeared so great a sacrifice, that I had no confidence in the duration of a peace so dearly purchased. The idea that Staps might have imitators among his countrymen, probably induced Napoleon to hurry away from Schoenbrunn, for he set off before he had ratified the preliminaries of the peace, announcing that he would ratify them at Munich. He proceeded in great haste to Nymphenburg, where the court of Bavaria was awaiting his arrival. He next visited the King of Wirtemberg, whom he declared to be the cleverest sovereign in Europe; and at the end of October he arrived at Fontainebleau. From thence he proceeded on horseback to Paris, riding with such rapidity, that only a single chasseur of his escort could keep up with him, and attended by this one guard he entered the court of the Tuileries.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

It was during Napoleon's stay at Fontainebleau, before his return to Paris, that Josephine for the first time heard any mention of her divorce, the idea of which had occurred to the emperor's mind while he was at Schoenbrunn. At Fontainebleau, likewise, Napoleon appointed M. de Montalivet Minister of the Interior—a choice which gave universal satisfaction. The letters which we received from Paris at this period were continually dwelling on the brilliant state of the capital during the winter of 1809, and especially on the splendour of the imperial court, where the emperor's levees were attended by the Kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Wirtemberg; all eager to evince their gratitude to the hero who had raised them to the rank of sovereigns.

I was the first person in Hamburg that received intelligence

of Napoleon's projected marriage with the Archduchess Maria-Louisa. The news was brought to me from Vienna by two estafettes. How wonderful were the fortunes of this man! Who could have supposed, on that day when I accompanied Bonaparte to my brother's, with whom he left his watch as a deposit for a little silver, that he was destined to marry an Austrian archduchess? It is impossible to give any idea of the effect produced by the anticipation of this event in the north of Germany. From all parts the merchants received orders to buy Austrian stock, which immediately experienced an extraordinary rise. The marriage was hailed with the most enthusiastic joy; it was looked upon as the guarantee of a lasting peace, and the hope was entertained that the repose of the continent would no more be disturbed by the rivalry of France and Austria. My extensive correspondence led me to believe that these sentiments were shared by the people of the interior of France, and the different countries of Europe. For my own part, in spite of the presentiment I had always had of the return of the Bourbons to France, I confess I now began to think that event problematical, or at least very remote.

About the beginning of the year 1810 commenced the differences between Napoleon and his brother Louis, which, as the reader has already seen, terminated in a complete rupture. Holland could not exist without commerce, and this Napoleon interdicted. His object was to make himself master of the navigation of the Scheldt, which Louis wished should remain free, and hence ensued the union of Holland with the French empire. Holland was the first province of the grand empire which Napoleon took the new empress to visit. Their journey took place almost immediately after the marriage ceremonies were completed. Napoleon first proceeded to Compiègne, where he remained a week. He next set out for Saint Quentin, and inspected the canal. The Empress Maria-Louisa then joined him, and they revisited Belgium in company. At Antwerp, the emperor inspected all the works which he had ordered, for the execution of which he testified much anxiety. Throughout their whole progress they were received with public rejoicings, fêtes, and other popular manifestations of joy. Having visited several places in Holland, the emperor returned by way of Ostend, Lille, and Normandy, to Saint Cloud, where he arrived on the 1st of June, 1810.

He then learned from my correspondence that the Hanse Towns had refused to advance money for the pay of the

French troops, who were left absolutely destitute, without money and without resources. I represented the urgent necessity for putting an end to this state of things. The Hanse Towns, once so opulent, had been reduced by taxations and extortions to absolute misery, and were wholly unable to satisfy the unjust demand which was now made upon them.

Towards the end of this year, Napoleon, in a fit of madness, issued a decree, an infernal one, for I can find no milder epithet with which to characterize it. It ordained the burning of all English merchandise in France, Holland, the Grand Duchy of Berg, the Hanse Towns, in short, in all those places subject to the disastrous dominion of Napoleon. I did not conceal the discontent which this ruinous measure excited, and the emperor himself was at length convinced of its folly, by the following circumstance: In spite of the sincerity with which the Danish government endeavoured to enforce the continental system, Holstein contained a great quantity of colonial produce, and, notwithstanding the severest measures, it was necessary to find a market somewhere for such commodities. The smugglers often succeeded in introducing them into Germany, and within a few months the whole would, no doubt, have passed the custom-house limits. After much consideration on this state of things, I thought it most advisable to turn to some account an evil which could not be avoided. I proposed, therefore, that the colonial produce then in Holstein, and which had been imported before the date of the edict for its prohibition, should be allowed to enter Hamburg, on the payment of 30 or, on some articles, of 40 per cent. This duty was to be collected at the custom-house, and to be confined entirely to articles consumed in Germany. The colonial produce in Altona, Gluckstadt, Husum, and other towns of Holstein, had been estimated at about thirty millions of francs, and the duty would amount to ten or twelve millions. By the adoption of this plan the smuggler's trade would at once be at an end; as of course the merchants would prefer to give 30, or 33 per cent., for the right of carrying on a lawful trade, rather than 40 per cent. to the smugglers, with the chance of seizure besides.

The emperor was not slow in adopting my idea, for I transmitted my observations on the subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 18th of September, and on the 4th of October a decree was issued conformable to the plan I proposed. Within six weeks after the decree had been made public, the custom-house director received thirteen hundred notices from

persons holding colonial produce in Holstein. The estimate of the duties was now about forty millions of francs, that is to say, twenty-eight or thirty millions more than I had calculated them at. In fact, several commercial houses paid (each) four millions; but this surplus of revenue did not surprise me, knowing that I had made no exaggerated statements in my representations on the subject.

At the beginning of December I received a letter from M. de Champagny, stating that the emperor wished to see me, in order to consult with me upon different matters connected with Hamburg. On my arrival at Paris, however, I did not see the emperor; but the first *Moniteur* I read contained the official report of a *senatus consultum*, which united the Hanse Towns, Lauenburg, etc., to the French empire, by the right which the strong possesses over the weak. In one of my interviews with M. de Champagny, after my return to Paris, he informed me that the emperor did not wish to receive me. My situation in Paris was now extremely delicate.

The emperor's refusal to see me was an embarrassing circumstance, and I was, at first, in doubt, whether I might seek an interview with Josephine. Duroc, however, having assured me that Napoleon would not object to it, I wrote, requesting permission to wait upon her. I received an answer the same day, and, on the morrow, I went to Malmaison. I was ushered into a small drawing-room in the form of a tent, where I found Josephine and Hortense. On my entrance, Josephine stretched out her hand to me, exclaiming, 'Ah! my friend.'—These words she pronounced with deep emotion, and tears prevented her from continuing. She threw herself on the ottoman, on the left of the fireplace, and beckoned me to be seated near her. Hortense was standing by the fireplace endeavouring to conceal her tears. Josephine took my hand, which she pressed in both her own. It was some time before she could sufficiently command her feelings, and her tears still flowed as she said, 'My dear Bourrienne, I have drained my cup of misfortune. He has cast me off! forsaken me.—He conferred upon me the vain title of empress, only to render my fall the more marked. Ah! we judged him rightly. I did not deceive myself as to the destiny that awaited me, for what would he not sacrifice to his ambition?' At this moment one of the ladies of Queen Hortense entered with a message to her mistress, who remained a minute or two, apparently to recover herself from her emotion, and then withdrew. I was thus left alone with Josephine, an opportunity

not displeasing to us. She seemed to wish for the relief of disclosing her sorrows, which I was equally desirous to hear from her own lips ; women have such a charming way of relating their troubles.

Josephine told me much of what I had previously learned from my friend Duroc ; then, coming to the period when Bonaparte had declared to her the necessity of a separation, ‘My dear Bourrienne,’ she said, ‘during all the years you were with us, you know you possessed my entire confidence—to you I often expressed my sad forebodings. Cruelly, indeed, are they now fulfilled ; I have finished my character of wife—I have suffered all—I am resigned !’ After a short pause, she continued, ‘What fortitude did it require latterly, when, though no longer his wife, I was obliged to appear so in the eyes of the world ! What looks do courtiers bend upon a repudiated wife ! I was in a state of vague uncertainty, worse than death, until the fatal day, when he at length avowed to me what I had long before read in his looks. It was the 30th of November, 1809 : well do I remember the sinister expression of his countenance on that day ; we were dining together as usual, and during that sorrowful repast I had not uttered a word, and he had only broken silence to ask one of the servants what it was o’clock. As soon as Bonaparte had taken his coffee he dismissed all his attendants, and I remained alone with him. His features sufficiently marked what was passing in his mind, and I knew that my hour was come. Coming close to me he took my hand, pressed it to his heart, and, after gazing at me for a few moments in silence, he uttered these fatal words, “Josephine, my dear Josephine ! you know I have loved you : to you alone do I owe the only moments of happiness I have tasted in this world. But, Josephine, my destiny is superior to my will ; my dearest affections must give way to the interests of France.” “Say no more !” I exclaimed. “I understand you ; I expected this, but the blow is not the less severe.” I had not power to say more,’ continued Josephine ; ‘I know not what took place after ; strength and reason at once forsook me, and when I recovered, I found myself in my chamber. Your friend, Corvisart, and my poor daughter were with me. Bonaparte came to see me in the evening, and oh ! Bourrienne, how can I give you an idea of what I then felt ! even the interest he appeared to feel for my situation seemed an additional cruelty. Alas ! I had good reason to fear ever becoming an empress.’

I was at a loss what consolation to offer to Josephine ; and knowing as I did the natural gaiety of her character, I should have been surprised to find her grief so acute after the lapse of a year, did I not also know that there are certain chords in a woman's heart, which, when struck, are long ere they cease to vibrate. A divorce may be submitted to, but scarcely pardoned ; and wounded self-love is a lasting passion. I sincerely pitied Josephine, and among other things which I said to assuage her sorrow, the one which appeared to afford her the most sensible consolation was, that public opinion was decidedly opposed to Bonaparte's divorce. On this point I said nothing but the truth, for Josephine was generally beloved. I reminded her of a prediction I had made under happier circumstances, viz., on the day when she came to visit us in our little house at Ruel, as I was accompanying her back to the high road. 'I remember it, my friend,' she replied, 'and I have often thought of all you then said. For my own part, I knew that all was lost from the day he made himself emperor. Adieu, Bourrienne ; come and see me soon again, come often ; we have a great deal to talk about, and you know how happy I always am to see you.' Such, as nearly as I can recollect, was what passed at my first interview with Josephine after my return from Hamburg.

During the period of my stay in Paris, the war with Spain and Portugal occupied much of the public attention ; proving, in the sequel, an enterprise upon which Josephine's clear perception had not deceived her. In general she intermeddled but little with politics ; in the first place, because her doing so would not have been agreeable to Napoleon ; and secondly, because the levity of her disposition led her to prefer more pleasurable pursuits. I cannot but observe, however, that she was endowed with an instinct so perfect, that she was seldom deceived as to the good or evil tendency of any measure bearing on her husband's fortune ; and I remember she told me, that on being informed of the emperor's intention to bestow the throne of Spain on Joseph, she was seized with an indescribable feeling of alarm. I know not how to define that instinctive feeling which seems a presentiment of the future ; but it is certain that Josephine was endowed with this faculty beyond any other person I ever knew. To her, indeed, it was a fatal gift, since to the unhappiness of the present was superadded a sad foreboding of the future.

Though more than a twelvemonth had elapsed since the divorce, it was still a new theme of grief in the heart of Josephine.

‘You cannot conceive, my friend,’ she often said to me, ‘all the torments I have endured since that fatal day : I cannot think how I survived it. You can form no conception of the misery it is to me to see everywhere descriptions of fêtes. And the first time he came to see me after his marriage, oh ! what a meeting was that ! what tears I shed ! The days on which he comes are days of torture to me, for he has no delicacy. How cruel of him to speak to me about his expected heir ! You may suppose, Bourrienne, how distressing all this is to me. Better far to be exiled a thousand leagues from hence ! However,’ added Josephine, ‘some few friends still continue faithful to me, and that is now my only consolation in the few moments I am able to admit of it.’ The truth is, she was really very unhappy ; and the only consolation her friends could offer her, was to mingle their sympathetic tears with hers. And yet such was the passion which Josephine still retained for dress, that, after having wept for a quarter of an hour, she would forget her tears to give audience to milliners and jewellers. At the sight of a new hat, she was still a very woman. I remember that one day, taking the opportunity of a momentary calm, the effect of an ample display of some glittering baubles, I congratulated her on the happy influence they exercised over her spirits, when she replied, ‘Why, my dear friend, it is true all these things should now be indifferent to me, but it is a habit.’ Josephine might have added, that it was an occupation too, for it would be no exaggeration to say, that if the time she spent in tears, and at her toilet, had been subtracted from her life, its term would have been very considerably shortened.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE commencement of the year 1811 was sufficiently favourable to the French arms in Spain ; but towards the beginning of March, fortune changed sides. The Duke of Belluno, notwithstanding the valour of his troops, was defeated at Chiclana ; and from that day the French army was unable to stand its ground against the combined forces of England and Portugal. Even Massena, notwithstanding the title of Prince of Esslingen, which he had won under the walls of Vienna in the last battle, was no longer the favoured child of fortune, as he had been at Zurich. Having mentioned Massena—what could he do

against the English in Portugal? The combined English and Portuguese forces were daily augmenting, whilst ours still decreased. England considered no sacrifice too great to secure success in the important struggle in which she was engaged; and as her money was lavished profusely, her troops paid well wherever they went, and were abundantly supplied with ammunition and provisions. The French, on the other hand, were far from possessing the same ample means, and yet, in order to prevent the natives taking part with the English, we were constrained to imitate their lavish expenditure. But even this did not prevent numerous partial insurrections in many places, which rendered all communication with France extremely difficult. Armed bands continually carried off our dispersed soldiers, and the presence of the British troops, supported by the money they spent, excited the inhabitants against us; for it cannot be supposed that, unaided by the English, Portugal could have held out for a moment against France. But battles, bad weather, and privations of every kind, had so weakened the French army, that it absolutely stood in need of repose; at the same time its enterprises could lead to no results. In this state of things Massena was recalled, because his health was so materially injured, that it was impossible he could exert sufficient activity to restore the army to a respectable footing.

Under these circumstances, Napoleon sent Bertrand into Illyria to supersede Marmont, who was ordered in his turn to relieve Massena in Portugal. Marmont, on succeeding to the command, found the troops in a deplorable state. The difficulty of procuring provisions was extreme, and the means he was compelled to employ for that purpose only aggravated the evil; at the same time insubordination and want of discipline had arrived at such a pitch, that it would be as difficult as painful to depict the situation of our army at this period. Marmont, by his firmness and conduct, happily succeeded in bringing about a better state of things, and soon found himself at the head of a well organized army, amounting to 30,000 infantry, with forty pieces of artillery; but he could only collect a very small body of cavalry, and even those ill-mounted.

The aspect of affairs in Spain at the commencement of 1811 was very similar to what was taking place in Portugal. At first a continued series of victories, but those very victories so dearly purchased, that the ultimate issue of the struggle might easily have been foreseen; because, when a people are fighting for their liberties and their homes, their assailants must gradually

diminish ; while, at the same time, the armed population, emboldened by success, increases in a still more perceptible progression. A regiment cut off cannot immediately be supplied, whilst the burning of a single village amongst a spirited people sets a whole province in arms. Besides, insurrection was now considered by Spaniards a holy and sacred duty, to which the recent meetings of the Cortes in the Isle of Leon had given, as it were, a legitimate character, since Spain found again, in the remembrance of her ancient privileges, at least the shadow of a government—a centre around which the defenders of the soil of the Peninsula might rally.

When, at the commencement of 1811, I left Paris, I had ceased to delude myself respecting the brilliant career which seemed opening upon me during the consulate. I clearly perceived, that since Bonaparte, instead of receiving me as I expected, refused to see me, the calumnies of my enemies had succeeded, and that I had nothing to hope from a despotic master whose past injustice did but render him the more unjust. He now possessed what he had so long and ardently desired—a son of his own, the heir to his name, his power, and his throne. Truth requires me here to notice, that the foul and malevolent reports which were circulated respecting the birth of the King of Rome were entirely without foundation. My friend Corvisart, who did not for a single instant leave Maria-Louisa during her protracted and dangerous labour, removed every doubt from my mind on this subject. It is as true that the young prince, for whom the Emperor of Austria answered at the font, was the son of Napoleon and the Archduchess Maria-Louisa as it is false that Napoleon was the father of the eldest child of Hortense. The birth of the son of Napoleon was hailed with universal enthusiasm ; never did a child come into the world encircled with such a diadem of glory. The emperor's power, indeed, was at its height from the period of the birth of his son until his first reverse at Moscow. The empire, including the states possessed by the imperial family, comprised nearly fifty-seven millions of inhabitants ; but the moment was now fast approaching, when this power, unequalled in modern times, was to crumble and fall under its own weight.

During the summer of the year 1811, no important engagement took place in Spain ; victory and defeat succeeded each other, blood flowed in torrents, but nothing decisive was effected. Some brilliant events, it is true, attested the courage of our troops and the skill of our generals: the battle of

Albufera, for instance, and the taking of Tarragona by Suchet, while Wellington was obliged to raise the siege of Badajoz. These advantages, productive of nothing but glory, still served, however, to keep up Napoleon's hope of triumphing in the Peninsula, and permitted him to enjoy the brilliant fêtes which took place in Paris in celebration of the birth of the King of Rome.

On his return from a tour in Holland, at the end of October, Napoleon clearly perceived that a speedy rupture with Russia was inevitable. In vain he sent Lauriston as ambassador to St. Petersburg in the place of Caulincourt, who would no longer remain there; the most skilful diplomatist that ever existed could effect nothing with a powerful government whose determination was already fixed. All the cabinets of Europe were now unanimous in wishing for the overthrow of Napoleon's power, and the people were no less anxious for an order of things less destructive to their trade and industry. In the state to which Europe was reduced no one could effectually counteract the wish of Russia and her allies to go to war with France—Lauriston no more than Caulincourt.

The impending war, for which Napoleon was now obliged to prepare, compelled him to neglect Spain, and to leave affairs in that country in a state of real danger. In fact, Napoleon's occupation of Spain, and his well-known wish to maintain himself there, were additional motives for inducing the powers of Europe to enter upon a war which would necessarily cause a diversion of his forces. All at once the troops which were in Italy and the north of Germany moved towards the frontiers of the Russian empire. In March, 1811, the emperor had nearly all the military forces of Europe at his command. One now reflects with astonishment at this union of nations, differing in manners, language, religion, and interests, but all ready to fight for one man, against a power that had never injured them. Prussia herself, though she could never pardon the wrongs he had inflicted upon her, joined his alliance, with the obvious intention of breaking it on the first opportunity. When the war with Russia was first spoken of, I had frequent conversations with the Duke de Rovigo on the subject. I communicated to him whatever intelligence I received from abroad respecting that vast enterprise. The duke shared all my forebodings, and if he and those who thought like him had been listened to, that war, in all probability, would never have taken place. Through him I learned who the individuals were that

urged the invasion. Their ambitious views could be realized only by war ; whilst dreaming of viceroyalties, duchies, and endowments, they overlooked the possibility of seeing the Cossacks in Paris.

The gigantic enterprise being now resolved on, preparations were made as if for the conquest of a world. Before his departure, Napoleon, intending to take with him the whole of his disposable troops, caused a *senatus consultum* to be issued for levying the national guards, who were divided into three corps. He also arranged his diplomatic affairs, by concluding, in February, 1812, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia, by virtue of which the two contracting powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of their respective possessions and the European possessions of the Ottoman Porte, because that prince was then at war with Russia. A similar treaty was concluded about the beginning of March with Austria, and about the end of the same month Napoleon renewed the capitulation of France and Switzerland.

Determined at length to extend the bounds of his empire, or rather to avenge the injuries which Russia had committed against his continental system, Napoleon, as was his custom, put all his affairs in order ; his despatch and foresight on these occasions were little less than miraculous. Yet, before his departure for Germany, the inflexible determination of the pope not to come to any arrangement occasioned him considerable anxiety. Savona did not appear to him a residence sufficiently secure for such a prisoner. He was fearful lest, when all his forces were removed towards the Niemen, the English should attempt to carry off the pope, or that the Italians, excited by the clergy, whose dissatisfaction was general in Italy, should stir up those religious commotions which are always fatal and difficult to appease. With the view therefore of keeping the pope still under his control, he appointed him his residence at Fontainebleau, and even at one time thought of bringing him to Paris.

The emperor gave directions to M. Denon to reside at Fontainebleau with the Holy Father ; and in this respect evinced a degree of delicacy and attention, in affording his illustrious prisoner the society of a man whose manners and accomplishments were so suitable to his situation. Pius VII. soon conceived a great degree of friendship for M. Denon, and the latter, when speaking to me of his residence with the pope, related the following anecdote :—‘The pope,’ said he, ‘conversed with me

in the most familiar manner. He always addressed me by the appellation "my son," and seemed to take a pleasure in conversing with me, especially on the subject of our Egyptian expedition, respecting which he made frequent inquiries. One day he asked me for my work on the "Antiquities of Egypt," and, as you are aware, it is not quite orthodox on some points, and does not perfectly agree with the creation of the world according to Genesis. I at first hesitated, but the pope insisted, and at length I complied with his desire. The Holy Father told me he had felt much interested in its perusal, and upon my alluding to certain delicate points, he said, "No matter, no matter, my son ; all that is exceedingly curious, and certainly quite new to me." I then, continued M. Denon, 'explained to his holiness why I had hesitated to lend him the work, which, I observed, he had excommunicated, together with its author. "Excommunicated you, my son !" exclaimed the pope, in a tone of the most affectionate concern, "I am very sorry for it, and I assure you I was not at all aware of it."' M. Denon, on relating to me this anecdote, observed, that he had constant reason to admire the virtues and resignation of the Holy Father, but he added, that it would nevertheless have been easier to make him a martyr, than to have induced him to yield on a single point, until he should be restored to the temporal sovereignty of Rome, of which he considered himself the depositary, and which he would not endure the reproach of having willingly sacrificed.

CHAPTER XXXIX

HAVING provided for the pope's residence, Napoleon set off for Dresden, accompanied by Maria-Louisa, who had expressed a wish to see her father.

The expected war with Russia, the most gigantic enterprise, perhaps, that the mind of man ever conceived since the conquest of India by Alexander the Great, now absorbed universal attention, and set at nought the calculations of reason. The Manzanares was forgotten, and nothing was thought of but the Niemen, already so celebrated by the raft of Tilsit. Thither, as towards a common centre, were moving men and horses, carriages and provisions, and baggage of every description. The ambitious hopes of the generals, and the fears of the wise,

were all now directed towards Russia. The war in Spain, which was becoming more and more unfortunate, excited but feeble interest, and our most distinguished officers considered it almost a disgrace to be employed in the Peninsula. In short, it required no great foresight to tell that the period was at hand, when the French would be obliged to re-cross the Pyrenees. No general plan of operation was laid down for the troops who were scattered into many separate divisions, and although Joseph had returned to Madrid, he had scarcely a single general under his orders. Though the truth was concealed from the emperor on many subjects, he certainly was not deceived as to the situation of Spain in the spring of 1812. In February, the Duke of Ragusa had frankly informed him, that without considerable reinforcements of men and money, no important advantages could be hoped for, since Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz had fallen into the hands of the English. The French were shortly after defeated at the battle of Salamanca, and Wellington entered Madrid.

The negotiations which Napoleon carried on with Alexander, when he yet wished to appear averse to hostilities, resembled those oratorical circumlocutions which do not, however, prevent us from coming to the conclusion we desire. The two emperors equally wished for war; the one with the view of consolidating his power, and the other in the hope of freeing himself from a yoke which had become a species of vassalage; for it was little short of it to require a power like Russia to close her ports against England, merely to favour the interests of France. At this period there were but two European powers not tied to Napoleon's fate—Sweden and Turkey. With these powers, such near neighbours of Russia, Napoleon was anxious to form an alliance. With respect to Sweden, his efforts were vain; and though, in fact, Turkey was then at war with Russia, yet the Grand Signior was not now, as at the time of Sebastiani's embassy, under the influence of France.

The peace which was soon concluded at Bucharest, between Russia and Turkey, increased Napoleon's embarrassment, who was far from expecting such a result. The left of the Russian army, secured by the neutrality of Turkey, was reinforced by Bagration's corps from Moldavia. This corps subsequently occupied the right of the Beresina, and thus destroyed the last hope of saving the wrecks of the French army, reduced as it then was one half. It is difficult to conceive how Turkey could have allowed the consideration of past injuries on the part of

France to induce her to terminate the war with Russia, when France was attacking that power with immense forces. The Turks never had a more favourable opportunity for taking revenge of Russia, and unfortunately for Napoleon they suffered it to escape.

With the northern power Napoleon was not more successful. In vain were his overtures addressed to the prince whose fortune he had made—who was allied to his family—but with whom he had never been on terms of good understanding. The Emperor Alexander had a considerable body of troops in Finland, destined to protect that country against the Swedes—Napoleon having consented to that occupation, in order to gain the provisional consent of Alexander to the invasion of Spain. What was the course pursued by Napoleon, when, being at war with Russia, he wished to detach Sweden from her alliance with Alexander? He intimated to Bernadotte, that he had a sure opportunity of retaking Finland—a conquest which would be glorious to himself, gratifying to his subjects, and the certain means of winning their attachment to him. By this alliance Napoleon wished to force Alexander to maintain his troops in the northern part of his empire, and even to augment their numbers, in order to cover Finland and St. Petersburg. It was thus that Napoleon endeavoured to draw the prince royal into his coalition. Napoleon cared little whether Bernadotte should succeed or not. The Emperor Alexander would have been obliged to increase his force in Finland, and that was all Napoleon desired. In the gigantic struggle in which France and Russia were about to engage, the most trivial alliance was not to be neglected. But in the month of January, 1812, Davoust had invaded Swedish Pomerania, without any declaration of war, and without any apparent motive. Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely to dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proffered alliance, even had that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country? That was impossible, and Bernadotte took the part that was expected of him. He rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming events.

Alexander, on his side, was desirous of withdrawing his forces from Finland, in order to make a more effectual resistance to the immense army which threatened his states. Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August, 1812, at Abo, with the prince royal, for the purpose of effecting an arrangement and a union

of interests. I know that the Emperor of Russia promised Bernadotte that, happen what might, he should not be involved in the fate of the new dynasties ; that he would guarantee the possession of his throne, and that he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland. He even went so far as to hint, that he might eventually supersede Napoleon. Such promises had the desired effect. Bernadotte adopted all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made common cause against Napoleon.

CHAPTER XL.

It has been a question frequently and warmly discussed, whether Bonaparte, previous to undertaking his last campaign, had resolved on restoring her independence to Poland. Facts will but prove that Bonaparte, as emperor, never formed the decided intention of re-establishing the old kingdom of Poland, although at a previous period he was fully convinced of its necessity. He may have said that he would do so, but I must beg leave to say that this affords no reason for believing that such was his real intention.

On Napoleon's arrival in Poland, the Diet of Warsaw, convinced, as it had reason to be, of the emperor's sentiments, declared the kingdom free and independent. The different treaties of dismemberment were pronounced to be null, and unquestionably the Diet, relying upon Napoleon's support, had a right so to act. But the address it sent up to the emperor, in which these principles were declared, was but ill-received. His answer was ambiguous and indecisive, nor could his motive be blamed. To secure the alliance of Austria against Russia, he had just guaranteed to his father-in-law the integrity of his dominions. Napoleon therefore declared, that he could take no part in any movement or resolution tending to disturb Austria in the possession of the Polish provinces forming part of her empire. To act otherwise, he said, would be to separate himself from his alliance with Austria, and to throw her into the arms of Russia. But with regard to the Polish-Russian provinces, Napoleon declared that he would see what could be done, should Providence prosper their good cause.

The character of Bonaparte presents many most unaccountable inconsistencies. Although the most positive man that,

perhaps, ever existed, yet there never was one who more readily yielded to the charm of illusion. In many circumstances the wish and the reality were to him one and the same thing. But never did he indulge in greater illusions than at the beginning of the campaign of Moscow. The burning of their towns and villages seemed a sufficient proof that the Russians wished to allure us into the heart of their empire. It was the opinion of all sensible people, even before the commencement of those disasters which accompanied the most fatal retreat recorded in history, that the emperor ought to have passed the winter of 1812-1813 in Poland, and have resumed his vast enterprises in the spring. But his natural impatience urged him forward as it were unconsciously, and he seemed to be under the influence of an invisible demon, stronger even than his own will:—this demon was ambition. He who knew so well the value of time, never sufficiently understood its power, and how much is oftentimes gained by delay. And yet he might have learned from Cæsar's Commentaries, which were his favourite study, that Cæsar did not conquer Gaul in one campaign. Another delusion by which Napoleon was misled during the campaign of Moscow, and which past experience might render in some degree excusable, was the belief that the Emperor Alexander would propose peace, when he saw him at the head of his army on the Russian territory. But the burning of Moscow soon convinced him that it was a war of extermination, and the conqueror, so long accustomed to receive overtures from his vanquished enemies, had now the deep mortification to see his own, for the first time, rejected. The prolonged stay of Bonaparte at Moscow cannot otherwise be accounted for than by supposing that the Russian cabinet would change its opinion and consent to treat for peace. However that may be, Napoleon, after his long and useless stay at Moscow, left that ruined city with the design of taking up his winter quarters in Poland; but Fate now declared against him, and in that dreadful retreat, the very elements seemed leagued with the Russians to destroy the most formidable army ever commanded by one chief. To find a catastrophe in history comparable to that of the Beresina, we must go back to the destruction of the legions of Varus.

Notwithstanding the general gloom which hung over Paris, the distresses of some, and the forebodings of others, that capital continued tranquil, when, by a singular chance, on the very day on which Napoleon evacuated the burning city of Moscow, Mallet attempted his extraordinary enterprise. This general,

who had always professed republican principles, and was a man of much energy of character, after having been imprisoned for some time, obtained permission from government to live in Paris in an hospital-house, situated near the Barriere du Trone. This hair-brained adventurer conceived the idea of overthrowing Napoleon's empire, and establishing a popular form of government. But what power had Mallet ? what could he do to effect this ? Absolutely nothing ; and had his government continued three days, chance must have been more favourable to him than he could reasonably have expected. He affirmed that the emperor had been killed in Russia, but the first post that arrived from that country would at once confound both Mallet and his proclamations. In short, his enterprise was quite that of a madman. The nation was much too weary of agitation to throw itself into the arms of Mallet and his associate Lahorie, who had figured so disgracefully on the trial of Moreau. Yet, in spite of the evident impossibility of success, it must be confessed that considerable ingenuity and address were employed in the commencement of this silly conspiracy.

On the 22nd of October, Mallet escaped from the hospital-house, and sent for Colonel Soulier, who commanded the tenth cohort of the national guard, whose barracks were situated immediately behind the hospital. So far all went well. Mallet was provided with a bundle of forged orders, drawn up and signed by himself. He announced himself to Soulier under the name of General La Motte, and said that he came from General Mallet.

Colonel Soulier, on being informed of the emperor's death, burst into tears, and gave immediate directions to the adjutant to assemble the cohort, and obey the orders of General La Motte ; to whom he apologized for being obliged, on account of his health, to remain in bed. It was then two o'clock in the morning, and the forged documents respecting the emperor's death and the new form of government, were read to the troops by the light of the lamps. Mallet then hastily set off with 1200 men to the prison of La Force, and liberated the Sieurs Guidal and Lahorie, who were confined there. Mallet informed them of the emperor's death and the change of government ; gave them some instructions, and appointed them to meet him at the Hôtel de Ville. In consequence of his directions the Minister and Prefect of Police were arrested in their hotel.

I was then at Courbevoie, and on that very morning went to Paris, as I frequently did, to breakfast with the Minister of

Police. My surprise may be imagined, when I learned from the porter that the Duke of Rovigo had been arrested and conveyed to the prison of La Force. I made my way, however, into the house, and was informed, to my great astonishment, that the ephemeral minister was being measured for his new suit of office, an act so completely characteristic of the conspirator, that I saw at once how matters really stood.

The Minister of War was also arrested, and Mallet himself repaired to General Hulin, who had the command of Paris. He told him that he was commissioned by the Minister of Police to arrest him, and seal his papers. Hulin demanded to see the orders, and then entered his cabinet, into which Mallet followed him; and just as Hulin was turning round to speak to him, he fired a pistol in his face. Hulin fell. The ball entered his cheek, but the wound was not mortal. It is not a little remarkable, that the captain whom Mallet had ordered to follow him, and who accompanied him to Hulin's, took no part in these proceedings, which he seemed to consider quite as a matter of course; and Mallet proceeded with the utmost composure to the adjutant-general Doucet's. It happened that one of the inspectors of the police was there. He recognized Mallet as being a man under his own surveillance, and telling him he had no right to leave the hospital without his knowledge, ordered his immediate arrest. Mallet perceiving that all was lost, endeavoured to draw a pistol from his pocket, but the act being observed, he was seized and disarmed, together with his three attendants. Thus terminated this extraordinary conspiracy, for which fourteen individuals suffered death, though with the exception of Mallet, Guidal, and Lahorie, the rest were but passive machines, or dupes.

This event produced but little sensation in Paris, for the enterprise and its result were made known almost at the same instant. But the wits amused themselves greatly at the idea of the Minister and Prefect of Police being imprisoned by the men who only the day before were their prisoners. The next day I went to see Savary, whom I found scarcely yet recovered from the stupefaction caused by his extraordinary adventure. He was aware that his imprisonment, though it had lasted only half an hour, afforded a topic for the jests of the Parisians.

The emperor, as I have already mentioned, left Moscow on the very day of Mallet's audacious enterprise, and was at Smolensko when he heard the news. Rapp was present when

Napoleon received the despatches containing an account of what had happened in Paris. He informed me that Napoleon was greatly agitated on perusing them, and vented his anger against the inefficiency and negligence of the police. 'Is it come to this, then?' said he; 'is my power so insecure as to be endangered by a single individual, and he a prisoner? It would seem that my crown sits but loosely on my head, if, in my own capital, the bold stroke of three adventurers can shake it. Rapp, misfortune never comes alone; this is an appropriate finish to what is passing here. I cannot be everywhere, but I must go back to Paris, my presence there is indispensable to re-animate public opinion. I must have men and money; great successes and great victories will repair all; I must set off.' Such were the motives which induced the emperor to leave his army so precipitately. It is not without indignation that I have heard that departure attributed, by some, to cowardice and fear. Napoleon a coward! they know nothing of his character who say so. Tranquil in the midst of danger, he was never more happy than on the field of battle. On leaving Moscow, Napoleon consigned the wrecks of his army to the care of his experienced generals—to Murat, who had so nobly commanded the cavalry, but who abandoned the army to return to Naples; and to Ney, the Hero rather than the Prince of the Moskowa, whose name will be immortal in the annals of glory, as his death will be eternal in the annals of party revenge. Amidst the general disorder, Eugene, more than any other chief, maintained a sort of discipline among the Italians; and it was remarked that the troops of the South engaged in the fatal campaign of Moscow, endured the rigour of the cold better even than the men who were natives of less sunny climes.

The return of Napoleon from Moscow was not like his return from the campaigns of Vienna and Tilsit, when he came back crowned with laurels, and bringing peace as the reward of his triumphs. From this period, he threw off even the semblance of legality in the measures of his government; he assumed arbitrary power, imagining that the critical circumstances in which he was placed would be a sufficient excuse. But however inexplicable were the means to which the emperor had recourse to procure resources, it is but just to acknowledge that they were the natural consequence of his system of government, and that he evinced almost inconceivable activity in repairing his losses, so as to place himself in a situation to resist his enemies, and restore victory to his banners. Obedience followed his mandates; but

who shall describe the distresses they occasioned throughout his vast empire? Conscriptions were enforced even after substitutes had been procured at enormous sacrifices. In one instance, no less a sum than 15,000 francs was given for a discharge from the guard of honour, which was raised about this period for the protection of Napoleon's person.

But, in spite of all Napoleon's strenuous efforts, the disasters of the Russian campaign were every day more and more sensibly felt. The King of Prussia, in joining France, had played a part which betrayed his weakness, instead of openly declaring himself for the cause of Russia, which was also his own. Then took place the defection of General Yorck, who commanded the Prussian contingent to Napoleon's army in Marshal Macdonald's division. The King of Prussia, though no doubt secretly pleased with the conduct of General Yorck, had him formally tried and condemned, and yet a short time after that sovereign commanded in person the troops which had turned against us. The defection of the Prussians produced a very ill effect. It was a signal which could leave no doubt as to the disposition of our German allies, and it was easy to perceive that this defection would be followed by others. Napoleon quickly foresaw that this event was indicative of fatal chances for the future, and in consequence assembled a privy council, consisting of the Ministers of State, and some of the grand officers of his household. M. de Talleyrand, Cambacères, and the President of the Senate were present. Napoleon asked whether, in the complicated difficulties of our situation, it would be most advisable to negotiate for peace, or to prepare for a new war? Cambacères and Talleyrand gave their opinion in favour of peace, which, however, Napoleon would never hear of after a defeat; but the Duke de Feltre, knowing how to touch the susceptible chord of Bonaparte's heart, said that he should consider the emperor dishonoured if he consented to give up the smallest village which had been united to the empire by a decree of the Senate. This opinion was adopted, and the war continued.

The powers with whom Bonaparte was most intimately allied separated from him, as he might have expected, and Austria was not the last to imitate the example set by Prussia.

In these difficult circumstances, the emperor, who for some time past had noticed the talent and address of the Count Louis de Narbonne, sent him to Vienna to replace M. Otto; but the pacific propositions of M. de Narbonne were not

listened to. Austria would not let slip so fair an opportunity of taking a safe revenge.

Napoleon now saw clearly, that since Austria had abandoned him, and refused her contingent, he should soon have all Europe in arms against him. But even this did not intimidate him. Some of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine still remained faithful to him; and his preparations being completed, he proposed to resume in person the command of the army, which had been re-produced as it were by miracle. Before his departure, Napoleon appointed the Empress Maria-Louisa as regent, with a council of regency to assist her

CHAPTER XLI.

A LONG time before Napoleon left Paris to join his army, the bulk of which was in Saxony, partial insurrections had occurred in many places. Although he had built a new city in La Vendée, to which he gave the name of Napoleon-town, the troubles in La Vendée were still spoken of. It is true, these related to obscure rumours that excited no great attention, and the interior of old France was still in a state of tranquillity. Far otherwise was it in the provinces annexed by force to the extremities of the empire, particularly in the north, and in the unfortunate Hanse Towns, for which, since my residence at Hamburg, I have always felt the greatest interest. The intelligence of the march of the Russian and Prussian troops, who were descending the Elbe, increased the agitation which prevailed in Westphalia, Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Pomerania. Advantage was everywhere taken of our reverses, and, in consequence, all the French troops cantoned between Berlin and Hamburg, including those who occupied the shores of the Baltic, fell back upon Hamburg. Reports of the most exaggerated nature now announced the approach of a Russian corps. A retreat was immediately ordered, which was executed on the 12th of March. General Cara Saint-Cyr having no money for the troops, helped himself out of the municipal chest. He left Hamburg at the head of the troops and men whom he had taken from the custom-house service. He was escorted by the town-guard, which protected him from the insults of the populace, and heartily glad were the Hamburgers to be well rid of their guests. This sudden retreat excited the indignation of Napoleon, and

he accused General Saint-Cyr of pusillanimity, in an article inserted in the *Moniteur*, and afterwards copied by his order into all the journals. It would, indeed, be difficult to exculpate Saint-Cyr in the eyes of impartial observers, for had he been better informed, and less easily alarmed, he might have kept Hamburg, and prevented its temporary occupation by the enemy ; to dislodge whom, it was necessary two months afterwards to lay siege to the city. The whole blame of this transaction was cast upon General Saint-Cyr, who, in fact, was betrayed by his perfidious and cowardly advisers.

In the month of August all negotiation was broken off with Austria, though that power, with its usual fallacious policy, still continued to protest fidelity to the cause of Napoleon, until the moment that her preparations were completed, and her resolution made. But if there were duplicity at Vienna, were there not folly and blindness in the cabinet of the Tuileries ? Could we reasonably rely upon Austria ? Without a single remonstrance, she had seen the Russian army pass the Vistula, and advance as far as the Saale. At that moment, a single movement of her troops, a word of declaration, would have prevented everything. But as she would not interfere when she might have done so with certainty and safety, was there not, I repeat, a most extraordinary degree of folly and blindness in the cabinet which witnessed this conduct, and did not understand it ?

I again turn to the relation of those misfortunes which still afflicted the north of Germany, and Hamburg especially. Fifteen leagues east of Hamburg, but included within its territory, is a village called Bergdorff. It was in that village that the Cossacks were first seen. Twelve or fifteen hundred of them arrived under the command of Colonel Tettenborn, who was detached from the main body of the Russian army, then about thirty leagues distant. Had it not been for the retreat of the French troops, amounting to 3000, exclusive of men in the custom-house service, no attempt would have been made upon Hamburg ; but the very name of the Cossacks inspired a degree of terror which everybody must well remember.

At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th of March, a picket of Cossacks, consisting of only forty men, took possession of a town recently flourishing, with a population of 120,000, but now ruined and reduced to 80,000 inhabitants, by the blessing of its union with the French empire. On the following day, the 18th, Colonel Tettenborn entered Hamburg at the head of 1000 Cossack regulars.

It was not until the expiration of three or four days that the small number of the allied troops was noticed, and even that number gradually diminished. On the day after the arrival of the Cossacks, a detachment was directed upon Lubeck, where they were received with the same honours as at Hamburg. Other detachments were sent to various places, and, after four days' occupation, there remained in Hamburg only seventy out of 1200 Cossacks, 200 irregulars included, who had entered on the 18th of March. The first care of their commander was to take possession of the post-office, and the treasuries of the different public offices. All the movable effects of the French government and its agents were seized and sold ; and the officers laid their hands on whatever private property they could reach, after the true Cossack fashion.

The restored Senate of Hamburg was but of short duration. It was soon discovered that the popular manifestation of hatred to the French government was somewhat premature, and the people of the Hanse Towns learned with no small alarm, that the emperor was making immense preparations to fall upon Germany, where his lieutenants would not fail to take cruel revenge on such as had disavowed his authority. Before he quitted Paris, on the 15th of April, Napoleon had enrolled under his banners 180,000 men, exclusive of the guard of honour ; and with such forces, and such ability to direct them, it was certain that he might venture on a great game—and possibly win it too.

The French having advanced as far as Haaburg took up their position on the Schwartzenberg, which commands that little town, as well as the river itself, and the considerable islands situated in that part of it between Haaburg and Hamburg. Being masters of this elevated point, they began to threaten Hamburg, and to attack Haaburg. These attacks were directed by Vandamme, of all our generals the most dreaded in conquered countries. He was a native of Cassel, in Flanders, and had acquired a reputation by his inflexible severity. At the very time he was attacking Hamburg, Napoleon said of him at Dresden, 'If I were to lose Vandamme, I know not what I would not give to have him back again ; but if I had two Vandammes, I should be obliged to shoot one of them.' It is certainly true that one was quite enough.

Davoust was at Haaburg with 40,000 men, when it was agreed that the town should be surrendered ; and the French, consequently, made their entrance on the evening of the 30th

of May, occupying the posts as quietly as if they had been merely changing guard.

On the 18th of June was published an imperial decree, dated the 8th of the same month. To expiate the crime of rebellion, an extraordinary contribution of 48,000,000 of francs was imposed upon Hamburg, and Lubeck was required to contribute 6,000,000. This enormous sum, levied on the already ruined city of Hamburg, was to be paid in the short space of a month, by six equal instalments, either in money, or bills on respectable houses in Paris. In case of default, or delay of payment, the whole movable and immovable effects of the inhabitants were to be sold. In addition to this, the new prefect of Hamburg made a requisition of grain and provisions of every kind, wines, sailcloth, masts, pitch, hemp, iron, copper, steel—in short, everything that could be useful for the supply of the army and navy. But whilst these exactions were made on the property of individuals in Hamburg—at Dresden, their liberties, and even their lives, were invaded. On the 15th of June, Napoleon, no doubt blinded by the false reports that were laid before him, gave orders that a list should be made of all the inhabitants of Hamburg who were absent from the city. He allowed them only a fortnight to return home, as if this short interval would be sufficient for them to come from the places where they had taken refuge. The consequence was, that many of them remained absent beyond the given time. But victims were wanting, and this measure was calculated to produce them, whilst it also carried terror into the bosom of every family. It was not Bonaparte, however, who conceived the iniquitous idea of seizing hostages to answer for the men whom prudence obliged to be absent. Of this I entirely clear his memory. The hostages were, nevertheless, taken, and were declared to be also responsible for the payment of the contribution of the 48,000,000. They were selected from among the most respectable and wealthy men in the city of Hamburg ; some of them even eighty years of age. They were conveyed to the old castle of Haarburch, on the left bank of the Elbe ; and there these men, who had been accustomed to all the comforts of life, were deprived even of necessities, and had only straw to lie on. O for the pen of a Juvenal to lash these enormities as they deserve ! The hostages from Lubeck were taken to Hamburg, where they were thrown, between decks, on board of an old ship that was anchored in the port—a worthy imitation of the prison ships of England. On the 24th of July a decree was issued, which

was published in the *Hamburg Correspondent* on the 27th of the same month. This decree consisted merely of a proscription list, comprising the names of some of the wealthiest men in the Hanse Towns, Hanover, and Westphalia, convicted, it was said, of treason against France.

On the 2nd of May, Napoleon won the battle of Lutzen. A week afterwards he was at Dresden, where he stayed only ten days, and then went in pursuit of the Russian army, which he came up with on the 19th at Bautzen. This battle, which was followed on the two succeeding days by those of Wurtchen and Ochkirchen, may thus be said to have lasted three days, a sufficient proof that it was obstinately disputed. It terminated at length in favour of Napoleon, though the advantage was dearly purchased both by him and France. General Kirschner, while speaking to Duroc, was killed by a cannon-ball, which also mortally wounded the latter in the abdomen.

The moment had now arrived for Austria to prove whether or not she intended altogether to betray the cause of Napoleon. All her amicable demonstrations were limited to an offer of her intervention in opening negotiations with Russia. Accordingly, on the 4th of June, an armistice was concluded at Plesswitz, which was to last till the 8th of July, and was finally prolonged to the 10th of August.

The first overtures, after the conclusion of the armistice of Plesswitz, determined the assembling of a congress at Prague. It was reported at the time that the allies demanded the restoration of all they had lost since 1805, that is to say, since the campaign of Ulm. In this demand were comprehended Holland and the Hanse Towns, which had become French provinces. But even then, we should have retained the Rhine, Belgium, Piedmont, Nice, and Savoy. This proposition, reasonable as it appeared, was nevertheless impracticable, for it depended on a man who would never consent to go back to such a state of things. The battle of Vittoria, which placed the whole of Spain at the disposal of the English, the retreat of Suchet upon the Ebro, and the fear of seeing the army of Spain annihilated, were enough to alter the opinions of those counsellors who, never hazarding their own persons on the field of battle, still advised a continuance of the war. At this juncture General Moreau arrived, and, it has been said, at Bernadotte's solicitation. But that is neither true nor probable. Moreau was influenced by the desire of being revenged on Napoleon, and he found death where he could not find glory.

CHAPTER XLII.

AT the end of July, the proceedings of the congress at Prague were no further advanced than on its first assembling. Far from holding out a prospect of peace to the French nation, the emperor made a journey to Mentz ; the empress went there to see him, and returned to Paris immediately after the emperor's departure. The armistice not being renewed, it died a natural death on the 17th of August, the day appointed for its expiration. A fatal event immediately followed the rupture of the conferences. On the same day, Austria, willing to gain by war, as she had before gained by alliances, declared that she would join her forces to those of the allies. On the very opening of this disastrous campaign, Jomini went over to the enemy. Jomini belonged to the staff of the unfortunate Marshal Ney, who was beginning to execute with his accustomed ability the orders he had received. Public opinion has pronounced upon the conduct of Jomini, who deserted from our ranks at so critical a moment, the better as it would seem to advance his own interests,

The first actions were the battle of Dresden, which took place seven days after the rupture of the armistice, and the battle in which Vandamme was defeated, and which rendered the victory of Dresden unavailing. It was at Dresden that Moreau perished. The signal once given, and Bavaria freed from the presence of the French troops, she, too, soon raised the mask, and ranged herself among our enemies. In October was fought the battle of Leipsic, and its loss decided the fate of France. The Saxon army, which had alone remained faithful to us, went over to the enemies' ranks during the engagement. In this battle, the forerunner of our misfortunes, perished Prince Poniatowski, in an attempt to pass the Elster.

I will take this opportunity of relating what came to my knowledge respecting the death of two men who were deeply and deservedly regretted—Duroc and Poniatowski. Napoleon lamented Duroc, less from real feeling, than because he was sensible of his great utility to him. The admirable order which prevailed in the emperor's household, and in the other imperial establishments, was entirely due to him. Next to the death of Duroc, that of Poniatowski excited the greatest public sympathy

during the campaign of 1813. Joseph Poniatowski, nephew of Stanislaus Augustus, King of Poland, was born at Warsaw on the 7th of May, 1763, and was present at the battle of Leipsic. He had previously been raised to the rank of marshal of France.

After that battle, where 500,000 men were engaged on the surface of three square leagues, retreat became indispensable. Napoleon, therefore, took leave at Leipsic of the King of Saxony and his family, whom he had brought with him from Dresden. The emperor then exclaimed in a loud voice, 'Adieu, Saxons,' to the people who filled the market-place, where the King of Saxony resided. With some difficulty, and after threading many circuitous passages, he reached the suburb of Runstadt, leaving Leipsic by the outer gate of that suburb which leads to the bridge of the Elster and Lindenau. The bridge blew up soon after he had passed it, thus completely cutting off the retreat of that part of the army which was on the left bank of the Elster, and which fell into the power of the enemy. Napoleon was, at the time, accused of having ordered the destruction of the bridge immediately after he had himself passed it, in order to secure his own personal retreat, as he was threatened by the active pursuit of the enemy. This was not the fact. Before passing the bridge of the Elster, Napoleon had directed Poniatowski, in concert with Marshal Macdonald, to cover and protect the retreat, and defend that part of the suburb of Leipsic which is nearest the Borna road. For the execution of these orders he had only 2000 Polish infantry. He was in this desperate situation when he saw the French columns in full retreat, and the bridge so choked up with their artillery and waggons, that there was no possibility of passing it. Then, drawing his sword, and turning to the officers who were near him, he exclaimed, 'Here, my friends, we must fall with honour!' At the head of a small party of Cuirassiers and Polish officers, he rushed on the columns of the allies. In this action he received a ball in his left arm; he had already been wounded on the 14th and 16th. He, nevertheless, pushed forward, but found the suburb filled with allied troops; he cut his way through them, and received another wound. He then threw himself into the Pleisse which is before the Elster. Aided by his officers he gained the opposite bank, leaving his horse in the Pleisse. Though greatly exhausted, he mounted another and gained the Elster by passing through M. Reicherbach's garden, which was situated on the side of that river. The

moment was urgent—the greater part of his troops were drowned in the Pleisse and the Elster. Disregarding the steepness of the banks of the latter at that spot, the prince, wounded as he was, plunged into it and both horse and rider were swallowed up in the stream, together with several officers who followed his example; Marshal Macdonald happily escaped. Five days after a fisherman drew the body of the prince out of the water. On the 26th of October, it was temporarily deposited in the cemetery of Leipsic, with all the honours due to the rank of the deceased. A modest stone marks the spot where the body of the prince was taken out of the river. The body of the prince, after being embalmed, was sent in the following year to Warsaw; and in 1816, by permission of the Emperor Alexander, it was deposited in the cathedral, among the kings and great men of Poland. The celebrated Thorwaldsen was commissioned to execute a monument for his tomb. Prince Poniatowski left no issue but a natural son, born in 1790. That royal race, therefore, exists only in a collateral branch of King Stanislaus, born in 1754.

When the war resumed its course, after the disaster of Leipsic, the allies determined to treat with Napoleon only in his own capital, as he, two years before, had refused to treat with the Emperor of Austria except at Vienna. That monarch now completely threw off the mask, and declared to the emperor that he would make common cause with Russia and Prussia against him. The reason he assigned for this in his manifesto was curious enough, viz., that the more enemies there were against him, the greater would be the chance of speedily obliging him to accede to conditions which would at length restore the tranquillity of which Europe stood so much in need. This declaration on the part of Austria was a matter of no trifling importance, since she had by this time raised an army of 250,000 men; the Confederation of the Rhine 150,000; in short, including the Swedes and the Dutch—English troops in Spain and in the Netherlands—the Danes, who had abandoned us—the Spaniards and Portuguese, whose courage and hopes were revived by our reverses—Napoleon had arrayed against him upwards of a million of enemies. Among them, too, were the Neapolitans, with Murat at their head!

The month of November, 1813, was fatal to the fortune of Napoleon. In all parts the French armies were repulsed and driven back upon the Rhine, while in every direction the allied forces advanced towards that river. I had long looked upon the

fall of the empire as certain, not because the foreign sovereigns had resolved on its destruction, but because I saw the impossibility of Napoleon defending himself against all Europe; and because I knew that, however desperate might be his fortune, nothing would induce him to consent to conditions which he considered disgraceful. At this period every day witnessed some new defection. Even the Bavarians, the natural allies of France—they whom the emperor had led to victory at the commencement of the second campaign of Vienna—they whom he had, as it were, adopted on the field of battle, were now against us, and distinguished themselves as the most inveterate of our enemies.

Even before the battle of Leipsic, the loss of which was followed by such ruinous consequences to Napoleon, he had felt the necessity of applying to France for a fresh levy of troops—as if France had been inexhaustible. He directed the Empress-Regent to make this demand, who accordingly proceeded to the Senate for the first time in great state; but the glories of the empire were now on the decline. Maria-Louisa obtained a levy of 280,000 men, who were no sooner enrolled than sacrificed to the exigencies of the war. The defection of the Bavarians considerably augmented the difficulties experienced by the wreck of the army which had been all but annihilated at Leipsic. They had preceded us to Hanau, a town four leagues distant from Frankfort; there they established themselves with the view of cutting off our retreat; but French valour was roused, the little town was soon carried, and the Bavarians repulsed with considerable loss. The French army then arrived at Mentz, if indeed the name of army can be applied to a few masses of men, destitute, dispirited, and exhausted by fatigue and privations—in a word, brutalized, as it were, by excess of misery. On their arrival at Mentz, no preparations had been made for their reception, there were no provisions or supplies of any description, and, as the climax of misfortune, contagious diseases broke out among the soldiers. I received several letters from their commanders, and all concurred in representing their situation as most dreadful.

However, without reckoning the shattered remains which escaped the disasters of Leipsic and the ravages of disease—without including the 280,000 men which, on the application of Maria-Louisa, the Senate had granted in October—the emperor still possessed 120,000 good troops; but they were in the rear, scattered along the Elbe, or shut up in fortresses,

such as Dantzic, Hamburg, Torgau and Spandau. Such, therefore, was the horror of our situation, that if, on the one hand, we could not resolve to abandon them, it was on the other impossible to assist them. In France, the universal cry was for peace—peace—at whatever price it was to be purchased. The levy of October was followed within a month by another of 300,000 men, and it was then only that France fully understood how deep and deadly were the wounds she had received. In this state of things, it may even be affirmed that the year 1813 was more fatal to Napoleon than the year 1812. His own activity and the sacrifices of France succeeded in repairing the disasters of Moscow—those of Leipsic were irreparable.

After the battle of Leipsic, in which France lost for the second time a formidable army, all the powers allied against Napoleon declared at Frankfort, on the 9th of November, that they would never break the bonds which united them; that henceforth it was not merely a continental peace, but a general peace, that would be insisted on, and that any negotiation not having a general peace for its object would be rejected. The allied powers declared, that France ought to be satisfied with her natural boundaries, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees.

According to these proposals, Germany, Italy, and Spain were to be entirely withdrawn from the dominion of France. England recognised the freedom of trade and navigation, and there appeared no reason to doubt her sincerity when she professed her willingness to make very considerable sacrifices for the promotion of the object proposed by the allies. But to these offers a fatal condition was added, namely, that the congress should meet in a town to be declared neutral, on the right bank of the Rhine, where the plenipotentiaries of all the belligerent powers were to assemble—but ‘the course of the war was not to be impeded by these negotiations.’

The Duke de Bassano, who was still Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied, by order of Napoleon, to the overtures made by the allies for a general congress, and stated that the emperor acceded to them, and wished Manheim to be chosen as the neutral town. We shall now see the reason why these first negotiations were attended with no result. In the month of October the allies overthrew the colossal edifice denominated the French empire. When led by victory to the banks of the Rhine, they declared their wish to abstain from conquests, explained their intentions, and manifested an unalterable resolution

not to depart from them. This determination of the allies induced the French government to evince pacific intentions. Napoleon wished, by an apparent desire for peace, to justify, if I may so express myself, in the eyes of his subjects, the necessity of new sacrifices, which, according to his proclamations, he demanded only to enable him to obtain peace on as honourable conditions as possible. But the truth is, he was resolved not even to listen to the offers made at Frankfort. He always represented the limits of the Rhine as merely a compensation for the partition of Poland, and the immense aggrandizement of the English possessions in Asia. But his grand object was to gain time, and if possible to keep the allied armies on the right bank of the Rhine.

The nation was weary of its sacrifices ; the immense levies raised one after the other had converted the conscription into a sort of press. The labourers of the country and the artisans of the town were alike dragged from their employment, and the dissatisfaction of the people at the measures of government was loudly and boldly expressed. Still, however, they were willing to make one last effort could they have believed that the emperor would henceforth confine his views to France alone. Napoleon sent Caulincourt to the headquarters of the allies, but that was merely to gain time, and to induce a belief that he was favourably disposed to peace.

The allies having learned the immense levies of troops which Napoleon was raising, and being well acquainted with the state of feeling in France, published their famous manifesto, addressed to the French people, which was profusely circulated, and which may be referred to as an important lesson to subjects who trust to the promises of governments.

The good faith with which those promises were kept may be judged of from the treaty of Paris. In the meantime, the manifesto did not a little contribute to alienate from Napoleon those who were yet faithful to his cause, for, believing in the declarations of the allies, they saw in him the sole obstacle to that peace which France so ardently desired. It was in vain, too, to levy troops—everything essential to an army was wanting. To meet the most pressing demands, the emperor drew out thirty millions from the immense treasure which he had accumulated in the cellars and galleries of the Pavillon Marsan at the Tuileries. These thirty millions, a generous sacrifice on the part of Napoleon, were soon swallowed up.

I am now arrived at the most critical period in Napoleon's

career. What reflections must he have made, if he had had leisure to reflect, if he had compared the recollections of his rising glory with the melancholy picture of his falling fortune ! How forcible the contrast, when we compare the famous flag of the army of Italy, carried to the Directory by Bonaparte when flushed with youth and victory, with those drooping eagles who were now compelled to defend the aerie whence they had so often taken flight to spread their triumphant wings over Europe ! How strikingly does this display the difference between liberty and absolute power ! Napoleon, the child of Liberty, to whom he owed everything, had disowned his mother and was now about to fall. For ever past were those glorious triumphs, when the people of Italy consoled themselves for defeat and submitted to the magical power of that liberty which heralded the armies of the republic. Now, on the contrary, it was to free themselves from a despot's yoke that the nations of Europe had taken up arms, and were preparing to invade the sacred soil of France.

I have already made frequent mention of the sufferings of the unhappy city of Hamburg, but these were merely the prelude to what it had still to undergo. During the campaign of 1813, the allies, after driving the French out of Saxony, and obliging them to retreat towards the Rhine, besieged Hamburg, where Davoust was shut up with a garrison of 30,000 men, resolutely determined to make it a second Saragossa. From the month of September, every day augmented the number of the allied troops, who were already making rapid progress on the left bank of the Elbe. Davoust endeavoured to fortify Hamburg on so extended a scale that, in the opinion of the most experienced military men, it would have required a garrison of 60,000 men to defend it in a regular and protracted siege. At the commencement of the siege, Davoust lost Vandamme, who was killed in a sortie, at the head of a numerous corps, which was rashly sacrificed, the greater part being made prisoners. It is but fair, however, to state, that Davoust displayed great activity in his erroneous and useless plan of defence ; he began by laying in large supplies, and employed upwards of 15,000 men in the works of the fortification. General Bertrand was ordered to construct a bridge which might form a communication between Hamburg and Haaburg, by joining the islands of the Elbe to the continent. along a total distance of about two leagues. This bridge was to be built of wood, and Davoust seized upon all the timber-yards to supply material for its construction. In the space of eighty-

three days the bridge was finished. It was a very magnificent structure ; its length being 2529 fathoms, exclusive of the lines of junction formed on the two islands.

The inhabitants underwent every species of oppression, but all the cruel and tyrannical measures of the French to preserve the place were ineffectual. The allies advanced in great force and occupied Westphalia, which obliged Davoust to recall to the town the different detachments dispersed around the neighbourhood of Hamburg. In the month of December, provisions began to diminish, and there was no possibility of renewing the supply. The poor were, first of all, compelled to leave the town, and afterwards all persons who were not usefully employed. It is no exaggeration to estimate at 50,000 the number of persons who were thus exiled. At the end of December, people, without distinction of sex or age, were dragged from their beds, and conveyed out of the town on a cold night, when the thermometer stood between sixteen and eighteen degrees, and, by a refinement of cruelty, their fellow-townsmen were obliged to form their escort. It was affirmed that several aged men perished in this removal. Those who survived were left on the outside of the gates of Altona ; at which town, however, they all found refuge and assistance. Such is a brief statement of the vexations and cruelties which long oppressed this unfortunate city.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE affairs of Italy, and the principal events of the viceroyalty of Eugene, now demand some share of attention ; I shall therefore somewhat anticipate the order of time in laying before the reader those particulars relative to Eugene, which I obtained from authentic sources.

After the campaign of 1812, when Eugene revisited Italy, he was promptly informed of the more than doubtful dispositions of Austria towards France. He, therefore, lost no time in organizing a force capable of defending the country which the emperor had committed to his safeguard. Napoleon was well aware of the advantage he would derive from the presence, on the northern frontiers of Italy, of an army sufficiently strong to harass Austria, in case she should draw aside the transparent veil which still covered her policy. Eugene did all that depended on him to further the emperor's intentions : but, in spite of all

his efforts, the army of Italy was, after all, only an imaginary army to those who could compare the number of men actually present with the number stated in the lists. When, in July, 1813, the viceroy was informed of the turn taken by the negotiations at the shadow of a congress assembled at Prague, he had no longer any doubt of the renewal of hostilities, and foreseeing an attack on Italy, he resolved, as speedily as possible, to approach the frontiers of Austria. By his utmost endeavours he could only assemble an army of about 45,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry, consisting both of French and Italians. On the renewal of hostilities, the viceroy's head-quarters were at Udina. Down to the month of April, 1814, he succeeded in maintaining a formidable attitude, and in defending the entrance of his kingdom with that military talent which was to be expected in a man educated in the great school of Napoleon, and whom the army looked up to as one of its most skilful generals.

During the great and unfortunate events of 1813, public attention had been so much engrossed with Germany and the Rhine, that the affairs of Italy seemed to possess an inferior interest, until the defection of Murat for a time diverted attention to that country. At first, this fact was thought incredible by everyone, and Napoleon's indignation was extreme. Another defection about the same period deeply distressed Eugene, for though raised to the rank of a prince, and almost a sovereign, he was still a man, and an excellent man. United to the Princess Amelia of Bavaria, who was as amiable and as much beloved as himself, he had the deep regret of counting the subjects of his father-in-law among the enemies whom he would probably have to combat. Fearing lest he should be harassed by the Bavarians on the side of the Tyrol, Eugene commenced his retrograde movement in the autumn of 1813. He at first fell back on the Tagliamento, and successively on the Adige. On reaching that river, the army of Italy was considerably diminished in spite of all Eugene's care of his troops. About the end of November, Eugene learned that a Neapolitan corps was advancing upon Upper Italy, part taking the direction of Rome and part that of Ancona. The object of the King of Naples was to take advantage of the situation of Europe, whilst, in fact, he was the dupe of the promises held out to him as the reward of his treason. Murat seemed to have adopted the deceitful policy of Austria, for not only had he determined to join the coalition, but was actually in communication with

England and Austria at the very moment that he was making protestations of fidelity to Napoleon.

When first informed of Murat's treason by the viceroy, the emperor refused to believe it; 'No,' he exclaimed, to those about him, 'it cannot be. Murat—to whom I have given my sister! Murat—to whom I have given a throne! Eugene must be misinformed. It is impossible that Murat has declared himself against me.' It was, however, not only possible, but true. Gradually throwing aside the dissimulation beneath which he had concealed his designs, Murat seemed inclined to renew the policy of Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the art of deceiving was deemed by the Italian governments the most sublime effort of genius. Without any declaration of war, he directed one of his generals, who occupied Rome with 5000 men, to assume the supreme command in the Roman states, and to take possession of the country. General Miollis, who commanded the French troops in Rome, could only throw himself, with his handful of men, into the castle of Saint Angelo, the famous mole of Adrian, in which was long preserved the treasure of Sixtus V.; the French general soon found himself blockaded by the Neapolitan troops, who also blockaded Civita Vecchia and Ancona.

The treaty concluded between Murat and Austria was definitely signed on the 11th of January, 1814. As soon as he was informed of it, the viceroy, certain that he should soon have to engage with the Neapolitans, was obliged to renounce the preservation of the line of the Adige, the Neapolitan army being in the rear of his right wing. He accordingly ordered a retrograde movement on the other side of the Mincio, where his army was cantoned. In this position, Prince Eugene, on the 8th of February, had to engage with the Austrians who had come up with him; and the victory of the Mincio arrested for some time the invasion of the Austrian army, and its junction with the Neapolitan troops. It was not until eight days after that Murat officially declared war against the emperor, and immediately several general and superior officers, and a great many French troops, abandoned his service, and repaired to the head-quarters of the viceroy. Murat did everything he could to detain them; but they signified to him that, as he had declared war against France, no Frenchman who loved his country could continue in his service. The viceroy received an official communication from Napoleon's War Minister, accompanied by an imperial decree, recalling all the French who were

in the service of Joachim, and declaring that all who were taken with arms in their hands should be tried by a court-martial as traitors to their country. On the 1st of February Eugene published a proclamation, calling on all true Frenchmen to quit the service of Murat, which, indeed, most of them had already done. Murat commenced by gaining advantages which it was impossible to dispute with him. His troops almost immediately took possession of Leghorn, and the citadel of Ancona, and the French were obliged to evacuate Tuscany.

I again turn to the affairs of France at the close of 1813, where the prospect was scarcely more cheering than on the other side of the Alps. The defection of Murat had destroyed one of Bonaparte's gigantic projects. This was, that Murat and Eugene, with their combined forces, should march on the rear of the allies, whilst he, disputing the soil of France with the invaders, should multiply the obstacles to their advance. The King of Naples and the Viceroy of Italy were to march upon Vienna, and make Austria tremble in the heart of her capital, before the timid million of her allies, who measured their steps as they approached Paris, should pollute by their presence the capital of France. When informed of the vast project, which, however, was but the dream of a moment, I immediately recognized that eagle glance, that power of discovering great resources in great calamities, which is the true mark of superior genius, and which was so eminently conspicuous in Napoleon.

But all his resources were now exhausted—even victory, if dearly purchased, must have proved fatal to him; whilst in France new hopes and wishes had succeeded to those bright illusions which had attended his advance to the consular power. Now was he able fully to appreciate the wisdom of that advice which Josephine gave him—‘Bonaparte, I entreat you, do not make yourself a king!’ Napoleon, it is true, was still emperor; but he, who had imposed on all Europe treaties of peace, scarce less disastrous than the wars which had preceded them, could not now obtain an armistice, and Caulincourt, who was sent to treat for one at the camp of the allies, spent uselessly twenty days at Luneville, before he could obtain permission to pass the advanced posts of the invading army.

In the first fortnight of January, 1814, one-third of France was invaded, and it was proposed to form a new congress, to be held at Chatillon-sur-Seine. Napoleon's situation became daily worse and worse. He was advised to seek extraordinary resources in the interior of the empire, and was reminded of the

fourteen armies which rose, as if by enchantment, to defend France at the commencement of the Revolution.

At this time, the Jacobins were disposed to exert every effort to save him ; but they required to have their own way, and to be allowed uninterruptedly to excite a revolutionary feeling. The press, which groaned under a most odious and intolerable censorship, was to be wholly at their command. I do not state these facts from hearsay ; I happened, by chance, to be present at two conferences in which were set forward projects infected with the odour of the clubs ; and these projects were supported with the more assurance, because their success was regarded as certain. And yet the ill-omened counsellors of the emperor were well aware of his hatred of a free press, and his contempt for the popular authority ! Though I had not seen Napoleon since my departure for Hamburg, yet I was sufficiently assured of his feeling towards the Jacobins, to be convinced that he would quickly turn from them with loathing and disgust. I was not wrong. Indignant at the price they demanded for their services, he exclaimed, ' This is too much ! In battle I shall have a chance of deliverance ; but I shall have none with these furious blockheads : there can be nothing in common between the demagogic principles of ninety-three and the monarchy ; between clubs of madmen and a regular ministry ; between revolutionary tribunals and established laws. If my fall is decreed, I will not at least bequeath France to the revolutionists from whom I have delivered her.'

These were golden words ; and Napoleon thought of a more noble and truly national mode of warding off the danger which threatened him. He ordered the enrolment of the national guard of Paris, which was intrusted to the command of Marshal Moncey. The emperor could not have made a better choice ; but the staff of the national guard was a focus of hidden intrigues, in which the defence of Paris was less thought about than the means of taking advantage of Napoleon's overthrow. I was made a captain in this guard, and with the rest of the officers was summoned to the Tuileries on the 21st of January, when the emperor took leave of them, previous to his departure on the following day, to combat the invaders of his kingdom. We were introduced into the noble hall which I had so often trod whilst an inmate of the palace. Napoleon entered with the empress ; he advanced with a dignified air, leading by the hand his son, not yet three years old. It was long since I had had so near a view of him. He had grown very corpulent, and I

remarked on his pale countenance an expression of melancholy and irritability. The habitual movement of the muscles of his neck was more observable and frequent than formerly. Were I to attempt it, I should but ill describe what were my feelings during the ceremony, when I again saw, under such circumstances, the friend of my youth, who had become master of Europe, and who was now on the point of sinking beneath the efforts of his enemies. There was something melancholy in this solemn and impressive ceremony. Seldom indeed have I witnessed such profound silence in so numerous an assembly. At length, Napoleon, in a voice as firm and sonorous as when he used to harangue his troops in Italy or in Egypt, but without that air of confidence which then lighted up his features, delivered to us an address, of which the following is a part :— ‘Gentlemen, and Officers of the National Guard ! I am happy to see you around me. This night, I set out to take the command of the army. On quitting the capital, I confidently leave behind me my wife, and my son, in whom so many hopes are centred. Under your faithful guard I leave all, that, next to France, I hold dear. To your care they are intrusted.’ I listened attentively to Napoleon’s address, and though he delivered it firmly, he either felt or feigned emotion. Whether or not the emotion was sincere on his part, it was shared by many present ; and for my own part, I confess I was deeply affected when he uttered the words, ‘I leave behind me my wife and my son.’ At that moment my eyes were fixed on the child, and the interest with which he inspired me was equally unconnected with the splendour which surrounded and the misfortunes which seemed ready to overwhelm him. I beheld in the interesting infant, not the King of Rome, but the son of my old friend. I could not but contrast my feelings on the occasion with those which I experienced when, fourteen years ago, we came to take possession of the Tuileries. O what ages had passed in the interval ! It may be considered curious, by those who are in the habit of comparing dates, that Napoleon, the successor of Louis XVI., and who had become the nephew of that monarch by his marriage with the niece of Marie Antoinette, took leave of the national guard of Paris on the anniversary of the fatal 21st January, after twenty-five years of successive terror, disgrace, hope, glory, and misfortune.

CHAPTER XLIV.

MEANWHILE, a congress was opened at Chatillon-sur-Seine, at which were assembled the Duke de Vicenza on the part of France ; Lords Aberdeen, Cathcart, and Stewart, as the representatives of England ; Count Razumowsky on the part of Russia ; Count Stadion for Austria ; and Count Humboldt for Prussia. Before the opening of the congress, the Duke de Vicenza, in conformity with the emperor's orders, demanded an armistice, which is almost invariably granted during negotiations for peace ; but it was now too late, the allies had long since determined not to listen to any such demand. Instructed by the past, they resolved to continue their military operations during the time negotiations were going on, and required, on their part, that the propositions for peace should be immediately signed. But these were not the propositions of Frankfort. The allies established as their basis the limits of the old French monarchy. They conceived themselves authorized in doing so by their success, and by their situation.

In order to form a just estimate of Napoleon's conduct during the course of these negotiations, it is especially necessary to bear in mind the organization he received from nature, and the ideas which that organization produced at a very early period of life. If the last negotiations of his expiring reign be examined with due attention and impartiality, it will appear evident that the causes of his fall arose out of his character. I cannot range myself among those flatterers who have accused the persons about him with having constantly dissuaded him from peace. A victim to his own duplicity and unbounded love of fame, he had no one, at this period at least, to blame but himself.

The plenipotentiaries of the allies, convinced that these renewed difficulties and demands on the part of Napoleon had no other object than to gain time, declared that the allied powers, faithful to their principles, and in conformity with their previous declarations, regarded the negotiations at Chatillon as terminated by the French government. This rupture of the conferences took place on the 19th of March, six days after the presentation of the ultimatum of the allied powers, for the signing of which only twenty-four hours were at first allowed.

The issue of these long discussions was thus left to be decided by the chances of war, not very favourable to the man who had Europe arrayed in arms against him. The successes of the allies during the conferences at Chatillon had opened to their view the road to Paris; while Napoleon shrank from the necessity of signing his own disgrace. To this feeling alone his ruin is to be attributed, and he might have said, 'Everything is lost but honour!' His glory is immortal.

The campaign of France obliged Napoleon to adopt a system of operations quite new to him. He, who had been accustomed to attack, was now compelled to stand on his defence, so that instead of having to execute a previously concerted plan, as when in the cabinet of the Tuileries he traced out to me the field of Marengo, his movements were all now dependent on those of his numerous enemies. When the emperor arrived at Chalons-sur-Marne, the Prussian army was advancing by the road of Lorraine. He drove it back beyond Saint Dizier. Meanwhile, the grand Austro-Russian army passed the Seine and the Yonne at Montereau; and even sent forward a corps which advanced as far as Fontainebleau. Napoleon then made a movement to the right, in order to drive back the troops which threatened to march on Paris; and, by a curious chance, he came up with the troops in the very place where his boyish days were passed, and those wild dreams indulged, which seemed to relate but to a fabled future. What thoughts and recollections must have crowded on his mind, when he found himself an emperor and a king at the head of a still powerful army, in the chateau of the Count de Brienne, to whom he had so often paid his homage! It was at Brienne that he said to me thirty-four years before, 'I will do your French nation all the harm I can.' Since then he had certainly changed his mind; but it might be said that Fate persisted in forcing the man, in spite of himself, to realize the intention of the boy. No sooner had Napoleon revisited Brienne, as a conqueror, than he was repulsed and hurried towards his fall, which every moment was making a nearer approach.

I think it indispensable briefly to describe Napoleon's wonderful activity from the moment of his leaving Paris to the entrance of the allies into the capital. But few successful campaigns, indeed, afforded our generals and the French army an opportunity of reaping so much glory as they gained during this great reverse of fortune. For it is possible to triumph, and to fall with glory, though honour itself be missed. The

chances of the war were not doubtful, but certainly the numerous hosts of the allies could never have counted on so long and brilliant a resistance. The theatre of the military operations soon approached so near to Paris, that the general eagerness for news from the army was readily satisfied ; and upon any fresh intelligence of success on the part of the emperor, his partisans saw the enemy already driven from the French territory. Too well acquainted with the resolves and resources of the allied sovereigns, I was not for a moment led away by this delusion. Besides, events were so rapid and diversified in this war of extermination, that the guns of the Invalides announcing a victory, were sometimes immediately followed by the distant rolling of artillery, denoting the enemy's near approach to the capital.

The emperor had left Paris on the 25th of January, at which time the Emperors of Russia and Austria, and the King of Prussia, were assembled at Langres. Napoleon rejoined his guard at Vitry-le-Français. On the second day after his departure he drove before him the Prussian army, which he had forced to evacuate Saint Dizier. Two days after this the battle of Brienne was fought, and on the 1st of February, between 70 and 80,000 French and allied troops stood face to face. On this occasion the commanders on both sides incurred great personal risks, for Napoleon had a horse killed under him, and a Cossack fell dead by the side of Marshal Blücher.

A few days after this important engagement, Napoleon entered Troyes, where he stayed but a short time, and then advanced to Champ Aubert. At this latter place was fought the battle which bears its name. The Russians were defeated, General Alsufieff was made prisoner, and 2000 men and thirty pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the victors. The prisoners were sent to Paris, as a proof of the emperor's success. This battle took place on the 10th of February, and at this period it is scarcely an exaggeration to say, that the French army had every day to sustain a conflict, and frequently on different points. After the battle of Champ Aubert, the emperor was under such a delusion as to his situation, that while supping with Berthier, Marmont, his prisoner General Alsufieff, and others, he said, 'Another such a victory as this, gentlemen, and I shall be on the Vistula.' Finding that no one replied, and observing by the countenances of the marshals that they did not share his hopes, 'I see how it is,' he added, 'everyone is

growing tired of war ; there is no longer any enthusiasm. The sacred fire is extinct.' Then, rising from table, and stepping up to General Drouet, with the marked intention of paying him a compliment, which should at the same time reflect censure on the other marshals, 'General,' said he, patting him on the shoulder, 'is it not true that we only want a hundred men like you to ensure success ?' Drouet replied, with equal presence of mind and modesty, 'Rather say 100,000, Sire.' This anecdote, so characteristic of Napoleon, was related to me by the two principal persons who were present on the occasion.

But Napoleon now began to have other subjects of inquietude, besides the fate of battles. He was not ignorant that, since the beginning of February, the Duke d'Angouleme had arrived at Saint Jean de Luz, whence he had addressed a proclamation to the French armies in the name of his uncle Louis XVIII. ; and he speedily heard of the arrival of the Count d'Artois at Vesoul, on the 21st of February, which place he did not leave until the 16th of March following.

Meanwhile hostilities were maintained with increased vigour over a vast line of operations. How much useless glory did our soldiers not gain in these conflicts ! But in spite of prodigies of valour the enemy's masses advanced and approximated to a central point, so that this war might be compared to the battles of the ravens and the eagle in the Alps. The eagle kills them by hundreds, every stroke of his beak is the death of an enemy, but still the ravens return to the charge and press upon the eagle, until he is literally overwhelmed by the number of his assailants.

Towards the close of February, the allies were in retreat on several points—but their retreat was not a rout. After experiencing reverses, they fell back without disorder and retired behind the Aube, where they rallied, and obtained numerous reinforcements, which daily arrived, and soon enabled them to resume the offensive.

Still Napoleon continued to astonish Europe, leagued as it was against him. At Craonne, on the 7th of March, he destroyed Blucher's corps in a contest which was very warmly disputed, but the victory was attended with great loss to the conqueror. Marshal Victor was seriously wounded, as well as Generals Grouchy and Ferrière.

The latter days of March were but a continued series of misfortunes to Napoleon. On the 23rd, the rear-guard of the French army suffered considerable loss. To hear of attacks

on his rear-guard must, indeed, have sounded harshly to Napoleon, whose advanced guard had so often led on his grand army to victory. Prince Schwartzberg soon passed the Aube, and marched upon Vitry and Chalons. Napoleon, counting on the possibility of defending Paris, threw himself with the rapidity of the eagle on Schwartzberg's rear, passing by Doulevant and Bar-sur-Aube. He pushed forward his advanced guard to Chaumont, and there saw the Austrian army make a movement which he took for a retreat—but it was no such thing. The movement was directed on Paris, while Blucher, who had again occupied Chalons-sur-Marne, marched to meet Prince Schwartzberg; and Napoleon thinking to cut off their retreat, was himself cut off from the possibility of returning to Paris. Everything then depended on the defence of Paris, or, to speak more correctly, it was just possible, by sacrificing the capital, to lengthen out for a few days longer the existence of the shadow of the empire, now fast disappearing from the view. On the 26th was fought the battle of Fere Champenoise, where, valour giving way to numbers, Marshals Marmont and Mortier were obliged to retire upon Sezanne, after sustaining considerable loss.

It was on the 26th of March, and I beg the reader's attention to this date, that Napoleon suffered a loss which in his circumstances was quite irreparable. At the battle of Fere Champenoise, the allies captured a convoy, consisting of nearly all the ammunition and stores we had left, a vast quantity of arms, caissons, and equipage of all kinds. The whole became the prey of the allies, who published a bulletin announcing this important capture. On that very day the empress left Paris.

An extraordinary council of regency was convoked, at which Maria-Louisa presided. The question discussed was, whether the empress should remain at Paris or proceed to Blois. Joseph Bonaparte strongly urged her departure, in conformity with a letter from the emperor, which directed that, in case of Paris being threatened, the Empress-Regent and all the council of regency should retire to Blois. The arch-chancellor and the majority of the council were of the same opinion, but one of the most influential members of the council, a man of distinguished judgment and discernment, observed to Joseph, that the letter referred to had been written under circumstances very different from those then existing, and that it was highly essential to the interests of the imperial family, that the empress should remain in Paris, where no one could doubt she would

obtain more advantageous conditions from the emperor her father, and the allied sovereigns, than if she were fifty leagues from Paris. The same individual even suggested, that Maria-Louisa, imitating the example of her ancestress, Maria-Theresa, should take her son in her arms and throw herself on the protection of the people. Such a step he considered would rouse to the highest pitch the national enthusiasm, and cause the citizens to arm in defence of their capital. The adoption of this opinion would only have retarded, for a few days, a change which had become inevitable; nevertheless it might have given rise to serious difficulties, and, certainly, as regards Napoleon's interest, it was the wisest that could have been given. The emperor's will, however, as declared in his letter, prevailed with the majority, and their first opinion was acted upon. The empress accordingly proceeded to Blois, and Joseph took up his residence at the Tuileries, with the title of Lieutenant-general of the Empire.

On the departure of the empress, many persons expected a popular movement in favour of a change of government, but the people of Paris remained as tranquil as if they had been merely the spectators of the concluding scenes at one of their theatres. Many of the inhabitants, it is true, at first thought of defence, not for the sake of preserving Napoleon's government, but merely from that quickness of feeling which belongs to our national character. They could not but feel indignant at the thought of seeing foreigners masters of Paris, a circumstance of which there had been no example since the reign of Charles VII. Meanwhile the critical moment approached. On the 29th of March, Marshals Marmont and Mortier fell back to defend the approaches to Paris. During the night the barriers were consigned to the care of the national guard, and not a foreigner, not even one of their agents, was allowed to enter the capital.

On the 30th of March, at daybreak, the whole population of Paris was awakened by the report of cannon, and the plain of St. Denis was soon covered with allied troops, who were pouring into it from all points. The heroic valour of our troops was now unavailing against such superiority of numbers. But the allies paid dearly for their entrance into the capital. The national guard under the command of Marshal Moncey, and the pupils of the Polytechnic school, transformed into artillerymen, behaved in a manner worthy of veteran troops. The conduct of Marmont in that day alone, would be enough

to immortalize him as a general. The corps he commanded was reduced to between 7 and 8000 infantry, and 800 cavalry, with which, for the space of twelve hours, he maintained his ground against an army of 55,000 men, of whom it is said 14,000 were either killed, wounded, or taken. The marshal was seen everywhere in the thickest of the fight, a dozen of soldiers were bayoneted at his side, and his hat was perforated by a ball. But what could be done against overwhelming numbers? In this state of things the Duke de Ragusa made known his situation to Joseph Bonaparte, who authorized him to negotiate. Joseph's answer is so important, in reference to the events which succeeded, that I think it necessary to transcribe it literally. It was as follows :—

‘If the Dukes of Ragusa and Treviso can no longer hold out they are authorized to negotiate with Prince Schwartzberg and the Emperor of Russia, who are before them. They will fall back on the Loire.

‘JOSEPH.

‘MONTMARTRE, March 30, 1814,
Quarter-past 12 o'clock.’

It was not until a considerable time after this formal authority that Marmont and Mortier ceased to make a vigorous resistance against the allied army, for the suspension of arms was not agreed upon until four in the afternoon, and Joseph, it is well known, did not wait for it. At a quarter-past twelve, that is to say, immediately after he had addressed to Marmont the authority just alluded to, Joseph repaired to the Bois de Boulogne, to regain the Versailles road, and from thence to proceed to Rambouillet. Joseph's precipitate flight astonished only those who did not know him. I have been assured, that several officers attached to his staff were by no means pleased at so sudden a retreat. Indeed, they at first imagined that it was a movement towards the bridge of Neuilly, in order to oppose the passage of the allies, but were promptly undeceived when, on gaining the outward barrier, the whole company turned off to the left towards the Bois de Boulogne.

Under these circumstances, what was to be done but to save Paris, which there was no possibility of defending two hours longer? and Marmont, who signed the suspension of arms, which was followed by the capitulation of the city on the following night, deserved rather a civic crown, than the unjust reproaches which have been heaped upon him. Methinks I still

see the marshal, when, on the evening of the 30th of March, he returned from the field of battle to his hotel in the Rue de Paradis, where I was waiting for him, together with about twenty other persons, among whom were MM. Perregaux and Lafitte. When he entered, he was scarcely recognizable; he had a beard of eight days' growth, the great coat which covered his uniform was in tatters, and from head to foot he was blackened with gunpowder. We were considering what was best to be done, and all insisted on the necessity of signing a capitulation. The marshal must remember that the general exclamation around him was, 'France must be saved.' MM. Perregaux and Lafitte expressed themselves most decidedly, and it will easily be conceived what weight was attached to the opinions of two men who stood at the head of the financial world. They affirmed that the general wish of the Parisians, which no one could be better acquainted with than themselves, was decidedly averse to a protracted struggle, and that France was tired of the yoke of Bonaparte. This last declaration afforded a wider field for the discussion of the question then under consideration. It was no longer confined to the capitulation of Paris, but the change of the government was contemplated, and the name of the Bourbons was for the first time pronounced. I do not recollect which of us it was who, on hearing mention made of the possible recall of the old dynasty, remarked how difficult it would be to effect a restoration without retrograding to the past. But I am pretty well sure it was M. Lafitte who replied, 'Gentlemen, we shall have nothing to fear, provided we have a good constitution, which will guarantee the rights of all.' The majority of the meeting concurred in this judicious opinion, which was not without its influence on Marshal Marmont.

This memorable meeting, however, was attended by an unexpected incident. In the very midst of our discussions, one of the emperor's aides-de-camp arrived at Marmont's hotel. Napoleon, being informed of the advance of the allies on Paris, had marched with the utmost speed from the banks of the Marne on the road of Fontainebleau. In the evening he was in person at Froidmanteau, whence he despatched his envoy to Marshal Marmont. From the language of the aide-de-camp, it was easy to perceive that the ideas which prevailed at the imperial head-quarters were very different from those entertained by the people of Paris. The officer expressed indignation at the very idea of capitulation, and announced with inconceivable confidence the approaching arrival of Napoleon in Paris, which

he yet hoped to save from the occupation of the enemy. The same officer assured us with much warmth, that Napoleon depended on the people rising in spite of the capitulation, and that they would unpave the streets to stone the allies on their entrance. What more he said to the same effect I do not now remember, but I ventured to dissent from the absurd idea of defence, and observed that it was madness to suppose that Paris could resist the numerous troops who were ready to enter on the following day. The greater part of the company present concurred in my opinion, and the decision of the meeting was unanimous.

Such is a correct statement of facts which have been perverted by certain parties, with the view of enhancing Napoleon's glory. I am aware that there are some versions which differ in many points from my own : with regard to them I have but one observation to offer, which is, that I heard and saw what I have here described.

The day after the capitulation of Paris, Marmont went in the evening to see the emperor at Fontainebleau. He supped with him, and Napoleon greatly praised his noble defence of Paris. After supper the marshal rejoined his corps at Essonne, and six hours after the emperor arrived there to visit the lines. On quitting Paris, Marmont had left Colonels Fabvier and Denys to superintend the execution of the terms of the capitulation. These officers joined the emperor and the marshal as they were proceeding up the banks of the river of Essonne. They did not disguise the effect which the entrance of the allies had produced in Paris. The emperor appeared deeply mortified at the intelligence, and returned immediately to Fontainebleau, leaving the marshal at Essonne.

At daybreak, on the 31st of March, Paris presented a novel and curious spectacle. Scarcely had the French troops evacuated the capital, than the most respectable quarters of the town resounded with cries of 'Down with Bonaparte !' 'No conscription !' 'No consolidated duties !' With these cries were mingled that of 'The Bourbons for ever !' though this latter cry was not repeated so frequently as the others, and in general I remarked that the people looked on and listened with comparative indifference. As I had taken a very active part in all that had happened during some preceding days, I was particularly curious to study what might be called the physiognomy of Paris. This was the second opportunity which had been afforded me for such a study, and I now saw the people applaud the fall of

a man whom they had received with enthusiasm after the 18th Brumaire. The reason was the same—liberty [was then hoped for, as it was hoped for again in 1814. I went out early in the morning to see the numerous groups of people who were assembled in the streets. I saw women tearing their handkerchiefs, and distributing the fragments as the emblems of the revived lily. That same morning I met on the Boulevards, and some hours afterwards on the Place Louis XV. a party of gentlemen who were parading the streets of the capital, proclaiming the restoration of the Bourbons, and shouting ‘Vive le Roi!’ and ‘Louis XVIII. for ever!’ At their head I recognised M. Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld, Count de Froissard, the Duke de Luxembourg, the Duke de Crussol, Seymour, etc. The cavalcade, distributing white cockades as they passed along, was speedily joined by a numerous crowd, which tumultuously hurried to the Place Vendôme. The proceedings which there took place are well known, and even the delirium of popular joy could scarcely excuse the fury that was directed against the effigy of the man whose misfortunes, whether merited or not, ought to have protected him from such outrages.

On the evening of the 31st of March, an important meeting of the Royalists was held in the hotel of the Count de Morfontaine, who officiated as president, when it was proposed that a deputation should be immediately sent to the Emperor Alexander, to express to him the wish of the meeting. This motion was immediately approved, and the mover was chosen as chief of the deputation, which consisted besides of MM. Ferrand and Cæsar de Choiseul. On leaving the hotel these gentlemen met M. de Chateaubriand, who had that very day been, as it were, the precursor of the restoration, by publishing his admirable pamphlet, entitled ‘Bonaparte and the Bourbons.’ He was invited to join the deputation, to which he consented, but nothing could overcome his diffidence and induce him to speak. On arriving at the hotel, in the Rue Saint Florentine, the deputation was introduced to Count Nesselrode, to whom M. Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld briefly explained its object: he signified to him the wishes of the meeting, and the unanimous desire of Paris and of France. He represented the restoration of the Bourbons as the only means of securing the peace of Europe, and observed in conclusion, that as the exertions of the day must have been very fatiguing to the emperor, the deputation would not solicit the favour of being introduced, but would confidently rely on the good faith of his imperial majesty. ‘I

have just left the emperor, replied M. Nesselrode, 'and can pledge myself for his intentions. Return to the meeting, and announce to the French people that, in compliance with their wishes, so ardently expressed, his imperial majesty will use all his influence to restore the crown to the legitimate monarch; his majesty Louis XVIII. shall re-ascend the throne of France.' With this happy intelligence the deputation returned to the meeting in the Rue d'Anjou.

Great enthusiasm was undoubtedly displayed on the entrance of the allies into Paris. It may be approved or blamed, but the fact cannot be denied. I was an attentive observer of passing events, and I could not but recognize the expression of a sentiment which I had long anticipated.

Napoleon had become master of France by the sword, and the sword being sheathed he could plead no other right to the kingdom; for no popular institution had identified with the nation the new dynasty which he had hoped to establish. The nation admired but did not love him, for it is impossible to love what is feared—and Napoleon had done nothing to merit the affection of France.

CHAPTER XLV

I WAS present at all the meetings and conferences which were held at M. Talleyrand's hotel, where the Emperor Alexander had taken up his residence. Of all the individuals present at these meetings, M. de Talleyrand appeared most disposed to preserve Napoleon's government, with some restrictions on the exercise of his power. In the existing state of things it was only possible to choose one of three courses: first, to make peace with Napoleon, with proper securities against him; second, to establish a regency: and, third, to recall the Bourbons.

On the 31st of March the allied sovereigns entered Paris; and the Emperor Alexander repaired to M. de Talleyrand's hotel, where I, with others, was expecting him. When the emperor entered the drawing-room, most of the persons assembled, and particularly the Abbé de Pradt, the Abbé de Montesquieu, and General Dessolles, urgently demanded the restoration of the Bourbons. The emperor did not come to any immediate decision, but drawing me into the embrasure of a window which looked into the street, he made some

observations which enabled me to form an opinion as to his ultimate determination. 'M. de Bourrienne,' said he, 'you have been the friend of Napoleon, and so have I; I was most sincerely his friend, but there is no possibility of remaining at peace with a man of such bad faith. We must have done with him.' These last words opened my eyes, and when the different propositions which were made came to be discussed, I saw plainly that Bonaparte, in making himself emperor, had made up the bed for the Bourbons.

A discussion ensued on the three possible measures which I have already mentioned, and which Alexander had himself proposed. It appeared to me that his majesty was (what is commonly termed) acting a part when, pretending to doubt the possibility of recalling the Bourbons, which he wished above all things, he asked M. de Talleyrand, what means he proposed to employ for the attainment of that object? Indeed, I am persuaded that his only motive for starting obstacles was in order to hear the persons around him express themselves in a more decided manner. Besides the French, there were present at this meeting the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, Prince Schwartzemberg, M. Nesselrode, M. Pozzo-di-Borgo, and Prince Lichtenstein. During the discussion Alexander remained standing, at intervals walking up and down with some appearance of agitation; at length, addressing us in an elevated tone of voice, 'Gentlemen,' said he, 'you know that it was not I who commenced the war; you know that Napoleon came to attack me in my dominions. But we are not drawn here by the thirst of conquest, or the desire of revenge. You have seen the precautions I have taken to preserve your capital, the wonder of the arts, from the horrors of pillage, to which the chances of war would have consigned it. Neither my allies nor myself are engaged in a war of reprisals, and I should be inconsolable if any violence had been committed on your magnificent city. I repeat, gentlemen, that we are not waging war against France, but against Napoleon, and every other enemy of French liberty. William, and you, Prince' (here the emperor turned towards the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzemberg, who represented the Emperor of Austria), 'are not the sentiments I express in unison with your own?' Both signified their assent to this observation of Alexander, which his majesty several times repeated in different words. He insisted that France should be perfectly free, and that as soon as the wishes of the country were understood, he and his allies would support them, without

seeking to exercise their influence in favour of any government in particular.

The Abbé de Pradt then declared, in a tone of conviction, that we were all royalists, and that the feelings of the people, both of Paris and the whole of France, were similar to our own. The Emperor Alexander, again adverting to the different governments which might be suitable to France, spoke of the maintenance of Bonaparte on the throne, the establishment of a regency, the choice of Bernadotte, and the recall of the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand then spoke, and I well remember his saying to the Emperor of Russia, 'Sire, only one of two things is possible. We must have either Bonaparte or Louis XVIII.; Bonaparte, if you can support him, but you cannot, for you are not alone. Whom could you propose after him? Not another soldier; we will not have him. If we wanted a soldier we would keep the one we have, he is the first in the world. After him, any other offered to our choice would not have ten men to support him. I say again, Sire, either Bonaparte or Louis XVIII. Anything else is an intrigue.' These remarkable words of the Prince of Benevento produced on the mind of the Emperor Alexander all the effect we could have desired. Thus the question was simplified, having now but two alternatives, and as it was evident that Alexander would have nothing to do with either Napoleon or his family, it was reduced to the single proposition of the return of the Bourbons. On being pressed by us all, with the exception of M. de Talleyrand, who still wished to leave the question undecided between Bonaparte and Louis XVIII., Alexander at length declared, that he would never again treat with Napoleon. When it was represented to him that this declaration applied only to Napoleon personally, and did not extend to his family, he added, 'Nor with any member of his family.' Thus, as early as the 31st of March, the Bourbons might be said to be restored to the throne of France. Of all the propositions which were then in agitation, the one most to be deprecated, as it appeared to me, was that which had for its object the appointment of a regency. In that case, everything would still have been left in suspense.

The discussion did not terminate till three o'clock in the afternoon, when the Emperor Alexander signed the following declaration :—

'If the conditions of peace required strong guarantees when the object was to restrain the ambition of Bonaparte, they ought to be more favourable when, by a return to a wise government, France herself

shall offer the assurance of repose. The sovereigns proclaim that they will no longer treat with Bonaparte, nor with any member of his family. They respect the integrity of the French territory, as it existed under the legitimate monarchy: they may even go further, since they adopt the principle that France must be great and powerful. They will recognize and guarantee any constitution of which the French nation may make choice. They consequently invite the Senate immediately to appoint a provisional government, to manage the business of the state, and to prepare the constitution which may be agreeable to the wishes of the people. The sentiments herein expressed are shared by all the allied powers.'

And here I cannot help noticing the haste with which Laborie, whom M. de Talleyrand had appointed secretary to the provisional government, rushed out of the apartment as soon as he got possession of the Emperor Alexander's declaration. He got it printed with such expedition, that in the space of an hour it was placarded on all the walls in Paris. The effect it produced was prodigious—the hopes of intriguers were at once destroyed by it. As yet there appeared no doubt whatever of Alexander's sincerity. The treaty of Paris could not be anticipated, and there was reason to believe that France, with a new government, would obtain more advantageous conditions than if the allies had treated with Napoleon. But this illusion speedily vanished.

On the evening of the 31st of March, I returned to M. de Talleyrand's. About 11 o'clock on the same evening I again saw the Emperor Alexander, who, stepping up to me, said, 'M. de Bourrienne, you must take the superintendence of the post-office department.' I could not decline so marked an invitation on the part of the emperor; and besides, Lavalette having departed on the preceding day, the business of the office would have been for a time suspended; a circumstance which would have been extremely prejudicial to the Restoration, which we wished to favour. I accordingly, after some difficulty, succeeded in putting matters in a train by which letters were forwarded the next morning without the loss of a single post.

The most important point to be obtained was the declaration before mentioned. After that, everything else would follow as a matter of course. Bonaparte's partisans were now fully aware of the impolicy of removing the empress and her son from Paris. It was, of course, necessary to establish a provisional government, of which M. de Talleyrand was appointed President. The other members were General Beurnonville, Count François de Jaucourt, the Duke Dalberg, who married one of Maria-Lousia's

ladies of honour, and the Abbé de Montesquieu. The post of Chancellor of the Legion of Honour was given to the Abbé de Pradt. Thus, among the members of the provisional government were two abbés, and, by a singular chance, they happened to be the same who had officiated at the mass which was performed in the Champ de Mars, on the day of the first federation.

On the morning of the 30th of March, while the battle under the walls of Paris was at the hottest, Bonaparte was still at Troyes. He quitted that town at 10 o'clock, accompanied only by Bertrand, Caulincourt, two aides-de-camp, and two orderly officers. He was not more than two hours in travelling the first ten leagues—indeed, he and his feeble escort performed the journey without changing horses, or even once alighting. The emperor, with his attendants, who were not acquainted with their place of destination, arrived at Sens about one o'clock in the afternoon. Everything was in such confusion that it was impossible to prepare a suitable conveyance for the emperor. Both he and his suite were therefore obliged to continue their journey in a mean-looking calash, and in this equipage, about four in the morning, this monarch, lately so powerful, reached Froidmanteau, about four leagues from Paris. It was there that the emperor received from General Belliard, who arrived at the head of a column of artillery, the first intelligence of the battle of Paris. He heard the news with a composure which was probably affected, in order not to discourage those around them. He walked for about a quarter of an hour on the high road, in conversation with Belliard, and it was after that promenade that he sent Caulincourt to Paris, as I have before mentioned. Napoleon afterwards went to the house of the postmaster, where he ordered his maps to be brought to him, and, as was his custom, marked the different positions of his own and the enemies' troops with pins, the heads of which were tipped with wax of different colours. After occupying himself some time in this manner, he resumed his journey, and arrived at Fontainebleau at six o'clock in the morning.

On the evening of the 31st of March, the emperor sent for the Duke de Ragusa, who had just arrived at Essonne with his troops. The duke reached Fontainebleau between three and four o'clock in the morning of the 1st of April. At this interview Napoleon received a detailed account of the events of the 30th, and, as I have already stated, highly complimented Marmont for his gallant conduct before the walls of Paris.

All was gloom and melancholy at Fontainebleau, yet the emperor still retained his authority, and I have been informed that he deliberated for some time as to whether he should retire behind the Loire, or at once attempt a bold stroke upon Paris, which would have been far more in accordance with his character, than to resign himself to the chances which an uncertain temporizing might afford him. The latter idea pleased him best, and he was seriously considering his plan of attack, when the news of the 31st, and the unsuccessful issue of Caulincourt's mission, gave him to understand that his situation was more desperate than he had hitherto imagined.

Meanwhile the heads of the columns, which the emperor had left at Troyes, arrived at Fontainebleau, after one of the most rapid marches ever known, having completed a distance of fifty leagues in somewhat less than three days. On the 2nd of April, Napoleon communicated the events of Paris to the generals who were about him, recommending them, at the same time, to conceal the news, lest it should dispirit the troops upon whom he still relied. The same day he reviewed his troops in the court of the palace. He then endeavoured to persuade the generals to second his mad designs upon Paris, by making them believe that he had made sincere efforts to conclude a peace. He assured them that he had expressed to the Emperor Alexander his willingness to purchase it by immense sacrifices; that he had consented to resign even the conquests made during the Revolution, and to confine himself within the ancient limits of France.

The old companions of the glory of their chief exclaimed, with one voice, 'Paris! Paris!' but fortunately, during the night, the generals having deliberated with each other, saw the frightful abyss into which they were about to plunge their country. They, therefore, resolved to intimate in moderate and respectful terms to the emperor, that they would not expose Paris to destruction; and this spirit of moderation spreading gradually even among the ranks, by the 3rd of April more prudent ideas succeeded the rash enthusiasm of the day preceding.

The wreck of the army assembled at Fontainebleau, the poor remains of a million of troops which had been levied within fifteen months, consisted only of the corps of the Duke de Reggio, Ney, Macdonald, and General Gerard, which altogether did not amount to 24,000 men, and which, joined to the remaining 7000 of the guard, did not leave the emperor a

disposable force of more than 31,000 men. Nothing but madness or sheer despair could have suggested the idea of successfully combating, with such scanty resources, the foreign masses which occupied and surrounded Paris.

On the 2nd of April the Senate published a decree, declaring that Napoleon had forfeited the throne, and abolished the right of succession which had been established in favour of his family. Furnished with this act, and without waiting the concurrence of the Legislative Body, which was given next day, the provisional government published an address to the French armies. In this address the troops were informed that they were no longer soldiers of Napoleon, and that the Senate released them from their oaths. The address of the Senate was sent round to the marshals, and of course to such of them first as were nearest the capital. Of this latter number was Marmont, whose allegiance to the emperor, as we have already seen, yielded only to the sacred interests of his country. Prince Schwartzberg wrote to Marmont to induce him to espouse a cause which had now become the cause of France. To the prince's letter Marmont replied, that as the army and nation had been absolved from their oaths of allegiance to Napoleon, by a decree of the Senate, he was disposed to concur in the union of the army and the people, which would avert all chance of civil war, and stop the effusion of French blood; and that he was ready with his troops to quit the army of the Emperor Napoleon, on the following conditions, the assurance of which he required in writing—

First.—I, Charles Prince Schwartzberg, Marshal and Commander-in-chief of the allied armies, guarantee to all the French troops who, in consequence of the decree of the Senate of the 2nd of April, may quit the standard of Napoleon Bonaparte, that they shall retire freely into Normandy, with arms, baggage, and ammunition, and with the same marks of respect and military honours which the allied troops reciprocally observe to each other. Second.—That if, by this movement, the chances of war should throw into the hands of the allied powers the person of Napoleon Bonaparte, his life and liberty shall be guaranteed, in a space of territory and a circumscribed country, to be chosen by the allied powers and the French government.'

Prince Schwartzberg, in his answer to Marmont, expressed his satisfaction at the marshal's readiness to obey the call of the provisional government, and added, 'I beg of you to believe that I am fully sensible of the delicacy of the sentiment

expressed in the article you demand, and which I accept, relative to the person of Napoleon.'

The conditions before mentioned being agreed to on the part of the Prince of Schwartzenberg, Marmont considered himself bound to the cause which might now be called the cause of France. It will be seen, however, that he subsequently found himself so circumstanced as to be obliged to request a releasement from his promise, and the Prince of Schwartzenberg generously annulled it.

I happened to learn the manner in which Marshal Macdonald was informed of the taking of Paris. He had been two days without any intelligence from the emperor, when he received an order in the handwriting of Berthier, which ran thus : 'The emperor desires that you halt wherever you may receive this order.' After Berthier's signature the following words were added as a postscript : 'You of course know that the enemy is in possession of Paris.' This singular postscript, and the tone of indifference in which it was expressed, filled Macdonald with mingled surprise and alarm. He then commanded the rear-guard of the army, which occupied the environs of Montereau. Six hours after the receipt of the order alluded to, Macdonald received a second, directing him to put his troops in motion, and he then learnt the emperor's intention of marching on Paris with all his remaining force.

On receiving the emperor's second order Macdonald left his corps at Montereau, and repaired in haste to join Napoleon at Fontainebleau. On his arrival, the emperor had already intimated to the generals commanding divisions in the army corps assembled there, his intention of marching on Paris. Alarmed at such a determination, the generals, most of whom had left in the capital their wives, children, and friends, gathered round Marshal Macdonald, requesting him to go with them, and endeavour to dissuade the emperor from his intention. 'Gentlemen,' said the marshal, 'in the emperor's present situation such a proceeding might displease him. We must use delicacy and precaution. Leave it to me, gentlemen, I will go to the castle.'

Marshal Macdonald accordingly went to the palace of Fontainebleau, where the following conversation took place between him and the emperor, and I beg the reader not to lose sight of the fact that it was the marshal himself who gave me the relation. The moment he entered the emperor's apartment, the latter stepped up to him and said, 'Well, how are things

going on ?' 'Very badly, Sire.' 'How ! badly ! what then are the feelings of your army ?' 'My army, Sire, is entirely discouraged—their minds are alarmed by the events of Paris.' 'Will not your troops join me in an advance on Paris ?' 'Sire, do not think of such a thing. If I were to give such an order to my troops, I should run the risk of being disobeyed.' 'But what is to be done ? I cannot remain as I am ; I have still resources and partisans. It is said that the allies will no longer treat with me. Well, no matter. I will march on Paris, I will be revenged on the inconstancy of the Parisians, and the baseness of the Senate. Woe to the members of the government they have patched up until the return of their Bourbons, for that is what they are aiming at. But to-morrow I shall place myself at the head of my guards, and we will march on the Tuileries.'

Whilst Napoleon thus gave way to such idle threats, the marshal listened in silence ; at length, perceiving him somewhat more calm, he replied, 'Sire, it appears, then, that you are not aware of what has taken place in Paris, of the establishment of a provisional government, and——' 'I know it all, and what then ?' 'Sire,' added the marshal, presenting to him a paper, 'here is something which will tell you more than I can.' Macdonald thereupon gave him a letter from Marshal Beurnonville, announcing the forfeiture of the emperor pronounced by the Senate, and the determination of the allied powers not to treat with Napoleon, or any member of his family. 'Marshal,' said the emperor, 'may this letter be read aloud ?' 'Certainly, Sire.' The letter was then handed to Barre, who read it. An individual then present afterwards described to me the impression which the reading of the letter produced on Napoleon. His features were violently contracted, as I have often observed them on similar momentous occasions. He did not, however, lose his self-command, which, indeed, he could always preserve when policy or vanity required it ; and when the reading of Beurnonville's letter was ended, he affected to persist in his intention of marching on Paris. 'Sire,' exclaimed Macdonald, 'that project must be renounced. Not a sword would be drawn from its scabbard to second you in such an enterprise.'

The question of the emperor's abdication now began to be seriously entertained. Caulincourt had already hinted to Napoleon that, in the event of his abdicating personally, there was still a possibility that the allies might agree to a council of regency. This idea, and the opposition of the marshals to his

desperate project of marching upon Paris, determined Napoleon to sign his abdication, which he himself drew up in the following terms :—

‘The allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to leave France, and even to lay down his life, for the welfare of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, those of the regency, of the empress, and the maintenance of the laws of the empire. Given at our palace of Fontainebleau, April 2nd, 1814.

‘NAPOLEON.

After having written this act the emperor presented it to the marshals, saying, ‘Here, gentlemen ! are you satisfied ?’

This abdication of Napoleon was certainly very useless, but had circumstances recurred to render it of any importance, the act would possibly have proved altogether invalid. To most people its meaning would appear unequivocal, but not so to me, who was so instructed in the cunning to which Napoleon never hesitated to resort, whenever a purpose was to be gained by it. I beg the reader to observe, that Napoleon does not say that ‘he descends from the throne,’ but that ‘he is *ready* to descend from the throne.’ This was a subterfuge, by the aid of which he intended to open new negotiations respecting the form and conditions of regency for his son, in case of the allied sovereigns acceding to that proposition. This would have enabled him to gain time, and, blinded to his real situation, he had not yet resigned all hope.

In this state of feeling he joyfully welcomed a piece of intelligence communicated to him by General Allix. The general stated that he had met an Austrian officer who was sent by Francis II. to Prince Schwartzemberg, and who positively assured him, that all which had taken place in Paris was contrary to the wish of the Emperor of Austria. That this may have been the opinion of the Austrian officer is possible, and even probable, but subsequent events proved that it was nothing more. However, as soon as General Allix had communicated this good news, as he termed it, to Napoleon, the latter exclaimed to the persons who were about him, ‘I told you so, gentlemen. Francis II. cannot carry his enmity so far as to dethrone his daughter. Vicenza, go and desire the marshals to return my act of abdication. I will send a courier to the Emperor of Austria.’

Thus Bonaparte, in his shipwreck, looked round for a saving plank, and buoyed himself up with self-deceptions. The Duke de Vicenza went to Marshals Ney and Macdonald, whom he found just stepping into the carriage to proceed to Paris. Both positively refused to return the act to Caulincourt, saying, 'We are sure of the concurrence of the Emperor of Austria, and will take all responsibility upon ourselves.' The sequel sufficiently proved that they were better informed than General Allix.

During the conversation with Marshal Macdonald, which has been just related, the emperor was seated. When he came to the resolution of signing his abdication, he rose abruptly, and walked with hurried steps once or twice up and down the apartment. After the act was signed, he said, 'Gentlemen, the interests of my son, the interests of the army, and above all the interests of France, must be defended. I therefore appoint as my commissioners to the allied powers, the Duke de Vicenza, the Prince of the Moskowa, and the Duke de Ragusa—are you satisfied?' He added after a pause, 'I think all these interests are intrusted to good hands.' All present answered as with one voice, 'Yes, Sire.' But no sooner was the answer pronounced, than the emperor threw himself on a small yellow sofa which stood near the window, and striking his thigh with his hand, with a sort of convulsive motion, he exclaimed, 'No, gentlemen, I will have no regency. With my guards, and Marmont's corps, I shall be in Paris to-morrow.' Ney and Macdonald vainly endeavoured to undeceive him respecting this impracticable design. He rose with marked ill-humour, and rubbing his head, as he was in the habit of doing when much agitated, he said in a loud and authoritative tone, 'Retire.'

The marshals withdrew, and Napoleon was left alone with Caulincourt. He told the latter, as I afterwards heard, that what had most displeased him in the proceedings which had just taken place, was the reading of Beurnonville's letter. 'Sire,' observed the Duke de Vicenza, 'it was by your order that the letter was read.' 'Yes, that is true, but why was not that letter addressed directly to me by Macdonald?' 'Sire, the letter was at first addressed to Macdonald, but the aide-de-camp who was the bearer of it had orders to communicate its contents to Marmont, on passing through Essonne, because Beurnonville did not know precisely where Macdonald was to be found.' After this explanation, which did not take

more than three minutes, the emperor appeared satisfied, and said to Caulincourt, 'Vicenza, call back Macdonald.'

The Duke de Vicenza hastened after the marshal, whom he found at the end of the gallery of the palace engaged in conversation, and brought him back to the emperor. On his returning, Napoleon, who had quite recovered his usual composure, calmly addressed him. 'Well, Duke de Tarento, do you think that the regency is the only possible thing?' 'Yes, Sire.' 'Then I wish you to go with Ney to the Emperor Alexander, instead of Marmont; it is better that he should remain with his corps, to which his presence is indispensable. You will therefore go with Ney—I rely on you. I trust you have entirely forgotten all that has separated us for so long a time.' 'Yes, Sire, I have not thought of it since 1809.' 'I am glad of it, marshal, and I must acknowledge to you that I was in the wrong.' While speaking to the marshal the emperor manifested unusual emotion. He approached him, and pressing his hand in the most affectionate manner, he uttered but one word more, 'Depart.'

The emperor's three commissioners, that is to say, Marshals Macdonald and Ney, and the Duke de Vicenza, informed Marmont, that they would dine with him as they passed through Essonne, and acquaint him with all that had taken place at Fontainebleau. On their arrival at Essonne, the three imperial commissioners explained to the Duke de Ragusa the object of their mission, and persuaded him to accompany them to the Emperor Alexander. This obliged the marshal to inform them how he was situated. The negotiations which Marmont had opened, and almost concluded, with Prince Schwartzberg, were rendered null by the mission which he had joined, and which it was necessary he should himself explain to the commander of the Austrian army. The three marshals and the Duke de Vicenza repaired to Petitbourg, the head-quarters of Prince Schwartzberg, and there the prince released Marmont from the promise he had given.

CHAPTER XLVI.

AFTER my nomination as Director-General of the Post Office, the business of that department proceeded as regularly as before. I sent on the 4th of April an advertisement to the *Moniteur*, stating that the letters to and from England and other foreign

countries, which had been lying at the post-office for more than three years, would be forwarded to their respective addresses. This produced to the post-office a receipt of nearly 300,000 francs, a sum which will give some idea of the prodigious quantity of intercepted letters, and the system which characterized the imperial government during the time of its existence.

On the night after the publication of my advertisement, I was awakened by an express from the provisional government, requesting me to proceed with all possible haste to M. de Talleyrand's hotel. I lost no time in repairing thither, and arrived a few minutes before the emperor's commissioners. I went up to the saloon on the first floor, which was one of the suite of apartments occupied by the Emperor Alexander. The marshals were conferring with that monarch, and it would be difficult to describe the anxiety, or, indeed, I might say the consternation, which prevailed among some of the members of the provisional government and other individuals who were assembled in the saloon where I was.

During the interview of the marshals with Alexander, which lasted a considerable time, I had an opportunity of learning some particulars of a conversation which they had already had with M. de Talleyrand. The prince observed to them, 'Gentlemen, what is it you are about to do? If you succeed in your designs, you will compromise all who have met in this place since the 1st of April, and that number is not inconsiderable. As for me, I am willing to be compromised; take no account of me.' I had passed the evening of this day with M. de Talleyrand, who had observed to the Emperor Alexander, in my presence, 'Will you support Bonaparte? No, you neither can nor will. I have already had the honour to tell your majesty, that there can be no other alternative than between Napoleon and Louis XVIII.; any other choice whatsoever would be but an intrigue, and no intrigue will possess sufficient strength and consistency long to sustain him who may be its object. Bernadotte, Eugene, the regency, all these are but intrigues. Under present circumstances nothing but some fixed principle is sufficiently strong to establish the new order of things, on which we now find ourselves obliged to enter. Louis XVIII. is a principle.' I remember that M. de Talleyrand frequently made use of this expression to us—'Louis XVIII. is a principle.'

When the marshals and Caulincourt had retired, we were all anxious to know what had passed between them and the Emperor of Russia. I learned from Dessolles that the marshals were

unanimous in urging Alexander to accede to a regency. Macdonald, especially, warmly defended the proposition. The marshals strongly manifested their disinclination to abandon the family of the man who had so often led them to victory ; and lastly, they ventured to remind Alexander of his own declaration, in which he proclaimed in his own name, as well as on the part of the allies, that they had not come to France with the intention of imposing any particular government.

Dessolles, who from the first had openly declared himself in favour of the Bourbons, then replied in his turn, with as much warmth as the partisans of the regency. He represented to Alexander how many persons would be compromised for merely having acted or declared their opinions behind the shield of his promises. Alexander seemed to waver, and, unwilling to give the marshals a positive refusal, he had recourse to a subterfuge, by which he would be enabled to execute the design he had irrevocably formed, without seeming to take on himself alone the responsibility of a change of government. He, therefore, at last gave the following answer to the marshals : ‘Gentlemen, I am not alone in an affair of such importance, I must consult the King of Prussia, for I have promised to do nothing without consulting him. In a few hours you shall know my decision.’

While the marshals were gone to Paris, Napoleon was anxious to ascertain whether his commissioners had passed the advanced posts of the foreign armies, determined, in case of resistance, to march on Paris, for he could not bring himself to believe that he had lost every chance. He sent an aide-de-camp to Marmont, whom he ordered to come immediately to Fontainebleau ; but such was his impatience that, instead of waiting for the return of the first, he sent off a second, and then a third officer on the same errand. This rapid succession of messengers alarmed the generals who commanded the different divisions of Marmont’s corps at Essonne. They feared that the emperor had been made acquainted with the convention concluded that morning with Prince Schwartzberg, and that he had sent for Marmont with the view of severely reprimanding him. Napoleon, however, knew nothing of the matter, for Marmont, on departing for Paris, had left orders that it should be said he had gone to inspect his lines. Souham, Lebrun, Des Essarts, and Bordesaille, who had given their assent to the convention with Prince Schwartzberg, deliberated in the absence of Marmont, and, perhaps being ignorant that he was released from his promise,

and fearing the vengeance of Napoleon, they determined to march upon Versailles. On arriving there the troops, not seeing the marshal at their head, thought themselves betrayed, and a spirit of insurrection soon exhibited itself among them. One of Marmont's aides-de-camp, whom he had left at Essonne, exerted his utmost endeavours to prevent the departure of his general's corps, but finding all his efforts ineffectual, he hastened to Paris to inform the marshal of what had happened. Marmont was at breakfast at Ney's, with Macdonald and Caulincourt, when he received the news, which almost threw him into despair. He said to the marshals, 'I must immediately rejoin my corps and quell this mutiny.' Then, without losing a moment, he ordered his carriage, and told the coachman to drive with the utmost speed. He sent forward one of his aides-de-camp to inform the troops of his approach. Having arrived within a few hundred paces of the place where the troops were assembled, he found the generals who were under his orders advancing to meet him. They entreated him not to proceed, as the men were in open insurrection. 'I will go into the very midst of them,' said Marmont; 'in a moment they shall either kill me or acknowledge me as their chief.' He then sent off another aide-de-camp to range the troops in the order of battle, and, alighting from his carriage, and mounting a horse, he advanced alone, and thus harangued the soldiers: 'How! is there treason here? Is it possible that you disown me? Am I not your comrade? Have I not been wounded twenty times among you? Have I not shared your fatigues and privations, and am I not ready to do so again?' At these words he was interrupted by a general shout of 'Vive le Maréchal! Vive le Maréchal!'

The mission of the marshals had caused the most lively apprehensions among the members of the provisional government, but the alarm was equally great on hearing the news of the mutiny of Marmont's troops. During the whole of the day we were in a state of the most cruel anxiety. The insurrectionary spirit it was feared might extend to other corps of the army, and the cause of France again be compromised. But the successful gallantry of Marmont saved everything, and it would be impossible to convey an idea of the manner in which he was received by us at Talleyrand's, when he related the particulars of what had passed at Versailles.

As soon as Marmont had left Paris for Versailles, Napoleon's three commissioners hastened to the Emperor Alexander, to learn his resolution before he should be made acquainted with

the movement of Marmont's troops. Alexander had walked out at six in the morning to the residence of the King of Prussia, in the Rue de Bourbon. The two sovereigns afterwards proceeded together to M. de Talleyrand's, where they were when Napoleon's commissioners arrived. On the marshals and Caulincourt being introduced to the two sovereigns, the Emperor Alexander, in answer to their proposition, replied, 'That the regency was impossible—this, gentlemen, is the conclusion both myself and my allies have come to. Submissions to the provisional government are pouring in from all parts; and if the army had formed contrary wishes, those wishes should have been made known earlier.' 'Sire,' observed Macdonald, 'that was impossible, as none of the marshals were in Paris; and, besides, who could foresee the turn which affairs have taken? Could we have foreseen that an unfounded alarm would have removed from Essonne the corps of the Duke de Ragusa, who has this moment left us to bring his troops back to order?' These words produced no change in the determination of the allied sovereigns, who still insisted on Napoleon's unconditional abdication. Before taking leave of the Emperor Alexander the marshals solicited an armistice of forty-eight hours, which time they said was indispensable to negotiate the act of abdication with Napoleon. This request was immediately complied with.

When, in discussing the question of the abdication, conformably with the instructions he had received, Macdonald observed to the Emperor Alexander, that Napoleon desired nothing for himself, 'Assure him,' replied Alexander, 'that a provision shall be made for him suitable to the rank he had occupied. Tell him that if he wishes to reside in my dominions, he shall be well received, though he brought desolation there. I shall always remember the friendship which united us. He shall have the island of Elba, or something else.' After taking leave of the Emperor Alexander on the 5th of April, Napoleon's commissioners returned to Fontainebleau, to render an account of their mission. That same day I saw Alexander, and it appeared to me that his mind was relieved from a great weight by the question of the regency being definitely settled. I learned that he intended to quit Paris in a few days, and that he had given full powers to M. Pozzo-di-Borgo, whom he appointed his commissioner to the provisional government.

On the same day, the 5th of April, Napoleon inspected his

troops in the palace-yard of Fontainebleau. He observed some coolness among the officers, and even among the private soldiers, who had evinced such enthusiasm at the review on the 2nd of the same month: their altered behaviour shocked him so much that he remained but a short time on the parade, and immediately retired to his apartments. Convinced of the general discontent, which even his soldiers expressed by their silence, he gave himself up to the most painful reflections.

At near one o'clock on the morning of the 6th of April, Ney, Macdonald, and Caulincourt, arrived at Fontainebleau, to acquaint the emperor with the issue of their mission, and the sentiments expressed by Alexander when they took leave of him. Marshal Ney was the first to announce to Napoleon that the allies required his complete and unconditional abdication, without any other stipulation than his personal safety, which should be guaranteed. Marshal Macdonald and the Duke de Vicenza then spoke to the same effect; but in milder terms than those employed by Ney, who, indeed, was not an adept in courtly phrases. When Marshal Macdonald had finished speaking, Napoleon said with some emotion, 'Marshal, I am fully sensible of all that you have done for me, and of the warmth with which you have pleaded the cause of my son. They wish for my complete and unconditional abdication. Very well: I again empower you to act on my behalf. You shall go and defend my interests, and those of my family.' Then, after a few minutes' silence, and again addressing Macdonald, he continued—'Marshal, where shall I go?' Macdonald then informed the emperor of what Alexander had said, in the supposition of his wishing to reside in Russia.—'Sire,' added he, 'the Emperor of Russia told me that he destined for you the Island of Elba, or something else.' 'Or something else!' repeated Napoleon hastily; 'and what is that something else?' 'Sire, I know not.' 'Ah, no doubt it is the Island of Corsica, which he would not mention in order to avoid any embarrassment. Marshal, I refer all to you.'

The marshals returned to Paris as soon as Napoleon had furnished them with new powers; but on their arrival Ney sent in his adhesion to the provisional government, so that when Macdonald returned to Fontainebleau to convey to Napoleon the definitive treaty of the allies, Ney did not accompany him. Caulincourt had remained with the emperor. When Macdonald entered the emperor's chamber, he found him seated in a small arm-chair before the fireplace. He was dressed in a

morning-gown of white dimity, and he wore his slippers without stockings. His elbows rested on his knees, and his head was supported by his hands. He was motionless, and appeared absorbed in profound reflection. Only two persons were with him, the Duke de Bassano, who was at a little distance from the emperor, and Caulincourt, who was near the fireplace. So profound was Napoleon's reverie, that he did not hear Macdonald enter, and the Duke de Vicenza was obliged to inform him of the marshal's presence. 'Sire, the Duke de Tarento has brought for your signature the treaty which is to be ratified to-morrow.' Whereupon the emperor, as if roused from a lethargic slumber, turned to Macdonald, and merely said, 'Ah, marshal, you here !' Napoleon's countenance was so much altered that the marshal, struck with the change, uttered the involuntary exclamation—'Is your Majesty indisposed ?' 'Yes,' replied Napoleon, 'I have passed a very bad night.'

The emperor continued seated for a moment, then rising he took the treaty, read it without making any observation, and having signed returned it to the marshal, saying, 'I am not now rich enough to reward these last services.' 'Sire, interest never guided my conduct.' 'I know it, and I now see how much I have been deceived respecting you. I see, too, the designs of those who prejudiced me against you.' 'Sire, I have already told you that since 1809 I am devoted to you in life and death.' 'I know it ; but since I cannot recompense you as I would wish, I will beg you to accept a token of remembrance, which, trifling as it is, will at least serve to assure you that I shall never forget the services you have rendered me. Then turning to Caulincourt, Napoleon said, 'Vicenza, ask for the sabre which was given me by Murad Bey in Egypt, and which I wore at the battle of Mount Thabor.' Constant having brought the sabre, the emperor took it from the hands of Caulincourt, and presented it to the marshal. 'Here, my faithful friend !' said he, 'is a reward which I think will gratify you.' Macdonald, on receiving the sabre, said, 'If ever I have a son, Sire, this will be his most precious inheritance, but I will never part with it as long as I live.' 'Give me your hand,' said the emperor, 'and embrace me.' At these words Napoleon and Macdonald rushed into each other's arms with a mutual feeling of emotion, and parted with tears in their eyes.

On the 11th of April, at Fontainebleau, after the clauses of the treaty had been guaranteed, Napoleon signed his act of abdication, which was conceived in the following terms :—

‘The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces for himself and his heirs the thrones of France and Italy, and that there is no personal sacrifice, even that of life, which he is not ready to make for the interests of France.’

It was not until after Bonaparte had written and signed the above act, that Marshal Macdonald sent to the provisional government his recognition, expressed with equal dignity and simplicity. It was as follows :—

‘Being released from my oaths by the abdication of the Emperor Napoleon, I declare that I adhere to the acts of the Senate and the provisional government.’

Thus terminated Napoleon’s legal reign. It is worthy of remark that his act of abdication was published in the *Moniteur* on the 12th of April, the very day on which the Count d’Artois made his entry into Paris with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, conferred on him by Louis XVIII. The 12th of April was, also, the day on which the imperial army under the walls of Toulouse fought its last battle, when the French troops, commanded by Soult, made Wellington purchase dearly his entrance into the south of France.

CHAPTER XLVII

POLITICAL changes are generally stormy, yet at the period of which I am now treating Paris was perfectly tranquil, thanks to the excellent discipline maintained by the commanders of the allied armies, and thanks, also, to the services of the national guard of Paris, who every night patrolled the streets. My duties as Director-General of the Post Office had of course obliged me to resign my captain’s epaulette, but I cannot pass over without notice the important benefit which this citizen-guard conferred on the community.

When, on the departure of the commissioners whom Napoleon had sent to Alexander to treat for the regency, it was finally determined that the allied sovereigns would listen to no terms proposed by Napoleon or his family, the provisional government thought it was time to request that Monsieur would by his presence give a fresh impulse to the efforts of the Bourbon partisans. The Abbé de Montesquieu wrote to the prince a

letter, which was carried to him by Viscount Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld.

On the afternoon of the 11th, Monsieur arrived at a country-house belonging to Madame Charles de Damas, where he passed the night. The news of his arrival spread through Paris with the rapidity of lightning, and everyone seemed anxious to solemnize his entrance into the capital. The national guard formed a double line from the barrier of Bondy to Notre Dame, whither the prince was to proceed in the first instance, in conformity to an ancient custom, which, however, had not been very frequently observed during the last twenty years.

M. de Talleyrand, accompanied by the members of the provisional government, several marshals and general officers, and the municipal body headed by the prefect of the Seine, went in procession beyond the barrier to receive Monsieur. They arrived at the place of rendezvous about one o'clock, and M. de Talleyrand, in the name of the provisional government, addressed the prince, who, in reply, made that well-known observation, 'Nothing is changed in France ; there is only one Frenchman more.' This expression promised much, and it was quickly repeated in every quarter of the capital. The Count d'Artois then proceeded on horseback to the barrier Saint Martin.

Two days only intervened between Monsieur's entrance into Paris and the arrival of the Emperor of Austria. That monarch was no favourite with the Parisians. His conduct was almost universally condemned, for even among those who had most ardently desired the dethronement of his daughter, in order that they might be wholly rid of the Bonaparte family, there were many who blamed his conduct to Maria-Louisa. They would have wished that, for the honour of the Emperor of Austria, he had opposed, even though unsuccessfully, the downfall of the dynasty whose alliance he considered as a safeguard in 1809. The people form their opinion by instinct ; they judged of the Emperor of Austria in his character of a father, happily ignorant themselves of what was required of him in his character of a monarch ; and as the rights of misfortune are always sacred in France ; more interest was felt for Maria-Louisa when she was known to be forsaken, than when she was in the height of her splendour. Francis II. had not seen his daughter since the day she left Vienna, to unite her destiny with that of the master and arbiter of half the nations of Europe.

She constantly assured those about her that she could depend upon her father. The following words which were faithfully

reported to me, were addressed by her to an officer, who was in attendance upon her during the missions of M. de Champagny : 'Even though it should be the intention of the allied sovereigns to dethrone the Emperor Napoleon, my father will not suffer it. When he placed me on the throne of France, he repeated to me twenty times his determination to maintain me on it—and my father is a man of his word.' I have reason to know, too, that the empress, both at Blois and Orleans, frequently expressed her regret at not having followed the advice of those members of the regency who wished her to remain at Paris.

On leaving Orleans, Maria-Louisa proceeded to Rambouillet, and it was not one of the least remarkable circumstances of that eventful period, to see the sovereigns of Europe, the dethroned sovereigns of France, and those who had come to resume the sceptre, all brought together within a circle of fifteen leagues round the capital. There was a Bourbon at the Tuileries, Bonaparte at Fontainebleau, his wife and son at Rambouillet, the repudiated empress three leagues distant, and the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia in Paris.

When all her hopes had failed, Maria-Louisa left Rambouillet to return to Austria with her son. She did not obtain permission to see Napoleon before his departure, although she had frequently expressed a wish to do so. Napoleon himself was conscious of the embarrassment with which such a farewell might have been attended, or otherwise he would doubtless have made a parting interview with Maria-Louisa one of the clauses of the treaty of Paris and Fontainebleau, and of his definitive act of abdication.

Things had arrived at this point, and there was no possibility of retracting any of the decisions which had been made, when the Emperor of Austria went to see his daughter at Rambouillet. I remember that it was thought extraordinary at the time that the Emperor Alexander should accompany him on this visit ; and, in fact, the sight of the sovereign who was regarded as the head and arbiter of the coalition could not be agreeable to the dethroned empress. The two emperors set off from Paris shortly after each other. The Emperor of Austria arrived first, and was received by his daughter with respect and affection. Maria-Louisa was happy to see him, but the many tears she shed were not all tears of joy. After the first effusion of filial tenderness, she complained of the

situation to which she was reduced. Her father himself, deeply affected, could, however, do no more than sympathize with her, since her misfortunes were irreparable. But time passed on, and Alexander was momentarily expected; the Emperor of Austria was therefore obliged to apprise his daughter that the Russian monarch was on his way, desirous of an interview with her. At first, Maria-Louisa decidedly refused to see him, and for some time persisted in this resolution. She said to her father, 'Does he intend to make me a prisoner before your eyes? If he enters here by force, I will retire to my chamber. There I presume he will not dare to follow me, whilst you are present.' Not a moment was now to be lost, for Francis II. heard the carriages of the Emperor Alexander rolling through the courtyard of Rambouillet, and his entreaties to his daughter became more and more urgent. At length she yielded to his solicitations, and the Emperor of Austria went himself to meet his ally, and conduct him to the saloon where Maria-Louisa remained in deference to her father. She did not, however, carry her deference so far as to give a favourable reception to him whom she regarded as the author of all her misfortunes. She listened with much coldness to all the offers and protestations of Alexander, and merely replied, that all she wished for was the liberty of returning to her family. A few days after this painful interview, Maria-Louisa and her son set off for Vienna.

I must now direct the attention of the reader to Italy, which was the cradle of Napoleon's glory, and towards which he in imagination transported himself from his palace of Fontainebleau. Eugene had succeeded in keeping up his means of defence until April, but on the 7th of that month, having received positive information of the reverses by which France was overwhelmed, he found himself constrained to accede to the propositions of Marshal de Bellegarde, to treat for the evacuation of Italy; and on the 10th a convention was concluded, in which it was stipulated that the French troops, under the command of Eugene, should return within the limits of old France. The clauses of this convention were executed on the 19th of April. General Grenier and several other officers about him endeavoured to persuade Eugene to accompany them into France, and to conduct, in person, to the restored king, the remains of that noble army which he had, as it were, so miraculously preserved. It still amounted to 21,000 men, and upwards of 5000 cavalry. But Eugene, thinking that, in the general

partition of provinces, the son-in-law of the King of Bavaria would not be passed over, refused to return to France, declaring that he would await the decision of the allies amidst his former Italian subjects.

Thinking that the Senate of Milan was favourably disposed towards him, Eugene solicited that body to use its influence in obtaining the consent of the allied powers to his continuance at the head of the government of Italy ; but this proposition of the son of Napoleon was now contemptuously rejected by the Senate. Public feeling throughout the whole of Italy was highly exasperated, and the army had not proceeded three marches beyond Mantua, when an insurrection broke out in Milan. The Finance Minister, Prina, was assassinated, and his palace demolished ; and nothing could have saved the viceroy from sharing the same fate, had he remained in his capital. Amidst this popular excitement, and the eagerness of the Italians to be released from the dominion of the French, the friends of Eugene thought him fortunate in being able to join his father-in-law at Munich, almost incognito. Thus, at the expiration of nine years, fell the iron crown which Napoleon had placed on his head, saying, '*Dieu me l'a donné : gare à qui la touche.*'

CHAPTER XLVIII.

NAPOLÉON having consented to proceed to the island of Elba, conformably with the treaty he had ratified on the 13th, requested to be accompanied to the place of embarkation by a commissioner from each of the allied powers. Count Schuwaloff was appointed by Russia, Colonel Neil Campbell by England, General Kohler by Austria, and Count Waldburg Truchess by Prussia. On the 16th, the four commissioners came for the first time to Fontainebleau, where the emperor, who was still attended by Generals Drouet and Bertrand, gave to each a private audience on the following day.

Although the emperor received with coldness the commissioners whom he had himself solicited, there was still a marked distinction in his behaviour towards them. He who experienced the best reception was Colonel Campbell, whose person still exhibited many traces of wounds. Napoleon asked him in what battles he had received them, and on what occasions he had been invested with the orders he wore. He next questioned him as

to the place of his birth. Colonel Campbell having answered that he was a Scotchman, Napoleon congratulated him on being the countryman of Ossian, his favourite author, whose poetry he greatly praised. At this first audience, Napoleon said to the Colonel, 'I have cordially hated the English—I have made war against you by every possible means—but I esteem your nation. I am convinced there is more generosity in your government than in any other. I should like to be conveyed from Toulon to Elba by an English frigate.'

The Austrian and Russian commissioners were received coolly, but without any marked indications of displeasure. It was not so with the Prussian commissioner. The two former Napoleon had detained in conversation about five minutes, but to the latter he said, drily, 'Are there any Prussians in my escort?' 'No, Sire.' 'Then why do you take the trouble to accompany me?' 'Sire, it is not a trouble, but an honour.' 'These are mere words, you have nothing to do here.' 'Sire, it was impossible for me to decline the honourable mission with which the king, my master, has intrusted me.' At these words Napoleon turned his back on Count Truchess.

The commissioners expected that Napoleon would be prepared for an immediate departure, but such was not the case. Having asked to see the itinerary of his route, he wished to make some alteration in it, and this afforded a pretext for further delay, as the commissioners were unwilling to oppose his wishes, and were instructed to treat him with all the respect and etiquette due to a sovereign. They accordingly suspended the departure, but as they could not take upon themselves to acquiesce in the changes wished for by the emperor, they requested Caulincourt to wait on their respective sovereigns for fresh instructions. On the night of the 19th they were authorized to travel by any road the emperor might prefer, and the departure was then definitely fixed for the 20th.

Accordingly, at ten in the morning of the 20th, the carriages were in readiness, and the imperial guard was drawn up in the grand court of the palace of Fontainebleau, called the Court of the White Horse. All the population of the town and the neighbouring villages thronged round the palace. Napoleon sent for General Kohler, and complained of Maria-Louisa not being allowed to accompany him; but at length yielding to the representations that were made to him, he added, 'Well, I prefer remaining faithful to my promise, but if I have any fresh cause of complaint, I shall consider myself freed from all my engagements.'

At eleven o'clock, Count de Bussy, one of the emperor's aides-de-camp, was sent by the grand marshal to announce that all was ready for departure. 'Am I, then,' said Napoleon, 'to regulate my actions by the grand marshal's watch? I will go when it suits me. Perhaps I shall not go at all. Leave me.'

All the forms of imperial etiquette were observed, to avoid wounding the feelings of Napoleon, who loved them so much; and when he at length thought proper to leave his cabinet to enter the saloon, where the commissioners were waiting, the doors were thrown open as usual, and 'The Emperor' announced; but no sooner was the word uttered than he hastily turned back again. However, he soon re-appeared, rapidly crossed the gallery, and descended the staircase, and at twelve o'clock precisely he stood at the head of his guard, as if at a review in the court of the Tuileries in the brilliant days of the consulate and the empire. Then took place a really affecting scene—Napoleon's farewell to his soldiers. Of this I may forbear entering into any details since they are known everywhere and by everybody; but I may subjoin the emperor's last address to his old companions in arms, as it belongs to history. This address, delivered in a voice as firm and sonorous as in the days of his triumphs, was as follows:—

'Soldiers of my old guard, I bid you farewell. For twenty years I have constantly accompanied you on the road to honour and glory. In these latter times, as in the days of our prosperity, you have invariably been models of courage and fidelity. With men such as you, our cause could not be lost, but the war would have been interminable; it would have been civil war, and that would have entailed deeper misfortunes on France. I have sacrificed all my interests to those of the country. I go; but you, my friends, will continue to serve France. Her happiness was my only thought. It will still be the object of my wishes. Do not regret my fate; if I have consented to survive, it is to serve your glory. I intend to write the history of the great achievements we have performed together. Adieu, my friends! Would I could press you all to my heart.' Napoleon then ordered the eagles to be brought, and having embraced them, he added, 'I embrace you all in the person of your general. Adieu, soldiers! Be always gallant and good.'

Napoleon's parting words to his soldiers were, 'Adieu, my friends. My wishes will always accompany you. Do not forget me!' He then stepped into his carriage, accompanied by Bertrand.

During the first day, cries of 'Vive l'Empereur !' resounded along the road, and Napoleon, resorting to his usual dissimulation, affected to upbraid the people for their disloyalty to their legitimate sovereign, which he did with ill-disguised irony. The guard accompanied him as far as Briare, where he passed the night. Here he invited Colonel Campbell to breakfast with him. He conversed on the last war in Spain, and spoke in complimentary terms of the English nation, and the military talents of Wellington.

On the night of the 21st, Napoleon slept at Nevers, where he was still received with the acclamations of the people, who here, as in several other towns, mingled their shouts of enthusiasm, caused by their late emperor's presence, with imprecations against the commissioners of the allies. He left Nevers at six on the morning of the 22nd. The guards not now forming a part of his escort, Napoleon no longer heard the cries of 'Vive l'Empereur !' and as a corps of Cossacks had succeeded them, he had the mortification to hear in its stead, 'Vivent les Alliés !'

Augereau, an old republican, and who was still a republican, though he received the title of Duke de Castiglione from Napoleon, had always been among the discontented. On the 24th, having met Augereau at a little distance from Valence, Napoleon stopped his carriage, and immediately alighted. Augereau did the same, and they cordially embraced in the presence of the commissioners, to one of whom I am indebted for this anecdote. It was remarked that Napoleon saluted uncovered, while Augereau kept his hat on. 'Where are you going ?' said the emperor ; 'to court ?' 'No, I am going to Lyons.' 'You have behaved very badly to me.' Augereau, finding that the emperor addressed him in the second person singular, made use of the same familiar style, and they conversed as they had been accustomed to do when they were both generals in Italy. 'Of what do you complain ?' said he : 'Has not your insatiable ambition brought us to this ? Have you not sacrificed everything to that ambition, even the happiness of France ? I care no more for the Bourbons than I do for you. All I care for is the country.' Upon this Napoleon turned sharply away from the marshal, lifted his hat to him, and returned to his carriage. The commissioners, and all the persons in Napoleon's suite, were indignant at seeing Augereau stand on the road with his travelling cap still on his head, with his hands behind his back, and, instead

of bowing, merely making a disdainful salute to Napoleon with his hand. These haughty republicans, to have been consistent, should have acted in this manner at the Tuileries ; on the road to Elba it was nothing better than low-bred insolence.

At Valence, Napoleon, for the first time, saw French soldiers with the white cockade in their caps. They belonged to Augereau's corps. At Orange, the air resounded with cries of 'Vive le Roi !' Here the gaiety, real or feigned, which Napoleon had hitherto maintained, began to forsake him.

Had the emperor arrived at Avignon three hours later than he did, there is no doubt his death would have been the consequence. He did not change horses at Avignon, through which he passed at four in the morning, but at St. Audiol, where he arrived at six. The emperor, who was fatigued with sitting in the carriage, descended with Colonel Campbell and General Bertrand, and walked with them up the first hill. His valet-de-chambre, who also preceded them on foot at a little distance, met one of the post-office couriers, who said to him, 'Are those the emperor's carriages coming this way ?' 'No, they are the equipages of the allies !' 'I say, they are the emperor's carriages. Perhaps you don't know that I am an old soldier. I served in the campaign of Egypt, and I will save the life of my general.' 'I tell you again, they are not the emperor's carriages.' 'Do not attempt to deceive me : I have just passed through Orgon, where the emperor has been hanged in effigy, and if he is recognized, it will be all over with him. The wretches have erected a gibbet, on which they have hung a figure dressed in a French uniform and covered with blood. This confidence on my part may get me into trouble—but no matter, do you profit by it.' The courier then set off at full gallop. The valet-de-chambre took General Drouet apart, and told him what he had just heard. Drouet communicated the circumstances to General Bertrand, who himself related it to the emperor in the presence of the commissioners. The latter, justly alarmed, held a sort of council on the highway, and it was decided that the emperor should go forward without his retinue. The valet-de-chambre was asked whether he had any clothes in the carriage. He produced a long blue cloak, and a round hat. It was proposed to put a white cockade in his hat, but to this Napoleon would not consent. He went forward in the style of a courier with Amaudru, one of the two outriders who had escorted his

carriage, and hastily passed through Orgon. When the allied commissioners arrived there, the whole population of the neighbourhood was assembled, uttering exclamations of 'Down with the Corsican !' 'Down with the brigand !'

The commissioners would not breakfast at Orgon ; they paid for what had been prepared for them, and took some refreshments to eat during their journey. The carriages did not overtake the emperor until they came to La Calade, where he had arrived a quarter of an hour before with Amaudru. They found him standing by the fire in the kitchen of the inn, talking with the landlady. She had asked him whether the tyrant was soon to pass that way ? 'Ah, sir !' said she, 'it is no use to tell me that we have got rid of him. I always said, and always will say, that we shall never be sure of seeing an end of him until he be laid at the bottom of a well, covered with stones. I should like to see him safely laid in the well of our yard. You see, sir, the directory sent him into Egypt to get rid of him, but he came back again : and he will come back again, too, you may be sure of that, sir, unless——' Here the good woman, having finished skimming her pot, looked up, and perceived that the only person in the party who remained uncovered was the very one to whom she had been speaking. She was at first confounded ; but the embarrassment she experienced at having spoken so ill of the emperor to the emperor himself, converted all her anger into a kind and generous feeling. She shewed the greatest possible respect and attention, both to Napoleon and his attendants. A messenger was immediately sent off to Aix to purchase ribbons for making white cockades. All the carriages were brought into the courtyard of the inn, and the gate was closed. The good woman then told the emperor, that it would not be prudent for him to venture to pass through Aix, where a population of more than 20,000 were waiting to stone him.

Meanwhile dinner was served, and Napoleon sat down to table. He admirably mastered the agitation which doubtless he must have experienced, and I have been told by several of the individuals who were present at this extraordinary repast, that never had Napoleon taken more pains to render himself agreeable. Everyone was charmed by his conversation, enriched as it was from the stores of his memory and his imagination, and towards its conclusion he remarked, with an air of indifference, which was most likely affected, 'I believe the new French government has a design on my life.'

Whilst the commissioners, who had been informed of what was going on at Aix, were consulting about sending an order to the mayor directing him to close the gates, and to adopt measures for securing the public tranquillity, about fifty ill-looking fellows had assembled round the inn. One of them asked to speak with the commissioners, and offered to carry a letter to the mayor of Aix. They accepted his services, and in their letter they told the mayor, that if the gates of the town were not closed within an hour, they would advance with two regiments of Cossacks and six pieces of artillery, and would fire upon all who opposed their passage. This threat had the desired effect, and the mayor returned an answer by the same messenger, that the gates should be closed, and that he would take upon himself the responsibility of whatever might happen.

Thus the emperor escaped the dangers with which he was threatened at Aix ; but there was another to be braved. During the seven or eight hours he passed at La Calade, a considerable number of persons had collected round, and it was evident that they would have proceeded to the greatest excesses had not the doors of the inn been carefully fastened. Most of them had in their hands five-franc pieces, in order to recognise the emperor by his likeness to that on the coin. Napoleon, who had passed two nights without sleep, was in a little room adjoining the kitchen, where he had fallen into a slumber, reclining on the shoulder of his valet-de-chambre. In a moment of dejection he had said, 'I now renounce the political world for ever. I shall henceforth feel no interest about anything that may happen—at Porto-Ferrajo I may be happy—more happy than I have ever been ! No ! if the crown of Europe were now offered me, I would not accept it—I will devote myself to science. I was right never to esteem mankind ! I have treated them no worse than they deserved. But France—and the French people—what ingratitude !—I am disgusted with ambition, and I wish to rule no longer !' It was at length announced that everything was ready to renew the journey, but it was thought advisable that the emperor should put on the great-coat and fur cap of General Kohler, and that he should go into the carriage of the Austrian commissioner. Thus disguised, he left the inn of La Calade, passing between a double row of spectators, who vainly endeavoured to recognize him. On turning the walls of Aix, Napoleon had again the mortification to hear the cries of 'Down with the tyrant !' 'Down with Nicolas !' and these shouts resounded at the distance of a quarter of a league from the town.

Napoleon, dispirited by these manifestations of hatred, said in a tone of mingled grief and contempt, 'The people of these parts have ever been the same—brawlers and madmen. At the commencement of the Revolution these Provençals committed frightful massacres.' At about a league from Aix, the emperor and his retinue found horses, and an escort of gendarmerie, to conduct them to the castle of Luc.

The Princess Pauline Borghese was at that time at the country-house of M. Charles, member of the legislative body, near the castle of Luc. On hearing of her brother's misfortunes, which she was astonished he bore up against so well, she determined to accompany him to the island of Elba, and proceeded to Frejus to embark with him. Her presence was a great consolation to him. At Frejus the emperor rejoined Colonel Campbell, who had quitted the convoy on the road, and had brought into the port the English frigate, the *Undaunted*, which had been destined for his conveyance. Notwithstanding the wish he had expressed to Colonel Campbell, he evinced great reluctance to go on board. However, on the 28th of April he sailed for the island of Elba on board that frigate, which could not then be said to carry Cæsar and his fortune.

CHAPTER XLIX.

THE force of the changes produced by time is the most irresistible of all powers. Wise policy consists in giving it a proper direction, and for this purpose it is necessary to understand the wants of the age. On this account, Louis XVIII. appeared, in the eyes of all who were capable of forming a correct judgment, a monarch expressly formed for the circumstances in which we stood after the fall of Napoleon.

Louis XVIII. succeeding Bonaparte was like Numa coming after Romulus, only Numa had not the misfortune to be surrounded by inexperienced counsellors. Louis XVIII. embarked at Dover on board the *Royal Sovereign*, and landed at Calais on the 24th of April. I shall not enter into any details of the enthusiasm occasioned by his presence on French soil; that is generally known through the reports of the journalists of the period, who had only to change the word imperial for royal, to give an equally correct and glowing description of it. It is, however, very certain that all sensible persons saw with

satisfaction the princes of the house of Bourbon re-ascend the throne of their ancestors, matured by experience and misfortune, which, as some ancient philosopher observes, are the best counsellors of kings.

The route by which Louis XVIII. was to proceed from Calais to Paris had been indicated to me by a letter from the Duke de Duras in London. The king's wishes on this subject were punctually fulfilled, and I recollect with pleasure the zeal with which my efforts were seconded by all the persons in the service of the post-office. His majesty stopped for a short time at Amiens, and then proceeded to Compiègne, where the ministers and marshals had previously arrived, to present to him their homage and the assurance of their fidelity. Berthier addressed the king in the name of the marshals, and said, among other things, 'That France, groaning for five-and-twenty years under the weight of the misfortunes that oppressed her, had anxiously looked forward to the happy day which she now saw dawning.' Berthier might have said for ten years; but even had he spoken the truth in this instance, it was ill-placed in the mouth of a man whom the emperor had constantly loaded with his favours. The Emperor Alexander also went to Compiègne to meet Louis XVIII., and the two monarchs dined together.

At Saint-Ouen his majesty promulgated the declaration which preceded the charter, and which contained a repetition of the sentiments expressed by the king twenty years before in the declaration of Calmar. It was also at Saint-Ouen that the plan of a constitution was presented to him by the Senate, in which that body, to justify even to the last its title of *Conservative*, stipulated for the preservation of its revenues and endowments. On the 3rd of May, Louis XVIII. made his solemn entry into Paris, proceeding first to the cathedral of Notre Dame. In the same carriage with his majesty was the Duchesse d'Angouleme. On arriving at the Pont Neuf, he saw the model of the statue of Henry IV., on the pedestal of which was the following inscription: 'Ludovico reduce, Henricus redivivus.' These words were suggested by M. de Lally-Tollendal, and were in far better taste than the long and pompous inscription engraven on the bronze statue.

The king's entrance into Paris did not call forth such a manifestation of public feeling as that of Monsieur. In the places through which I passed on the 3rd of May, astonishment seemed to prevail over every other feeling. In a short time, however, the abatement of public enthusiasm became much more evident,

owing to Louis XVIII. having restored the red corps which Louis XVI. had suppressed long before the Revolution.

It was, besides, not a little extraordinary to see the management of affairs intrusted to a man who neither had nor could have any knowledge of France. From the commencement M. de Blacas affected ministerial omnipotence. When I went on the 11th of May to present, as usual, my portfolio to the king, in virtue of my privilege of personally transacting business with the sovereign, M. de Blacas wished to take the portfolio from me. This appeared to me the more surprising, as during the seven days I had had the honour of being near Louis XVIII., his majesty had been pleased to address me in that gracious and complimentary manner which he so well knew how to assume. I at first asserted my privilege and refused to give up the portfolio, but M. de Blacas told me the king had ordered him to receive it, and I then, of course, yielded the point. It was not long, however, before I found myself a victim to a courtier's revenge. Two days after this circumstance just alluded to, that is to say, on the 13th of May, having entered my cabinet at an early hour, I mechanically took up the *Moniteur*, which I found lying on my desk. On just running it over, what was my astonishment to find that the Count de Ferrand had been appointed Director of the Post-office in my stead. I immediately knew whence the blow came; and such was the strange manner in which M. de Blacas made me feel the gratitude of princes. Certainly after so many proofs of loyalty on my part, which a year afterwards procured for me the signal honour of being outlawed in quite a privileged way, I had reason to complain, and I might have said, with as much truth as Virgil, 'Sic vos non vobis,' when alluding to the unmerited favours lavished by Augustus on the Mævii and Bavii of his time.

The measures of government were now the subject of universal complaint. The usages of the ancient regime were gradually restored, and ridicule being mingled with more serious considerations, Paris was speedily inundated with pamphlets and caricatures. However, tranquillity prevailed until the month of September, when M. de Talleyrand departed for the congress of Vienna. Then all was disorder at the Tuileries. It seemed as if everyone, feeling himself freed from restraint, wished to play the statesman, and Heaven knows how many follies were committed in the absence of the schoolmaster!

Under a feeble government there is but one step from

discontent to insurrection ; under an imbecile government like that of France in 1814, after the departure of M. de Talleyrand, conspiracy had free scope. And thus, during the summer of 1814, were prepared the events which had their completion on the 20th of March, 1815. I could almost fancy myself dreaming, when I look back on the miraculous incapacity of the persons then at the head of our government. The emigrants, who, as it has been justly observed, had neither learned nor forgotten anything, came back with all the absurd pretensions of Coblenz.'

At the end of 1814, indications too plain to be mistaken enabled me to perceive that a great and important change was at hand. I regretted the errors which were constantly committed by the ministers ; but hoped that the government would gradually return to those principles which were calculated to conciliate public opinion. On one occasion, a friend called upon me, who had exercised important functions, and whose name had appeared on a proscription list. He gave it as his opinion that if the government persisted in its present course, it could not possibly stand, and that we should have the emperor back again. 'That,' said I, 'would be a great misfortune ; and even if such were the wish of France, it would be opposed by Europe. You, who are so devoted to France, cannot be indifferent to the danger that would threaten her, if the presence of Bonaparte should bring the foreigners back again. Can you endure to think of the dismemberment of our country ?'—'That they will never venture to attempt. But you and I can never agree on the question of the emperor and the Bourbons ; we take an entirely different view of the matter ; you had cause to complain of Bonaparte, and I had only reason to be satisfied with him. But tell me, what would you do if he were to return ?'—'Bonaparte return ?'—'Yes !'—'Upon my word, the best thing that I could do would be to take myself off as quietly as possible, and that I certainly should do. I am perfectly satisfied that he would never pardon me for the part I have taken in the restoration, and I candidly confess that I should not hesitate a moment to save my life by leaving France.'—'Well, you are wrong ; for I am convinced that, if you would range yourself amongst his friends, you might have whatever you wished—titles, honours, riches. Of this I give you assurance.'—'All this, I must tell you, does not tempt me ; I love France as sincerely as you do, but she never can be happy under Bonaparte. If he return, I will go and live abroad.'

This is only a part of the conversation, which will serve to shew the feeling which existed at the time. These opinions, which seemed to have been expressed to me as if by authority, led me to reflect upon the hypothesis of the return of Bonaparte, and from various other communications which were made to me about the same time I was at last led to believe that some important intrigue was in progress.

My conviction of an approaching crisis had become so strong that, in the month of January, I determined to solicit an interview with M. de Blacas, who then enjoyed the entire confidence of his sovereign, and through whom alone any communication could be made. I need scarcely add that my intention was merely to submit to him the facts which I had collected, without mentioning the individuals from whom I obtained them. After all, M. de Blacas would not receive me, and I had only the honour of speaking to his secretary, who was an abbé named Fleuriel. This personage, who was an extraordinary specimen of impertinence and self-conceit, had all the assumed dignity of the great secretary of a great minister, and with an air of perfect indifference told me that the count was not there ;—but M. de Blacas was there, and I knew it.

Devoted as I was to the cause of the Bourbons, I thought it my duty to write that very day to M. de Blacas to request an interview : I received no answer. Two days after I wrote a second letter, in which I informed M. de Blacas, that I had a communication of great importance to make to him. This letter also remained unnoticed. Unable to account for this strange conduct, I again went to the Pavilion of Flora, and requested the abbé Fleuriel to explain the cause of his master's silence. 'Sir,' said he, 'I received both your letters, and laid them before the count ; I do not know why he has not sent you an answer. I can do nothing in the matter, and *Monsieur le Comte* is so much engaged.'—'*Monsieur le Comte*,' said I, 'will, perhaps, repent of it. Good morning.'

I had thus experience in my own person of the truth of what I had often heard respecting M. de Blacas. This minister had succeeded Count d'Avaray ; he enjoyed the full confidence of the king, and concentrated the whole of the sovereign power in his own cabinet. Convinced of the danger which threatened France, and being unable to break through the blockade which M. de Blacas had formed round the person of the king, I wrote to M. de Talleyrand at Vienna, who I knew corresponded directly with the king, and communicated to him the information

which I had received. But the information thus communicated was too late to avert the danger—events hurried on.

Those who opposed the execution of the treaty concluded with Napoleon at the time of his abdication, were guilty of a great error, for they afforded him a fair pretext for leaving the island of Elba. The circumstances connected with that extraordinary enterprise are so well known to everyone, that it is unnecessary for me to repeat them. As for myself, so soon as I was informed of the rapidity of Bonaparte's march upon Lyons, and the enthusiasm with which he was received by the people and the army, I prepared to retire to Belgium, there to await the close of the new drama. My arrangements were completed on the evening of the 13th of March, and I was ready to depart, when I received a special message from the Tuileries, stating that the king desired to see me. This order occasioned some alarm, but I did not hesitate to obey. I went direct to M. Hue, to inquire why I had been sent for? He occupied the apartments in which I had passed the three most laborious and anxious years of my life. He perceived that I was uneasy at having been sent for at that late hour of the night, when he immediately informed me that the king wished to appoint me Prefect of Police. He conducted me to the king's chamber, when his majesty addressed me with great kindness, in a tone which clearly expressed his meaning—'M. de Bourrienne, can we rely upon you? I expect much from your zeal and fidelity.'—'Your majesty,' replied I, 'shall have no cause to complain of my betraying your confidence.'—'Tis well; I am about to re-establish the Prefecture of Police, and I appoint you prefect. Go, M. de Bourrienne, do for the best; I rely on you.' By a singular coincidence, on the 13th of March, the day on which I received this appointment, Napoleon, who was then at Lyons, signed a decree which excluded Talleyrand, Marmont, myself, and ten others, from the general amnesty. This decree confirmed me in the presentiments I had entertained so soon as I heard of the landing of Bonaparte; but as I was only influenced by the desire to serve the cause of the king, I determined to meet with courage every difficulty which might present itself.

Even now I am filled with astonishment when I recall to mind the proceedings of the council which was held at the Tuileries on the night of the 13th of March. The ignorance of the ministers respecting our real situation, and their confidence in the measures they had adopted against Napoleon, exceed

all conception. Could it be believed that those great statesmen, who had the control of the telegraph, the post-office, the police and its innumerable agents, money, in short everything which constitutes power, were absolutely ignorant of the advance of Napoleon, and that they asked me to give them information on the subject? What could I say to them? I could only repeat the reports which were circulated on the Exchange, and such others as I had collected during the last twenty-four hours. I did not conceal that all their precautions would be of no avail. This brought on the discussion as to what course should be adopted by the king. It was impossible he could remain in the capital, and yet where was he to go? One proposed Bordeaux; another, La Vendée; a third, Normandy; and a fourth, that the king should be conducted to Melun. I conceived that if a battle should take place anywhere, it would probably be in the neighbourhood of that town; but the minister who made that suggestion assured us that the presence of the king, in an open carriage with eight horses, would have a wonderful effect upon the minds of the soldiers. This project was ridiculous, and the others were dangerous and impracticable. I stated to the council that, considering the situation of affairs, it was necessary to renounce all idea of resistance by force; that no soldier would fire a musket, and that it was madness to entertain the idea. I further stated that defection among the troops was inevitable; that they had been amusing themselves and getting drunk, for some days past, with the money which had been given them to purchase their fidelity. They said, Louis XVIII. is a very good sort of person; but *long live the Little Corporal!*

Immediately on the landing of Napoleon, the king sent an express for Marmont, who was at Chatillon, whither he had gone to take leave of his dying mother. I saw him the day after he had an interview with the king; I think it was on the 6th or 7th of March. He told me that he had stated to his majesty that he had no doubt of Bonaparte's intention of coming to Paris, and that the best way to prevent him from doing so, would be for his majesty to remain. He recommended that his majesty should shut himself up in the Tuileries, and prepare to stand a siege; that the Duke d'Angouleme should go to Bordeaux, the Duke de Berri to La Vendée, and Monsieur to the Franche-Comté; that they should set out in open day, and announce that they were going to collect defenders for his majesty. I did not concur in Marmont's opinion, but it is certainly probable that had Louis XVIII. remained in his palace,

the defections which quickly took place would have been prevented. There can be no doubt, too, that Bonaparte would have hesitated before he attempted the siege of the Tuileries. While I rendered full justice to the recommendation of the Duke de Ragusa, yet I did not think that his advice could be followed. I opposed it, as I opposed all the other propositions that were made in the council as to the different places in which the king should retire. I myself recommended Lille as being the nearest and most secure, and consequently, in the present state of things, the safest asylum. It was after midnight when the council at the Tuileries broke up, without coming to any decision ; it was agreed that the different opinions should be submitted to the king, in order that his majesty should adopt that which appeared to him the best. My opinion was adopted, but it was not acted upon until five days after.

My appointment to the Prefecture of Police was, as has been seen, a late-thought-of measure, almost as late as Napoleon's proposition to send me as minister plenipotentiary to Switzerland. In accepting office, I was well aware that no effort could prevent the progress of the fast approaching and menacing events. On being introduced into the royal cabinet, his majesty asked me what I thought of the situation of affairs ? 'I think, sire, that Bonaparte will be here in five or six days.'—'Do you say so ?'—'Yes, sire.'—'But proper measures are taken, orders given, and the marshals are faithful to me.'—'Sire, I suspect no man's fidelity ; but I can assure your majesty that as Bonaparte has landed he will be here in eight days. I know him, and your majesty cannot know him as well as I do ; but I can venture to assure your majesty, that he will not be here six months ; he will commit excesses which will ruin him.' 'M. de Bourrienne, I augur better of events ; but if misfortune compels me again to leave France, and your second prediction be fulfilled, you may rely upon me.' During this conversation the king appeared calm and resigned.

On the following day, I again repaired to the Tuileries and received orders to arrest twenty-five persons. I took the liberty to observe that it was perfectly useless to do so, and that it was calculated to produce an injurious effect at that critical moment. The reasons I urged had not the effect I desired ; but some relaxation was made as to twenty-three, who were only to be placed under surveillance. Fouché and Davoust were ordered to be arrested without delay. The king repeatedly said, 'I wish you to arrest Fouché.' 'Sire, I beseech your majesty to consider the

inutility of the measure.'—'I am resolved upon Fouché's arrest ; but I am sure you will fail, for André could not succeed.'

After this formal order from the king, I could but obey, although I had a great objection to do so. I communicated the order to M. Foudras, the inspector-general of the police, who very coolly observed, 'Since we are to arrest him you need not be afraid, we shall have him secure enough by to-morrow.' The agents of police repaired to the hotel of the Duke of Otranto, and shewed the warrant for his arrest, but he refused to surrender himself, as the warrant purported to be signed by the prefect of police when there was no such officer. In my opinion Fouché was right, for my appointment had not been legally announced. On his refusal, application was made to the staff of the national guard for assistance. General Dessolles repaired to the Tuileries to receive the king's orders on the subject. Meanwhile Fouché retained all his coolness, conversed with the agents of police, and pretending to step aside for some indispensable purpose, he opened a door which communicated with a dark passage, through which he escaped into the street, where he stepped into a coach and drove off, leaving the agents of the police to seek after him in vain. This is the whole history of the famous arrest of Fouché. As for Davoust, he was my personal enemy. I therefore only ordered him to be looked after, that it might not be said that I acted towards him from a spirit of personal vengeance.

On the 15th of March, the day on which the above circumstance occurred, I called upon M. de Blacas, and repeated to him what I had stated to the king on the certainty of Bonaparte's speedy arrival in Paris. I then mentioned that I considered it necessary to devote the short time still in our power to provide for the safety of the royalists, and to preserve public tranquillity until the departure of the royal family. 'You may believe, count,' said I, 'that, considering the important interests with which I am intrusted, I am not inclined to lose valuable time in arresting parties, whose arrest would lead to nothing beyond serving to irritate public feeling.' I then inquired what previous information he had obtained of Bonaparte's departure from Elba. 'The only thing which we know positively,' replied the minister, 'was by an intercepted letter, dated Elba, February 6th, which was addressed to a M. —, near Grenoble ; but I can show it you.' M. de Blacas opened the drawer of his writing-table and took out the letter, which he gave to me. The writer thanked his correspondent for the information he had transmitted to the *inmate* at Elba, and went on to state that

everything was prepared for the departure ; that the first favourable opportunity would be seized for that purpose, but that it would be desirable first to receive answers to some questions contained in the letter. These questions referred to the regiments which had been sent to the south, and to the places of their cantonment. It was inquired, whether the officers had been appointed as agreed on at Paris, and whether Labedoyere was at his post, concluding with the request that precise answers should be given to the inquiries. On returning this letter to M. de Blacas, I remarked that the contents of the letter called for the adoption of prompt measures, and asked what had been done. He answered, 'That he had immediately sent a copy of the letter to M. d'André, that orders might be given for arresting the individual to whom it was addressed.' Having had an opportunity of closely observing the machinery of a vigilant and active government, I was amazed at the insufficiency of the measures adopted to defeat this well-planned conspiracy, and of the total negligence and weakness of the higher officers of state.

When I entered upon my duties in the Prefecture of Police, the evil was already past remedy. The incorrigible emigrants required another lesson, and the momentary resurrection of the empire was inevitable—but it could not last long. I constantly stated that Bonaparte would not remain six months in France. But, if he was recalled, it was not owing to any attachment to his person ; nor was it from fidelity to the recollections of the empire that a portion of France embraced his cause again. It had become the general wish to get rid of the imbecile counsellors who thought they might treat France like a conquered country for the benefit of the emigrants. In this state of things some looked upon Bonaparte as a liberator, but the greater part merely as an instrument. In this last character he was looked upon by the old republicans, and by a new generation who had hitherto only beheld liberty in promises, and who were blind enough to believe that the idol of France would be restored by Napoleon.

In February, 1815, when all the arrangements for the departure from Elba had been completed, Murat applied to the court of Vienna for permission to march through the Austrian provinces of Upper Italy an army destined for France. On the 26th of the same month, Napoleon escaped from Elba. These two facts have necessarily a close connexion with each other ; for however extravagant Murat's ideas might have been he never could have

conceived it possible to compel the King of France by force of arms to recognize his claim to the crown of Naples. Since the return of Louis XVIII., the cabinet of the Tuileries had never regarded Murat in any other character than that of an usurper ; and I know that the French plenipotentiaries at the congress of Vienna had special instructions to insist that the restoration of the throne of Naples in favour of the Bourbons of the Two Sicilies should be a consequence of the restoration of the throne of France. I likewise know that this demand was strongly resisted on the part of Austria, whose government had never viewed without extreme jealousy three European thrones in the occupation of the single house of Bourbon. Murat, therefore, was well aware of the part he might play in France, by supporting the conspirators and the interests of Napoleon. Thus he daringly advanced to the banks of the Po, leaving his country and his capital exposed, and incurring by this movement the hostility both of Austria and France. It is incredible that he would have acted in this manner unless he had previously been assured of a powerful diversion, and the assistance of Napoleon in his favour. There is a possibility, indeed, that Murat contemplated securing himself in Italy while the whole powers of Europe should be engaged anew with Napoleon ; but both suppositions lead to the same conclusion—that he was a party to the enterprise of Bonaparte. Murat, however, thus acting rather like an adventurer than a monarch, and having failed in an attack against the bridge of Occhio-Bello, was obliged to retreat, and by this ill-judged expedition ruined the great cause in which he was intended to co-operate.

According to information which I received from authority on which I can rely, the following were the plans which Napoleon conceived at Elba. Almost immediately after his arrival in France, he was to order the marshals on whom he could rely to defend to the last extremity the entrance of the French territory, and the approaches to Paris, by manœuvring within the triple line of fortresses which gird the north and east of France. Davoust was set apart for the defence of Paris ; he was to arm the population of the suburbs, and to have besides 20,000 men of the national guard at his disposal. Napoleon, not knowing well the situation of the allies, never supposed that they could concentrate their forces and march against him so speedily as they did. He hoped to take them by surprise, and defeat their projects by causing Murat to march upon Milan, and exciting insurrection in Italy. The

Po once passed, and Murat approaching the capital of Italy, Napoleon, with the corps of Suchet, Brune, Grouchy, and Massena, increased by troops set by forced marches to Lyons, was to cross the Alps and revolutionize Piedmont. There, having recruited his army from amongst the insurgents, and joined the Neapolitans at Milan, he was to proclaim the independence of Italy, unite the whole country under a single chief, and afterwards march, at the head of 100,000 men, upon Vienna, through the Julian Alps, across which victory had conducted him in 1797. This was not all; numerous emissaries, scattered through Poland and Hungary, were there to foment troubles, to raise the cry of independence, so as to alarm Russia and Austria. It must be confessed it would have been an extraordinary spectacle to see Napoleon giving liberty to Europe in revenge for not having succeeded in enslaving her.

By means of these bold manœuvres and vast combinations, Napoleon had calculated upon assuming the initiative in military operations. Perhaps his genius was never more fully developed than in this vast conception, which was not matured in one day. This design, in fact, comprised the essence of all he had ever aspired to accomplish—embraced all the great enterprises which he had meditated from the first of his fields to his latest hour on the imperial throne. The final object alone was changed—from empire to liberty; but success would in all probability have restored the original plan of his selfish ambition. According to this plan he was to extend his military operations over a line of 500 leagues, from Ostend to Vienna, by the Alps and Italy. He would thus have secured immense resources of every kind, would not only have prevented the Emperor of Austria from marching his troops against France, but, perhaps, have obliged him to terminate a war by which the hereditary states would exclusively suffer. Such was the bright prospect which presented itself to Napoleon, when he stepped on board the vessel which was to convey him from Elba to France. But the mad precipitation of Murat put Europe on the alert, and the brilliant illusion faded like a dream.

After assuring myself that all was tranquil, and that the royal family were secure against every danger, I set out, alone, at four o'clock on the morning of the 20th of March, taking the road to Lille, where I arrived about midnight on the 21st, and found the gates closed, which obliged me to content myself with a miserable lodging in the suburbs for the night.

On the 23rd, Louis XVIII. arrived at Lille. His majesty also

found the gates closed, and more than an hour elapsed before an order could be obtained for opening them; for the Duke of Orleans, who commanded the town, was inspecting the troops when his majesty arrived. The king was perfectly well received. There appeared some symptoms of defection, for it must be acknowledged that the officers of the old army had been completely sacrificed and passed over to favour the promotion of the returned emigrants; it was therefore very natural that the army should hail the return of a man who had so often led them to victory.

It was Louis XVIII.'s decided wish to continue in France as long as he could; but the Napoleon fever spread with such rapidity among the troops, that the garrison of Lille could not be depended upon. Marshal Mortier expressed to me his well-founded fears, and recommended me to urge the king to quit Lille speedily, in order to avoid any fatal consequence. At length, with great reluctance, the king consented to go to Ghent, and I left Lille the day before that fixed for his majesty's departure.

In September, 1814, the king had named me *chargé d'affaires* from France to Hamburg, but not having received orders to repair to my post, I had not before mentioned it. However, when Louis XVIII. was on the point of leaving France, he thought my presence in Hamburg would prove useful to his interest. I set out immediately, and without reluctance, to a place where I was sure of finding many friends. Though thus removed from the immediate theatre of events, I continued to be informed of all important transactions.

Bonaparte entered Paris on the 20th of March, about nine at night. Nothing could be more gloomy than his entry. The darkness was increased by a thick fog, the streets were almost deserted, and a vague feeling of terror prevailed almost generally in the capital. I had not an opportunity of observing the aspect of Paris during that memorable period, recorded in history by the name of *the hundred days*; but the letters which I received at the time, together with all that I afterwards heard, concurred in assuring me that the capital never presented such a melancholy appearance as during this period. None had confidence in the duration of Napoleon's second reign; and it was said without any reserve that Fouché, while serving the usurpation, would surely betray it. Throughout the whole mass of society, fears for the future agitated men's minds, and discontent had become general. The sight of the federates

who paraded the Faubourgs and the boulevards shouting, 'Long live the republic,' and 'Death to the royalists!'—their sanguinary songs—the revolutionary airs played in the theatres—all tended to produce a fearful stupor over the mind, and the issue of the impending events was anxiously looked for.

One of the circumstances which, at the commencement of the hundred days, chiefly tended to open the eyes of those who were yet dazzled by the past glory of Napoleon, was the non-fulfilment of the promise which he made, that the empress and his son were to be restored to him immediately. It was evident that he could not count upon any ally; and in spite of the prodigious activity with which a new army was created, those persons must have been blind who could imagine the possibility of his triumphing over the whole of Europe, then evidently arming against him. I deplored the inevitable disasters which Bonaparte's bold enterprise would entail; but I had such certain information respecting the intentions of the allies, and the spirit which influenced the plenipotentiaries at Vienna, that I could not, for a moment, doubt the issue of the contest.

When the first intelligence of Bonaparte's attempt was received at Vienna, the congress had made but little progress towards the final arrangement of affairs; they had been proceeding with caution, as their desire was to reconstruct a solid and durable order of things after the violent storm which had agitated and shaken so many thrones. Louis XVIII. had instructed his plenipotentiaries to defend and support the principles of justice, and the law of nations, so as to secure the rights of all parties, and to prevent the chances of new wars. The congress was occupied on these important deliberations, when intelligence was received of Napoleon's landing in the Gulf of Juan. The plenipotentiaries then signed the protocol of the conferences, and terminated the congress.*

* The instant that the news of Napoleon's daring movement reached Vienna, the congress published a proclamation in these words.—'By breaking the convention which established him in Elba, Bonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended. By appearing again in France, with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and manifested to the universe that there can be neither peace nor truce with him. The powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Bonaparte has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance.'

CHAPTER L.

ON my arrival at Lille, and afterwards at Hamburg, I received letters from my family, which gave me an account of what had taken place at Paris since the return of Bonaparte. Two hours after my departure, Madame de Bourrienne also left Paris, accompanied by her children, and proceeded to a retreat that had been prepared for her about seven leagues from the capital. She left at my house in Paris her sister, two of her brothers, and her friend the Countess Neuilly, who had resided with us since her return from emigration.

On the very morning of our departure, namely, the 20th of March, General Berton, with whom I had always been on a footing of friendship, and who was entirely devoted to Bonaparte, sent to request that Madame de Bourrienne would call upon him, as he had some most important business to communicate. My sister-in-law, accompanied by a friend, waited upon the general, who advised her to conjure me, above all things, not to follow the king; he observed, that the cause of Louis XVIII. was utterly lost, and that I should do well to retire quickly into Burgundy, as there was no doubt of my receiving the emperor's pardon. This assurance of a full and complete pardon was also communicated to my family by order of Bonaparte on the very day after his arrival in Paris, as well as the desire that I should retain my post in the Prefecture of Police. I was, I confess, very well pleased with these proofs of consideration when they came to my knowledge; but I did not, for a single moment, repent the course I had taken. I could not forget the intrigues of which I had been the object since 1811, nor the continual threats of arrest which, during that year, had not left me a moment's quiet; and it was not until 1814 that I was made acquainted with the real causes of the persecution to which I had been subjected. I had then communicated to me the following letter, the original copy of which is in my possession:—

‘MONSIEUR LE DUC DE BASSANO,

‘I send you some very important documents respecting the *Sieur Bourrienne*, and I beg you will make me a confidential report on them. Keep these documents for yourself alone. This business demands the greatest secrecy. I am led to believe

that Bourrienne has carried on a series of intrigues with London. Bring me the report on Tuesday.

‘NAPOLEON.

‘PARIS, December 25, 1811.’

I could then clearly perceive what hitherto had been enveloped in obscurity ; but I was not as yet made acquainted with the documents mentioned in Napoleon’s epistle ; but I afterwards learned they referred to some intercourse I had had at Hamburg with General Driesen, a warm partisan of Louis XVIII.

I was shortly afterwards informed that seals were to be placed upon the effects of all the persons included in the decree of Lyons, and, consequently, upon mine. As soon as my wife received information of this, she quitted her retreat, and repaired to Paris to face the storm. On the 29th of March, at nine in the evening, the police agents presented themselves at my house. Madame de Bourrienne remonstrated against the measure, and at the unseasonable hour that was chosen for its execution ; but all was in vain, and there was no alternative but to be silent. It did not even end there, for during the month of May, seven persons were appointed to examine my papers. They behaved with great rudeness, and executed their commission with a rigour and severity exceedingly painful to my family. They carried their search so far as to examine the pockets of my old clothes, and even to rip up the linings. All this was done in the hope of compromising me in the eyes of the new master of France ; but I was not to be caught in that way, for before leaving home, I had taken such precautions as to set my mind perfectly at rest.

From Hamburg I wrote to M. de Talleyrand, acquainting him with my arrival. I received an answer dated Vienna, April 19, 1815, in which he informed me, that the allied troops were approaching the French frontiers with all possible speed. ‘In the military measures,’ he said, ‘the greatest energy and activity everywhere prevail. The Russian troops, who were on the Vistula, have arrived in Bohemia four days sooner than they were expected, and will reach the Rhine at the same time with the Austrian troops. It is expected that operations will commence about the middle of May, and the immense resources which have been combined leave no doubt respecting the issue of events.’ In my new place of residence, I did not wish to multiply my correspondence unnecessarily, and having rarely anything of importance to communicate to M. de Talleyrand I

did not often address myself to him. In a second letter which I received from that minister, dated Vienna, May 5, he requested me to write oftener. In that letter he observed, 'Since you received my communication of the 19th of April, you will have learned that the Duke d'Angouleme has been unable to maintain himself, as we hoped he would, in the southern provinces. France is, therefore, for the moment, entirely in the power of Bonaparte ; but hostilities will not be commenced against him for some time, as it is wished to attack him simultaneously on all points, and with great masses. The most perfect concord prevails among the powers with respect to the military measures. The war is carried on against Murat, with a success which warrants the hope that it will not be of long duration. He has applied twice for an armistice, which has been refused.'

I cannot afford a better idea of what was going on at Vienna, than by giving the above extracts from the letters of the first diplomatist of Europe, for such M. de Talleyrand undoubtedly proved himself at that difficult period. At Vienna, as at Tilsit, he could not support himself upon the right of conquest ; his task was now to advocate the rights of the conquered, and yet he induced the allies to acknowledge, as a principle, the legitimacy of the throne of Naples in favour of a Bourbon prince, and at the same time prevented Prussia from aggrandizing herself too much at the expense of Saxony.

Napoleon had no sooner re-established himself in the Tuileries, than he commenced his preparations to meet the gigantic confederacy which was forming against him. 'Carnot became once more Minister of War ; and what Napoleon and he, when labouring together in the reorganization of an army, could effect, had been abundantly manifested at the commencement of the consulate. The army cantoned in France, when Bonaparte landed at Cannes, numbered 175,000 ; the cavalry had been greatly reduced ; and the disasters of 1812, 1813, and 1814, were visible in the miserable deficiency of military stores and arms, especially of artillery. By incredible exertions, notwithstanding the pressure of innumerable cares and anxieties of all kinds, and although the temper of the nation prevented him from having recourse to the old method of conscription—the emperor, ere May was over, had 375,000 men in arms—including an imperial guard of 40,000 chosen veterans, in the most splendid state of equipment and discipline, a large and brilliant force of cavalry, and a train of artillery of proportional

extent and excellence.' He also made every effort by means of his diplomacy to induce the allies to recognize the integrity of France, but without the least prospect of success. He, therefore, prepared for war. He had no intention to abide at home the onset of his enemies ; but the situation of civil affairs prevented him from commencing his military operations so soon as he could have wished—he met with difficulties which, in former days, were not used to perplex the opening of his campaigns. Therefore, after having presided at a great meeting in the *Champ-de-Mai*, on the 1st of June, and, three days after, having opened the sittings of the two chambers, he left Paris on the evening of the 11th of June to take the command of the army. He arrived at Vervins on the 12th, and assembled and reviewed at Beaumont on the 14th the whole of the army which had been prepared to act immediately under his orders. They had been carefully selected, and formed, perhaps, the most perfect force, though far from the most numerous, with which he had ever taken the field.

France and Europe were not kept long in suspense, for military operations commenced on the morning of the 15th, and the campaign and the war were decided by the great and sanguinary battle of Waterloo.*

The fulfilment of my prediction was now at hand ; † for the result of the battle of Waterloo enabled Louis XVIII. to return to his dominions. As soon as I heard of the king's departure from Ghent, I quitted Hamburg, and travelled with all possible expedition, in the expectation that I should have been enabled to reach Paris in time to witness his majesty's entrance. I arrived at Saint Denis on the 7th of July, and having resumed my uniform of a captain of the national guard, I proceeded immediately to the king's palace. The saloon was filled with ladies and gentlemen who had come to congratulate the king on his return.

At Saint Denis I found my family, who, not being aware that I had left Hamburg, were much surprised to see me. They informed me that the Parisians were all impatient for the return of the king, a fact of which I could judge by the opposition made to the free expression of public opinion. Paris having been

* For an account of the military operations connected with the campaign of 1815, see the abstract appended to the end of this chapter.

† The reader will recollect that while Louis XVIII. was at Lille, previous to his departure from France, I mentioned to his majesty my conviction that he would be restored to his throne before six months.

declared in a state of blockade, the gates were closed, and no one was allowed to leave the capital without permission. It is true, this permission could be obtained with tolerable ease, but the forms to be observed were such as to deter the mass of the people from proceeding to Saint Denis to meet the king at his public entry. As it had been resolved to force upon the king Fouché and the tricoloured cockade, it was attempted to keep away from his majesty all who might persuade him to resist the proposed measure. The king, however, resolutely refused to permit the tricoloured cockade to be adopted ; but he conceded to appoint Fouché his Minister of Police. It has been confidently stated, that Wellington was the person by whose influence in particular Fouché was made one of the counsellors of the king. After all the benefits which foreigners have conferred upon us, Fouché was, indeed, an acceptable present to France and to the king !

I was not ignorant of the influence of the Duke of Wellington upon the second restoration ; but for a long time I refused to believe that his influence should have outweighed all the serious considerations opposed to such a perfect anomaly as appointing Fouché the minister of a Bourbon. But I was deceived. France and the king owed to him Fouché's introduction into the council, and I had to thank him for the impossibility of my resuming a situation which I had relinquished to follow the king into Belgium. The king could not offer me the place of Prefect of Police under one whom, a short time before, I had received orders to arrest, but who had eluded my agents. That was impossible. Therefore, I was right in not relying on the assurances which had been given me ; but I confess that, if I had been told to guess the cause, I never could have supposed that it arose from Fouché being appointed as a minister of the King of France. Fouché Minister of the Police ! If, like Don Juan, I had seen a statue move, I could not have been more confounded than when I heard this news. I could not credit it until it was repeated to me by different persons. How, indeed, could I think that, at the moment of a reaction, the king should have intrusted the most important ministerial department to a man to whose arrest he had, a hundred days before, attached so much importance—to a man, moreover, whom Bonaparte had appointed at Lyons to fill the same office. This was impossible ! Thus, in less than twenty-four hours, the same man had been intrusted to execute measures the most opposite, and, to some interests, the most contradictory. He was one day the minister of usurpation, and the next the minister of legitimacy !

Having returned to private life solely on account of Fouché's presence in the ministry, I yielded to that consolation which is always left to the discontented. I watched the extravagance and inconsistency which were passing around me, and the new follies which were every day committed ; and it must be confessed, that a rich and varied picture was presented to my observation. The king did not bring back M. de Blacas—he yielded to prudent advice, and, on arriving at Mons, he sent the unlucky minister as his ambassador to Naples.

Vengeance had been talked of, and there were some inconsiderate persons who wished to avail themselves of the presence of foreigners to put what they called 'an end to the Revolution' ; as if there were any other means of effecting that object than by frankly adopting whatever good the Revolution had produced ! The foreigners observed with pleasure the disposition of these foolish persons, as they thought it might turn to their own advantage. The truth is, that on the second restoration our pretended allies proved themselves our enemies.

But for them—but for their bad conduct—their insatiable exactions—but for the humiliation which was felt at seeing foreign cannon planted in the streets of Paris, and beneath the very windows of the palace—the days which followed the 8th of July might have been considered by the royal family as a period of rejoicing. Every day people thronged to the Tuileries, and expressed their joy by singing and dancing under the king's windows. This ebullition of feeling might perhaps be considered absurd ; but it at least bore evidence of the pleasure caused by the return of the Bourbons. These manifestations of joy, however, became displeasing to Fouché, and he determined to put a stop to them, lest it might be supposed that his services could be dispensed with. Wretches were hired to mingle with the crowd, and to sprinkle destructive acids upon the dresses of the females, and to commit acts of indecency, to prevent respectable people from visiting the gardens of the Tuileries, through fear of being insulted or injured. Thus, by such means, he contrived to make it be believed, that he was the only person capable of preventing the disturbances of which he himself was the author. He got the police of the Tuileries under his control, and the singing and dancing ceased, and the palace was the scene of dulness.

While the king was at Saint Denis he re-appointed General Dessolles to the command of the national guard. The general ordered the barriers to be immediately removed. On the arrival

of the king in Paris, he determined to surround the throne by a privy council, the members of which were to consist of the princes, and such persons as his majesty might appoint at a future period. He then named his new ministry, which was thus composed :—

Prince Talleyrand, peer of France, President of the Council of Ministers, and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Baron Louis, Minister of Finance.

The Duke of Otranto, Minister of Police

Baron Pasquier, Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals.

Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Minister of War.

Count de Jaucourt, peer of France, Minister of the Marine.

The Duke de Richelieu, peer of France, Minister of the King's Household.

The portfolio of the Minister of the Interior, which was not immediately disposed of, was provisionally intrusted to the Minister of Justice. Great satisfaction was expressed on the appointment of Marshal Macdonald to the Chancellorship of the Legion of Honour, in place of M. de Pradt. M. de Chabrol resumed the prefecture of the Seine, and M. de Molé was made Director-General of Bridges and Highways ; I was superseded in the Prefecture of Police by M. de Cazes, and M. Ferrand became Director-General of the Post Office.

In the month of August, the king having resolved to convoke a new chamber of deputies, I was appointed president of the electoral college of the department of the Yonne. As soon as I was informed of my nomination, I waited upon M. de Talleyrand to receive instructions, but he told me that, in conformity with the king's directions, I was to receive my orders from the Minister of Police. I observed, that I had a great objection to wait upon Fouché, on account of the situation in which we stood with reference to each other. 'Go to him, go to him,' said M. de Talleyrand—'be assured he will not take any notice of it.' I did so, and was very much surprised at my reception. He received me as a man would be expected to receive an intimate friend that he had not seen for a long time. On reflection I was not surprised at his conduct, for I was well aware that Fouché could make his hatred give way to necessity : he said not a word about his arrest, and on my asking for instructions respecting the elections of the Yonne, he merely desired me to get myself nominated if I could, and to use my influence to exclude General Desfournaux. 'Anything else,' said he, 'is a matter

of indifference to me.'—'What is your objection to him?'—'The ministry will not have him.' I was about to depart when he called me back, and entered into a long conversation respecting the first return of the Bourbons, which it is not necessary here to describe, otherwise than that he spoke of them with great disrespect; indeed, it was impossible to carry indecorum of language further than he did. He spoke of the royal family in such terms of contempt, that he appeared like a bold conspirator, or a perfidious seducer, rather than as a minister of the king. I could almost have fancied he was attempting to practise upon me the treachery of which Joseph Bonaparte had once made me the dupe at Fouché's house, or, in other words, that he was playing the part of a spy; but knowing as I did his odious principles, I felt that he was giving utterance to his real sentiments. I then broke off this extraordinary conversation.

I conceived it my duty to make the king acquainted with the conversation I had had with his Minister of Police, and as there was now no Count de Blacas to keep truth and good advice from his majesty's ear, I was, on my first solicitation, admitted to a private interview. The king thanked me for my communication, and I could perceive that he was convinced that, by retaining Fouché any longer, he would become the victim of the minister who had been forced upon him on the 7th of July. The disgrace of the Duke of Otranto speedily followed, and I had the satisfaction of having contributed to repair one of the evils inflicted upon France by the Duke of Wellington.

Soon after my audience with the king, I set off to discharge my duties in the department of the Yonne, and I obtained the honour of being elected to represent my countrymen in the Chamber of Deputies. My colleague was M. Randot, a man who, in very trying circumstances, had given proof of his attachment to the king's government.

After my election I returned to Paris, but took no part in public affairs. I was grieved to see the government resort to measures of severity, to punish faults which it would have been better policy to attribute to the unfortunate circumstances of the times. No consideration can ever make me cease to regret the memory of Marshal Ney, who was sacrificed to the influence of foreigners. Their object, as Blucher intimated to me, was to disable France from engaging in new wars for a long time; and they hoped to accomplish that object by stirring up between the government and the army that discord which the sacrifice of

Ney was calculated to produce. I have no positive proof of the fact, but in my opinion, Ney's life was a pledge of gratitude which Fouché considered he must offer to that influence which made him minister.

In the month of August I was named by the king a counsellor of state, and in the following month I was appointed a Minister of State and Member of the Privy Council. I may close this volume by relating a circumstance connected with the last-mentioned nomination, which I felt as very flattering to me. The king had directed M. de Talleyrand, as President of the Council, to present to him a list of such persons as he deemed suitable as members of the privy council. The king having read the list, said to his minister, 'But M. de Talleyrand, I do not see the names of two of our best friends, Bourrienne and Alexis de Noailles.'—'Sire, I considered that their nomination would seem more flattering in coming directly from your majesty.' The king then added my name, as well as that of the Count Alexis de Noailles, to the list; so that our names are written in Louis XVIII.'s own hand in the original ordinance.

I have now brought to a termination my narrative of the extraordinary and important events in which I have taken a part, either as an actor or as a spectator, and of which, at present, little more than the mere recollection remains.

ABSTRACT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815.

EXTRACTED FROM THE REMARKS PUBLISHED BY CAPTAIN
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IN the following observations, it is not pretended that any new matter can be given on a subject already so much discussed; still, some facts and considerations are treated of, which have not been perhaps fully or fairly appreciated.

France, as is well known, is, on the Belgian frontier, studded with fortresses. Belgium, on the contrary, is now defenceless. The numerous fortresses in the Low Countries, so celebrated in our former wars, had been dismantled in the reign of the Emperor Joseph; and their destruction completed by the French when they got possession of the country at the battle of Fleurus, 1794, with the exception of Antwerp, Ostend, and Nieuport, which they had kept up on account of their marine importance.

These circumstances placed the two parties in very different situations, both for security, and for facility of preparing and carrying into execution the measures either for attack or defence.

It may be well supposed, that the general impression in Belgium was, that Bonaparte would lose no time in endeavouring to regain a country which he considered as almost part of France ; important to him from the resources it would have afforded, and perhaps still more so, as it would deprive his enemies of so convenient a base of operations for the preparation of the means for attacking France. The discontent in Belgium, and the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, also amongst the Saxon troops who had served in his army, was known. The mutinous spirit of these troops appeared to be in concert with the movements of the French forces on the frontiers ; so much so, that they were disarmed and sent to the rear. In the former, the discontent was particularly favoured by the number of French officers and soldiers who had been discharged as aliens from the French army, in which they had served nearly since the Revolution, and now gave themselves little care to conceal their real sentiments and attachments. The flight of Louis from Lille, through Flanders, added to this feeling in Belgium—such appeared to be the prevailing spirit. The force the British had to keep it in check, and resist an invasion, amounted only to 6000 or 7000 men, under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, consisting chiefly of second battalions, hastily collected, a great portion of our best troops not having yet returned from America. There were also in Belgium the German legion, together with 8000 to 10,000 men of the new Hanoverian levies. The organization of the Belgian troops had been just commenced, so that the force of the Prince of Orange might amount to about 20,000 men. The Prussian General Kleist, who commanded on the Rhine and Meuse, had 30,000 men, afterwards augmented to 50,000, which, however, included the Saxons.

The intelligence of Napoleon having landed at Cannes on the 1st of March, reached Brussels on the 9th. Preparations were immediately made for the defence of the country. The British troops under General Clinton concentrated, with their allies, near Ath, Mons, and Tournay ; and these places, with Ypres, Ghent, and Oudenarde, were ordered to be put in a state of defence consistently with the exigencies of the moment. To effect this, every use was made of what remained of the old fortifications. New works were added, and advantage was taken of the great system of defence in that country, which is generally under

the level of some canal, or the sea, and consequently capable of being inundated. The sluices which commanded the inundations were covered by strong redoubts.

About 20,000 labourers, called in by requisitions on the country, were daily employed on the works, in addition to the working parties furnished by the troops. The necessary artillery and stores were supplied from England and Holland. Troops arrived daily, and were immediately moved to the frontiers, whence, from the movements that were constantly taking place, it is probable that exaggerated accounts were transmitted to the enemy. By these vigorous and prompt measures, confidence became restored—the panic amongst the people of Belgium was removed—they saw that their country was not to be given up without a severe struggle ; it fixed the wavering, and silenced the disaffected. In less than a month, most of the frontier places were safe from a coup-de-main.

The Duke of Wellington had arrived at Brussels from Vienna early in April, and immediately inspected the frontier and the fortresses ; after which, he agreed on a plan of operations with the Prussians, by which they concentrated their troops along the Sambre and Meuse, occupying Charleroi, Namur, and Liege, so as to be in communication with his left. The Prussians had repaired the works round Cologne, which assured their communications with Prussia, and gave them a tête-du-pont on the Rhine. Reference to the map will shew that the cantonments of the Prussians, along the Sambre and Meuse, enabled them to act in concert with our army ; to cover their line of communication with Prussia ; and to move rapidly into the provinces of the Moselle, in the event of the enemy advancing from Metz.

The Russians were to have come into the line at Mayence, but they did not reach the Rhine until June, and then only the first corps ; so that, for the present, a gap existed from the Prussian left at Dinant, to the Austro-Bavarian right at Mannheim.

It was an important object to cover Brussels ; and it is to be considered that this city forms, as it were, a centre to a large portion of the French frontier, extending about seventy miles from the Lys to the Meuse, viz. from Menin to Philipville or Givet ; that it is about fifty miles distant from these extreme points ; and that it was necessary to guard the entry from France by Tournay, Mons, and Charleroi ; and also to prevent Ghent, a very important place, from being attacked from Lille

Bonaparte appears to have attached much importance to the occupation of Brussels, as appears by the bulletins found ready printed in his baggage, which was captured. It was therefore of much importance, in every point of view, to prevent even a temporary occupation of this city, and this could only be done by risking an action in front of it.

Some movements were observed on the French frontier between Lille and Berguer, as if preparing for offensive operations, about the end of March, at which period the troops cantoned near Menin had orders, after making due resistance, and destroying the bridge on the Lys, to fall back on Courtrai, their point of assembling; and then, after such a resistance as would not compromise their safety in retreat, to endeavour to ascertain the object of the enemy's movements, and give time for the troops to assemble. They were to retire on Oudenarde and Ghent, opening the sluices, and extending the inundation. About the beginning of May similar movements were also observed, but less was then to be apprehended, since, by the advanced state of the works at Tournay, the tête-du-pont at Oudenarde and Ghent, we then commanded the Scheldt, and could have assumed the offensive.

Great credit is undoubtedly due to Napoleon, for the mode in which he concealed his movements, and the rapidity with which he concentrated his army. The forced marches he was obliged to make appear, however, to have paralyzed his subsequent movements, from the fatigue his troops underwent. The army he commanded were mostly old soldiers of the same nation, under a single chief. The allied armies were composed of different nations, a great portion young levies, and under two generals, each of such reputation as not likely to yield great deference to the other.

On the night of the 14th of June, the French army bivouacked in three divisions, as near the frontier as possible, without being observed by the Prussians; the left at Ham-sur-heure, the centre at Beaumont, where the head-quarters were established, and the right at Philipville.

At three o'clock a.m., on the 15th of June, the French army crossed the frontier in three columns, directed on Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Chatelet. The Prussian outposts were quickly driven in; they, however, maintained their ground obstinately at three points, until eleven o'clock, when General Ziethen took up a position at Gilly and Gosselies, in order to check the advance of the enemy, and then retired slowly on Fleurus,

agreeably to the orders of Marshal Blucher, to allow time for the concentration of his army. The French army was formed, on the night of the 15th, in three columns, the left at Gosselies, the centre near Gilly, and the right at Chatelet. Two corps of the Prussian army occupied the position at Sombref on the same night, where they were joined by the 1st corps, and occupied St. Amand, Bry, and Ligny; so that, notwithstanding all the exertions of the French, at a moment when time was of such importance, they had only been able to advance about fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen hours of daylight. The corps of Ziethen had suffered considerably, but he had effected his orders; so that Marshal Blucher was enabled to assemble three corps of his army, 80,000 men, in position early on the 15th, and his 4th corps was on its march to join him that evening.

The Duke of Wellington seems to have expected an attack by the Mons chaussée, and on his first receiving information of the enemy's movements, merely ordered his troops to hold themselves in readiness; this was on the evening of the 15th of June, at six o'clock. Having obtained further intelligence about eleven o'clock, which confirmed the real attack of the enemy to be along the Sambre, orders were immediately given for the troops to march upon Quatre-bras.

The Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre-bras on the 16th, at an early hour, and immediately proceeded to Bry, to concert measures with Marshal Blucher, for arranging the most efficient plan of support. It appeared at that time that the whole French attack would be directed against the Prussians, as considerable masses of the enemy were in movement in their front.

The object of the enemy on the 16th, as may be seen by the general orders of Napoleon, communicated by Soult to Ney and Grouchy, was to turn the Prussian right, by driving the British from Quatre-bras, and then to march down the chaussée upon the Bry, and thus separate the armies. For this purpose, Ney was detached with 43,000 men. The plan was excellent, and if Ney had been successful, would have led to important results. After obtaining possession of Quatre-bras, he was to have detached part of his forces to attack the Prussian right flank in rear of St. Amand, whilst Bonaparte was making the chief attack on that village, the strongest in the position, and at the same time keeping the whole Prussian line engaged. Half of Ney's force was left in reserve near Frasnès, to be in readiness either to support the attacks on Quatre-bras or St. Amand, and

in the event of both succeeding, to turn the Prussian right, by marching direct on Wagnele or Bry.

The village of St. Amand was well defended ; it formed the strength of the Prussian right, and from the intersection of several gardens and hedges, was very capable of defence, although so much in advance of the rest of the Prussian position. After a continued attack for two hours, the enemy had only obtained possession of half the village of St. Amand, and a severe attack was made upon Ligny, which was taken and retaken several times. At this time Bonaparte sent for the corps of reserve left by Ney at Frasnes ; before, however, it reached St. Amand in consequence of the check they had sustained at Quatre-bras, it was countermarched, and from this circumstance became of little use either to Bonaparte or Ney. Bonaparte having observed the masses of troops which Blücher had brought up behind St. Amand, appears to have changed the disposition of his reserves, who were marching upon St. Amand, and moved them towards the right to attack the Prussian centre at Ligny, which they succeeded in forcing, and so obtained possession of that village. It was now nine o'clock, about dark, which prevented the French from advancing farther, and they contented themselves with the occupation of Ligny. The Prussians did not evacuate Bry before three o'clock a.m. on the 17th. In the course of the night, the Prussians fell back on Tilly and Gembloux. The loss of the Prussians, according to their own account, amounted to 14,000 men, and fifteen pieces of artillery : the French official account in the *Moniteur* says 15,000. The French acknowledge to have lost 7,000.

The force of the enemy, at the time the Duke of Wellington left Quatre-bras to communicate with Blücher, appeared to be so weak, that no serious attack was at that time to be apprehended ; but on his return to that position, about three o'clock, he found they had assembled a large force at Frasnes, and were preparing for an attack, which was made about half-past three o'clock by two columns of infantry, and nearly all their cavalry, supported by a heavy fire of artillery. The force at that time under his orders was 17,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, of which about 4500 were British infantry, the rest Hanoverians, and Belgians, and Nassau troops. They at first obtained some success, driving back the Belgian and Brunswick cavalry ; their cavalry penetrated amongst our infantry before they had quite time to form squares, and forced a part to retire into the adjoining wood ; they were, however, repulsed. At this period

of the action, the third British division, under General Alten, arrived about four o'clock, soon after the action had commenced. They consisted of about 6300 men, and were composed of British, King's German legion, and Hanoverians. They had some difficulty in maintaining their ground, and one regiment lost a colour. They succeeded, however, in repelling the enemy from the advanced points he had gained at the farm of Gemin-court and the village of Pierremont.

Ney still, however, occupied part of the wood of Bossu, which extends from Quatre-bras, on the right of the road towards Frasnes, to the distance of about a mile. This favoured an attack on the right of our position, which he accordingly made, after having been repulsed on the left. At this moment the division of General Cooke (guards), 4000 strong, arrived from Enghien, and materially assisted to repel this attack, which, after considerable exertions, was done, and the enemy driven back upon Frasnes in much confusion. This affair was severely contested, and though the enemy were repulsed, the loss on each side was nearly equal, owing to the superiority of the French in artillery. The loss, however, inflicted on the French by the fire of musketry, which their attacking columns were exposed to, was very considerable, and counterbalanced the advantage they derived from their artillery. It required great exertions to maintain the important post of Quatre-bras, in the present relative situations of the two armies. If Ney had advanced as rapidly as Bonaparte says he might have done, he would have obtained his object.

• But even had Ney got possession of Quatre-bras at an early hour, he would scarcely have been able to detach any sufficient force against the Prussians, seeing, as he must have done, or at least ought to have calculated, that the British forces were arriving rapidly on the point which we suppose him to have occupied. The British could have still retreated on Waterloo, and been concentrated on the 17th at that position; and there was nothing to prevent the Prussians retreating on Wavre, as they afterwards did. Bonaparte did not gain possession of Quatre-bras until the forenoon of the 17th. He had sustained a severe check with one part of his army, and gained an indecisive action with the other; the loss of the allies not exceeding his own, whilst they had the advantage of retiring leisurely on their resources and reinforcements, and, by the retreat, gave up no place or position now of consequence to the pursuing enemy. The result of the operations of the 16th

produced no important consequences to the French. The celebrated engineer, General Rogniat, does not hesitate to term it an indecisive action. The success of the British in repelling the attack of Quatre-bras, tended to make them meet the renewed attack at Waterloo with more confidence, and probably had a contrary effect on the enemy; whilst the manner in which the Prussian corps of Thielmann received the attack of Grouchy on the 18th, who had superior forces, shewed how little the confidence of the Prussians had been shaken by the action at Ligny.

The outline of the operations, and the strategy on the part of Napoleon to separate the two armies, was no doubt finely conceived, and, as we have seen, was nearly successful; yet it is presumed that, had it been so, even to the extent Bonaparte could hope or expect, the allies had still a safe retreat, and sufficient resources. On all sides it was a calculation of hours. It is hardly possible to know the point an enterprising enemy means to attack, especially on so extended a line; and here the assailant has the advantage.

The spirited manner in which the allied marshals adhered to their plans of defence previously agreed on, and extricated themselves from the difficulties which they found themselves placed in by the sudden and vigorous attack they had to sustain, and which their distinct commands tended rather to increase, must command admiration.

On the morning of the 17th, the British troops remained in possession of Quatre-bras, where the rest of the army had joined the Duke of Wellington, who was prepared to maintain that position against the French army, had the Prussians remained in the position of Ligny, so as to give him support.

Marshal Blucher had sent an aide-de-camp to inform the duke of his retreat, who was unfortunately killed, and it was not until seven o'clock on the 17th, that Lord Wellington learned the direction which the Prussians had taken. The Prussians had fallen back very leisurely on Wavre, their rear-guard occupying Bry, which they did not evacuate before three o'clock on the morning of the 17th. The retrograde movement of the Prussians rendered a corresponding one necessary on the part of the British, which was performed in the most leisurely manner, the duke allowing the men time to finish their cooking. About ten o'clock the whole army retired, in three columns, by Genappe and Nivelles, towards a position at Waterloo.

As the troops arrived in position in front of Mont Saint Jean

they took up the ground they were to maintain, which was effected early in the evening. The weather began to be very severe at this period. The whole French army, under Bonaparte, with the exception of two corps under Grouchy (32,000 men, and 108 guns), took up a position immediately in front; and after some cannonading both armies remained opposite to each other during the night, the rain falling in torrents. The duke had already communicated with Marshal Blücher, who promised to come to his support with the whole of his army on the morning of the 18th. It was consequently decided upon to cover Brussels (the preservation of which was of such importance, in every point of view, to the King of the Netherlands), by maintaining the position of Mont St. Jean. The intention of the allied chiefs, if they were not attacked on the 18th, was to have attacked the enemy on the 19th.

The morning of the 18th, and part of the forenoon, were passed by the enemy in a state of supineness, for which it was difficult to account. The rain had certainly retarded his movements, more particularly that of bringing his artillery into position; yet it was observed that this had been accomplished at an early hour. Grouchy has given as a reason that Napoleon's ammunition had been so much exhausted in the preceding actions, that there was only a sufficiency with the army for an action of eight hours. The heavy fall of rain on the night of the 17th was no doubt more disadvantageous to the enemy than to the troops under Lord Wellington; the latter were in position and had few movements to make; whilst the enemy's columns and particularly his cavalry, were much fatigued and impeded by the state of the ground, which, with the trampled corn, caused them to advance more slowly, and kept them longer under fire. On the other hand, the same causes delayed the Prussians in their junction, which they had promised to effect at eleven o'clock, and obliged Lord Wellington to maintain the position alone nearly eight hours longer than had been calculated upon.

About twelve o'clock, the enemy commenced the action by an attack upon Hougomont, with several columns, preceded by numerous light troops, who, after severe skirmishing, drove the Nassau troops from the wood in its front, and established themselves in it.

During the early part of the day, the action was almost entirely confined to this part of the line, except a galling fire of artillery along the centre, which was vigorously returned by our guns. This fire gradually extended towards the left, and some

demonstrations of an attack of cavalry were made by the enemy. As the troops were drawn up on the slope of the hill, they suffered most severely from the enemy's artillery. In order to remedy this, Lord Wellington moved them back about one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards, to the reverse slope of the hill, to shelter them from the direct fire of the guns; our artillery in consequence remained in advance, that they might see into the valley. This movement was made between one and two o'clock by the duke in person; it was general along the front or centre of the position, on the height to the right of La Haye Sainte.

It is by no means improbable that the enemy considered this movement as the commencement of a retreat, since a considerable portion of our troops were withdrawn from his sight, and determined in consequence to attack our left centre, in order to get possession of the buildings called Ferme de M. St. Jean, or of the village itself, which commanded the point of junction of the two chaussées. The attacking columns advanced on the Genappe chaussée, and by the side of it; they consisted of four columns of infantry (d'Erlon's corps, which was not engaged on the 16th), thirty pieces of artillery, and a large body of cuirassiers (Milhaud's). On the left of this attack, the French cavalry took the lead of the infantry, and had advanced considerably, when the Duke of Wellington ordered the heavy cavalry (Life Guards) to charge them as they ascended the position near La Haye Sainte. They were driven back on their own position, where the chaussée, being cut into the rising ground, leaves steep banks on either side. In this confined space they fought at swords' length for some minutes, until the enemy brought down some light artillery from the heights, when the British cavalry retired to their own position. The loss of the cuirassiers did not appear great. They seemed immediately to reform their ranks, and soon after advanced to attack our infantry, who were formed into squares to receive them, being then unsupported by cavalry. The columns of infantry in the meantime pushed forward on *our* left of the Genappe chaussée, beyond La Haye Sainte, which they did not attempt in this attack to take. A Belgian brigade of infantry, formed in front, gave way, and these columns crowned the position; when Sir Thomas Picton moved up the brigade of General Pack from the second line (the 92nd regiment in front), which opened a fire on the column just as it gained the height, and advanced upon it; when within thirty yards, the column began to hesitate; at this moment a

brigade of heavy cavalry (the 1st and 2nd Dragoons) wheeled round the 92nd regiment, and took the column in flank ; a total rout ensued ; the French, throwing down their arms, ran into our position to save themselves from being cut down by the cavalry ; many were killed, and two eagles, with 2000 prisoners, taken. But the cavalry pursued their success too far, and being fired upon by one of the other columns, and at the same time, when in confusion, being attacked by some French cavalry, who had been sent to support the attack, the British were obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this attack the enemy had brought forward several pieces of artillery, which were captured by our cavalry ; the horses in the guns were killed, and we were obliged to abandon the guns. General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry, was killed. The gallant Sir Thomas Picton also fell, leading on his division to repel this attack. From this period, half-past two, until the end of the action, the British cavalry were scarcely engaged, but remained in readiness in the second line. After the French cuirassiers had re-formed, and were strongly reinforced, they again advanced upon our position, and made several desperate attacks upon our infantry, who immediately formed into squares, and maintained themselves with the most determined courage and coolness.

The French cavalry, in the attack on the centre of our line above mentioned, were not supported by infantry. They came on, however, with the greatest courage, close to the squares of our infantry ; the artillery, which was somewhat in advance, kept up a well-directed fire upon them as they advanced, but, on their nearer approach, the gunners were obliged to retire into the squares, so that the guns were actually in possession of the enemy's cavalry, who could not, however, keep possession of them, or even spike them, if they had the means, in consequence of the heavy fire of musketry to which they were exposed. They were driven back with loss on all points, and the artillerymen immediately resumed their guns in the most prompt manner, and opened a severe and destructive fire of grape-shot on them as they retired.*

* The cavalry came up to one of the squares at a trot, and appeared to be hanging back as if expecting our fire ; they closed round two sides of it, having a front of seventy or eighty men, and came so close to one angle, that they appeared to try to reach over the bayonets with their swords. The squares were generally formed four deep, rounded at the angles ; on the approach of the cavalry two files fired, the others reserving their fire : the cavalry then turned, and it is not

After the failure of the first attack, the French had little or no chance of success by renewing it ; but the officers, perhaps ashamed of the failure of such boasted troops, endeavoured repeatedly to bring them back to charge the squares ; but they could only be brought to pass between them, and round them. They even penetrated to our second line, where they cut down some stragglers and artillery-drivers, who were with the limbers and ammunition-waggons. They charged the Belgian squares in the second line with no better success ; and upon some heavy Dutch cavalry shewing themselves, they soon retired.

If the enemy supposed us in retreat, then such an attack of cavalry might have led to the most important results ; but by remaining so uselessly in our position, and passing and repassing our squares of infantry, they suffered severely by their fire ; so much so, that before the end of the action, when they might have been of great use, either in the attack, or in covering the retreat, they were nearly destroyed. Had Bonaparte been nearer the front, he surely would have prevented this useless sacrifice of his best troops. Indeed, the attack of cavalry at this period is only to be accounted for by supposing the British army to be in retreat. Thus, every attack of the enemy had been repulsed, and a severe loss inflicted. The influence this must have had on the 'morale' of each army, was much in favour of the British, and the probability of success on the part of the enemy was consequently diminished from that period.

It may here be proper to consider the situation of the Prussian army, and the assistance they had rendered up to this time, about six o'clock.

The British army had sustained several severe attacks, which had been all repulsed, and no advantage of any consequence had been gained by the enemy. They had possessed part of the wood and garden of Hougomont, and La Haye Sainte, which latter they were unable to occupy. Not a square had been broken, shaken, or obliged to retire. Our infantry continued to display the same obstinacy, the same cool, calculating confidence in themselves, in their commander, and in their officers, which had covered them with glory in the long and arduous war in

easy to believe how few fell—only one officer and two men ; no doubt many were wounded, but did not fall from their horses. Many squares fired at the distance of thirty paces, with no other effect. In fact, our troops fired too high, which must have been noticed by the most casual observer.

the Peninsula. From the limited extent of the field of battle, and the tremendous fire their columns were exposed to, the loss of the enemy could not have been less than 15,000 killed and wounded. Two eagles and 2000 prisoners had been taken, and their cavalry almost destroyed. We still occupied nearly the same position as we did in the morning, but our loss had been severe, perhaps not less than 10,000 killed and wounded. Our ranks were further thinned by the numbers of men who carried off the wounded, part of whom never returned to the field. The number of Belgian and Hanoverian troops, many of whom were young levies that crowded to the rear, was very considerable, besides the number of our own dismounted dragoons, together with a proportion of our infantry, some of whom, as will always be found in the best armies, were glad to escape from the field. These thronged the road leading to Brussels, in a manner that none but an eye-witness could have believed ; so that perhaps the actual force under the Duke of Wellington at this time, half-past six, did not amount to more than 34,000 men. We had at an early hour been in communication with some patrols of Prussian cavalry on our extreme left. But it was certainly past five o'clock before the fire of the Prussian artillery (Bulow's corps) was observed from our position ; and it soon seemed to cease altogether. It appears that they had advanced, and obtained some success, but were afterwards driven back to a considerable distance by the French, who sent a corps under General Lobau to keep them in check. About half-past six, the first Prussian corps came into communication with our extreme left near Ohain.

The effective state of the several armies may be considered to have been as follows.

The army under the Duke of Wellington amounted, at the commencement of the campaign, to 75,000 men, including every description of force, of which nearly 40,000 were English or the King's German legion. Our loss at Quatre-bras amounted to 4500 killed and wounded, which reduced the army to 70,500 men ; of these about 54,000 were actually engaged at Waterloo—about 32,000 were composed of British troops, or the King's German legion, including cavalry, infantry, and artillery ; the remainder, under Prince Frederic, took no part in the action, but covered the approach to Brussels from Nivelles, and were stationed in the neighbourhood of Halle. The French force has been variously stated, and it is not easy to form a very accurate statement of their strength. Batty gives it at 127,000 ;

that is the number which crossed the frontiers. It is also given at 122,000. Courgaud reduces it to 115,000 ; of these, 21,000 were cavalry, and they had 350 guns. They assert they had but 71,000 engaged at Waterloo.

This number, however, is certainly underrated ; and there is little doubt but Bonaparte had upwards of 75,000 men under his immediate command on the 18th of June.

It may be necessary here to refer to the operations of the corps under Grouchy, who were detached in pursuit of the Prussians. It appears that at twelve o'clock on the 17th, Bonaparte was ignorant of the direction the Prussian army had taken. It was generally supposed that it was towards Namur. At that hour Bonaparte ordered Grouchy, with 32,000 men, to follow them. As the troops were much scattered, it was three o'clock before they were in movement, and they did not arrive at Gembloux before the night of the 17th, when Grouchy informed Bonaparte of the direction the Prussian army had taken. He discovered the rear-guard of the Prussians near Wavre about twelve o'clock on the 18th, and at two o'clock he attacked Wavre, which was obstinately defended by General Thielmann, and succeeded in obtaining possession of a part of the village. By the gallant defence of this post by General Thielmann, Grouchy was induced to believe that the whole Prussian army was before him. Blucher, however, had detached Bulow's corps (4th) at an early hour upon Chapelle-Lambert, to act on the rear of the French army.

The British army, at this eventful period of the day, amounted to about 34,000 men (allowing 10,000 killed and wounded, and 10,000 more who had left the field), 18,000 of whom were English. The enemy may have had about 45,000 immediately opposed to us, allowing 20,000 killed, wounded, and taken prisoners ; and 10,000 men detached to act against the Prussians.

The assistance of the Prussians had been expected at an early hour, which had induced Lord Wellington to accept a battle ; so that the British army had to bear the whole brunt of the action for a much longer period than was calculated. Lord Wellington, however, shewed no anxiety as to the result. The corps of Lord Hill, several Belgian battalions, and a considerable portion of the cavalry, had been little engaged. He knew the troops he had under his command, and seemed confident of being able to maintain his position, even if the Prussians did not arrive before night.

The above detail has been entered into for the purpose of shewing the state of the armies towards the close of the day. Bonaparte was now aware of the powerful diversion the Prussians were about to make, but at the same time seems to have imagined that Grouchy would be able to paralyze their movements. He therefore resolved to make a last desperate effort to break the centre of the British army, and carry their position before the attack of the Prussians could take effect.

The Imperial Guard had been kept in reserve, and had been for some time formed on the heights extending from La Belle Alliance towards Hougomont, which supported their left flank. They had not yet been engaged.

About seven o'clock they advanced in two columns, leaving four battalions in reserve. They were commanded by Ney, who led them on. At the same time they pushed on some light troops in the direction of La Haye. The advance of these columns of the guards was supported by a heavy fire of artillery. Our infantry, who had been posted on the reverse of the hill, to be sheltered from the fire of the guns, were instantly moved forward by Lord Wellington. General Maitland's brigade of guards, and General Adams' brigade (52nd and 71st regiments, and 95th rifles), met this formidable attack. They were flanked by two brigades of artillery, who kept up a destructive fire on the advancing columns. Our troops waited for their approach with their characteristic coolness, until they were within a short distance of our line, when they opened a well-directed fire upon them. The line was formed four deep. The men fired independently, retiring a few paces to load, and then advanced and fired, so that their fire never ceased for a moment. The French, headed by their gallant leader, still advanced, notwithstanding the severe loss they sustained by this fire, which apparently seemed to check their movement. They were now within about fifty yards of our line, when they attempted to deploy in order to return the fire. Our line appeared to be closing round them. They could not, however, deploy under such a fire; and from the moment they ceased to advance, their chance of success was over. They now formed a confused mass, and at last gave way, retiring in the utmost confusion. They were immediately pursued by the light troops of General Adams' brigade. This decided the battle. The enemy had now exhausted his means of attack. He had still, however, the four battalions of the Old Guard in reserve. Lord Wellington immediately ordered the whole line to advance to attack their

position. The enemy were already attempting a retreat. These battalions formed a square to cover the retreat of the flying columns, flanked by a few guns, and supported by some light cavalry (red lancers).

The first Prussian corps had now joined our extreme left. They had obtained possession of the village of La Haye, driving out the French light troops who occupied it. Bulow, with the fourth corps, had some time previous to this made an unsuccessful attack upon the village of Planchenoit, in the rear of the enemy's right wing, and being joined by the second corps (Pirch's), was again advancing to attack it. In the meantime, the square of the Old Guard maintained itself, the guns on its flank firing upon our light cavalry, who now advanced, and threatened to turn their flank. Our light troops were close on their front, and our whole line advancing, when this body, the 'élite,' and now the only hope of the enemy to cover their retreat, and save their army, gave way, and mixed in the general confusion and rout, abandoning their cannon and all their materiel. It was now nearly dark. Bulow, upon being joined by Pirch's corps, again attacked Planchenoit, which he turned; and then the enemy abandoned it. He immediately advanced towards the Genappe chaussée, and closed round the right of the French, driving the enemy before him, and augmenting their confusion. His troops came into the high-road, or chaussée, near Maison du Roi, and Blucher and Wellington having met about the same time near La Belle Alliance, it was resolved to pursue the enemy, and give him no time to rally.

The Prussians, who had made only a short march during the day, pursued the enemy with such vigour, that they were unable to rally a single battalion. The British army halted on the field of battle. The French once attempted to make a show of resistance at Genappe, where, perhaps, if they had had a chief to direct them, they might have maintained themselves until daylight, the situation of the village being strong; this might have given them the means of saving at least the semblance of an army. The second Prussian corps was afterwards detached to intercept Grouchy, who was not aware of the result of the battle until twelve o'clock next day. He had succeeded in obtaining some advantage over General Thielmann, and got possession of Wavre. He immediately retreated towards Namur, where his rearguard maintained themselves against all the efforts of the Prussians, who suffered severely in their attempt to take

the place. This served to cover his retreat, which he executed with great ability, keeping in a parallel line to Blücher; and having rallied many of the fugitives, he brought his army without loss to Paris. He had been considered as lost and his army made prisoners; this belief was a great cause of the resignation of Bonaparte; otherwise, with this army he could have mustered 70,000 or 80,000 men; with the fortifications and resources of Paris, which was sufficiently secure against a coup-de-main, it is not likely he would have so easily submitted without another struggle, after the brilliant defensive campaign he had made the preceding year. There are always some turns of fortune in the events of war; he might at least have made terms. That army, and a great part of the population, would still have been glad to make sacrifices to endeavour to re-establish the sullied lustre of his arms. At least the honour of falling sword in hand was in his power.

The time of the arrival and co-operation of the Prussians has been variously stated. The above account is perhaps as near the truth as can be. The French writers make it at an early hour, to account more satisfactorily for their defeat. The Prussians also make it somewhat earlier than was actually the case, in order to participate more largely in the honours of the day. Their powerful assistance has been acknowledged to its full extent. They completed the destruction of the French army, after they had failed in all their attacks against the British, which continued upwards of seven hours; after their cavalry had been destroyed, their Imperial Guards driven back, and eagles and prisoners taken, and when their means of further attack may be considered as exhausted. The British army had suffered severely, and was not in a state to have taken great advantage of the retreat of the French. But its safety was never for a moment compromised, and no calculation could justify the idea that we would have been so easily defeated and driven from our position, but that the enemy would have been so much crippled, that he could not have taken much advantage of our reverses. Even in such a case the arrival of the Prussians must have obliged him to have retired.

This short campaign of 'Hours' was a joint operation. The honours must be shared. On the 16th, the Prussians fought at Ligny under the promise of our co-operation, which could not, however, be given to the extent it was wished or hoped. On the 18th, Lord Wellington fought at Waterloo, on the promise of the early assistance of the Prussians, which, though

unavoidably delayed, was at last given with an effect which perhaps had never before been witnessed. The finest army France ever saw, commanded by the greatest and ablest of her chiefs, ceased to exist, and in a moment the destiny of Europe was changed.

CHAPTER LI.*

THE immediate consequences of the battle of Waterloo were the total loss of the campaign, and the entire destruction of the finest, though not the most numerous, army which Napoleon had ever commanded. That portion of the army which escaped from the field fled in the greatest confusion towards the frontiers of France, and was not re-assembled until it had reached Laon.

Napoleon himself continued his flight until he reached Philipville, and at this point he intended to have placed himself at the head of Grouchy's division, but a report became current that this division also had been destroyed, and that the general was made prisoner. These reports led him to abandon his purpose, and to continue his journey to Paris, whither he carried the news of his own defeat.

On the 19th, the capital had been greeted with the news of three great victories, at Charleroi, at Ligny, and at Quatre-bras; but on the 21st, the third day after the fatal action, it was whispered, and then openly said, that Napoleon had returned alone from the army on the preceding night, and was now at the palace of the Bourbon-Elysée. The fatal truth could not long be concealed—that a great battle had been fought, and that the French army was destroyed.

The two chambers hastily assembled, and passed a series of resolutions; the first, declared the state to be in danger; the second, *their* sittings to be *permanent*; the third, that the troops had deserved well of their country; the fourth, that the national guard should be called out; and the fifth, that the ministers be invited to repair to the assembly. These propositions intimated

* The whole of this chapter has been added to continue the narrative from the battle of Waterloo to the death of Napoleon, as M. de Bourrienne has not offered any observations connected with that interesting period. The facts are principally taken from the life by Sir Walter Scott.

the fears of the Chamber of Representatives, lest they should be again dissolved by an armed force, and at the same time announced their intention to place themselves at the head of public affairs, without further respect to the emperor. The resolutions were all adopted, except the fourth, which was considered premature.

The chamber formed itself into a secret committee, before which the ministers laid the full extent of the disaster, and announced that the emperor had named Caulincourt, Fouché, and Carnot as commissioners to treat of peace with the allies. The ministers were bluntly reminded by the republican members that they had no basis upon which they could found any negotiations, as the allies had declared war against Napoleon, and that he alone was the sole obstacle betwixt the nation and peace. All seemed to unite in one sentiment that the abdication of Napoleon was a measure absolutely necessary ; and a committee of five members was appointed to concert measures with ministers. The Chamber of Peers adopted the three first resolutions of the lower chamber, and named a committee of public safety.

It was now evident that Napoleon must either declare himself absolute and dissolve the chambers by violence, or abdicate the authority he had so lately resumed. His brother Lucien recommended him to dissolve the chambers as he had formerly done on the 19th Brumaire : but times were now very much changed, and he could neither bring himself to adopt desperate measures, nor to make an apparently voluntary resignation. On the evening of the 21st of June, he held a council to which the presidents and vice-presidents of both chambers were admitted, and after an angry discussion, in which his abdication was stated as necessary, the meeting broke up without coming to any decision.

On the morning of the 22nd of June, only four days after the defeat at Waterloo, the Chamber of Representatives again assembled, and expressed the utmost impatience to receive the act of abdication. They were about to put it to the vote, that it should be demanded of the emperor ; but this was rendered unnecessary by his compliance. It was presented by Fouché, and was expressed in the following terms :—

‘Frenchmen !—In commencing war for maintaining the national independence, I relied on the union of all efforts, of all wills, and the concurrence of all the national authorities. I had

reason to hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of the powers against me.

‘Circumstances appear to me changed. I offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in their declarations, and have really directed them only against my power ! My political life is terminated, and I proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., Emperor of the French.

‘The present ministers will provisionally form the council of the government. The interest which I take in my son induces me to invite the Chambers to form, without delay, the regency by a law.

‘Unite all for the public safety, in order to remain an independent nation.

(Signed) ‘NAPOLEON.

‘Done at the palace Elysée,
June the 22nd 1815.’

The debate which followed the production of this act, in either house, was violent ; but to preserve the respect due to the late emperor, the chamber named a committee to wait on him with an address of thanks, in which they carefully avoided all mention and recognition of his son. Napoleon, for the last time, received the committee delegated to present the address in the imperial robes, and surrounded by the great officers of state. He seemed pale and pensive, but firm and collected ; and in his answer he recommended unanimity, and the speedy preparation of means of defence. He also reminded them that his abdication was conditional, and comprehended the interests of his son.

The president of the chamber replied, with profound respect, that the chamber had given him no directions respecting the subjects which he had just pressed upon them. Napoleon now clearly perceived that there was no hope for his son ; he dismissed the deputation with dignity and courtesy, and thus terminated the second reign—the *hundred days* of Napoleon.

A provisional government was formed, vesting the executive powers of the state in five persons—two chosen from the House of Peers, and three from that of the Representatives. These were Carnot, Fouché, Caulincourt, Grenier, and Quinette.

The chambers again met on the 24th of June, when the question of the succession came to be considered, and was evaded

upon the plea that there was no occasion for a formal recognition of Napoleon II., since he was, by the terms of the constitution, already in possession of the throne. By this means the chambers succeeded in silencing the imperialist party, by nominally acknowledging the young Napoleon's right to the crown ; and at the same time preventing the interference of Napoleon or any of his friends in the further administration of the country. The provisional government also exacted a proclamation from Napoleon, addressed in his own name to the soldiers, in order to confirm the fact of his abdication, which the troops were unwilling to believe on any authority inferior to his own. They also required that he should retire to the palace of Malmaison, where he had not been a single day, before, surrounded by Fouché's police, he found that he was no longer the free master of his own actions. From this they proceeded to place him under a sort of arrest, by directing General Beker, an officer with whom Napoleon had been on indifferent terms, to watch over, and if necessary to restrain, his movements in such a manner as to prevent his escape, and to use measures to induce him to leave Malmaison for Rochefort, where two frigates were provided to convey him to the United States of America.

Napoleon submitted to his destiny with resignation and dignity. He received General Beker with ease, and even cheerfulness, and the latter, with feelings which did him honour, felt the task committed to him the more painful, as he had experienced the personal enmity of the individual who was now committed to his charge. On the 29th of June, Napoleon departed from Malmaison ; and on the 3rd of July he arrived at Rochefort. General Beker accompanied him, as he was instructed to continue his *surveillance* until he had actually embarked on board the vessels. In this journey, wherever he came, the troops received him with acclamation, and the citizens respected the misfortunes of one who had been well-nigh master of the world.

The provisional government sent to the Duke of Wellington to request passports for Napoleon to the States of America, but as the duke had no instructions from his government he declined to grant them ; and the only consequence of this application, as perhaps it was intended, was to increase the vigilance of the English cruisers so as to prevent the possibility of flight.

The provisional government now attempted, without success, to awaken the spirit of the soldiery as in 1794 ; but the charm was dissolved, the soldiers refused to fight 'because they had

no longer an emperor.' Meanwhile the armies of Soult and Grouchy were driven under the walls of Paris, and closely followed by the English and Prussians ; and after some further useless resistance, an armistice was concluded, by which the capital was surrendered to the allies, and the French army was drawn off behind the Loire.

The allies communicated to the provisional government that they considered their authority as at an end, and that Louis XVIII., who was then at St. Denis, would, in a few days, enter his capital, and resume his royal authority. They accordingly dissolved themselves, and Louis re-entered his capital on the 8th of July, and was once more installed in the palace of his ancestors.

So rapid had been the progress of events since the battle of Waterloo that within the short space of fifteen days, Napoleon not only found himself an exile, but obliged to surrender himself to some one of his enemies. It is true that means for his transportation were provided, and still at his disposal ; but the increased vigilance of the English navy had rendered his escape by sea all but impossible. He was aware that the white flag was already hoisted at the neighbouring town of Rochelle, and that the authorities at Rochefort were only waiting his departure to follow the example. Various means of escape were projected, but all in their turn were abandoned—and the only alternative which now remained was to surrender his person either to the allied powers as a body, or to one of them in particular.

Accordingly, on the 10th of July, Napoleon sent two of his attendants, General Savary and Count Las Cases, to open a communication with Captain Maitland of the *Bellerophon*, under pretence of inquiring about a safe conduct from England, which they said had been promised to him. But this was merely a pretence ; their object was to ascertain whether Captain Maitland would permit the frigates to sail with him, without interruption. On this being refused by the British commander, it then became evident to Napoleon that there was no alternative but to surrender. Various negotiations were then entered into for that purpose, and on the 15th of July, he was received on board the *Bellerophon* with the greatest respect, but without any distinguished honours. Napoleon uncovered himself on reaching the quarter-deck, and said to Captain Maitland, in a firm tone of voice, 'I come to place myself under the protection of your prince and laws.' His manner was uncommonly pleasing, and he displayed much address in seizing upon opportunities

of saying things flattering to the hearers whom he wished to conciliate.

As the terms upon which this surrender took place have been variously represented, we think we cannot do better than to give the letter which Captain Maitland addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty on the 14th of July, and which was despatched on that day along with the well-known letter which Napoleon addressed to the Prince Regent. These letters, we think, will satisfactorily shew that the surrender was unconditional. Captain Maitland thus writes :—

‘For the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I have to acquaint you that the Count Las Cases and General Lallemand this day came on board his majesty’s ship under my command, with a proposal from Count Bertrand for me to receive on board Napoleon Bonaparte, for the purpose of throwing himself on the generosity of the Prince Regent. Conceiving myself authorized by their lordships’ secret order, I have acceded to the proposal, and he is to embark on board this ship to-morrow morning. That no misunderstanding might arise, I have explicitly and clearly explained to Count Las Cases, that I have no authority whatever for granting terms of any sort, but that all I can do is to carry him and his suite to England, to be received in such manner as his Royal Highness may deem expedient.’

The letter to the Prince Regent was in these terms :—

‘ROCHEFORT, July 13th, 1815.

‘ROYAL HIGHNESS,

‘A victim to the factions which distract my country, and to the enmity of the greatest powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career, and I come, like Themistocles, to throw myself upon the hospitality of the British people. I put myself under the protection of their laws ; which I claim from your Royal Highness, as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies.

‘NAPOLEON.’

The *Bellerophon* immediately set sail for England, and during the whole passage, notwithstanding his situation and the painful uncertainty under which he laboured, Napoleon seemed always tranquil and in good temper : at times he even approached to

cheerfulness. On the 24th the *Bellerophon* entered Torbay, and on the 26th they were ordered round to Plymouth Sound. The arrival of Napoleon having by this time become known, the ship was immediately surrounded by numerous boats, filled with persons whose curiosity nothing could repress. There was great difficulty in keeping the ship itself clear of these eager multitudes. Napoleon appeared on the deck, and was greeted with huzzas, and bowed and smiled in return.

On the 31st of July the final resolution of the British government was communicated to him, namely, that he should not be landed in England, but conveyed forthwith to St. Helena, and that he should not be allowed any other rank than that of a *General*. He listened to the reading of the letter of Lord Melville without impatience or surprise, and on being asked to state if he had any reply, he began with great calmness of manner and mildness of countenance to declare that he solemnly protested against the orders which had been read, and refused to be sent as a prisoner to St. Helena. He expressed his wish rather to die than to be sent thither. He also complained much of the title which they had given him—General Bonaparte—and insisted upon his right to be considered as a sovereign prince. But to one in his situation it was useless to complain—he had now only to submit.

Napoleon, at last, received in quiet the intimation that Admiral Sir George Cockburn was ready to receive him on board the *Northumberland*, and to convey him to St. Helena. The fallen emperor was permitted to select four officers, together with his surgeon, and twelve domestics to attend him. He selected Counts Bertrand, Montholon, Las Cases, and General Gourgaud, and for his surgeon Dr. O'Meara, whom he found on the *Bellerophon*. Bertrand and Montholon were accompanied by their respective countesses and their children.

On the 7th of August Napoleon was transferred from the *Bellerophon* to the *Northumberland*, and on the following morning they sailed for St. Helena, where they arrived on the 15th of October, 1815.

The orders of government had been that Napoleon should remain on board until a suitable residence could be provided for him, but as he had become weary of shipboard, Sir George Cockburn undertook upon his own responsibility to land his passengers, and to provide for the security of Napoleon's person.

The island at that time afforded little accommodation for such a

guest, with the exception of Plantation-house, the country residence of the governor, which, however, was expressly prohibited from being assigned as the residence of the fallen emperor. Sir George Cockburn made choice of Longwood, a country-house occasionally occupied by the lieutenant-governor, as suitable, from its particular situation, to be extended so as to afford such accommodation as was sufficient for a captive of the rank at which Napoleon was rated by the British government. This situation was also approved of by Napoleon himself, and, until the necessary alterations could be made, he took up his residence at a small house, or cottage, called the Briars, romantically situated at a little distance from James' Town, in which he could only have one spare room for his accommodation.

On the 9th of December Longwood received Napoleon and part of his household, and a space of about twelve miles in circumference was traced off, within which Napoleon might take exercise without being attended by anyone. Beyond that boundary a chain of sentinels was placed to prevent his passing, unless accompanied by a British officer. He was also permitted to extend his excursions to any part of the island, providing the officer was in attendance, and near enough to observe his motions. Sir George Cockburn, in conceding such an extensive space for the convenience of his prisoner, took every precaution which the peculiarity of the island presented to prevent the possibility of escape.*

* Dr. O'Meara gives the following account of the precautions which were taken :—

'A subaltern's guard was posted at the entrance of Longwood, about six hundred paces from the house, and a cordon of sentinels and picquets was placed round the limits. At nine o'clock the sentinels were drawn in and stationed in communication with each other, surrounding the house in such positions, that no person could come in or go out without being seen and scrutinized by them. At the entrance of the house double sentinels were placed, and patrols were continually passing backward and forward. After nine Napoleon was not at liberty to leave the house unless in company with a field-officer; and no person whatever was allowed to pass without the counter-sign. This state of affairs continued until daylight in the morning. Every landing-place in the island, and, indeed, every place which presented the semblance of one, was furnished with a picquet, and sentinels were even placed upon every goat-path leading to the sea; though in truth the obstacles presented by nature, in almost all the paths in that direction, would, of themselves, have proved insurmountable to so unwieldy a person as Napoleon.

'From the various signal-posts on the island, ships are frequently discovered at twenty-four leagues' distance, and always long before

In April, 1816, Sir George Cockburn was superseded in his anxious and painful office by Sir Hudson Lowe, who remained governor of St. Helena and had the charge of Napoleon's person until his death. The conduct of this officer has been much censured by various writers, but considering the very important duty he had to fulfil, and the personal dislike which Napoleon exhibited towards him from the first, and the offensive manner in which he was treated by him, it was not to be wondered that the governor should refuse to submit to it. It seemed that every circumstance, whether of business or of etiquette, which occurred at St. Helena, was certain to occasion some dispute betwixt Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe, the progress and termination of which seldom passed without an aggravation of mutual hostilities. It was necessary that the greatest vigilance should be exercised, which could not be accomplished without giving offence to the haughty mind of Napoleon, and rather than submit to the restraints which were imposed, he often chose to seclude himself; and it cannot be doubted but that the constant irritation in which he kept himself towards the governor was a principal means of shortening his life.

During the five years and seven months that he lived in the island of St. Helena, few circumstances occurred to vary the melancholy tenor of his existence. His habits of life were of the most regular and simple character; he never took more than two meals a-day, and concluded each with a cup of coffee. He

they can approach the shore. Two ships of war continually cruised, one to windward, and the other to leeward, to whom signals were made as soon as a vessel was discovered from the posts on shore. Every ship except a British man-of-war was accompanied down to the road by one of the cruisers, who remained with her until she was either permitted to anchor, or was sent away. No foreign vessels were allowed to anchor, unless under circumstances of great distress; in which case, no person from them was permitted to land, and an officer and party from one of the ships of war was sent on board to take charge of them as long as they remained, as well as in order to prevent any improper communication. Every fishing-boat belonging to the island was numbered, and anchored every evening at sunset, under the superintendence of a lieutenant in the navy. No boats, excepting guard-boats from the ships of war, which pulled about the island all night, were allowed to be down after sunset. The orderly officer was also instructed to ascertain the actual presence of Napoleon twice in the twenty-four hours, which was done with as much delicacy as possible. In fact, every human precaution to prevent escape, short of actually incarcerating or enchaining him, was adopted by Sir George Cockburn.

generally breakfasted about ten o'clock, and dined at eight. He preferred plain food, and ate plentifully and with an apparent appetite. A very few glasses of claret, scarce amounting to an English pint, which he chiefly drank during the time of dinner, completed his meal. He sometimes drank champagne; but his constitutional sobriety was such that a large glass of that wine would have brought the colour to his cheek, and it may be truly said that few men were ever less influenced by the appetites which are peculiar to man than Napoleon. He was exceedingly particular as to the neatness and cleanliness of his person, and this habit he preserved to his death.

It had been generally stated, so early as 1817, that the health of Napoleon had become impaired, and he himself made use of it as a reason for obtaining more indulgence; but as his illness was not then apparent, it was only considered one of the many complaints he was in the habit of making to annoy the governor. But it is probable that even at that period he felt the symptoms of that internal malady which consumed his life—a cancer in the stomach. Towards the end of 1820 the symptoms of his disease increased, the disorganization in the digestive powers became more and more apparent, and his reluctance to take any medicine, as if from an instinctive persuasion that the power of physic was in vain, continued as obstinate as ever. From this time his health began seriously to decline, and his mind became more and more depressed. He has often remained silent for many hours, suffering, as may be supposed, much pain, and immersed in profound melancholy. About the end of January, 1821, he appeared to resume some energy, and made some attempt to overcome the disease by exercise, but he found himself unequal to the effort and that his strength was rapidly sinking under him. In the month of March the disease assumed a character still more formidable, and on the 3rd of May it was seen that the life of Napoleon was drawing evidently to a close. The last sacraments of the church were then administered by Vignali. He lingered on in a delirious stupor until the 5th, and about six in the evening he breathed his last.

We conclude the Memoirs of this extraordinary man by the simple account of his funeral as given by Sir Walter Scott :—

‘The officers of Napoleon’s household were disposed to have the body anatomized in secret. But Sir Hudson Lowe had too deep a sense of the responsibility under which he and his country stood, to permit this to take place, unless in the presence of the English physicians.

‘Generals Bertrand and Montholon, with Marchand, the valet-de-chambre of the deceased, were present at the operation, which took place on the 6th of May. It was also witnessed by Sir Thomas Reade, and some British staff-officers. Drs. Thomas Shortt, Archibald Arnott, Charles Mitchel, Matthew Livingstone, and Francis Burton, all of them medical men, were also present. The cause of death was sufficiently evident. A large ulcer occupied almost the whole of the stomach. It was only the strong adhesion of the diseased parts of that organ to the concave surface of the lobe of the liver, which, being over the ulcer, had prolonged the patient’s life by preventing the escape of the contents of the stomach into the cavity of the abdomen. All the other parts of the viscera were found in a tolerably healthy state. The report was signed by the British medical gentlemen present. Dr. Antommarchi was about to add his attestation, when, according to information which we consider as correct, General Bertrand interdicted his doing so, because the report was drawn up as relating to the body of *General Bonaparte*. Dr. Antommarchi’s own account does not, we believe, greatly differ from that of the British professional persons, though he has drawn conclusions from it which are apparently inconsistent with the patient’s own conviction, and the ghastly evidence of the anatomical operation.

‘The gentlemen of Napoleon’s suite were desirous that his heart should be preserved and given to their custody. But Sir Hudson Lowe did not feel himself at liberty to permit this upon his own authority. He agreed, however, that the heart should be placed in a silver vase, filled with spirits, and interred along with the body ; so that in case his instructions from home should so permit, it might be afterwards disinhumed and sent to Europe.

‘The place of interment became the next subject of discussion. On this subject Napoleon had been inconsistent. His testamentary disposition expressed a wish that his remains should be deposited on the banks of the Seine ; a request which he could not for an instant suppose would be complied with, and which appears to have been made solely for the sake of producing effect.

‘A grave for the Emperor of France, within the limits of the rocky island to which his last years were limited, was the alternative that remained ; and sensible that this was likely to be the case, he had himself indicated the spot where he wished to lie. It was a small secluded recess, called Slane’s or Haine’s Valley, where a fountain arose at which his Chinese domestics used to fill the silver pitchers which they carried to Longwood for Napoleon’s use. The spot had more of verdure and shade than any in the neighbourhood ; and the illustrious Exile was often accustomed to repose under the beautiful weeping willows which overhung the spring. The body, after lying in state in his small bedroom, during which time it was visited by every person of condition in the island, was, on the 8th of May, carried to the place of interment. The pall which covered the coffin was the military cloak which Napoleon had worn at the battle of Marengo. The members of his late household attended as mourners, and were followed by the governor, the admiral, and all the civil and military authorities of the island. All the troops were under arms upon the solemn occasion. As the road did not permit a near approach of the hearse to the place of sepulture, a party of British grenadiers had the honour to bear the coffin to the grave. The prayers were recited by the priest, Abbé Vignali. Minute guns were fired from the admiral’s ship. The coffin was then let down into the grave under a discharge of three successive volleys of artillery, from fifteen pieces of cannon. A large stone was then lowered down on the grave, and covered the moderate space now sufficient for the man for whom Europe was once too little.’

In 1840, Napoleon’s remains were, by permission of the British Government, removed to Paris, and on December 15th were re-interred in the chapel of the Hôtel des Invalides, to which they were conveyed on a splendid car, escorted by a grand military procession

CHRONOLOGY

FIRST PERIOD

		AGE	
1769	Aug. 15		Napoleon Bonaparte born at Ajaccio (Corsica).
1779	April 25	9	Entered Royal Military School at Brienne.
1784	Oct.	15	" " " " in Paris.
1785		16	Appointed "SECOND" LIEUTENANT of Artillery.
1785 }		16-26	Served in garrison at Valence, Lyons, Douai, Paris, Auxonne, Seurre, Auxonne again.
1795 }			
1787	Feb. }	18	With his family at Ajaccio (Corsica).
	Oct. }		
1787 }	Dec. }		Writes 'Letters on History of Corsica, essays, professional pamphlets, etc.
1788 }	May }		
1789 }	Sept. }		
1791 }	Feb. }		
1789	Sept.	20	Heads revolutionary party at Ajaccio.
1790	Oct.	21	Has meeting with Paoli, the Corsican patriot. Elected LIEUTENANT-COLONEL of battalion of volunteers at Ajaccio. FORFEITS FRENCH COMMISSION by outstaying leave.
1791			
1792	Easter	22	Fails in attempt to seize Ajaccio. Flees from Corsica.
1792	May 21		Arrives in Paris as private person.
1792	Aug. 10		Views storming of Tuileries by insurgents.
1792	Aug. 30	23	Restored to army as CAPTAIN.
1792	Sept. 17		Arrives at Ajaccio.
1792 }	Winter		Joins in unsuccessful expedition against Sardinia.
1793 }			
1793 }	June		Fails in attempts on citadel of Ajaccio. Flees with Bonaparte family to France (Toulon).
1793 }			

SECOND PERIOD

1793	July		Aids in attack on anti-revolutionists at Avignon.
1793	Aug.	24	Marches with General Carteaux into Marseilles (anti-revolutionary).

		AGE	
1793	Sept.	24	Appointed CHEF DE BATAILLON in 2nd Regiment of Artillery.
1793	Oct. } Dec. }		Distinguished at siege of Toulon (anti-revolutionary) and appointed GENERAL OF BRIGADE.
1794	Spring		Joins Army of Italy as GENERAL OF ARTILLERY and Inspector-General.
1794	July		On mission to Genoa.
1794	Aug. 6		Suspended (by 'Representatives' with army) from functions, and put under arrest.
1794	Aug. 20	25	Released from arrest.
1795	Mar.		Fails in naval expedition to recover Corsica from British.
1795	May		Summoned to command 'Army of the West' (in France).
1795	Summer		Avoids taking up command. Engaged in War Office work.
1795	Oct.	26	Second in command (under Barras) of 'Army of the Interior.'
1795	Oct. 5		Suppresses Sections (Wards) of Paris with grape-shot in insurrection of 13th Vendémiaire .
1795	Oct.		Appointed to command 'Army of the Interior.'
1796	Feb. 23		Appointed by Directory to command 'Army of Italy.'
1796	Mar. 9		Marries Josephine, Vicomtesse de Beauharnois.
1796	Mar. 11		Leaves Paris for Italy.
1796	April 12		Defeats Austrians at Monte Notte.
1796	April 13		" " " Millesimo.
1796	April 14		" " " Dego.
1796	April		" Sardinians (Piedmontese) at Ceva and Mondovi.
1796	April 28		King of Sardinia signs 'Convention of Cherasco,' yielding his fortresses to France.
1796	May 7		Crosses Po at Piacenza.
1796	May 10		Defeats Austrians at Bridge of Lodi.
1796	May 15		Enters Milan as conqueror.
1796	May 27		Leaves Milan to pursue Austrian general, Beaulieu.
1796	June		Breaks through Austrian centre at Borghetto, driving Beaulieu into Tyrol.
1796	June } July }		Besieges Mantua.
1796	June		Invades Papal territory and extorts fifteen millions.
1796	July 30		Raises siege of Mantua.
1796	Aug. 3		Defeats Wurmser at Castiglione, driving him into Tyrol.
1796	Aug.		Invests Mantua again.

1796	Sept.	AGE 27	Defeats Wurmser at Bassano, driving him into Mantua on September 15.
1796	Nov. 15 }		Defeats Austrian general, Alvinzi, at Arcola (Arcole), driving him into Tyrol.
1797	Nov. 17 }		Defeats Alvinzi at Rivoli.
1797	Jan. 14		Wurmser surrenders Mantua.
1797	Feb. 2		Invades Papal States and concludes 'Treaty of Tolentino,' extorting cession of Bologna, Ferrara, the Romagna, etc.
1797	Feb. 19		Advances against Archduke Charles in Carinthia, and reaches Leoben (Styria).
1797	April 13		Armistice signed at Leoben.
1797	April 18		Treaty of Campo Formio (France and Austria), France gaining Belgium, etc., Austria acknowledging 'Cisalpine Republic' and ceding Lombardy to the new state; Austria receives Istria, Dalmatia, and territory of Venetian Republic.
1797	Oct. 17	28	Bonaparte returns to Paris.
1797	Dec. 5		Surveys French coast opposite England.
1798	Jan.		Appointed to command 'Army of Egypt.'
1798	April		Sails from Toulon.
1798	May 19		Occupies Malta.
1798	June 12		Reaches Alexandria.
1798	June 30		Defeats Mamelukes under Mourad Bey at Pyramids, etc. Enters Cairo.
1798	July 24		Invades Syria.
1799	Feb.	29	Takes El-Arish and Gaza.
1799	Feb.		Takes Jaffa. Massacres Turkish prisoners.
1799	Mar.		Fails in siege of Acre (St. Jean d'Acre).
1799	Mar. 19 }		Returns to Egypt.
1799	May 20 }		Defeats Turks at Aboukir.
1799	June		Embarks for France.
1799	July 25	30	Reaches France.
1799	Aug. 22		Revolution of 18th, 19th Brumaire . Legislature dissolved by force.
1799	Oct. 9		Consulate established. Bonaparte created FIRST CONSUL for ten years.
1799	Nov. 9 }		Takes field at Geneva against Austria.
1799	Nov. 10 }		Crosses Mt. Great St. Bernard into Italy with army.
1799	Dec.		Enters Milan.
1800	May 9		Defeats Austrians under General Melas at Marengo.
1800	May 15 }		Returns to Paris.
1800	May 20 }		Treaty of Luneville with Austria.
1800	June 2	31	Makes Concordat with the Pope (re-establishing Catholic worship in France).
1800	June 14		Treaty (Peace) of Amiens with England.
1800	July 2		
1801	Feb. 9		
1801	July		
1802	Mar.		

THIRD PERIOD

	AGE	
1800 } 1808 }		Establishes the judicial system, the four codes, local government, the University, and Bank of France.
1802 April 1802	32	Elected FIRST CONSUL for life. Seizes Elba, Piedmont, Duchy of Parma. Interferes in Switzerland. Assumes headship of 'Italian Republic' (Northern Italy).
1803 April	33	Insults Lord Whitworth (British ambassador) at Tuileries Palace.
1803 May 18 1803 June 1804 } 1805 }		Great Britain declares war. Bonaparte seizes Hanover.
1804 Mar. 21 1804 May 18	34	Camp of invasion and flotilla at Boulogne. Executes Duc d'Enghien at Vincennes. Created ' EMPEROR ' by decree of Senate, with name of 'Napoleon.'
1804 July		Legion of Honour founded. Creation of fourteen marshals.
1804 Dec. 2 1805 May 26 1805 July 1805 Aug. 1805 Aug. } 1805 Sept. }	35	Crowned at Notre Dame , Paris. Crowned 'King of Italy' at Milan. Visits Boulogne camp. War with Austria and Russia.
1805 Oct. 17	36	Marches from Boulogne to Bavaria. Forces Austrian general, Mack, to surrender at Ulm.
1805 Nov. 14 1805 Dec. 2		Arrives at palace of Schoenbrunn. Defeats Russian and Austrian emperors at Austerlitz .
1805 Dec. 26 1806 Feb. 1806 July		Treaty of Presburg with Austria. Returns to Paris. Forms 'Confederation of Rhine.' Creates Bavaria and Wirtemberg kingdoms.
1806 1806 1806 Sept. 1806 Oct. 14 1806 Oct. 27 1806 Nov. 21	37	Makes Joseph Bonaparte King of Naples. Makes Louis Bonaparte King of Holland. War with Prussia. Defeats Prussians at Jena . Enters Berlin as conqueror. Issues 'Berlin Decree' against British continental commerce.
1806 Dec. 1807 Feb. 8 1807 June 14 1807 July 1807 Aug. 1807 Aug. 1807 Dec.	38	Marches against Russians. Defeats Russians and Prussians at Eylau . " " " " " Friedland . Peace of Tilsit with Russia and Prussia. Returns to Paris. Makes Jérôme Bonaparte King of Westphalia. Attacks Portugal. Lisbon occupied by the French.
1808 April		Dethrones King of Spain.

	AGE	
1808 April		Makes Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain.
1808 } 1814 }		Peninsular War —Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain against France.
1808 Oct.	39	Meets Emperor Alexander I. of Russia at Erfurt.
1808 Oct. 26		Leaves Paris for Spain.
1808 Dec. 4		Enters Madrid.
1808 Dec.		Directs movements clearing Spain of British troops.
1808 Dec. 22		Starts in pursuit of Sir John Moore.
1809 Jan. 1		Reaches Astorga.
1809 Jan. 17		Starts for Paris.
1809 March		Declares war against Austria.
1809 April 11		Leaves Paris for seat of war.
1809 April 20		Austrians defeated at Abensberg.
1809 April 21		" " Landshut.
1809 April 22		" " Eckmühl.
1809 April 23		Drives enemy from Ratisbon.
1809 May 13		Enters Vienna.
1809 May 21 }		Defeated by Archduke Charles at Aspern and
1809 May 22 }		Essling .
1809 July 5		Defeats Archduke Charles at Wagram .
1809 Oct. 14	40	Treaty of Schoenbruun with Austria.
1809 Oct.		Annexes Tuscany and Papal States.
1809 Dec. 16		Divorces Josephine.
1810 April 1		Marries Archduchess Maria - Louisa of Austria.
1811 Mar. 20	41	' King of Rome ' born.
1811 July }		Annexes Kingdoms of Holland and West-
1811 Aug. }		phalia.
1812 April	42	Declares war with Russia.
1812 May 16		Reaches Dresden.
1812 June 24		Crosses Niemen.
1812 June 28		Occupies Vilna.
1812 Aug. 18	43	Drives Russians from Smolensk.
1812 Sept. 7		Defeats Russians at Borodino .
1812 Sept. 14		Enters Moscow .
1812 Oct. 20		Leaves Moscow .
1812 Dec. 18		Reaches Paris.
1813 Feb. }		Uprising of Germany.
1813 Mar. }		
1813 April 15		Leaves St. Cloud for Mainz (Mayence).
1813 May 2		Defeats Russo-Prussian army at Lützen .
1813 May 20 }		Defeats allies at Bautzen .
1813 May 21 }		
1813 June 4		Makes armistice lasting to Aug. 11.
1813 Aug. 27	44	Defeats Austrians at Dresden .
1813 Oct. 16 }		Defeated by allies at Leipzig .
1813 Oct. 18 }		
1813 Nov. 1 }		
1813 Nov. 2 }		Recrosses Rhine at Mainz (Mayence).

	AGE	
1813 Dec. }		
1814 Jan. }	44	France invaded by allies.
1814 Jan. 25		Napoleon takes field from Paris.
1814 Feb. 1		Defeats Prussians at Brienne.
1814 Feb.		Defeated at La Rothière.
1814 Feb. 10		Defeats Prussians, etc., under Blücher at Champaubert.
1814 Feb. 11		Defeats Prussians, etc., under Blücher at Montmirail.
1814 Feb. 12		Defeats Prussians, etc., under Blücher at Château Thierry.
1814 Feb. 13		Defeats Prussians, etc., under Blücher at Vanchamps.
1814 Feb. }		
1814 Mar. 19 }		Futile congress at Châtillon-sur-Seine.
1814 Mar.		Indecisive battles at Craonne and Laon—great loss to Napoleon.
1814 Mar. 31		Paris occupied by allies.
1814 April 11		Napoleon signs abdication.
1814 April 20		Takes farewell of guard at Fontainebleau.
1814 May 4		Lands in Elba.
1815 Feb. 26	45	Leaves Elba.
1815 Mar. 1		Lands at Fréjus on French coast.
1815 Mar. 20		Enters Paris
1815 Mar. 13 }		The Hundred Days period.
1815 June 22 }		
1815 June 12		Leaves Paris for Belgium.
1815 June 15		Crosses Belgian frontier.
1815 June 16		Defeats Blücher at Ligny.
1815 June 18		Defeated at Waterloo .
1815 June 21		Reaches Paris.
1815 June 22		The second abdication.
1815 July 3		Arrives at Rochefort, making for United States.
1815 July 15		Surrenders to Captain Maitland on board Bellerophon .
1815 July 24		Napoleon in Torbay.
1815 July 27		„ „ Plymouth Sound.
1815 Aug. 8		Sails for St. Helena on the Northumberland .
1815 Oct. 15	46	Arrives at St. Helena.
1815 Dec. 9		Begins residence at Longwood.
1816 April		Sir Hudson Lowe assumes charge.
1821 May 5	51	Napoleon dies at 6 p.m.

1840 Dec. 15

Re-interred at Hôtel des Invalides, Paris.

APPENDIX

BONAPARTE: HIS ORIGIN AND EARLY LIFE.

To understand the character and career of Napoleon Bonaparte, it is needful to remember always that he was not a Frenchman, but an Italian. The Bonaparte family sprang in Tuscany, and a branch of it was settled in Corsica in the sixteenth century. From this time Bonapartes were influential citizens of Ajaccio, having an ancient title of nobility from the Genoese republic, and, in the eighteenth century, from the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Napoleon, the second of thirteen children, of whom eight grew up, was the son of a somewhat indolent Italian gentleman of literary tastes, who was born in 1746, and took a degree as Doctor of Laws at the University of Pisa in 1769, the year of Napoleon's birth. This gentleman had married, in 1764, when he was eighteen years of age, a beautiful girl of fifteen, Letitia Ramolino. Of the father's character nothing is seen in his illustrious son: the Corsican mother may account for his astounding energy. We may note that Napoleon is the most remarkable instance on record of a second son far surpassing an elder brother in mental capacity and power.

From his father, who died in 1785, at the age of thirty-eight, of cancer in the stomach, Napoleon doubtless derived the seeds of the disease which ended his own life. The man who was to become the master of Europe for a time was thus a needy provincial of noble birth, a foreigner who, for some months prior to entering the school at Brienne, had to learn the French language in a school at Autun. From his tenth year his education was solely military—a fact to be noted in connection with his subsequent career. His character, in school life, was shown earlier than his mental powers. His instructors reported him as 'taciturn, fond of solitude, capricious, haughty, energetic in reply, ready and keen in repartee, full of self-love, of unbounded aspirations.' He was studious, and made great progress in geography and mathematics, but had neither taste nor talent for grammatical studies. He was fond of books of a solid nature, and seems, at this time to have

been chiefly influenced by the revolutionary works of Rousseau and Raynal.

From early in 1787 to February, 1791—a period largely spent in Corsica—the young artillery lieutenant was chiefly engaged in authorship, as his only road to distinction. As Sir John Seeley has observed in his admirable *Short History*, character rather than literary ability is shown in his early writings, apart from his pamphlets on practical subjects. A ‘precocious seriousness’ is there, and the style is marked by ‘a kind of suppressed passion and fierce impatience.’

The six years between 1789 and 1795 may be called ‘the Corsican period’ of Bonaparte’s life. When the Revolution broke out, the Italian island had been for twenty years a dependency of France, by purchase of the rights of the Genoese republic. The patriotic Paoli had taken refuge in England, where he was still living in 1789. In November, 1789, Corsica was declared by the new National Assembly sitting at Versailles to be a province of France, on the motion of Salicetti, one of the Corsican representatives. In July, 1790, Paoli landed in Corsica, after an absence of twenty-one years. The Bonaparte family had always favoured the French cause in the island. Napoleon, however, in 1789, just after the taking of the Bastille, had hurried to Ajaccio, and headed the revolutionary party, and had published a letter attacking a Corsican renegade as a cynic who had no belief in virtue, but supposed all men to be guided by selfish interest. The subsequent career of the writer is a curious commentary on these noble sentiments.

In 1791, Bonaparte became commander of a battalion of national volunteers in the Ajaccio district, by choice of the volunteers themselves. It was in canvassing for this post that he outstayed his furlough and forfeited his commission in the French artillery. At the Easter festival of 1792 he failed in an attempt to seize Ajaccio, and fled to France. The young man was thus a rebel in Corsica and a deserter in France, liable to be tried by court-martial and shot. Arriving in Paris on May 21st, he escaped notice in the confusion then prevailing, and on August 10th he saw the downfall of the monarchy. On August 30th, when the new French government, with France invaded from beyond the Rhine, needed every trained officer, his name was restored to the army-list, with captain’s rank. Instead of proceeding at once to the field, Bonaparte set out again for Corsica, arriving at Ajaccio on September 17th, and during the winter he made his first campaign in an unsuccessful expedition against Sardinia.

In April, 1793, he is found as a champion of the French connection and a bitter opponent of Paoli. The insular patriotism with which his *Letters on the History of Corsica* had teemed had ended in this. Paoli summoned a national assembly which dissolved the French connection, and denounced the Bonaparte family

by name. After another desperate attempt to seize the citadel of Ajaccio, the young officer, with his widowed mother and the whole family, took refuge in France from the fury of the people of Ajaccio. Henceforth Bonaparte was a Frenchman. He had done with sentiment, except as a resource, when he landed at Toulon in June, 1793, and, embracing the stronger side in his own interest, he soon issued a pamphlet, in the cause of the 'Mountain' or extreme revolutionists, against the falling Girondins. In the attack on Avignon, held by the opponents of the Convention, in July, 1793, Bonaparte commanded the artillery, and became intimate with the younger Robespierre, one of the 'Representatives in Mission' of the Convention. In August he marched with Carteaux, the Convention's general, into Marseilles. In October he was before Toulon, and his services during the siege made him a marked man. The veteran Dugommier wrote: 'Among those who distinguished themselves most, and who most aided me to rally the troops and pushed them forward, are Citizens Buona Parte, etc.' On April 5th, 1794, when he had joined the 'Army of Italy' as general of artillery and inspector-general, the younger Robespierre describes him in a letter as 'of transcendent merit.' Marmont writes of him as one who 'had acquired an ascendancy over the representatives which it is impossible to describe.' On July 28th, 1794, the younger Robespierre died on the scaffold in Paris with his famous brother. Bonaparte, on August 6th, was placed under arrest and imprisoned at Fort Carré, near Antibes. A fortnight later he was set free on the ground of 'the possible utility of the military and local knowledge of the said Bonaparte.' Marmont declares that his escape from being sent to Paris to share the fate of the Robespierres was due to the favour of the Corsican Salicetti (then one of the Convention's 'Representatives' with the army in Italy) and to other powerful help which Bonaparte succeeded in procuring. His power of attaching followers is shown in the fact that Junot and Marmont, who had made his acquaintance at Toulon, formed a plan, in case Bonaparte were ordered to be sent to Paris, for freeing him by killing the *gens d'armes* and carrying him into Genoese territory. It is in reference to this time that Marmont wrote of the young commander: 'there was so much future in his mind.'

In March, 1795, the coming man made a failure in a maritime expedition to recover Corsica from the English. He embarked with his brother Louis, Marmont, and others on the brig *Amitié*, one of a fleet which sailed on March 11th. The squadron fell in with the English, lost two ships, and returned in discomfiture. His return to Paris from Marseilles in May, 1795, was that of a man who felt that all previous credit was lost. In the topographical section of the War Office he furnished strategical plans for the conduct of the war in Italy. In August of the same year we

find him applying for a commission from government to go to Constantinople at the head of a party of artilleryists in order to reform that part of the Turkish service. In making this application, he sends in a testimonial from an official superior describing him as 'a citizen who may be usefully employed, whether in the artillery or in any other arm, and even in the department of foreign affairs.' He did not go to Constantinople. The time was to come when the fate of Turkey, not of her artillery only, was in the hollow of his hand, if he had chosen to urge Russia to conquest in Southern Europe.

On October 5th (13th *Vendémiaire*) the revolt of the Paris 'Sections' was suppressed. On February 23rd, 1796, 'General Bonaparte' is appointed by the Directory to command the 'Army of Italy.' On March 9th the lonely Corsican, destitute of connections in Paris or in France, marries Josephine de Beauharnois, prominent in Parisian society for her grace, tact, taste in dress, and sweet disposition. Two days later he starts for Italy, and his great career before the world begins.

THE PROJECTED INVASION OF ENGLAND.

Bourrienne, in chapters xix. and xxi. of this work, represents the great gathering of forces at Boulogne as a device to draw the attention of Europe in that direction, with the view of deceiving the Continental powers against whom the army was to be employed. It is difficult to believe that the vast expense incurred in naval, as well as in military, preparations for a descent upon England was wasted for a needless show. It is certain that Napoleon seriously intended an invasion of England. He had, however, as Sir John Seeley has remarked, 'always two strings to his bow.' When circumstances occurred to baffle one plan, he had another in reserve. He could not cross the Channel, so he marched for Bavaria. He could not hope to land in England, so he shattered her great coalition at Austerlitz. The invasion of this country was, beyond doubt, a real project in the mind of Napoleon. When the Peace of Amiens was broken in 1803, the descent upon our shores was planned, and every effort was made to rouse France for the undertaking. The 'Bayeux Tapestry,' setting forth incidents prior to and connected with the landing of William the Conqueror, was taken from its resting-place in the Hôtel de Ville of that town, sent about from place to place, and hanged up for view in the theatres. On every French and Flemish river, from the Gironde to the Rhine, flat-bottomed boats were building for the transport of an invading host across the narrow sea. One French department, the *Upper Rhine*, built a ship of war to bear its own name; another (*Côte d'Or*) furnished a hundred cannon. A hundred and fifty thousand men were assembled at Boulogne, with thirteen hundred

vessels for their transport, and by constant practice the troops became so expert that a hundred thousand men could be embarked in about forty minutes. The army was organised in six corps, with Ney, Soult, and Davoust, three of the ablest and most daring of the famous band of 'Marshals,' among the leaders.

In the summer and autumn of 1805 the peril of invasion reached its height for Great Britain. The whole fleets of Spain and Holland were at the disposal of Napoleon, and an armada of seventy sail of line-of-battle ships was to force the passage of the Channel. On July 20th, 1804, Napoleon had joined the army on the coast, and he wrote to his admiral at Toulon, Latouche Treville, who alone knew all his plans: 'Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours, and we are masters of the world.' A medal to commemorate the conquest was actually struck by the French Mint, bearing the words '*Frappe à Londres*,' and many of those made are still to be seen in collections. A lofty pillar was erected inland, some miles from Boulogne, in celebration of an event which never 'came off.' This ridiculous monument is still an object of amusement to British visitors. When all was ready, on August 20th, Latouche Treville died, and the expedition was put off. Napoleon then made a fatal mistake in choosing the wrong man for a command of supreme importance to his enterprise. The weakness of Admiral Villeneuve, Treville's successor at Toulon, ultimately ruined the plan for the invasion of England.

In the spring of 1805 Napoleon was again preparing for the attempt. Nelson had, for nearly two years, been blockading the enemy's ships in Toulon. On March 31st, 1805, when the British fleet was kept away from her station off the French port by contrary winds, Villeneuve put to sea with his squadron, and on April 8th he passed through the Straits of Gibraltar *en route* for the West Indies. Foul winds prevented Nelson from reaching Gibraltar until April 30th, and not until May 5th did an easterly breeze enable him to start westwards in pursuit. The French admiral had thus the advantage of nearly four weeks' start. Villeneuve, on reaching the West Indies, 'doubled back' for Europe, and steered for Ferrol, on the north-west coast of Spain, there to join the Spanish fleet. Nelson had, meanwhile, sent off, from the West Indies, swift ships to England, with news of his having missed the French, and Sir Robert Calder was on the look-out for Villeneuve. An indecisive action was fought off Cape Finisterre on July 22nd, and the French commander went to Corunna and Ferrol. There he found pressing orders from Napoleon to hasten to Brest, and thence to the Channel, with his fleet, now of twenty-nine sail of the line.

At this juncture it was the name and fame of Nelson, the hero of the Nile and of Copenhagen, that saved England from invasion. Villeneuve's heart failed him at the bare thought of encountering Nelson, who was really at Gibraltar. and he sailed for Cadiz. He

reached that port on the very day when Napoleon looked for his arrival at Brest. Every man of the great host was ready to embark on the flotilla of small vessels at Boulogne. Day after day Napoleon stood on the cliffs, watching for Villeneuve's vessels. Staff-officers were posted at signal-stations all along the coast to the west, to give warning of his approach, so that the army might instantly embark. Villeneuve was, in fact, blockaded in Cadiz by Collingwood ; and Napoleon, with a last gaze of baffled rage at the British coast, hurled his vast forces, vainly gathered at Boulogne, against Pitt's Continental coalition. While he led them to his crowning victory at Austerlitz on December 2nd, Nelson had, at Trafalgar, on October 21st, finally secured England against the very thought of French invasion.

BOURRIENNE AND HIS BOOK.

Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne, French diplomatist and deputy, was born at Sens in July, 1769, about a month before his future illustrious patron and master. Just prior to the French Revolution, failing, from lack of noble birth, to obtain a commission in the royal army, Bourrienne went, to complete his education, to Vienna and Leipsic. With a view to the diplomatic career, he studied law and foreign languages, and, after visiting Prussia and Poland, he returned to France early in 1792. He soon returned to Germany, as secretary to the French legation at Stuttgart, the capital of Wirtemberg. When the French republic was proclaimed, the government of Wirtemberg did not recognise the new state, and Bourrienne retired to Leipsic, returning to France in 1794. His career from 1797 to 1815 is given by himself in this work. We may state that he does not give his readers the real cause of his rupture with Napoleon, which was one not creditable to Bourrienne's honesty in financial affairs. Count las Cases, in his *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, informs us that Napoleon spoke of his former secretary as a man of ability and resource, but of extreme greed for money.

In August, 1815, Bourrienne was elected Deputy for the Department of the Yonne, and was sent again to the Chamber in 1816, 1822, and 1824. His political attitude was that of an ultra-loyalist. In 1827, on the fall of his patron, the finance minister M. de Villèle, Bourrienne failed to be re-elected, and fled from his creditors to Belgium. After the downfall of Charles X. in 1830, Bourrienne lost his reason, and he died in February, 1834, in a *maison de santé* near Caen.

The original work, based on materials gathered by the author during several years of association with Napoleon, and at a later time, was written in Belgium, during his exile from 1827 to 1830. The author informs us, in his 'advertisement' to the original,

that during his time of retirement from active life, he was constantly questioned concerning Napoleon, and that his hearers generally ended by saying : ' You ought by all means to write your memoirs.' The author did not conceive that the right time for publication had arrived until after the death of Napoleon. The book was written, as above, in Belgium, at Fontaine l'Évêque, near Charleroi, the seat of Mme. la Duchesse de Brancas, whose kindness provided Bourrienne with a quiet retreat for the purpose of arranging and correcting his very extensive materials. The *Mémoires* were edited, in Bourrienne's name, by M. de Villemarest, and first appeared in ten octavo volumes in 1829-31, being published at Paris.

One of the many amusing passages in these lively *Mémoires*, as here reproduced in an abridged form, runs somewhat thus :

Napoleon.—' Well, Bourrienne, you too will be immortal.'

Bourrienne.—' Why, General?'

Napoleon.—' Are you not my secretary?'

Bourrienne.—' Tell me the name of Alexander's.'

' A good hit !' cries Napoleon.

We may assume that the author does justice, in general, to the talents and genius of the great man with whom his name will be ever associated. Whenever, in fact, Bourrienne is not writing of himself, and has no need, in his own interests, of either falsification or suppression, his memoirs are of real historical value, and contain many true and curious details which, without his work, must have been lost to the world. The book was a great success with the public, and has become a ' classic' in the vast Napoleonic literature. Editions were published in English in 1830 (in two separate translations), 1831, 1836, and 1848, all these appearing in London. The abridged English edition of 1836, as here reproduced, is by far the best in this form. In 1852-4 an edition appeared in Glasgow, London, and New York ; in 1869 another was published, and yet another in 1885, both in London.

THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.

In the pages of Bourrienne, Napoleon's first wife appears generally in an attractive way, as a good genius to whose advice he would have done well to pay heed. Marie Rose Tascher de la Pagerie was born on June 23rd, 1763, in the island of Martinique. Her father was ' captain of the port' at St. Pierre, the chief town, destroyed by the fearful eruption, in May, 1902, of the adjacent Mont Pelée. She had the scanty colonial education of a French creole in that age ; but she was attractive from her mental and moral character, as well as from her graceful manners and beauty. In her sixteenth year she went with her father to France, and was married, in December, 1779, to Viscomte Alexandre Beauharnois, born in 1760 of an old French family in Martinique. He served.

under Rochambeau, in the American war of independence against Great Britain. In 1789 he was an ardent supporter of the popular cause, and became a member of the military committee. He lost favour by defending the conduct of General Bouillé in his vigorous suppression of the insurrection at Nancy. In July, 1794, he was executed on a false charge of having brought about the surrender of Mainz (Mayence) by inactivity in the field. Josephine, for the crime of being his wife, had a narrow escape, being saved, when she was on the 'list of proscription,' only by the fact that her state of prostration, due to her husband's fate, was such that she could not be removed from prison. On the fall of Robespierre, she was liberated through the influence of Tallien, and she recovered, by the help of Barras, a portion of her husband's property.

It is remarkable that in the 'act of marriage,' on her union with Bonaparte, he is declared to have been born in 1768 instead of 1769, and she in 1767 instead of 1763. It was, of course, a device to bring them nearer together in age. It may be noted that, as mother of Hortense, Queen of Holland, Josephine was grandmother of Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III.), Emperor of the French.

During her life with her more famous husband, she exercised a benevolent influence in favour of many *émigrés*, and at the time of the Pichegru and Georges Cadoudal conspiracy, she saved by her intercession the lives of Rivière and of Armand de Polignac. After the divorce, Josephine retired to her beautiful seat of Malmaison, with the title of 'empress-queen-dowager,' and was followed by the love of the French people. The Emperor Alexander I. showed his respect for her virtues by repeated visits. She felt severely the first downfall of Napoleon, with whom she had continued to correspond, and on May 29th, 1814, she died at Malmaison.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

There is only one reference, in Bourrienne's pages, to Napoleon's greatest and final antagonist, to which we need advert. On p. 386 we find these words: 'At Talavera commenced the European reputation of a man who, perhaps, would not have been without some glory, even had less pains been taken to build him up a fabric of renown.' We can scarcely expect a Frenchman to do complete justice to Wellington, but the above comment is certainly exquisite concerning one who beat nearly all Napoleon's best marshals in the Peninsula, and ended his military career by foiling, with a far inferior force as to quality, all Napoleon's efforts for many hours at Waterloo. It is, moreover, rather ungrateful of Bourrienne to sneer at the man who did far more than any other single personage to bring about the return of the Bourbons, of whom Bourrienne became so devoted an adherent, and to whom he owed office and pay.

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